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Abstract
This thesis examines the origins, direction and control of German 
Radio's Irish propaganda unit in World War II. Known as the Irland- 
Redaktion, this unit was founded by a small group of Germans, some of whom 
had studied Irish folklore and language in the Gaeltacht regions in the 
192 0s and 193 0s.
Drawing widely on archival sources in Belgium, Britain, Germany, Ireland 
and the United States - as well as incorporating interviews with key 
survivors of the Irland-Redaktion - the thesis attempts to define the 
structures, modus operandi and raison d'être of the radio service.
A detailed analysis, quoting numerous published and unpublished sources, 
seeks to place the output of the Irland-Redaktion in context by evaluating 
its structures and content, personnel and target audiences, in addition to 
its guiding themes and ascertainable effects.
The work endeavours to explore those features of the Irland-Redaktion 
which, it can be argued, set it apart from other propaganda services of 
Germany's wartime Europasender. These include the fact that overall control 
of the service from November 1941 to May 1945 rested with a member of the 
Irish civil service who had left Dublin for Berlin shortly before the 
outbreak of war.
The thesis also examines the special position of Ireland as a target for 
both English-language and Irish-language radio propaganda from Nazi 
Germany. While German Radio beamed programmes in 3 0 languages to other 
states and regions in Europe, Ireland's case was unusual. The newly 
independent state straddled the Atlantic shipping lanes and shared a 
disputed land frontier with the United Kingdom which was at war with 
Germany. The thesis seeks to place these and other factors in their proper 
context in relation to the radio service.
Finally, having dealt with the pre-war and war periods, the thesis 
describes the subsequent circumstances of those most directly involved in 
the operation of the Irland-Redaktion, through the immediate post-war years 
to the present day.
Foreword
The idea for this work, H i t l e r ' s  I r i s h  V o i c e s , first occurred to me in 
the late 198 0s while I was teaching in England on a postgraduate diploma 
course in radio journalism. I had planned to write about the work of 
William Joyce (Lord Haw Haw) and other 'renegade' broadcasters whose voices 
graced the airwaves from wartime Berlin. My plans were encouraged by a 
director of the college where I taught, one Gerard Mansell, better known as 
the former Deputy Director General of the BBC and head of BBC Radio's 
External Services. I also received encouragement from two other BBC men, 
Blair Thomson, one time Editor of BBC Radio's flagship current affairs 
programme The W o r ld  T o n i g h t , and David Smeeton, a former BBC correspondent 
in Germany.
In 1989 I returned to Ireland as a journalist employed in the newsroom 
of C e n t u r y  FM, the new national radio station. The heavy workload put paid 
to the Lord Haw Haw project. However, the idea was destined to resurface in 
another form following discussions with Century FM's Head of News, Mr David 
Davin-Power, and two acknowledged experts on Ireland in the 1939-45 period: 
Lt. Col. (retd.) John P. Duggan, author of N e u t r a l  I r e l a n d  a n d  t h e  T h i r d  
R e i c h , and the journalist Robert Fisk, author of I n  Tim e o f  War. It was on 
a visit to the Military Archive in Dublin's Cathal Brugha barracks, while 
reading through the transcripts of Francis Stuart's wartime broadcasts from 
Berlin, that I decided to focus my research on the Irish dimension of 
Germany's wartime radio propaganda effort rather than the English service 
as personified by William Joyce. This project was actually more attractive 
because, while a number of books had already been written on Haw Haw, 
little research had been undertaken on German Radio's wartime Irish 
service, the mysterious Irland-Redaktion. Fisk's I n  T im e o f  War is the sole 
publication to have dealt with the radio operation in any detail. In a 
chapter spanning just 27 pages of a work devoted to 'Ireland, Ulster and 
the price of neutrality', Fisk briefly addresses some of the radio talks by 
Francis Stuart, Hans Hartmann and John O'Reilly. For its part, Maurice 
Gorham's F o r t y  Y e a r s  o f  I r i s h  B r o a d c a s t i n g , covering the period from 1926 
to 1966, devotes only 19 pages out of 336 to the 1939-45 'Emergency' 
period.
It seemed that the time was ripe for the history of the Irland-Redaktion
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to be written. This was all the more so because, while wartime archives 
were becoming more accessible with the passage of almost half a century, 
some key personnel of the Irish service were alive and well, and willing to 
tell the tale. Even so, I approached the project with some initial 
apprehension. One of the first people with whom I discussed it was the 
veteran newspaper editor Liam Bergin. He greeted me at the door of his home 
in Dalkey with the words: 'A journalist is always welcome in my house.' Mr
Bergin, who died in January 1994, told me all he knew of the period as well 
as pointing me in the right direction with some invaluable addresses in 
Germany.
In fact, my research was to take me not only to Germany but also Belgium 
and many parts of Britain and Ireland. I was assembling a jigsaw the pieces 
of which had been scattered to the four winds with the collapse of the 
Third Reich in May 1945. My task was not made easier by the fact that 
transcripts of the Irland-Redaktion's programmes are incomplete and not a 
single sound recording of the service's output appears to have survived.
The story could never have been told adequately without the help of key 
members of the Irland-Redaktion. These include the head (from December 1941 
to May 1945) of the service, Dr Hans Hartmann. In December 1990 I met Dr 
Hartmann at his home in Cologne where, for the first time in almost half a 
century, he agreed to discuss the origins and operation of the service.
Also of major assistance in compiling the study was the Irish writer, 
Francis Stuart, who granted me several interviews at his home in Dundrum. 
Stuart broadcast for Hartmann's service for almost two years from March 
1942 to January 1944. Dr Hartmann's former assistant in the radio service, 
Dr Hilde Spickernagel, who now lives in retirement in Hanover, wrote many 
letters to me detailing aspects of the Irland-Redaktion as well as the 
Irish Desk at the Berlin Foreign Office where she also worked with 
Ribbentrop's main Irish expert, Dr Adolf Mahr. Another survivor of the 
Irish service, Nora 0'Mara (also known as Roisin Ni Mheara), who lives near 
Berlin, was reluctant to discuss her role in detail. Nonetheless, some 
useful historical details are contained in her memoirs which were published 
in 1992.
Needless to say, the author is most grateful to the above for their 
help, without which this study would have been unavoidably superficial. 
Thanks are also due to Adolf Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig of
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Gelnhausen, and Mahr1 s son, Dr Gustav Mahr of Berlin who, like his late 
father, is an archaeologist of note. The daughter of the late Charles 
Budina, Mrs Joan Medcalf, and the daughter of the late Colonel Fritz Brase, 
Miss Mona Brase, rendered valuable assistance for the completion of this 
work as did Mr Edward Sweney, brother of Irland-Redaktion member Mrs Susan 
Hilton.
The author also wishes to thank the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr Gerard Collins TD, MEP, and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr Noel Dorr, who arranged for hitherto restricted documents to be 
made available for this study. These files detail the then Department of 
External Affairs' protests to Germany concerning wartime broadcasts from 
Berlin by Francis Stuart.
The following persons who either heard the wartime broadcasts or worked 
before, during or after the war with Professor Mühlhausen or Dr Hartmann,
provided detailed recollections to the author: Sean 0 Súilleabháin, Dublin;
Sean Ö Heochaidh, Donegal; Hugh Byrne, Donegal; Professor Tomás de 
Bháldraithe, Dublin; Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin; Eimear Ö 
Broin, Dublin; the late Dr Joseph Raftery, Dublin (a former director of the 
National Museum, Dublin); Miss Eileen Walsh, Dublin (secretary to Charles 
Bewley and later to William Warnock at the Irish legation in Berlin, 1933- 
43); Mr Maurice Irvine, the last surviving member of the BBC's wartime team 
of Gaelic monitors; Mr Vova Rubinstein and Miss Lorna Swire, both wartime 
monitors with the BBC.
The author is grateful for help and information received from the 
following experts in the field of Irish-German relations in the 193 0s and 
1940s: Lt. Col. (retd.) John P. Duggan; Professor Thomas P. O'Neill,
Dublin; and Enno Stephan author of S p i e s  i n  I r e l a n d  a book which did much 
to explain German-Irish links in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the more
clandestine connections between both countries in the 193 9-1945 period.
German military documents relating to an invasion of Ireland (Operation 
Green) were made available to the author by Monsieur de Winter, Directeur, 
Institut Géographique National, Brussels, through the good offices of 
Monsieur Emmanuel de Beer de Laer, Directeur (retd.), Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères, Brussels, who also helped the author to trace details 
of the wartime operations of Radio Luxembourg.
The author wishes to acknowledge the help, encouragement and endless
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patience of Dr Colum Kenny of Dublin City University who supervised the 
thesis from its earliest stage. Others who kindly gave of their time to 
read the draft document, and whose help the author wishes to acknowledge, 
include: Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne; Dr Eunan O'Halpin of Dublin City 
University; the historian and author Mr Donal O'Donovan of Kilbride Books, 
County Wicklow; and Mr Thomas Turpin of Trinity College, Dublin.
The bulk of the archival material used in this thesis came from the 
Irish Army's Military Archive whose director, Commandant Peter Young, and 
staff provided the author with much valuable assistance over a number of 
years. Other archives containing transcripts of the Irland-Redaktion's 
programmes and details of its staff are to be found at the BBC's Written 
Archives Centre in Reading, Berkshire; the Imperial War Museum in London, 
and the Public Record Offices in Belfast, Chancery Lane and Kew. The 
assistance of the following is acknowledged: Dr Pat Wallace, director of 
the National Museum, Dublin; the director of the National Library, Dublin; 
the directors of the aforementioned Public Record Offices in Britain and 
Northern Ireland; and the director of the National Archive in Dublin where 
career records of the Irland-Redaktion broadcaster, John F. O'Reilly, are 
held. The author also acknowledges the help of the BBC's Written Archives 
Officer, Jacqueline Kavanagh, in tracing details of the Corporation's 
wartime Gaelic monitors. The author also wishes to thank the staff of the 
Lord Chancellor's Department in London which holds records on British 
subjects who worked for Germany's wartime radio services. Other key records 
were found at the German Foreign Ministry's political archive in Bonn, the 
U.S. Embassy's Berlin Document Center, and the Bundesarchiv bureau in 
Potsdam.
A number of specialised reference books covering broadcasting in Germany 
during the period of Nazi rule from 1933 to 1945 were provided by the 
Goethe Institute in Dublin whose library staff, Carola Hogreve and Monika 
Schlenger, the author wishes to thank. Translations of German texts were 
undertaken by Andrea Kunze-Galt, Christine Schuhmann, Deirdre Humphreys and 
Ursula Kopetschek. The author is grateful to the former and likewise to the 
following for their help with translations of Irish language material used 
in this thesis: Mr Eoghan 0 hAnluain of the Department of Modern Irish, 
University College Dublin; the broadcaster and translator Mr Sean 0 Briain, 
Dublin; and broadcasters John Walsh and Darina Ni Chinneide. The assistance
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of the following persons is also much appreciated: Art O'Leary, Journal 
Office, Leinster House; Maura Corcoran, Librarian of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas, and her staff including Dr Pat Melvin, Seamus Haughey and Maedhbh 
McNamara; Dr Seamus Mac Mathuna, University College Galway; Professor Conn R. 
0 Cleirigh, UCD; Professor F.J. Byrne, UCD; Mr Tomas 0 Cathasaigh, UCD; Mr 
Tony Eklof, UCD Law Library; Fr Ignatius, Director of the Franciscan Library, 
Killiney, Co Dublin; Mr Mark Farrell, researcher; Mr Nicholas Carolan, 
Administrator of the Irish Traditional Music Archive, Dublin; Valerie Walsh, 
Dublin City University Library; and Mr Jim Brady, Dublin.
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Introduction
When Eamon de Valera and his government colleagues gathered round the 
cabinet table in Dublin at 11 a.m. on 17 July 1934, they were faced with an 
agenda comprising four apparently mundane matters: the final item concerned 
the appointment of a new director of the National Museum which stood just a 
stone's throw from where the ministers were sitting in cabinet. The minutes 
of their meeting do not detail the discussions that took place round the 
table. All that remains on record is the formal cabinet decision which 
reads as follows:
National Museum: appointment of Director. The appointment by the
Minister for Education of Dr Adolf Mahr as Director of the National
Museum was approved. The meeting adjourned at 1.4 0 p.m.1
Whether they knew it at the time or not, de Valera's government had 
formally promoted a stalwart member of Hitler's Nazi party to a senior, 
permanent and pensionable position in the Irish civil service.
Adolf Mahr, the Austrian born archaeologist and expert in prehistory, 
who had come to Ireland to work at the National Museum in 1927 at the age 
of 40, had been a card-carrying member of the Nazi party since 1 April 
1933, just two months after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.2 After 
joining the Nazis, Mahr had been put in charge of the Irish branch of the 
influential Nazi Foreign Organisation (Auslandsorganisation or AO). The AO 
was created in 1934 to keep an eye on German communities outside the 
Fatherland. As local head of the AO, Adolf Mahr was the most powerful 
member of the small Austro-German community in pre-war Ireland. All 
visiting Germans had to report to him, and he amply demonstrated that his 
powers outstripped those of the German Legation's personnel in Dublin by 
getting two German diplomats recalled to Berlin in disgrace during the 
1930s.3
A secret profile on Mahr, drawn up for de Valera in 1945, described the 
Austrian museum director as
1
an open and blatant Nazi [who] made many efforts to convert Irish 
graduates and other persons with whom he had associations, to Nazi 
doctrines and beliefs.4
Damning as this assessment of Mahr is, it appears that no security 
profile of Mahr was sought by the Irish cabinet prior to their 1934 
decision to promote him to the top museum job. However, Mahr1s extra­
curricular activities in Ireland make clear that from 1933 to 1939, when he 
left for Berlin, the Austrian's principal allegiances lay not to the 
country of which he was a senior civil servant, but to Hitler's Third 
Reich. As Director of the National Museum, Mahr was in a key position to 
travel the country and assess the political climate of a newly independent 
state whose sentiments were far from pro-British. Mahr got to know his host 
country well. Visitors to his Dublin home at 37 Waterloo Place included the 
photographer, Joachim Gerstenberg, and the leading Celtologist and amateur 
photographer, Ludwig Mühlhausen, who had joined the Nazi party in 1932.
Both men took hundreds of photographs around Ireland, and some of 
Mühlhausen's pictures later appeared in a German military handbook prepared 
to assist a top secret invasion of Ireland codenamed Operation Green. There 
is also evidence that, in the late 193 0s, Adolf Mahr was supplying 
sensitive military information to a war maps office run by the SS in 
Prague.5
On 19 July 193 9, Mahr left Ireland for the last time. Plans for his 
departure had been laid as early as December 1938 when a senior AO director 
visited Dublin to nominate another German, Heinz Mecking, as Mahr's 
eventual successor as local AO chief in the Irish capital. Mahr was going 
officially to represent his adopted country at an international archaeology 
congress in Berlin that August. He also intended holidaying in his native 
Tyrol region as well as attending the Nazi Party rally planned for 
Nuremberg in September - the annual rallying point for leading Nazis. But 
the 1939 rally never took place due to the outbreak of World War II at the 
beginning of September.
After the devastating war which destroyed the Third Reich, Mahr claimed 
that he tried unsuccessfully to return to Ireland in 1939. However, after 
the outbreak of war, he was recruited for government service in Berlin. The 
war brought a swift transformation for the Austrian archaeologist who had
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spent the previous 12 years at the National Museum in Dublin. Mahr was put 
to work in the Irish section of the German Foreign Office which, among 
other things, tried, in August 1940, to land IRA leader Sean Russell in 
Kerry from a U-boat. Mahr also worked at the top secret black propaganda 
unit called Büro Concordia, as well as launching, in 1941, a new nightly 
radio service for Irish listeners. In addition, he drew up a top secret 
radio propaganda blueprint for Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop aimed at 
converting Irish communities around the world to the Nazi cause.®
From the outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 193 9, radio 
propaganda had a high priority in the capital of the Third Reich. So intent 
was the Nazi leadership on making sure that its message got through, not 
only to its opponents but also to neutrals and minorities within states, 
that by the summer of 1940 Germany's national broadcasting company (the 
Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft or RRG) was putting out programmes in 31 
languages.7 These included the three Baltic tongues of Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia, the language of the Faeroe Islands, in addition to Icelandic, 
Flemish and Irish. Berlin's weekly radio talks in Irish were inaugurated in 
December 1939 by the noted Celtic scholar, Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen, who 
had studied the language on various trips to Ireland from the late 192 0s to 
1937. From 1939 to mid-1941 German radio propaganda to Ireland comprised 
first weekly then twice-weekly talks in Irish by Mühlhausen and his 
academic protégé, Hans Hartmann, who had spent two and a half years 
studying Irish dialects and folklore in Ireland from April 1937 to 
September 1939.
The initial impetus for this limited service had come from Joseph 
Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry but the arrangement was considered 
unsatisfactory by Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office. Although he never 
broadcast himself, Mahr's role in shaping the Irish service was central. In 
March 1941 he drew up a blueprint for an extended radio propaganda service 
to Ireland. Once his proposals had received the official backing of the 
Foreign Ministry, Mahr set out to improve both the quality and quantity of 
the Irish service. In the wake of nightly test transmissions at the end of 
August, Mahr attended a planning meeting of the new 'Irish' team in Berlin 
on 8 September 1941. The meeting was also attended by Wolfgang Dignowity, 
who had already been chosen by the Propaganda Ministry as head of the 
Irland-Redaktion; by James Blair, an English journalist; and by Hilde
3
Poepping, a Berlin University graduate who worked with Mahr at the Foreign 
Office during the second half of 1941. The day after the meeting, Mahr 
wrote to his Foreign Office superiors exposing the fact that the man 
nominated by the Propaganda Ministry as head of the service, namely 
Dignowity, knew little or nothing about Ireland, was a Goebbels appointee, 
and had picked a non-Irish team for the Irish service. In November 1941, as 
a result of Mahr's protest, Dignowity was removed as head of the service 
together with two Frenchmen he had recruited. Shortly before Christmas
_ O1941, Hans Hartmann was installed in Dignowity1s place. A team was then 
assembled by Hartmann, at Mahr's behest, to put out the new nightly radio 
service from Berlin to Ireland. It included, most notably, the Irish writer 
Francis Stuart, whose first broadcast was made on 17 March 1942. None of 
its members was to become very familiar to radio listeners. The chief 
announcer for the England-Redaktion, William Joyce - who did become a 
household name in Britain and Ireland - never worked for the Irland- 
Redaktion. Joyce did offer 'to speak [on the Irland-Redaktion] to his Irish 
followers' but was turned down by Hartmann who believes that in 1943 Joyce 
may have been behind a series of anti-semitic radio talks to Ireland which
Qwere given under the name of Patrick Joseph Cadogan.
Back in Dublin in the early 1940s, de Valera may have come to regret 
playing host to, and promoting, Adolf Mahr. At the end of 1942, one of 
Mahr's broadcasters, Francis Stuart, praised an IRA leader and, some months 
later, began to advise voters in the run up to the general election of June 
1943. De Valera complained formally to Berlin about unwarranted German 
interference in Ireland's internal affairs.10 But by mid-1943 Berlin had 
other things on its mind than the far off protests of a small neutral state 
like Ireland. Adolf Mahr was firmly in control of the Irish desk at the 
Foreign Office, and the authorities in Dublin could only listen in growing 
distain as the propaganda machine run by a senior member of the Irish Civil 
Service swung into action every night from Berlin.
Berlin's Irish broadcasts were seen by Dublin as an intrusion and had 
the potential to place de Valera in an embarrassing position. The war had 
put his neutrality policy firmly under the international spotlight. Many 
other countries had also chosen a neutral path at the outset of the war but 
few in Europe were able to maintain this position beyond mid-1940 as the 
German war machine extended its influence across the continent. In addition
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to Ireland these few neutral states were, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, 
Portugal and Turkey. On 2 September 193 9, de Valera told the Dail:
...when you have powerful states in a war of this sort, each trying to 
utilise whatever advantage it can for itself, the neutral state, if it 
is a small state, is always open to considerable pressure.11
The political environment of the war years was further complicated by 
the fact that Northern Ireland was not neutral. British, and later 
American, troops were stationed there. But, although Northern Ireland was a 
part of the United Kingdom, military conscription was never introduced 
there. Churchill felt it would be 'more trouble than it is worth to enforce 
such a policy' in the North. Dublin's neutrality policy meant that German 
and Italian legations could function alongside a British diplomatic mission 
although the parties were at war on the European battlefronts.
Underlining the importance the Germans attached to Ireland's neutral 
stance, Hans Hartmann regularly signed off his Irish language broadcasts 
from Berlin with the words 'Coinnigh bhur neodracht' (keep your 
neutrality). As Hartmann pointed out after the war, Irish neutrality 'was a 
part of the war aims'.13 Among other German considerations, a neutral 
Ireland could not be expected to hand back the westerly ports of Berehaven, 
Cobh and Lough Swilly to Britain which had relinquished control of them in 
1938.14
So it was that in 193 9 the curtain rose on a radio propaganda war that 
would affect neutral and belligerent states alike. The situation was in 
stark contrast to friendlier pre-war times when, for example, the BBC 
Y e a r b o o k of 1932 contained a fraternal message from the director of the 
German Broadcasting Company, D.H. Giesecke, reviewing the progress of his 
country's fledgling wireless service.15 Almost ten year's earlier, in 
November 1922, the BBC's 2L0 transmitter in London had started up and 
German radio had come on air the following year. In Ireland the BBC's 
Belfast transmitter 2BE went into service in September 1924. and Dublin's 
2RN station began broadcasting on New Year's Day 192616 with a speech by Dr 
Douglas Hyde, 'founder of the Gaelic League, the most respected figure in
i nthe Irish language movement, and later President of Ireland'.
In his article for the BBC Yearbook of 1932, Giesecke proudly spelled
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out for his British readers the achievements of German Radio in the period 
from 1923-31. The article was illustrated with a fine aerial photograph of 
Berlin's custom-built radio centre, the Rundfunkhaus. Just seven years 
later, from the same building, Hitler's best known English-language 
propagandist, William Joyce, would spread disquiet among Britain's civilian 
population with forecasts of imminent Luftwaffe bombing raids. A diagram of 
the Reich's broadcasting stations, which appeared alongside Giesecke's 
article, showed the extent of radio cover in Germany at that time. From 
Berlin, which would shortly become the centre of the Nazi empire, the 
transmission system stretched out to Aachen on the Belgian border, Freiburg 
on the French and Swiss borders, north to Flensburg on the Danish border, 
south to Munich, and east to Königsberg serving East Prussia. In the early 
1930s German Radio seemed to have no limit to its horizons. A performance 
of Wagner's opera T r i s t a n , recorded at the Bayreuth summer festival in 
1931, was rebroadcast by 200 stations in three continents.
Anxious no doubt to forestall British claims that Germany might be 
lagging behind the BBC, having started transmissions a year later than 
London, Giesecke wrote:
The invention of wireless telephony did not, in Germany, lead at once to 
the introduction of broadcasting; the political and economic situation 
at the time pointed to the necessity of placing this new gift first of 
all - in the form of a system of wireless communication - at the service 
of trade and commerce. Only when the utilisation of wireless telephony 
for economic purposes had been sufficiently secured was it possible to 
liberate some wavelengths for broadcasting.
Germany's Radio Director thus made it clear that the new 'gift' was to 
benefit the political and business community first, and the general public 
second. His choice of the word 'political' is a reminder that German Radio 
was subject to political control even before the Nazis came to power. At 
the time, each of German Radio's ten regional companies was overseen by a 
political supervisory committee.
The Nazi takeover of January 1933 set the radio agenda for the following 
12 years. With the new Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels anxious, as he 
put it, to 'boot out the old regime', by mid-1933 Germany's Broadcasting
6
The above diagram, which appeared in the BBC Yearbook of 1932, shows the extent of 
German Radio's transmission system the year before the Nazis came to power. As well as 
utilising transmitters in Germany, from mid-1940 to May 1945, the Irland-Redaktion also used 
transmitters in the Netherlands (Kootwyk and Hilversum), Norway (Oslo), Luxembourg, and 
France (Rennes and Calais).
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Commissioner, Hans Bredow, had been sacked, 136 RRG officials had been
dismissed or moved sideways, and three had reportedly committed suicide.
Goebbels appointed a former motor mechanic, Eugen Hadamowsky, as his new
18director of programmes. The changeover was stark. In late 1932, German 
Radio had broadcast a talk by Leni Riefenstahl on her film trip to 
Greenland (11 October 1932), U.S. President Roosevelt's election address 
from Washington (9 November 1932), a talk by writer Thomas Mann (10 
November 1932), and Pope Pius XI's Christmas Eve message from the Vatican 
(24 December 1932). From 30 January 1933 onwards there was national 
socialism and little else. Listeners to German Radio's domestic service
could hear a talk on the national socialist press in America by Kurt
Liidecke (3 February 1933), or a broadcast from Rome about fascism and 
national socialism by Professor Guido Bortolotto (15 February 1933) . Nazi 
radio's musical diet was dubbed 'Eine Kleine Schlachtmusik' (a little 
battle music) by BBC monitors. It typically comprised military marches and 
the Horst Wessel song, along with Richard Wagner and Beethoven, 
interspersed with speeches by Hitler, Goebbels and Goering.
One BBC wartime radio commentator notes that:
The Nazis were quick to recognise the power of the wireless, and they
made sure that not only the Fiihrer's rabble-rousing rantings but all the
cheers and drums and ecstatic descriptions of the Brownshirts' marches 
and rallies were sent throbbing into the air from every German 
broadcasting station. Without public radio, without their cunning 
exploitation of it to appeal unscrupulously to mass emotions, Hitler and 
his adherents could not have gained so swiftly and surely their 
ascendancy and backing in the Fatherland and their fatal stranglehold on
o 0the surrounding peoples.
Through the next twelve years of centralised Nazi control of the radio 
system, Roosevelt was not heard of again except when portrayed as the 
'number one enemy of peace'. Leni Riefenstahl supported the Nazi cause, and 
her films of Hitler - notably T r iu m p h  o f  t h e  W i l l - approached the level of 
deification. Thomas Mann, in exile in the United States, broadcast anti- 
Nazi talks which were relayed to European listeners by the BBC.21
Berlin's decision, in December 1939, to launch a series of weekly Irish-
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language broadcasts constituted the Nazis’ first radio propaganda drive 
aimed specifically at an Irish audience. In 1941 a second Irish propaganda 
initiative was launched from Berlin. A third and final initiative was 
attempted, unsuccessfully, in the 1943-44 period. Its aim was to reach 
Irish American listeners in the United States.
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Chapter 1 
A Nazi Radio Service For Ireland
The r a i s o n  d ' ê t r e  o f  a p r o p a g a n d a  c a m p a ig n
The origins of German Radio's wartime Irish service are to be found, 
along with the beginnings of the entire Nazi propaganda network, in the 
words of the party's founding father, Adolf Hitler. In M e in  Kampf (My 
Struggle), Hitler laid much of the blame for Germany's defeat in 1918 on 
enemy propaganda and Germany's failure to develop properly the propaganda 
weapon for its own ends :
In England...propaganda was regarded as a weapon of the first order, 
while in our country it was the last resort of unemployed politicians 
and a comfortable haven for slackers. And, as was to be expected, its 
results all in all were zero.1
Hitler also described enemy propaganda as 'seduction' under which 'the 
[German] army gradually learned to think as the enemy wanted it to'. The 
corollary was that, from the start of the Second World War, enemy, occupied 
and neutral states would gradually learn to think as Hitler's Nazi party 
wanted them to.
The Nazi party leader's determination that German war propaganda would 
not fail a second time stemmed not only from his bitter experiences as a 
corporal in the First World War but also from his work, from 1919, as head 
of propaganda with the German Workers' party which, in 1920, became the 
Nazi party.3
As chief propagandist of the new party, Hitler boasted of having 'found 
the means, not only to render [our opponents'] propaganda ineffective, but 
in the end to strike its makers with their own weapon'. In M e in  Kampf  
Hitler disclosed his admiration for 'the indefatigable and truly enormous 
propaganda work' of Marxist agitators.4
Once the Nazis came to power in 1933, it was predictable that radio 
would play a central role in their plans since Hitler has decreed that 'the 
spoken word...alone...is able to bring about really great changes...All 
great, world-shaking events have been brought about, not by written matter, 
but by the spoken word'.5 According to Shulman, Hitler 'converted radio
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into an aggressive weapon of foreign policy. By the end of the 193 0s German 
Radio was on the air over 21 hours a day, working to divide, confuse, and 
fragment the world'.6
For Hitler, 'the function of propaganda is to attract supporters...the 
supporter is made amenable to the movement by propaganda', and 'propaganda
ntries to force a doctrine on the whole people'. The Nazi leader described
Qhis own brand of propaganda as 'radical and inflammatory' and was 
unequivocal about its tasks: 'the first task of propaganda is to win people
for subsequent organisation... the second task of propaganda is the 
disruption of the existing state of affairs and the permeation of this
Qstate of affairs with the new doctrine'. Hitler also maintained that there 
was a direct correlation between the success of propaganda and the size of 
a revolutionary organisation: 'if propaganda has imbued a whole people with
an idea, the organisation can draw the consequences with a handful of 
men...the better the propaganda has worked, the smaller the organisation 
can be...and vice versa; the poorer the propaganda is, the larger the 
organisation must be'.10 Hitler saw the correct use of propaganda as 'a
1 1 ,  i otrue art' and 'a frightful [weapon] in the hand of an expert'.
Propaganda, which 'must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses', 
was too important to be left to 'any old simpleton... the most brilliant 
psychologists would have been none too good'.13
It is clear, however, from Hitler's propaganda formula that he 
considered his target audience to be closer to the simpleton model than the 
brilliant psychologist one:
It is a mistake to make propaganda many-sided...the receptivity of the 
great masses is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their 
power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence of these facts, all 
effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp 
on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands.14
In 1939, Nazi radio propaganda to foreign countries was pitched, 
according to Grandin, at a different target audience from that of communist 
radio propaganda: 'whereas the Soviet appeal [i.e. of Radio Moscow's world
service] is made principally to workers and peasants, the German radio 
seeks support abroad among bourgeois elements'.15
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But whatever the differences of approach between the Soviet and Nazi
radio systems, a link has been discerned between potential supporters of
the extreme left and extreme right on the political spectrum: 'Communism
and Fascism or Nazism although poles apart in their intellectual content
are similar in this, that both have emotional appeal to the type of
personality that takes pleasure in being submerged in a mass movement and
submitting to superior authority.'16
Given Hitler's thoughts on propaganda, it was not surprising that after
taking over as Reichkanzler on 30 January 1933 he wasted little time in
putting propaganda matters high on the agenda. Forty-three days after
coming to power, the Fiihrer established by decree his Ministry for Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Joseph Goebbels: 'It is to form the
vital contact', Dr Goebbels explained, 'between the national government, as
17the expression of the popular will, and the people themselves'.
Hitler and Goebbels are widely regarded as being among the foremost 
exponents of propaganda both in print and on the air, though on balance it 
is said that both 'believed in the primacy of the spoken over the written 
word as an instrument of thought control'. Their greatest advantage was 
the psychological condition of their audience, for the German Weimar 
government had failed to provide the leadership that would have restored 
German confidence and morale after 1918, and the German people were
X 9desperately searching for the answers to their political nightmare. True
to the policy of his master's voice, Goebbels instructed the manufacturers
to produce a people's radio set whose two valves would be powerful enough
to receive the German stations but too weak to catch much of what was said
abroad. 'The different things said by Hitler at different times could no
longer be contradicted; they would be echoed; the German masses were about
to receive the myth of national socialism. By an audible stimulus the
people were to be conditioned in the course of years as methodically as the
2 0dogs in the laboratories of Pavlov.
In practice German radio propaganda was used throughout the 193 0s to 
support Nazi policies, - in the case of the Rhineland occupation in 1935,
the Saar plebiscite in 1936, the Berlin Olympics of the same year, and the
21193 8 Anschluss - the annexation of Austria.
That Nazi radio would in time turn its attentions outwards to the rest 
of Europe and the world was never in doubt. In 1933, the new Nazi director
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of the German Broadcasting system, Eugen Hadamowsky, termed radio a 'sharp 
and reliable weapon'. He ensured that 'high-powered stations were
concentrated on the frontiers - Königsberg for Poland; Hamburg and Bremen
2 2for England; Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Saarbrücken for France'. The 
Sudetenland crisis of March 1939 sparked the use of foreign language news 
services by German radio to large and small states alike. Among the smaller 
states targetted by Nazi radio were Portugal, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania.23 By May 1939 German radio was also broadcasting in Norwegian, 
Danish, and Slovakian.24
By the late 193 0s the number of radio sets worldwide had grown to over 
70 million.25 In Ireland the number of radio licences issued rose sharply
in the 1930s from 50,500 in 1935 to 100,000 in 1937. The peak of licences
2 cissued in one year was reached in 1941 at 183,000. Theoretically, these 
statistics augured well for German Radio's overseas services, particularly 
once war had begun.
One effect of international radio propaganda is the influence it has on 
the standards of all communications media: 'It provides a challenge which
2 ncannot be ignored.' Britain was not slow to take up the challenge: 'One
of the characteristic features of Britain's overseas propaganda between the 
wars was that it began, almost without exception, as a direct response to 
the activities of other countries. It was thus, strictly speaking, counter-
2 Qpropagandist in the widest sense.' One study of BBC Radio's World Service 
notes that: 'Only four months after the outbreak of war the BBC had...added
seven new languages to the existing nine...By the end of 1939 broadcasting
2 9in German had been increased to one and a half hours a day'. These 
services were believed to be effective, a former BBC wartime news editor 
noting in 1970 that: 'There can be no doubt that the BBC's broadcasts to
Europe accelerated the downfall of the Nazi regime.'30
F o r m a t i o n  a n d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a p r o p a g a n d a  s e r v i c e
From December 193 9 to June 1941 Ludwig Mühlhausen was in charge of the 
German Radio's Irish service - the Irland-Redaktion. From June 1941 to 
November 1941 the service was run by Wolfgang Dignowity. Both Mühlhausen 
and Dignowity worked on behalf of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. From 
November 1941 to May 1945 the Irish service was run by Adolf Mahr and Hans 
Hartmann on behalf of Ribbentrop's Foreign Office. Throughout the war the
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service's primary, discernable objectives remained the same regardless of 
whether overall control was excercised by the Propaganda Ministry or the 
Foreign Office. These objectives were as follows:
1. to ensure that Ireland remained neutral.
2. to ensure that Irish listeners understood the Nazi message.
3. to ensure that as few people as possible sided with the Allied cause.
4. to appeal to nationalist aspirations on unity.
5. to appeal to Catholic fears of atheistic Bolshevism and Judaism.
6. to provide a familiar service that would have the potential to play a 
more important role in the event of (a) a German invasion of Fire; (b) a 
British or U.S. invasion of Fire; (c) a successful pro-German coup 
d'état against the Dublin government; (d) a German invasion of 
Britain.31
The Foreign Office's takeover of the Irish service in late 1941 mirrored 
the rivalry between Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Nazi propaganda in general 
fell victim to their power struggle, which has been described as 'a battle 
o f authorities characteristic of the Third Reich'.
Adolf Mahr and Ribbentrop insisted that the Irish service be used to 
support Ireland's independence and neutrality but at Ribbentrop's 
propaganda conference in Berlin in May 1941, which laid the groundwork for 
the launch of the nightly Irish service three months later, Ireland was 
described as a country 'standing under the yoke of Great Britain'. 
Ribbentrop appeared not to accept that, despite being nominally a member of
the Commonwealth, the Free State and later Fire had not been under the
3 3'yoke' of Britain since gaining independence in 1922.
In addition, the German Foreign Minister seems to have considered 
Scotland and Wales as being in a similar position to Ireland. Thus, one 
study of Germany's wartime propaganda to Britain remarks that:
Ribbentrop, despite his time in London [as German ambassador] and ample
opportunities to learn better, was convinced that the tyrannical English
were holding down the other races in the British Isles by force and that
these minorities were awaiting their chance of overthrowing their 
34oppressors.
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Another study maintains that clandestine Welsh and Scottish nationalist 
stations, operated by the Nazis,
were founded upon Foreign Minister Ribbentrop1s incorrect belief that 
the Scots and Welsh were awaiting the opportunity to depose their 
English overlords. Ribbentrop equated these regions with Northern 
Ireland, where the IRA advocated secession from Great Britain. It was 
beyond Ribbentrop's abilities to understand that Ireland had been an 
internal colony of Great Britain, whereas Scotland and Wales were not.35
N e u t r a l i t y  t h e  k e y  i s s u e
As war broke out in Europe, Ireland's Minister for Post and Telegraphs, 
Paddy Little, remarked that 'it is sometimes very much wiser for a small, 
neutral country to keep silent1.36 He was presumably not suggesting that 
the state radio service, Radio Eireann, should go off the air as Radio 
Luxembourg did until the Grand-Duchy was occupied by the Germans on 10 May
*5 n1940. Radio Eireann continued transmissions throughout the war years, 
though extreme care was taken to maintain a neutral line and strict
O Qcensorship, including a ban on weather forecasts, was m  force.
The wartime Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera:
insisted that neutrality was based on prudence, not cowardice; he did 
fear that Ireland might become a 'cockpit' or a 'side-show' to a German 
invasion of Britain. He also feared that if the British returned either 
by invitation or invasion they might not withdraw at the conclusion of 
the war. De Valera knew well that no policy other than neutrality was
■5 Qpolitically possible.
De Valera believed that it would have been 'suicide' to abandon 
neutrality. There were some who 'appreciated that Irish neutrality might 
even be the best possible policy from the Allied viewpoint'.40 But it 
suited the Axis too. From December 193 9 onwards through the war, German 
Radio's Irish service praised and supported de Valera's policy of 
neutrality. Irish neutrality, according to one wartime head of the Irland- 
Redaktion, was considered important in Berlin because:
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It was a part of the war aims. One can start from the assumption that 
Hitler did not actually want to attack England. He favoured a solution, 
or a distribution of the world, leaving the east to him and the seas and 
the west to England and America. Then, when de Valera declared his 
neutrality, Hitler said to himself that that was the best thing for him 
too. He really wanted to respect Ireland's neutrality if Ireland was not 
foolish enough to make some move to make that difficult for him; to 
force him into another attitude. Irish neutrality was really one of the 
objectives which was in conformity with German policies.41
Although Hans Hartmann would claim after the war that there had been 'no 
danger of a German invasion' of Ireland, the threat of German military 
action in the event of Ireland's abandoning its neutrality policy was first 
made by Hartmann in a broadcast from Berlin on 28 December 1941 when he 
remarked that
The fine edifice of the Republic would collapse immediately if the Irish 
government did not succeed in avoiding war and maintaining neutrality.
In addition, it is likely that in such a case the war would be fought on 
Irish soil despite the long-standing friendship between Germany and 
Ireland. This means that there is no other course open to the Irish 
people, if they have sense and do not wish to commit suicide, but to 
defend their neutrality at any cost...I should not like to see Ireland 
completely destroyed and to see everything achieved after the last war 
brought to nothing again.42
Hartmann's threat may have lent weight to the Taoiseach's fears, as
'what in particular terrified de Valera was the prospect of a German
invasion of nationalist areas north of the border'.43 Alarm at Germany's
success coupled with fear of a German invasion and a German/IRA link-up,
prompted de Valera to sanction top level discussions between the Irish and
British armies aimed at soliciting British help in the event of a German 
44invasion.
One historian claims that, apart from the potential military problems 
involved in launching a successful invasion of the United Kingdom, another 
restraining factor was 'Hitler's doctrinaire inclination towards his
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British enemy, whom he continually tried to win round through offers of
peace, having no desire to run the risk of an invasion and an extension of
the war with the British1.45 Since an invasion of Ireland could have been
the prelude to an invasion of Britain, the former could be ruled out by the
same criteria. While Hitler himself, in December 1940, claimed that
'possession of Ireland could have the effect of ending the war', he
accepted the counsel of his military advisers that, strategically, German
'occupation of the island of Ireland was impossible' if Ireland were not at 
4 6war with Britain.
The Irland-Redaktion supported Ireland's neutrality, while Nazi 
Germany's domestic radio service represented it as a form of hostility 
towards Britain:
German policy does not recognise neutrality, except when it has been
'violated' by Germany's enemy. In the first months of the war, all
neutrals were said to suffer from British oppression; the blockade was
damaging their economic interests...Information on neutral countries
presented to the German listener was focused on this subject, and by the
spring of 1940 there was in Nazi propaganda a Germany defending the
neutrals against British supremacy and British aggression. In reality,
or for propaganda purposes, few countries have retained their neutral
status. In propaganda... Ireland was at all times England's implacable 
47enemy.
As noted earlier, there was a pa/6^icular strategic reason why Germany 
had every interest in backing a continuation of Irish neutrality. Neutral 
Ireland was unlikely ever to grant wartime control of its three treaty 
ports at Lough Swilly, Berehaven and Cobh to the Allies. Britain had 
withdrawn from them in 1938 and was thus unable to combat U-boats and other 
enemy shipping from these three most westerly ports. This situation made it 
easier for German naval power to cut Britain's vital supply lines. The 
British considered the scenario in a top secret memorandum drafted for the 
British war cabinet. Dated 3 0 May 194 0, this concluded that: 'A neutral
Eire assists Germany in the general prosecution of the war, and denies to
4 8us the use of important naval bases.'
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While German propaganda supported de Valera's neutral stance, U.S. 
propaganda later attacked it, as Bowman explains:
American propaganda against Irish neutrality was especially cynical
since Ireland's and America's policy was identical. Both disliked the
war, both were insistent on neutrality. Both said they would remain
neutral unless attacked. America was attacked and joined the war.
4 9Ireland was not, and stayed out.
But just how neutral was Ireland? One study of the period notes that 
'after America’s entry into the war, Ireland became less strategically 
important and Irish neutrality became more openly benevolent; from 1942 
stranded Allied air crews were sent straight to Northern Ireland, while 
Germans were interned'.50
Lee notes that 'in so far as Germany had a coherent Irish policy, it was 
largely directed at keeping Ireland neutral', but he adds that the Irish 
attitude to neutrality was not so clear cut:
It was from Britain that the only serious invasion threat could come 
unless she herself fell. Had Britain's circumstances become so desperate 
that she considered Southern Irish bases crucial to her survival, she 
would have inevitably seized them, with unpredictable consequences for 
Irish domestic politics. It was therefore in de Valera's interest that 
Britain's case should not reach desperation point. He consequently 
played, as he had to play, a double game. He rigidly maintained the 
formality of Irish neutrality right to the end, even to the extent of 
raising a storm of indignant Allied protest when conveying his 
condolences to Hempel on the death of Hitler. But he simultaneously took 
care to co-operate sufficiently with Britain, and later with the United 
States, to ensure that they did not feel provoked into aggressive action 
against Irish interests. He had to ensure that Britain could not acquire 
by conquest much more than she gained through co-operation. He could 
not, and did not, keep Ireland strictly neutral during the war. He kept 
Ireland benevolently neutral for Britain.51
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P r o f i l e  o f  a p r o p a g a n d a  team
The team of propagandists which staffed the Irland-Redaktion from 193 9
to 194 5 could not be compared with those working at the neighbouring
England-Redaktion office. The Irish team was overwhelmingly academic in
5 2nature - five of them worked at Berlin University - while most members of 
the English team were not professional academics. A number of the latter 
group had been either fascist sympathisers and/or active in pre-war fascist 
groups in England.53 Only one person spanned the Nazi radio services beamed 
to both Ireland and Britain: she was Mrs Susan Hilton (née Sweney) who 
began broadcasting for the 'black' Scottish service of German Radio - known 
as Radio Caledonia - in September 1941 after a brief spell with another 
'black' unit, the Christian Peace Movement station. Hilton began working 
for the Irland-Redaktion on 2 January 1942 when she made her first 
broadcast to Ireland.54
The Nazi authorities appear to have taken full advantage of the fact 
that foreigners based in Berlin could be persuaded or coerced into service 
on the radio. In such cases it mattered little whether the potential 
broadcasters had come voluntarily to Berlin before the war (as in the case 
of Eduard Dietze, the Glasgow-born propagandist who worked in the England- 
Redaktion) , after the war began (as in the case of Francis Stuart who took 
up a teaching post in Berlin University in January 1940 and John O'Reilly 
who travelled from the Channel Islands to Germany in July 1941), or had 
arrived in occupied Europe as prisoners of war (as was the case of Susan 
Hilton).
Failure to assist the German war effort by carrying out broadcasting 
duties carried severe penalties. At least five foreign broadcasters are 
known to have been punished by the Nazis; three from the Irland-Redaktion 
and two from the England-Redaktion. The Irland-Redaktion's Sonja Kowanko 
was forced to work in a factory when the Gestapo found 'objectionable' 
material in one of her letters.55 The England-Redaktion's James Gilbert was 
interned in a camp when he tried to leave the radio service.56 Susan Hilton 
herself was imprisoned by the Gestapo in Vienna in 1944 and spent the final
cr neight months of the war in a women's internment camp m  Germany. Norman 
Baillie-Stewart, who worked for the English service, narrowly escaped a
tz pconcentration camp when he fell out with one of his radio employers. In 
January 1944 when Francis Stuart refused to broadcast anti-Soviet
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propaganda he was sacked, had his passport confiscated and received
5 9anonymous threats by telephone.
German Radio used the services of English men and women and Germans with 
fluent English on its programmes to Britain. For its part, the BBC employed
¿z 0native German speakers like Sefton Delmer. Both sides used groups that 
were sheltering abroad to broadcast messages to third countries in the hope 
of ending German or British occupation there. These included, in London, de 
Gaulle's Free French, and in Berlin, Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian 
nationalists. Perhaps mistakenly, one commentator lumps the radio 
propagandists of wartime Berlin together in one sweeping condemnation as,
a polyglot assembly of speakers of all nations, colours, and diverse 
creeds wait to go on the air to the glory of Greater Germany - a 
fantastic assortment of traitors, propaganda mercenaries, confused 
idealists, fanatics, and plain riffraff.61
But this definition does not include those working under coercion, those 
for whom broadcasting was only part-time work, nor those - including 
journalists from neutral countries - who saw little contradiction in living 
in wartime Berlin and broadcasting messages to neutral states including 
Ireland, Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal and (until December 
1941) the USA. Many nationalists in Berlin, including Bretons, Irish,
Croats and Indians, perhaps naively - saw in Hitler's plans a chance to 
seize national independence from a dominant power. As the conflict 
progressed beyond the 'phoney war' period of 1939 and early 1940, through 
the sweeping Nazi successes of mid-1940, to the reversal of the Soviet 
campaign from December 1941, there was no escape for those who had chosen 
to use the Nazi microphones for whatever reason. The alternatives to 
continuing to work at the radio might well be death or incarceration.
The position of foreign broadcasters in Berlin was dictated by the 
nature of the war itself. The Allied leaders had declared their goal as the 
'unconditional surrender' of Germany while Goebbels reply was a policy of 
'total war'. The uncompromising nature of the British attitude to Nazi 
Germany was summed up by Churchill's political intimate and Minister for 
Information, the Tipperary-born Brendan Bracken who said: 'It's7 too late
Z  - ¿TOfor redemption. They're all tarred with the same diabolical brush.'
2 0
The t a r g e t  a u d i e n c e
The German Radio Company, RRG, began broadcasting in 1923 but did not 
carry foreign language programmes until the Nazis came to power ten years 
later. English-language material for North America comprised the first such
shortwave items in April 193 3 and were followed later the same year by
£> 4.Spanish-language transmissions. Irish-language broadcasts were a
continuous feature of German Radio's European services throughout the war 
years. While other minority languages came and went - Slovenian, for 
example, had disappeared from the airwaves by the end of 1940 - Irish was 
always there.65 While English-language programmes were also a constant part 
of the European services, English-language programmes specifically 
targetted to Ireland were only featured from August 1941 onwards.
From December 1939 to August 1941 German Radio's Irland-Redaktion chose 
to beam only Irish-language talks to Irish listeners, indicating that the 
Nazi propaganda machine was not chasing a mass audience in Ireland at that 
time. Nor was it making any attempt to tap the worldwide Irish emigrant 
audience, particularly in the United States. The fact that both Ireland and 
America were neutral during this period may have been one reason for a 
'softly, softly' approach by the German broadcasting service. We will see 
elsewhere in this thesis that Dr Adolf Mahr, the Irish expert in the Berlin 
Foreign Office, considered these omissions to be mistakes when, in March 
1941, he argued for an extension of the radio service to include English- 
language material for Ireland as well as for Irish audiences around the 
world.
The impact of Irish-language broadcasts from wartime Berlin was bound to 
be limited to those who had access to radio sets and who also had a 
comprehensive understanding of Irish. As Mahr pointed out in his analysis 
of the early war propaganda from Germany to Ireland, the audience was 
essentially restricted to those in the Gaeltacht who had radios and were 
predisposed to listen, as well as those he termed, 'politically 
important... language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of 
society'.66
The propagandist's audience, according to one definition, may be divided 
into three categories: 1. those who are initially predisposed to react as
the propagandist wishes; 2. those who are neutral or indifferent; and 3.
6 7those who are in opposition or perhaps even hostile. It may be presumed
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that all three categories of listener were present in Ireland in the war 
years.
The decision by Ribbentrop in May 1941 to expand the radio propaganda 
services to Ireland can be seen as a significant turning point in Germany's 
consideration of the importance of Irish neutrality, certainly in 
propaganda terms and perhaps in strategic terms also. There was every 
reason to believe that, as Mahr had indicated, a much wider audience could 
be reached by broadcasting in both English and Irish to Irish audiences, 
and by increasing the broadcasts from Sunday and Wednesday nights to every 
night of the week. A survey of European radio listeners published in August 
1941 in the German paper W i r t s c h a f t  u nd  S t a t i s t i k  - coincidentally the same 
month in which the Irland-Redaktion began nightly test transmissions from 
Berlin to Ireland - stated that there were 179,600 radio listeners in Eire
6 oor 60.3 radio listeners per thousand inhabitants.
Although the figures for Irish radio listeners - as a percentage of the
population - were well below those of Britain, Germany, France, Scandinavia 
and the Benelux nations, they were above countries like Hungary, Slovakia, 
Italy, Romania, Portugal, Bulgaria, Spain and Turkey. In any case, the 
number of radio listeners in any one country does not appear to have been a 
major factor in determining German Radio's target audiences since 
practically every potential audience was exploited. They included listeners 
in enemy states, occupied territories and neutrals as well as ethnic groups 
within belligerent and neutral states.
Since audience research did not feature as part of the Irish 
broadcasting industry until the 1950s it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish whether German Radio reached its intended Irish target- 
audience in the war years. The consensus would appear to be that the 
audience was small because: 1. the signal was weak; 2. after the 'phoney 
war' period to mid-1940 Irish newspapers no longer listed foreign radio
C Qprogrammes and wavelengths; 3. for the first 23 months of the war,
programmes specifically for Ireland were broadcast only in Irish; and 4.
once the tide of war had turned in favour of the Allies there was less 
reason to listen to the losing side. The Irland-Redaktion's programmes had 
a following in Gaeltacht areas, particularly County Donegal, and among 
Irish Celtic scholars who - like listeners in Donegal - would have known 
Ludwig Miihlhausen and/or Hans Hartmann.
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De Valera's government was kept informed of the broadcasts from Berlin
through the Department of External Affairs which received transcripts of
German radio programmes from Irish Army Intelligence. The Minister for the
Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, Frank Aiken, also received copies of
the transcripts. Despite being furnished regularly with transcripts, the
government appears to have been largely unconcerned by the content of the
broadcasts and only reacted twice, privately through diplomatic channels,
when the Berlin broadcasts touched on sensitive Irish issues. The first
occasion was in December 1942 when Francis Stuart praised the IRA's
northern commander, Hugh McAteer. The second was in May 1943 following a
series of talks by Stuart advising Irish voters not to back Fine Gael in
7 0the general election set for 22 June 1943.
The p r o p a g a n d a  m i x
The propaganda which was broadcast to Ireland from Nazi Germany may be 
divided into two distinct periods. Firstly, that from December 193 9 to 
November 1941 when the Propaganda Ministry was in control and, secondly,
from November 1941 to May 1945 when Irish propaganda material was in the
71hands of the Foreign Office. Certain propaganda themes were common to
both periods. These included: German support for Irish neutrality,- the
inevitability of an Allied defeat; assurances that Nazi Germany was not
anti-Catholic; and an anti-Jewish stance. As regards the latter, the value
of anti-semitic propaganda to the Nazis appears to have lain mainly in the
manner in which it was manipulated to satisfy the psychological needs of
the Germans themselves, rather than in any effect it might have had on
7 yforeign audiences. Hitler 'at various periods used Jew baiting as the
spear point of his entire propaganda effort and used his anti-semitic
programme to create many of the most important elements in his image- 
7 3projection'. Though beamed occasionally to Ireland, anti-Jewish 
propaganda was primarily for German domestic consumption, and 'on balance, 
the Nazi anti-semitic drives abroad had more often a repulsive than an 
attractive effect'.74
In the 18-month period prior to 22 June 1941, when Germany invaded 
Russia, German Radio's Irish service was not in a position to woo Irish 
Catholic listeners with anti-Bolshevik propaganda. This was because of the
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Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed on 23 August 1939. However, after 
the invasion of Russia the anti-Bolshevik line became part of the staple 
diet for Irish audiences. The Irish service was even apt to seize on anti­
communist statements by the Irish Catholic hierarchy, repeating them word 
for word with attribution.
Apart from the various themes beamed to Irish listeners, Ireland itself 
was an important plank in the Nazi propaganda mix which sought 
internationally to project the component parts of the British Empire as 
being at odds with one another over the war. Silvey makes the point that 
German propaganda broadcasts to Britain tried 'to exploit undeniable facts 
in such a way as to excite alarm and despondency. With Eire neutral, South 
Africa deeply divided and India concerned above all with achieving freedom, 
the disunity of "the Empire" as compared with its unity in 1914 was 
undeniable'.75 Balfour states that Britons who tuned into German radio
broadcasts were more aware than those who did not 'that the Empire was
7 6divided over the war'.
The disunity of the British Empire was a recurrent theme in William 
Joyce's wartime broadcasts to Britain.77 From this it follows that Irish 
nationalist aspirations to unity might have been expected to provide a 
major propaganda plank for the Nazi broadcasters. But despite the fact that 
Eire's neutrality was praised and encouraged by Berlin, the goal of Irish 
unity was barely mentioned in the Irland-Redaktion's programmes. Adolf Mahr 
preferred to approach the Irish question from a recent historical 
perspective. He did this by providing radio scripts which detailed British 
atrocities committed during the 1919-1921 Irish War of Independence. These 
so-called 'Flashback' features began in November 1941 when Mahr had just 
succeeded in taking control of the Irland-Redaktion from the Propaganda 
Ministry on behalf of the Foreign Office. By then the issues of partition 
and eventual Irish unification were being played down by the Germans. A 
former employee of the Irland-Redaktion explains that the relegation of 
these issues began a year earlier:
From October 1940 [when preparations for an invasion of England were 
stopped by the German military] German interests were all in favour of: 
1. keeping Ireland neutral; 2. not working up problems of what was then 
called partition; 3. broadcasting news that might interest the Irish
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while stressing points of view on international questions as seen by the 
7 8Germans.
7 9The influence of the Nazi Auslandsorganisation in shaping propaganda 
for Ireland and elsewhere cannot be ignored. Even before war broke out it 
was noted that 'German short-wave... works in close co-operation with the
O QAuslandsorganisation'. In September 1940, Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle - the head 
of the AO and a State Secretary at the Foreign Office where Mahr was also 
working - declared:
The more attention we pay in this way [including local news in radio
bulletins] to the mentality of the audience, thus inspiring confidence
in our programmes, the more will those parts about which we are really
81concerned be believed and accepted as trustworthy.
Bohle's tactic suggests that local news in the Irland-Redaktion's 
bulletins was supposed to act as a cover for the real Nazi message to Irish 
listeners, i.e. encouraging support for Hitler's regime and its 
international policies. In the event though, censorship of mail, newspapers 
and radio programmes in Ireland prevented the Irland-Redaktion from 
gathering items of local interest for inclusion in the bulletins, other 
than material put out by Allied sources mainly through London. Ludwig 
Mühlhausen was able, however, to find an alternative means of giving his 
broadcasts a local dimension: he sent his Irish acquaintances personal 
greetings over the airwaves which he then followed up with the standard 
Nazi propaganda of the early war period including denials of Nazi 
persecution of Catholics in Czechoslovakia and Poland. As time went on, the 
Irland-Redaktion followed the Propaganda Ministry's basic broadcasting 
formula. This included: anti-British and anti-Jewish talks (Hans Hartmann 
says that anti-Jewish material was 'kept to a minimum' at his insistence 
when he took over the service in December 1941 'although there was pressure
to use anti-Jewish propaganda which was supplied to the foreign language
8 ?services from a central reporting pool') ; laudatory remarks about Hitler; 
war communiqués from the German Army's High Command; and, from 22 June 1941 
onwards, anti-Bolshevik talks.
In the later stages of the war some propaganda themes for Ireland
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g ooverlapped with those beamed at the German public. One study identifies 
five central themes which governed Germany's domestic radio propaganda in 
the final two years of the war. They were: anti-Bolshevism; anti-semitism; 
The progress of Germany's social policy compared to other countries; 
Military protection against Bolshevism; and England's economic decline.
German propagandists faced much the same tasks as those confronting 
public information specialists in other belligerent states. These included: 
1. justifying one's own policy as peaceful and defensive; 2. emphasizing 
enemy losses and one's own expectations of victory; 3. keeping morale high;
4. urging workers on to greater productivity; and 5. promising a better
84world after the war.
The Nazi regime's concern with reaching audiences in small states and 
regions as well as large ones - whether belligerent or non-belligerent - is 
emphasised by the fact that, by 1943, German Radio was putting out 279
8 5foreign news service bulletins per day in 53 languages including Irish.
Although anti-English propaganda was a constant factor in the broadcasts to
Ireland, in the mass of material put out by Berlin to audiences worldwide
it never appeared to reach the same heights of fanaticism as the invective
directed against the Jews and Bolsheviks. Baird comments that 'at its
height the motif of "British plutocracy" came to symbolize Germany's love-
hate for the English, a curious amalgam of respect and jealousy...Hitler
was convinced that the English were of Germanic stock and thus fellow
Aryans'. Goebbels, however, contended that the Scots were the purest
8 7Germanic stock in the British Isles, without any Jewish influence.
Herzstein takes a slightly different line, perceiving Britain as more of 
a 'hate object' than a love-hate object for the German mass media. He 
allows for Hitler's view of the 'English as Germany's racial brethren and 
the British empire as a potential ally of the Reich' and adds that 'when 
Britain became a foe rather than a friend, the Nazis denounced the
8  8[British] empire as socially reactionary and oppressive of the masses'. 
Other groups or nations such as the Boers, Indian nationalists and the 
Irish 'offered a more fruitful source of anti-British propaganda to the
O QGerman ideologues'. Thus, as well as being beamed to Ireland, Germany's 
Irish propaganda could also be turned inwards for domestic consumption:
26
[Ireland] offered German propagandists rich material for demonstrating
the perfidy of British rule. The German mass media directed an endless
barrage of 'Irish' propaganda at the German people, a campaign intended
to stoke the flames of righteous wrath in both Ireland and Germany, but
particularly in Germany...The only time during the war when the German
media avoided using the Irish theme was in late June and July of 1940,
9 0when Hitler hoped that the British would come to terms with him.
During the offensive phase of German military expansion, Nazi radio 
'projected a world of invincible German armies confronting degenerate
Q1 .foreign villains'. When two of the Nazis' foreign villains - plutocratic 
Britain and atheistic Russia - were at the same time identical to the two 
major bogeymen of Irish Catholic nationalism, it made the work of Berlin's 
Irish propaganda team that much easier.
As we have already seen, Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office instigated the 
nightly 'Flashback' feature recounting stories of British atrocities in the 
Irish War of Independence, but the concept of using atrocity stories in 
international propaganda was far from new. Sanders and Taylor's study of 
British propaganda during World War I identifies an 'abundance of crude 
atrocity stories which circulated during the conflict. The ferocity of 
atrocity propaganda was most marked in the British press where much of it 
originated... one of the NWAC's [Britain's National War Aims Committee] most
successful enterprises was the "German Crimes" calendar which depicted an
92enemy atrocity for each month of the year'.
It was, however, a propaganda tactic which could backfire:
One of the unexpected consequences of the somewhat hysterical anti- 
German propaganda of World War I was that it made many people, 
particularly politicians, suspicious of alleged atrocity stories 
emanating from Germany during the 1930s. The very success of the British 
propaganda efforts in 1914-1918 proved to be a serious handicap in 
getting the world to accept the reality of what was happening in Nazi 
Germany, and this created a disastrous delay in the public's awareness 
of the horrors of the concentration camps and other Nazi atrocities.93
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MacKenzie notes the importance of this link between the First and Second
World Wars, stating that: 'A generation tutored in the years before and
during the First World War came to hold the levers of propaganda of the
9 4inter-war period. It was a legacy that proved enduring.'
For its part, German Radio was beaming anti-British, horror-style
propaganda to the United States as early as 1938. A German broadcast of 27
July that year stated: 'In no other historic empire have there been so many
9 ^murders as in the British Empire.' This type of propaganda also provided 
a central theme for Goebbels in 1945 when 'the Nazis charged that the 
Soviets would not stop with atrocities alone, for their goal was the total 
destruction of the German race... The atrocity propaganda was calculated to
reinforce the Nazis' demand for fanatical resistance in Germany's darkest
9hour in order to gain total victory'.
Although the German invasion of Russia provided endless anti-Bolshevik 
material for the German propaganda machine - including, of course, the 
Irland-Redaktion - it also sowed the seeds of the Third Reich's eventual 
defeat. According to Kris and Speier's study of Nazi domestic propaganda 
'Germany's propagandists expected to be believed because her armies were
Q 7being victorious'. But the link between successful propaganda and 
military achievement was perhaps best summed up by the French socialist, 
Régis Debray, who remarked that 'the most important form of propaganda is
q osuccessful military action'. °
When General von Paulus and 90,000 men of the German Sixth Army 
surrendered to Russian forces after the battle of Stalingrad on 3 0 January 
1943 (the 10th anniversary of Hitler's accession to power) the Propaganda 
Ministry instructed the German media that: 'henceforward the heroic
9 9struggle of Stalingrad will become the greatest epic of German history'. 
Bulletins put out at the time by the Irland-Redaktion followed this line to 
the letter and one, by Francis Stuart, even praised the German Army's 
'triumph of flesh and blood'.100
The military fortunes of the Third Reich went into decline after the 
Stalingrad reversal but the effects of what happened went beyond military 
defeat as Zeman explains: 'The hopes they [the German propagandists] had
raised during the first phase of the campaign were dashed to the ground, 
and a psychological crisis accompanied the military defeat.' Zeman adds 
that Stalingrad, coupled with German defeats in North Africa and the
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increasing intensity of Allied air raids on Germany, meant that: 'the
broadcasting war was also reaching the point from where the effectiveness
of Nazi propaganda would begin to decline'.101
According to Hildebrand, Allied bombing raids on Germany 'sometimes
degenerated into a senseless exercise in terror for its own sake [and] were
TOPused by Nazi propaganda to strengthen morale' . Such propaganda was 
included in broadcasts to Ireland in the second half of thet war when much 
was made of Catholic bishops' comments on the RAF's bombing of Cologne 
cathedral, the bombing of the monastery at Monte Cassino and other attacks 
on historic places of worship. This form of propaganda echoed the 
complaints of French newspaper editors who, during the First World War, had 
criticised the German Army's 'proclivity to destroy cathedrals, which has 
been amply confirmed by the bombardment of Rheims, the burning of Belgian 
churches and of cathedrals in Lorraine'.103
After the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944, 'the entire 
[Nazi] propaganda effort had to balance on a tightrope between rousing the 
public from apathy and inducing a mood of capitulation'.104 Ireland's 
neutral position precluded Radio Ëireann from commenting on the progress of 
the war but the station did relay communiqués from the warring sides. From 
an Allied point of view, however, the propaganda task eased with each 
German defeat. Hugh Carleton Greene, who was head of the BBC's German 
service from October 1940 to the end of the war, recalls that:
Hitler was perhaps our best propagandist... Day after day his recorded 
voice could be heard screeching, 'We shall wipe out their cities', as 
the bombs fell on German cities, or, 'We shall overrun Stalingrad and 
take it, you can count on that', as the Russian ring tightened round the 
trapped army of Field-Marshal Paulus - and so on.105
In 1945 the war's endgame was reflected in an irregular and diminishing 
number of broadcasts to Ireland. Propaganda directed to German domestic 
audiences increasingly overlapped with the material beamed to Ireland. 
According to Bytwerk's study of Nazi propaganda in the closing stages of 
the war, the Nazi propagandists retreated increasingly into the past as the 
war continued to be lost, and Goebbels warned that reprisals would be 
carried out against German civilians or that Germany would be kept in a
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pastoral state for several generations.106 By the second quarter of 1945
there appeared little difference between the Nazi propaganda directed at
Germany, Ireland or other areas. Amid warnings of the consequences for
Western civilisation of a Jewish-Bolshevik victory, Irish listeners were
told that the Allies planned to make Germany a 'potato yard turned soon
into a graveyard' and comparisons were drawn with England's historic
i n  7exploitation of Ireland.
In the final year of the war broadcasting time in occupied countries was 
being shared between the local civilian population and German troops. In 
April 1944, for example, Radio Tirana, in occupied Albania, was 
broadcasting for five hours a day in Albanian but two and a half hours of 
German-language programming were added each day for the benefit of troops 
stationed there.108
If any clash of styles existed between German Radio's propaganda to 
Ireland and other countries towards the end of the war, it was perhaps best 
reflected musically. The official announcement of Hitler's death, broadcast 
in German on all RRG frequencies (including the Irland-Redaktion's) on 1 
May 1945, was accompanied by excerpts from Wagner, the adagio of Bruckner's 
Third Symphony, drum rolls, the German national anthem and the Horst Wessel 
song.109 By contrast the very last broadcast to Ireland from the Irland- 
Redaktion, on 2 May 1945, was played out with John McCormack singing Come 
B a c k  To E r i n . Throughout the war the Irish service provided its listeners 
with a mixture of Irish music and song which had nothing in common with 
German Radio's musical output to other areas.
From 193 3 onwards the Nazis had adopted their own musical style on radio 
while at the same time banning from the airwaves any compositions by 'Jews, 
negroes and Bolsheviks'.110 Jazz, for instance, was considered to be 
'undeutsche Musik'.111 From 193 9 Nazi radio's choice of music - 
domestically and to its adversaries, though not to neutral states - was 
linked to military strategy and each military campaign had its own 
signature tune: D i e  Wacht  am R h e i n was used for the Battle of France, W ir  
f a h r e n  g e g e n  E n g e l l a n d for naval victories against England, Bomben a u f  
E n g l a n d for air attacks, P r i n z  Eu gen for the Balkans, and a combination of 
Liszt's symphonic poem L e s  P r é l u d e s , with part of the Horst Wessel chorus 
Kamerade n ,  d i e  R o t f r o n t  u nd  R e a k t i o n  e r s c h o s s e n , for the invasion of the 
USSR.112
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In the Nazi era music was, according to Moller, used as a medium for 
ideological conversion and pacification, and no composer ranked more highly 
for the Nazi leadership than Wagner:
Richard Wagner was the real answer to the philosophical void of the
NSDAP [Nazi party]. Wagner had written diatribes against Jews and the
French...Wagner appeared to be at the focal point of many of the
National Socialist race doctrines... His music was invaluable to the
propaganda machine and created an overwhelming emotional atmosphere at
113mass meetings and on the radio.
But such an atmosphere was not created on the airwaves by the Irland- 
Redaktion which, musically, rarely resorted to anything but traditional 
Irish music and song for its target audience. However, this use of Irish 
music, the Irish language and talks by Irish announcers was calculated to 
create a familiar 'Irishness' and was unique among foreign radio stations 
which could be received in Ireland during the war. The creators of the 
Irland-Redaktion hoped to elicit, at least, a sympathetic hearing from 
their audience. In essence, German Radio's Irish service can be seen as a 
propaganda exercise primarily designed to augment the existing pressures on 
Ireland to stay out of the Second World War.
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Chapter 2
Founding Fathers of the Irland-Redaktion
In the closing weeks of 1939 some radio listeners in Ireland tuned into a 
strange evening broadcast on the medium wave. While the language was 
unmistakeably Irish, the accent was unmistakeably German. Listeners may 
have scratched their heads as they strained to catch what appeared to be an 
attack on Allied propaganda. References to the Black and Tans were included 
by the speaker who signed off with the words 'Go mbeannai Dia dhaoibh a 
chairde, agus go saora Dia Eire' (God bless you my friends and may God save 
Ireland).
The Irish national radio service, Radio Eireann, had commenced 
broadcasting 13 years earlier in 1926. But this was no Radio Eireann 
programme from the Henry Street studios in Dublin. The man speaking a 
mixture of Kerry and Connemara Irish into a microphone that night in 
Berlin's radio centre was Ludwig Miihlhausen, who had spent some time in the 
1920s and 1930s studying Celtic folklore and Irish dialects on the Blasket 
Islands, in Connemara and in south west Donegal. He was one in a long line 
of German Celtologists who had taken an interest in Ireland's language and 
folklore.1
The C e l t o l o g y  C o n n e c t i o n
The German celtology movement dates back over 150 years to 183 9 when 
Franz Bopp wrote his pioneering work on The C e l t i c  l a n g u a g e s  f r o m  t h e  
v i e w p o i n t  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  p h i l o l o g y . A decade later in 1849, F.A. Korner's 
K e l t i s c h e  S t u d i e n  made its mark as one of the first major contributions to 
Celtic studies in Prussia. Korner, one of the great German linguistic 
scholars of his day, did not work in a vacuum. Johan Kaspar Zeuss published 
his Gram m ati ca  C e l t i c a  in Leipzig in 1853, and the geologist Christian 
Keferstein was in the course of publishing his O b s e r v a t i o n s  on C e l t i c  
A n t i q u i t i e s , t h e  C e l t s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  Germany,  a s  w e l l  a s  
t h e  C e l t i c  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  c i t y  o f  H a l l e . As the 19th century advanced,
Berlin became a more important focal point for the Celtic scholars, notably 
Hermann Ebel who produced the second edition of Zeuss's G ram m ati ca  C e l t i c a .  
He was appointed Professor of Comparative Philology at the University of 
Berlin in 1872, and was succeeded there six years later by Heinrich Zimmer,
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who went on to become the country's first professor of Celtic Studies at 
Berlin's Friedrich-Wilhelm University,
The early years of the 20th century saw the Celtologists defining a more 
important role for themselves, and it was inevitable that their attention 
would focus on Ireland's western seaboard with its vestiges of an ancient 
language and culture which seven centuries of Anglo-Norman influence had 
failed to suppress. In 1901, Zimmer's P e l a g i u s  i n  I r l a n d  was published, and 
from 1907 his Celtic Studies department became an independent section 
within Berlin University's Indo-European Seminar. Known as a tough task­
master, Zimmer insisted his students speak at least one modern Celtic 
language as well as having a knowledge of the earlier Brittonic languages 
which include Welsh, Cornish and Breton as well as Scots, Irish and Manx 
Gaelic. The German-Irish scholarly links were cemented by Kuno Meyer (1858- 
1919) who took over the Chair of Celtic Studies at the University of Berlin 
in 1911. From 1897 Meyer was editor, along with Ludwig Christian Stern, of 
the Z e i t s c h r i f t  f u r  c e l t i s c h e  P h i l o l o g i e  (Celtic Philology Journal) which 
still appears regularly. In 1903 Meyer founded the School of Irish Learning 
in Dublin and the following year began publishing its journal S r i u . This, 
together with his work on translating early Irish poetry and researching 
Irish lexicography and metrics, won him widespread recognition. He was 
granted the freedom of Dublin and Cork, though his name was erased from the 
roll of honour in Dublin's City Hall in a vote dominated by pro-British 
elements on the Corporation during the First World War. Meyer's name has 
never been reinstated on the roll despite public pressure.
Probing into the Celtic past, men like Kuno Meyer and his successor 
Julius Pokorny, who took over the Chair of Celtic Studies at Berlin in 
192 0, could not fail to be affected by Ireland's quest for independent 
nationhood.3 Germany's defeat in the First World War gave rise to popular 
resentment at what was seen as the country's relegation to second-class 
status by the Treaty of Versailles. Coupled with the effects of widespread 
unemployment and financial collapse during the Depression, this resentment 
provided an incubator for Hitler's National Socialist movement. After 
coming to power in 1933, the Nazi party sought to stamp its influence on 
the academic world as well as every other section of German society.4
Ironically, one of the Nazi's first academic victims turned out to be 
the pro-Irish, anti-British, Professor Julius Pokorny, who was sacked from
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his post in Berlin in October 1935. The pretext for removing Pokorny was 
that he was part-Jewish. Driven into exile, he sought refuge first in 
Vienna and later in Zürich. The Nazi party used its all-embracing influence 
to make sure that Ludwig Mühlhausen - who had joined the party in 1932 - 
got Pokorny's job in preference to two other candidates. From an Irish 
point of view, Mühlhausen was an interesting choice. He had founded the 
Department of Celtic Studies at Hamburg University in 1928, was a fluent 
Irish speaker and knew Ireland well. More importantly, in the context of 
war propaganda, Mühlhausen was the man who, in 1939, inaugurated German 
Radio's Irish-language talks.5
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Ludwig Mühlhausen 
Hamburg, circa 1931
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L u d w i g  M ü h l h a u s e n  : S c h o l a r  and  S p y
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Germany's leading Celtic 
scholar was Professor Rudolf Thurneysen of Bonn University. But for his 
advanced age and ill health the Swiss-born Thurneysen could well have been 
called on to launch German Radio's Irish talks. In the event, the role fell 
to Ludwig Mühlhausen, then 51 years of age. Hans Hartmann, who was at the 
time Mühlhausen's protégé at Berlin University, remembers that a Nazi party 
official, 'possibly someone at the Propaganda Ministry', chose Mühlhausen 
for the job since he knew Irish very well. Mühlhausen thus became the first 
person ever to broadcast propaganda to Ireland from abroad in the Irish 
language.6
Mühlhausen was a student of Celtic folklore and an accomplished 
linguist: as well as mastering Irish, he spoke Welsh, Dutch, French and 
English. But he was also a spy and, according to a profile drawn up by G2 
in mid-1943, an 'enthusiastic Nazi'. This unflattering portrait by Irish 
Military Intelligence claimed he was identified with pre-Nazi fascist 
groups such as the German National People ' s Party and the Steel Helmet 
organisation. In fact, Mühlhausen had joined the Nazi party on 1 May 1932, 
nine months before Hitler came to power in Germany. Mühlhausen's wife Else, 
a native of Leipzig whom he married in 1914 after he had taken a doctorate 
in philosophy at Leipzig University, had herself been active in right-wing 
political organisations before joining the National Socialists. By 1932 she 
had become a member of the inner circle of the Nazi party in Hamburg where 
she and her husband were then living. Hitler's rise to power as Reich 
Chancellor, in January 1933, gave Mühlhausen's career a boost. Firstly, the 
Nazis sacked the Jewish director of Hamburg's Commerce Library, Dr 
Rosenbaum, to make way for Mühlhausen. Then in October 1935, as noted 
earlier, the Nazis removed Professor Julius Pokorny from the chair of 
Celtic Studies at Berlin University where he had worked for 15 years. 
Mühlhausen filled the vacancy in 1937.
Mühlhausen's interest in Ireland and the Irish language had been 
stimulated by a number of summer visits to Cork and Kerry in the late 
1920s. He gave a series of lectures at UCC in the summer of 1929 when he 
stayed with the parents of a Cork linguist, Joe Healy, at Springfield in 
Cobh. Healy, who ten years later was to be called in by G2 to monitor 
Mühlhausen's initial radio talks, stayed with the Mühlhausen family in
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Hamburg while studying at the university there from 1927 to 1929. Healy, 
and his UCC colleague Seamus Kavanagh, spent some time in Germany teaching
gMühlhausen Irish, while they perfected their German.
Healy's younger brother Louis remembers the German professor's 
summertime visits to his parents' home in Cobh, and recalls that the 
younger Healy children did not get on with him:
Mühlhausen came from Hamburg by liner and my father had to meet him 
coming off the liner in Cobh. He was a tall, spare, bespectacled man. I
suppose in a way he was arrogant and had absolutely no sense of humour,
so as youngsters we did not care for him very much. He moved on down to
Kerry and spent some time on the Blasket Islands speaking Gaelic to the
natives. Joe was still in Germany at that time. The professor spent more 
time with us on his way back.
The following summer, Mühlhausen was back staying with the Healys again, 
but relations with the younger children had not improved:
[Mühlhausen] made himself very much at home. The family laid on a nice 
meal with a good bottle of wine. At the end of the meal Patsy and I 
brought in a bottle of Joe's homemade wine and said 'Try this, 
professor'. He held it up to the light, sniffed at it, rolled it around 
and eventually tasted it, spat, and said 'Das ist cat's piss'. We said, 
'We know that, but which one? We have two cats'. My father had an 
awkward explanation to make in difficult circumstances and we got a mild 
parental admonition. We could never relax with Professor Mühlhausen. He
qseemed arrogant and easily offended.
Mühlhausen returned to Ireland in July 1932 where he studied the local 
Irish dialect and folklore of Cornamona in Co Galway. There he met 
Professor James Hamilton Delargy, director of the Folklore Commission. 
Mühlhausen was accompanied by a German professor of geography who took a 
great number of photographs of Lough Corrib and the Aran Islands. In 193 7 
Mühlhausen was back in Ireland again, this time, ostensibly, to study Irish 
dialects in Donegal. Delargy had put the German in touch with a Donegal 
folklore enthusiast called Sean Ö Heochaidh. In July 193 7, Mühlhausen wrote
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to 0 Heochaidh, in Irish, from Berlin: 'I would like to stay in a
fisherman's house. The most important thing for me is to be among the 
people, among the hills and by the sea.'10
On 25 August 1937 Sean 0 Heochaidh met Mühlhausen in Killybegs as he 
descended from the Galway train. He had arranged for the German to stay 
with a Teelin fisherman, Hugh Byrne. Byrne recalls that the German:
spent six weeks in my parents' house and never spoke anything but Irish. 
His Irish was very good, he had learned it on an earlier visit to the 
Blaskets. For the first week he was there, Mühlhausen shared a room with 
León 0 Broin. They had fierce arguments about religion. Mühlhausen kept
a large picture of Hitler in his room, while 0 Broin kept a crucifix
next to his bed.11
Long after the war 0 Broin recalled the time he shared that room in
Teelin with Mühlhausen:
When he woke the first morning we were together, he took out his Nazi
song book and sang a verse or two. I responded by kneeling down and
provocatively blessing myself. He then put on his dressing gown, walked
with me to the pier head nearby and dived into the bleak sea. Not to be
outdone I did the same and nearly died of the cold. I gave this morning
12exercise up; the Nazi, a man of tougher breed, did not.
0 Broin's son Eimear told the author that his father 'reported 
Mühlhausen's spying activities to an army friend, but nothing was done
since he was not breaking the law in any way'.13
Hugh Byrne remembers the German paying for his board in advance. 
Mühlhausen spent the entire six weeks in Teelin taking photographs and 
visiting elderly people to record their old folk stories. According to 
Byrne, Mühlhausen never went out in a fishing boat and never touched a drop 
of drink:
He idolised Hitler and thought he was a god. I don't think he had any
religion. He smoked cigars and spoke of the 1914-18 war which he had
fought in. He told me Germany would get the Rhineland back without
38
firing a shot, and they did. He was very anti-British and said he would 
not set foot on British soil. When he left Donegal for Dublin, he went 
through Sligo so he wouldn't have to go through the North.14
Sean 0 Heochaidh took the German around the area introducing him to the 
best Irish speakers so Mühlhausen could work on the Donegal dialects. But 
as well as studying the language, the local man noted that Mühlhausen 'took 
hundreds of photos'. Later, many photographs of County Donegal, including 
three taken in Teelin, appeared in a German military handbook produced in 
occupied Brussels, and published in Berlin in 1941. This was intended to 
assist with a top secret invasion plan for Ireland code-named Operation 
Green. When Hugh Byrne was shown copies of the three Teelin photographs by 
this author, he said he was sure that Mühlhausen had taken them. Both 0 
Heochaidh and Byrne say that Mühlhausen was the only German to have taken 
photographs in the area in the 193 0s, and some local people in Teelin still 
believe that he was a spy. Adolf Mahr's son, Gustav, told this author: 'it
would appear that Mühlhausen actually had carried on espionage in Ireland'. 
As well as containing scores of photographs, the 1941 handbook entitled 
M i l i t a r y  G e o g r a p h i c a l  d a t a  on I r e l a n d  included maritime charts, coastal 
profiles, and aerial photographs of harbours and inlets, as well as one 
picture of the County Donegal fishing village of Bunbeg where Hans Hartmann 
had stayed at the beginning of 1939. Also in the handbook was a list of 
approximately one hundred Gaelic words and their German equivalents.15
Both Hugh Byrne and Sean 0 Heochaidh were questioned by the Gardai once 
Mühlhausen began his radio talks from Berlin two years later. When the 
German sent Christmas greetings to 0 Heochaidh over the airwaves in 193 9, 
the Donegal man believed the Irish authorities thought he was 'a German 
fifth columnist'. According to 0 Heochaidh, the Garda surveillance only 
ended when Professor Delargy intervened and explained to the Department of 
Justice the innocent relationship between Mühlhausen and the two Donegal 
16men.
Returning to Berlin with hundreds of photographs of Ireland, Mühlhausen 
produced one book of folktales from South Donegal, and an article on house 
types in Teelin, in which he drew comparisons with houses in Cornamona, 
County Galway and Dunquin, County Kerry. A 1939 Irish Army memo noted that 
Mühlhausen was 'an expert photographer, and lectures in Germany on
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"Ireland: Land and People", illustrated by his own lantern slides'.
At 8.25 p.m. on the night of 10 December 1939, Mühlhausen spoke to 
Ireland in Irish via RRG's Hamburg transmitter. The talk was heard by his 
friend, Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy at McKee Barracks in Dublin, 
whose transcription noted:
In good Irish, a mixture of Kerry and Western dialects, he said it was a 
pleasure to talk over the air to his Irish friends, imagining himself 
seated 'cois na tine agus boladh na mona im shron' [by the fire and the 
smell of the turf in my nose]. He characterised as lies statements about 
the persecution by the Germans of Czechoslovakian and Polish Catholics, 
and reminded his listeners of the atrocities committed in Ireland by the 
Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries.
Healy attached background material to the transcription describing 
Mühlhausen's links with Ireland but omitting his own pre-war academic links 
with the German.
Mühlhausen's last radio talk to Ireland was on 24 September 1941, 
although he did contribute a few words to a special New Year's Eve 
broadcast from Berlin on 31 December 1941. By then Adolf Mahr had assumed 
control of the Irish service. In any event, as early as 194 0, according to 
Hans Hartmann, Mühlhausen 'got some other offers from the [Nazi] party or 
the Propaganda Ministry and did some other jobs which he found more 
attractive and more prosperous'.19 Mühlhausen's call to other duties arose 
from the fact that he had worked as a spy in southern Belgium (Wallonia) 
during the First World War. His extensive knowledge of both French and 
Flemish had marked him out at the time as a useful agent for German
9 QIntelligence. A confidential wartime memo from the Irish Chargé 
d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, to Dan Bryan noted that:
Mühlhausen still holds the chair [of Celtic Studies] in Berlin 
[University], and has been doing some propaganda work and lectures on 
Ireland. Has large collection of Irish photographs. Volunteered for S.S. 
after being in S.A. Was given the rank of lieutenant. Sent to work in 
Brittany, probably propaganda in view of his Celtic knowledge.21
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Warnock's educated guess at Mühlhausen's propaganda role in Brittany was 
accurate, Mühlhausen Nazi party membership file indicates he was in charge 
of radio propaganda for Ireland and Brittany for the first two years of the 
war. In summer 1942 he took over the management of the Office for Celtic 
Ethnological Research, an SS-controlled section dealing with Celtic 
ancestry. He was recruited to the SS in 1943 and, in the 194 3-1944 period, 
worked for the German Commander in France on Celtic research as well as 
political tasks, particularly in Brittany.22
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Adolf Mahr sitting in the director's chair 
at the National Museum, Dublin, circa 1935
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A d o l f  Mahr:  R i b b e n t r o p ' s  I r i s h  E x p e r t
One person whom Ludwig Mühlhausen made a point of meeting when he 
visited Ireland was the National Museum's Austrian-born director, Adolf 
Mahr. In fact, Mühlhausen, Hans Hartmann, the photographer Joachim 
Gerstenberg and many other Germans and Austrians were pre-war guests at the 
Mahr family home in Waterloo Place, Dublin. While Mahr never broadcast
during the war he, nevertheless, greatly influenced the shape and content
2 3of Germany's wartime radio propaganda to Ireland.
Mahr was born on 7 May 1887, at Trent in Austria, when the power and 
influence of the Austro-Hungarian empire was at its height. His father was 
a bandmaster to the Emperor Franz Josef. After studying geography and pre­
history at the University of Vienna, Adolf Mahr went to work for the Linz 
Museum in 1913 before joining the Natural History Museum in Vienna two 
years later. During the First World War he enlisted for military service in 
Salzburg. In 1919 Mahr, then aged 32, saw his beloved native South Tyrol 
region ceded to Italy under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The 
prospect of reintegrating this region into Austria was one of the principal 
factors that later attracted Mahr to Nazism. In 192 7 he was appointed 
Senior Keeper of Irish Antiquities at the National Museum in Dublin. 
Although technically an alien, the job meant that Mahr became a permanent 
and pensionable member of the Irish civil service.24
The Nazis' rise to power in Germany was matched by a corresponding rise 
in Adolf Mahr's fortunes. Hitler was appointed German Chancellor on 30 
January 1933. On 6 March 1933, the Secretary of the Department of Education 
in Dublin, Seosamh 0 Neill, wrote a letter to his opposite number at the 
Department of Finance noting that:
the personal qualifications of this officer [Mahr] are such as to enable 
the Minister for Education [Thomas Derrig] to accept him unreservedly as 
a most suitable person for appointment to the post of Director [of the 
National Museum].
As well as advancing up the promotional ladder of the Irish civil
service, Mahr was applying for membership of the German Nazi party. His
2party membership dated from 1 April 1933. The Irish government approved 
his appointment to the top museum post at a cabinet meeting on 17 July
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1934, and three days later the President of the Executive Council, Eamon de 
Valera, personally signed the cabinet minutes which included Mahr1s 
promotion.27 According to Mahr's daughter, Mrs Ingrid Reusswig, de Valera
9 Q ,was aware of her father's Nazi party links , although it is not clear 
exactly when he became aware of them. In February 1939 the Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs, Joe Walshe, wrote to de Valera that:
the existence of a Nazi organisation in Dublin...having as its chief
member and organiser an employee of our State, was not calculated to
improve relations between our two Governments [Ireland and
Germany]...and the [Irish] Government would be placed in a very awkward
situation when the position of Dr Mahr, Director of the National Museum,
as head of the Nazi cell in Dublin, became a matter of public 
2 9controversy.
In the same memorandum, Walshe revealed that he had frequently complained 
about the 'Nazi organisation in Dublin' both to Dr Eduard Hempel, the 
German Minister, and to his predecessor, Dr Erich Schroetter.30
The post of museum director had been vacant for 18 years before Mahr got 
the job. The previous incumbent was Count G.N. Plunkett whose services were 
dispensed with after the 1916 Rising in which his son had taken part. From 
1916 to 1934 the job had been held in an acting capacity by one of the 
museum's three keepers.31 In those years it was not uncommon for a 
foreigner to be appointed to a post where a suitable Irish candidate could 
not be found. Foreign nationals, particularly Germans, held technical, 
medical and administrative posts in the new Irish Free State, and it
appeared to be government practice to avoid filling such positions with
— 12 British nationals.
Mahr had first arrived in Ireland on 15 September 1927 with his 26-year- 
old wife Maria, their baby daughter Hilde and son Gustav who was later 
enrolled at Wesley College. From the time he took up his appointment at the 
museum on 29 September 1927, Mahr threw himself enthusiastically into his 
new job, reorganising the Irish Antiquities section and purchasing new 
items to exhibit there_ Former and current museum staff acknowledge that 
Adolf Mahr's contribution to the National Museum was a positive one.33 Mahr 
made it his business to know his newly adopted country well. In 1928 he was
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elected a member of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, and in 
1931 he edited the first volume of C h r i s t i a n  A r t  i n  A n c i e n t  I r e l a n d . Two of 
Mahr's essays appeared in the second volume of the same work, edited by Dr 
Joseph Raftery and published in 1941 when Mahr was working at the Foreign 
Office in Berlin. Mahr was also a member of the Royal Irish Academy and 
wrote for its P r o c e e d i n g s, as well as contributing to the English quarterly 
A n t i q u i t y  and many German publications. As president of the Prehistoric 
Society, in 193 7, Mahr delivered a presidential address on 'New Aspects and 
Problems in Irish Prehistory'. In 1939, the year he left Ireland, Mahr's 
book A n c i e n t  I r i s h  H a n d i c r a f t was published by the Thomond Archaeological 
Society and Field Club in Limerick.34
If Mahr had worked solely as a museum director he might never have 
attracted the publicity which after the war would see him named as a Nazi 
in heated Dáil exchanges and which led, effectively, to his being barred 
from resuming his museum work in Dublin. But during the 1930s Mahr had 
another role in Ireland which gave him an influence far beyond that of a 
museum director. He was head of the Irish section of the powerful 
Auslandsorganisation or AO, the Nazi party's foreign organisation. In the 
latter position, his powers in the small pre-war Austro-German colony 
exceeded those of the German Minister to Ireland. According to the 
historian J.P. Duggan, 'Mahr's AO was responsible for getting two diplomats 
recalled' to Berlin. They were Dr Georg von Dehn (posted to the German 
legation from 1923-34) and Herr Erich Schroetter (1936-37). Duggan also 
notes that the AO 'sent agents abroad to propagate Nazi doctrines and to 
extend party discipline over German nationals. It was also given the task 
of maintaining contacts with subversive organisations'.35
The AO was not a secret organisation but it was far more than just an 
umbrella group for Germans living abroad. Its functions spanned everything 
from the promotion of Irish-German trade links, to keeping an eye on 
Germans outside the Fatherland, monitoring political developments in the 
host country, and providing suitable candidates for espionage. Founded in 
1931 by Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle, the Auslandsorganisation was, according to one 
major study of German military intelligence, 'by far the most important 
Nazi agency for gathering foreign information'.36 By 1939 the AO had over 
50,000 members worldwide, and Bohle had been rewarded with a post as State 
Secretary in the Foreign Office. Whether it was because of his earlier work
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for the AO in Ireland or not, Mahr too was to join the Foreign Ministry in 
1940, following a brief period of part-time work at Berlin's Prehistory 
Museum. As AO chief in Ireland, Mahr would have been responsible, as was 
every AO district leader, for drawing up a monthly report on the local 
political situation. These reports, which sometimes included economic and 
military information, were forwarded to Bohle and then scrutinised by 
senior Nazi party figures like Hess, Bormann and Himmler. Internationally, 
the AO provided a pool of potential spies and, as early as 193 7, was 
maintaining liaison with the German counterintelligence service, the 
Abwehr.3 7
Irish Military Intelligence records for 1938-46 reveal that Adolf Mahr's 
enthusiasm for his National Museum work was paralleled by his AO activities 
on behalf of the Nazi party. G2 officers noted that 'Germans arriving in 
Dublin were supposed to report to Mahr', adding, 'There is record of a man 
called Plass (an exchange student) being reprimanded for failing to do so'. 
G2 was convinced that Mahr was using his position in Ireland to rally both 
Irish and Germans to the Nazi cause. In 1945 a G2 report on Mahr commented 
that while living in Dublin he had been 'an open and blatant Nazi and made
many efforts to convert Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had
- 18 associations to Nazi doctrines and beliefs'.
Dr Joseph Raftery, who worked with Mahr in the 1930s, recalled that the
Austrian was a good museum director. His recollection of Mahr was not as
'an open and blatant Nazi'. Of his decision to leave Dublin for Germany in
July 1939, Dr Raftery said Mahr 'could not have been expected to do
otherwise, given his loyalty to the [Nazi] party and the advent of war'. In
fact, Mahr had been appointed the official Irish representative to the
Sixth International Congress of Archaeology which was due to be held in
Berlin in August 1939. If any member of the Mahr family was an active Nazi
it was, according to Dr Raftery, his wife Maria. Dr Raftery remembers Maria
Mahr at a social occasion in Dublin 'standing like Joan of Arc, reciting a
poem about the Munich putsch, and shouting the last line at the top of her
voice, "und ihr habt doch gesiegt, und ihr habt doch gesiegt" (you have
conquered nevertheless)'. Raftery added that Mahr, though a Nazi supporter,
3 9was not anti-Jewish.
Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann, who met Mahr before and during the war, found 
him 'a very modest and simple person, and very enthusiastic about his
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archaeology1. She doubted if he had used his position in Dublin for spying 
purposes, if only because of the paltry information about Ireland which she 
said was subsequently available to the wartime radio propaganda service.
But Mrs Clissmann agreed that Mahr was active in the Nazi party in Ireland 
before the war. She put this down to:
the sort of enthusiasm that we Irish find in our American exiles. A kind 
of 'the green hills far away'; a kind of exile's enthusiasm where 
everything has to be right and everything that's done is right. We see 
reflections of it in a lot of long-time Irish emigrants' attitudes to 
the North or towards the IRA, or in other respects. He had that kind of 
idealistic, impractical admiration for the development in Germany - 
Germany's escape from the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, 
reunification of Germany and Austria. In fact, he had a great sympathy 
for Austria, a great feeling for Austria.40
Mahr appears to have attracted intense loyalty among those who worked 
with him in the 1930s. A former colleague, the Scottish archaeologist 
Howard Kilbride-Jones, recalls Mahr as 'a very generous man. He always 
thought of other people's welfare...He was a workacholic, sometimes 
remaining in the museum until 10 p.m.'. According to Kilbride-Jones, Mahr 
knew the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, well. In June 1938, the two 
archaeologists visited de Valera to seek extra funds to complete an 
excavation at Drimnagh. After a half-hour discussion 'we left with Dev's 
personal cheque for £400'.41 As noted above, Adolf Mahr's daughter, Mrs 
Ingrid Reusswig, confirms her father's links with de Valera and claims that 
the Fianna Fail leader knew that Mahr was a Nazi party member. She says the 
main reason her father was attracted to Nazism was because it sought a 
political union, or Anschluss, between Germany and Austria.42
By the spring of 1939 Mahr's activities outside the museum had attracted 
the attention of the Garda special branch and G2. From mid-1939 the 
authorities ordered the surveillance of mail destined for the Mahr family 
home at 37, Waterloo Place. This revealed a mixed bag of anti-Jewish 
newsletters from Germany, an invitation to a Nazi old boys' reunion in 
Vienna, letters from academic colleagues, and a detailed list of arrivals 
and departures of German nationals sent to Mahr from the German Legation in
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Dublin. One of the last letters Adolf Mahr received before leaving Ireland 
came from Ludwig Mühlhausen in Berlin. Addressing the note to 'Dear Party 
Comrade Mahr', Mühlhausen thanked him for sending newspaper clippings about 
the Irish language and announced he was taking over the editorship of the 
Z e i t s c h r i f t  f ü r  C e l t i s c h e  P h i l o l o g i e , edited until then by Professor Rudolf 
Thurneysen in Bonn. Mühlhausen asked Mahr's help to boost the journal's 
circulation which 'is so ridiculously small as to be not worth mentioning'. 
Mühlhausen wrote that his work entitled Ten I r i s h  F o l k t a l e s  had been sent 
to the printers that day, 4 July 193 9, and he signed off 'Heil Hitler, ever 
yours'. A letter dated 18 August to her housekeeper in Dublin, from Maria 
Mahr, then holidaying at the Hotel Lindenhof in Millstadt-am-See, spelled 
out Adolf Mahr's travel plans: 'my husband is going to Berlin, Stettin,
Kiel and then in September to the Parteitag'.43
Adolf Mahr left Cobh for Hamburg on 19 July 1939. His place as local 
head of the Auslandsorganisation was taken over by Heinz Mecking who was 
chief engineer with the Turf Development Board. Mecking had been lined up 
as successor to Mahr during a visit to Ireland by a senior AO director, 
Admiral Menske, in December 1938. The same month, Mecking attended a Nazi 
conference in London. In 1936 Heinz Mecking had come to Ireland from the 
German bog drainage equipment manufacturer Klasmann. But a contemporary 
account classed his bog drainage advice as 'disastrous' because of the vast 
differences between the German and Irish boglands. Mecking 'set himself up 
as a Nazi intelligence agent photographing railway stations, river bridges, 
sign posts and reservoirs'. He returned to Germany on the outbreak of war. 
After the German invasion of Russia, in June 1941, Mecking was sent there 
to advise on turf production during the winter campaigns. He remained there 
and died a prisoner of the Red Army on 18 December 1945, aged 43.44
Mahr had already left Ireland three days when G2 officers were busy 
copying one of the most suspicious letters ever to be mailed to his Dublin 
address. Signed by SS officer Friedrich Von Weinertsgruen at the Nazis' 
topographical office in Wenzelsplatz, Prague, it appeared to indicate that 
Mahr had supplied information which could have assisted in drawing up part 
of Germany's battle plans - particularly the top secret Operation Green, 
the invasion blueprint for Ireland. The letter was dated 11 July 193 9 and 
contained the following remarks:
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many thanks for last letter...1 have become a head official of the SS 
since the 1st June and am with the Reserve Command of the R.u.S. Head 
Office of the Prague Topographical Office. The questions referred to are 
therefore now of greater importance than ever. At all events, thank you 
sincerely for your efforts... Heil Hitler, [signed] Friedrich Maier 
(Edler) Von Weinertsgrün.45
The letter may have been one of the factors which, in 1946, permitted 
G2's Dan Bryan to inform Frederick Boland at External Affairs that:
Mahr approached one of the German intelligence sections which dealt with 
matters concerning a landing in Ireland, with a long report and was, as 
a result, employed in that section for a year or two...also employed in 
this section with Dr Mahr was Dr Otto Reinhard of our Forestry 
Department.46
In the 193 0s, Reinhard had fought off 64 other candidates for the job of
Forestry Director with the Department of Lands. But at the outbreak of war
in 1939, after registering 'only a moderate success' in the post, he left
4 7Ireland for Germany.
Some studies of the war period have suggested that Mahr used his
position at the National Musuem to build up a mass of sketches,
photographs, maps and other information for the German Army. However,
nothing thus far published has linked him so directly to Germany's invasion
plans for Ireland as do Colonel Bryan's secret memos of 1945-1946 and the 
4 8Prague letter.
The AO men Mahr and Mecking were not the only foreigners taking an 
interest in Irish affairs or actively gathering information. As noted 
already, Professor Mühlhausen built up an extensive collection of 
photographs which could have been of use to wartime Germany. In the summer 
of 193 9, Joachim Gerstenberg toured the country taking scores of pictures 
for his book E i r e ,  e i n  I r l a n d b u c h , published the following year in Hamburg. 
It included pictures of Lough Swilly in County Donegal - one of the three 
Treaty Ports - and Cobh Cathedral across the bay from another Treaty Port, 
as well as Killary Harbour and Bantry Bay, two of the deepest inlets on the 
west coast. Photographs of Tramore strand in County Waterford and Killiney
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strand in south County Dublin were also featured. Booklets designed to 
guide German troops in the event of Operation Green going ahead were 
produced from 1940 to 1941 at the Military Cartographic Institute in
occupied Brussels. They contained many photographs of Ireland and the Irish
, . 49coastline.
Little is known of Adolf Mahr's links with the SS beyond the fact that 
he was in written contact with an SS bureau in Prague in mid-1939.
According to Mahr's daughter Ingrid: 'He worked for part of the war for a
Propaganda Ministry department dealing with Jewish literature and files.'50 
But the fact that Mahr was the Foreign Office's Irish expert is beyond 
doubt. No one else working there during the war could boast the twelve 
years' experience that he had accumulated with the National Museum in 
Dublin. He was thus well placed to direct the Nazi message to Ireland in 
the war years, and this is what he was called upon to do in his role as 
head of the small but important Irish propaganda section in the Berlin 
Foreign Office. His assistant at the Foreign Office annexe near the 
Anhalter Bahnhof from mid- to end-1941 was Hilde Poepping, a former German 
exchange student who had spent a year studying Irish literature in 
Galway.51
As noted elsewhere in this study, Mahr played a key role in wresting 
control of German Radio's Irish service from the Propaganda Ministry. In 
March 1941 he drew up a blueprint for radio propaganda to Ireland which was 
personally approved by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in May of that year. The 
blueprint called for an expansion of the existing service, from fifteen 
minutes every Sunday and Wednesday night in Irish, into a nightly radio 
service in both Irish and English. In addition, Mahr's proposals envisaged 
the targeting of Irish radio audiences around the world in places such as 
the United States and Australia. But Mahr's plan did not succeed 
immediately. This was due to opposition by Goebbels' personnel at the 
Propaganda Ministry. In mid-1941, to forestall Mahr's efforts, they 
appointed their own representative to assemble an Irish team for the 
nightly broadcasts which would begin that August. Goebbels' appointee was 
Dr Wolfgang Dignowity.
50
28. Nov. 1936 fjamfcttrj 2 4  j
V /  h/ i 2-f V ,  l / t  W i T Y
P R O D U C E D  A T  T H E  B D C
|> 1E7-J*
I DOCV K C*? C I 'T T J I  i;
Wolfgang Dignowity
51
'IIH
I rl
lH
lH
I
W o l f g a n g  D i g n o w i t y :  Dr G o e b b e l s 1 I r i s h m a n
Wolfgang Dignowity was born on 4 September 1912 at Chemnitz in Saxony. 
His Nazi party membership dated from 1 July 1933. Dignowity was a graduate 
of the Nazis' Reich Presse-Schule (national college of journalism) and was 
picked by Goebbels to launch the planned expansion of the Irish radio
c 9service in the summer of 1941. As has been noted above, while the impetus 
for the expanded service came from Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office, 
Dignowity was appointed by Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry which had learned 
of the new initiative and was anxious to retain control of the Irish radio 
section.53
Dignowity presided over the initial test transmissions for the new 
nightly radio service at the end of August 1941. He had earlier recruited 
most of his 'Irish' team in Paris, including a Breton nobleman called 
Keroer, another French man called Piche, and a multi-lingual Russian 
emigree called Kowanko whose family had fled the October Revolution of 1917 
and settled in France. The nearest Digownity got to a genuine Irish recruit 
in Paris was the Dublin-born James Blair whose parents were British and who 
had been proof-reading for an American newspaper in the French capital. 
According to Mahr, Dignowity knew little or nothing about Ireland and had 
never even visited Dublin. When questioned by Mahr, Dignowity told him that 
he had spent some time on an Irish farm. However, although all foreign 
visitors were obliged to complete an alien's registration form on arrival, 
the Irish Military Archive has no record of Dignowity entering Ireland at 
any time. Mahr noted that while Dignowity had studied languages and 
economics in Germany and Geneva, his knowledge of French and Swiss affairs 
far outstripped his admittedly limited knowledge of Irish matters.54
During the short period in which Dignowity was running the fledgling 
nightly Irish service, the only people with Irish connections on his staff 
were Blair, who had not been to Ireland since he was a child, and John 
Francis O'Reilly who joined the team in September 1941. In his memoirs, 
O'Reilly wrote that Dignowity 'was affable and an accomplished linguist. 
But, like the other members of his staff, his knowledge of Ireland was 
purely geographic'. 55 On 9 September 1941, Mahr drafted a strongly worded 
report for his Foreign Office superiors criticising what he saw as 
Dignowity's unsuitability for running a radio propaganda operation for 
Irish listeners. He also pointed out that Dignowity was a Propaganda
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Ministry appointee. But it took some time for Mahr's report to be acted 
upon and Dignowity survived as head of the service until November 1941, 
when he and the two French men were removed. Shortly before Christmas Hans 
Hartmann was installed, at Mahr's behest, as the new head of the Irland- 
Redaktion.56 Mahr and Hartmann shared a common interest in Irish affairs. 
The two had known each other since 1937 when, as noted earlier, Hartmann 
applied for a student exchange visit to Ireland and had worked briefly with 
the Austrian at the National Museum in Dublin.
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Haris H ar tm a n n :  The a c c i d e n t a l  p r o p a g a n d i s t
Taking over the reins from Wolfgang Dignowity, Hans Hartmann soon 
stamped his authority on the Irland-Redaktion. Early on he refused the 
services of the Reichsrundfunk's chief English-language propagandist, 
William Joyce. Hartmann believed that Joyce, despite being the radio's 
'great star', as he put it, 'was the man to do the British broadcasts to 
England, and I did not want to have him specifically in the Irish edition'. 
In any case Hartmann noted that Joyce could already be heard in Ireland on 
the programmes beamed to England by German Radio's English service.
Hans Hartmann was born on 18 November 1909 in the village of Rustringen, 
near Oldenburg. At university he opted to study philology, a subject that 
was to dominate his life. Hartmann's love of folklore and languages would 
mark him out later as one of Germany's leading linguists.
In 1933 when Hitler took power in Germany, Hartmann, like many others of 
his generation, was put under pressure to join the Nazi party. He explains:
I became a member of the National Socialist party in 1933 . The reason 
was that my studies had been paid for by the Studienstiftung [student 
foundation] whose members were told that the Reich had done so much to 
promote their studies that they should show some gratitude, and that the
least they could and should do was to enter the party. That I did in
5 7order to be left undisturbed further on.
Hartmann was appointed a lecturer in Celtic Studies at Berlin University
in 1942 yet he had deliberately avoided the mainstream of German academic
life. The path of chemicals or engineering would have meant a lucrative job 
in the Third Reich's expanding industrial and armaments sector, but it was 
not for him. In the 1930s Hartmann was at his happiest wandering the remote 
boreens of Connemara and Donegal. In those Gaeltacht areas he tried to get 
to grips with the dialectical maze of a language which had, at that time,
C Qfew written guidelines for students.
In 1936, at the age of 27, the scholar from Rustringen graduated from
Berlin University after completing a paper entitled 'Studies on the stress 
pattern of adjectives in Russian'. He never visited the Soviet Union but 
told this author:
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I learnt Russian in 1930-31 from a well-educated, bilingual German-
Russian emigré evicted from a flourishing estate situated in the area of
Saratov, the principal town of the German Volga Republic, who was
S 9naturally strongly opposed to Soviet communism.
Within a short time of his graduation Hartmann was to switch his 
attentions westwards to Ireland and the Celtic world. In 193 7, he made his 
first trip to Ireland to study the Irish language and folklore. Arriving at 
Cobh on 3 April he made his way to Dublin to work at the National Museum 
with Mahr. Hartmann initially held a 12-month residence permit issued by 
the Department of Justice. As with all foreigners, he had to complete an 
alien registration card60 and this shows a young bespectacled scholar with 
dark hair, cut short at the back and sides. The secret file kept on 
Hartmann by the Irish Army's intelligence section, G2, indicates that, 
despite the apparently innocuous nature of his study trip to Ireland, he 
was kept under close surveillance for the duration of his two and a half 
year visit.61
Staying in a flat at Dartmouth Square, Hartmann's attendance at German
social functions was noted on his G2 file from the start of 1939. Hartmann
enjoyed meeting his fellow Germans, particularly at the Red Bank restaurant
in d'Olier Street, Dublin, where on Wednesday nights he would join Helmut
Clissmann and Adolf Mahr over pints of Guinness, ignoring the German beer
G 2that had been specially imported by the restaurant's owners. Clissmann 
was a former student of Trinity College who ran the German Academic 
Exchange Service in Dublin. The service brought students from Germany to 
study at Irish universities and sent Irish students in the opposite 
direction. During the war, as an agent for Abwehr II, the German Counter 
Intelligence division responsible for contacts with discontented minority 
groups in foreign countries, Clissmann would be involved in the preparation 
of operation Sea Lion, Hitler's planned invasion of England. He was also 
privy to the top-secret, but unsuccessful, plan to land IRA leader Sean 
Russell on the Dingle peninsula from a U-boat.63
As well as noting Hartmann's visits to Helmut Clissmann, G2 officers 
followed him on his travels around the country, reporting that in County 
Donegal he stayed at the Seaview Hotel in Bunbeg and toured the county with 
the same local folklore specialist who helped Ludwig Mühlhausen, namely
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Sean 0 Heochaidh. They noted that Hartmann lived off a monthly allowance of
thirty pounds. But if G2 had hoped to net a leading German spy in the
person of Hans Hartmann, they were to be disappointed. Hartmann's mission
was purely academic. He wanted to master the Irish language - which he
amazed everyone by doing in little over two years - as well as gathering
folklore material for a thesis leading to a lecturing post at Berlin 
64University.
In Dublin he was assigned to work under Adolf Mahr at the National 
Museum, but Mahr soon realised Hartmann was not cut out for museum work and 
arranged for his transfer to the Folklore Commission, then housed at 
University College Dublin in Earlsfort Terrace. Professor James Hamilton 
Delargy was director of the commission which had been set up in 1935. There 
Hartmann was in his element, working with Maire MacNeill and Sean 0 
Suilleabhain, a native of Kenmare, Co Kerry, who formed a close friendship 
with the German. Together with 0 Suilleabhain, Hartmann drew up a 
questionnaire seeking details of Gaeltacht folklore including 
superstitions, beliefs and fairytales. Copies of the questionnaire were 
sent to people in the Kerry, Connemara, and Donegal Gaeltachts, and the 
results were collated by Hartmann.65 Under the direction of Ludwig 
Miihlhausen, then in charge of the Department of Celtic Studies at Berlin 
University, Hartmann used the folklore material as the basis for his 1941 
thesis entitled 'Sickness, Death, and Concepts of the Hereafter in 
Ireland'. The work was highly regarded and, the following year, earned him 
a lecturer's job in Miihlhausen's Department. When part of his study 
appeared as a book in 1942, Hartmann dedicated it to the President of 
Ireland, Douglas Hyde.66
Ever suspicious of the activities of foreign nationals, G2 noted that 
Hartmann:
appears to have been accepted as genuine by the folklore [commission]
people, eg. he is said to have gone to Donegal on Delargy's advice, and
Delargy supported his application for an extension of his stay here.
The Gardai noted Hartmann's continued attendance at gatherings of the 
German colony at the Red Bank restaurant, as well as his regular visits to 
Adolf Mahr's house at Waterloo Place. A Garda report added: 'at no time
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have they [Hartmann and Mahr] been observed in the company of each other 
outside' . 67
On 17 September 1938, the Garda detectives followed Hartmann to a 
showing at the Olympia of a German film which featured coverage of Hitler's 
visit to Rome. He was accompanied by a TCD student Hans Garlach. Each day 
the Gardai followed Hartmann to the Folklore Commission in Earlsfort 
Terrace where he worked in room 55. The police also noted that Hartmann was
C Qoften accompanied by the German legation's typist, Helen Neugebauer.
Hartmann says that he would like to have continued his folklore work in 
Ireland, but the pace of world events dictated otherwise. His departure was 
decided when Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September
1939. Some forty members of the German colony, including Hartmann, left 
Ireland on 11 September 1939. Under alarming headlines detailing the German 
army's advance on Warsaw and clashes with French troops in the Saar region, 
The I r i s h  T i m e s carried a photograph of the German Minister to Ireland, 
Eduard Hempel, seeing off Charles Budina, a German-born County Wicklow 
hotelier, and Dr Robert Stumpf, a radiologist at Baggot Street Hospital who 
was also a junior Nazi party official. The Germans boarded the S.S. Cam br ia  
at Dün Laoghaire bound for home via Britain and Holland. Three buses, their 
windows blacked out, transported the German party under military escort 
from Holyhead to London. After staying there a few nights on the bare
boards of the deserted German ambassador's residence, they were put aboard
6 9a ship bound for Rotterdam.
Back in Berlin in the autumn of 193 9, Hartmann continued working on his 
Irish folklore material with the help of Ludwig Mühlhausen at Berlin 
University. The following year he would join Mühlhausen in giving Irish 
talks on the radio, and in December 1941 he was installed by Mahr as head 
of German Radio's propaganda service for Ireland. Hartmann's task was to 
ensure that the programmes, in both Irish and English, would conform to the 
blueprint drawn up nine months earlier by Mahr for Ribbentrop. Essentially 
this called for the use of virulently anti-British propaganda, while 
stressing the wisdom - and from a German standpoint the necessity - of 
Ireland's remaining neutral in the conflict. To carry out the strategy of 
his mentor at the Foreign Office, Hartmann took on a diverse English- 
speaking team of Irish and non-Irish broadcasters who would serve him on 
and off throughout his three and a half year tenure as head of the Irland-
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Redaktion. The story of German Radio's propaganda service to Ireland is 
very much the story of those individuals.
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Chapter 3 
Berlin's Irish Team
Of the various Irish people who staffed the Irish service of German Radio 
from 1941 to 1944, a number led colourful lives. The most distinguished was 
undoubtedly Francis Stuart, the author whose writings are still widely 
regarded and who returned to live in Ireland thirteen years after the war. 
His role is considered in chapter four and that of the non-Irish members of 
the Irland-Redaktion in chapters five and six. But what of the other Irish 
members of the team? For Francis Stuart was neither the first nor the only 
Irish, or Irish-born, person to be employed to broadcast to Ireland from 
Berlin. Before Stuart arrived, John O'Reilly had been recruited by Wolfgang 
Dignowity. O'Reilly, described by one Nazi official as 'a pig-headed 
opportunist', hailed from Kilkee, Co Clare, and was proud of what he 
described as his 'Irish spirit of independence'. After Stuart, he can be 
considered as the second most important Irish citizen to have worked for 
the Irland-Redaktion.
John Francis O'Reilly
John Francis O'Reilly was an improbable broadcaster for the Nazi radio 
service. He was an inherent adventurer, almost in the mercenary mould. The 
story of how he came to broadcast from wartime Berlin to Ireland says as 
much about the haphazard recruitment methods of German Radio as it does 
about this vaguely enigmatic Clare man. He was the only member of German 
Radio's wartime Irland-Redaktion who is known to have returned to Ireland 
on a spying mission. Susan Sweney turned down a similar mission before 
joining the radio team.1
John O'Reilly was born in Kilkee, Co Clare on 7 August 1916. His father 
Bernard was the local Royal Irish Constabulary sergeant who had taken part 
in the arrest of Roger Casement just three and a half months before John 
Francis was born. Casement was landed on the Kerry coast by a German U-boat 
on Good Friday, 21 April 1916 - three days before the Easter Rising. The 
RIC man was known thereafter as 'Casement' O'Reilly. Given that his father 
had gained notoriety through the arrest of Casement, there was more than a 
little irony in the fact that, twenty seven years later, the RIC sergeant's 
son would be dropped by parachute from a Luftwaffe plane to spy for the
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Germans. According to O'Reilly's own memoirs he duped the Germans into
taking him on as an agent simply to get back home.
In 1943, a secret Garda assessment on the younger O'Reilly's background 
noted he had 'always been regarded as the wild boy of the family'. 
O'Reilly's taste for adventure, his apparent inability to stick to any one 
job for any length of time, and his propensity for globe-trotting, proved 
early on that 'wild boy' was an apt sobriquet for the young Kilkee man. His 
early career was nothing if not varied. After being educated by the 
Christian Brothers in Kilrush, he got a job as a customs officer at 
Rosslare Harbour in 1935, but left - reportedly after failing an Irish 
language exam - to study for the priesthood at Buckfast Abbey in England. 
But the priestly life proved not to be the young O'Reilly's true vocation 
for he left after only two weeks to work as a reception clerk in a London 
hotel. His temporary move into the hotel business was prophetic in some 
ways because many years after the war he was to buy the Esplanade Hotel in 
Dublin.3
O'Reilly was in London when war broke out and in May 1940 he used his 
savings to travel to Jersey in the Channel Islands for a holiday. When that 
money was spent, O'Reilly took a job on Jersey's Beaumont Farm helping out 
with the potato harvest. He chose to stay on there, even when other Irish 
labourers returned to Britain along with the Dunkirk evacuees, and was
still doing casual work when the German Army occupied the Islands on 2 July
1940. A chance meeting with a German sentry landed the Clare man a barracks 
job at St Peter's airfield, then controlled by the Luftwaffe. Later, he 
distributed rations from the kitchen of an anti-aircraft battery on Jersey.
O'Reilly's aptitude for learning German made up for his earlier failure 
to master Irish, and by March 1941 a G2 memorandum noted that he was acting 
as an interpreter and go-between for Irish labourers and the German 
commander on Jersey. The Germans regarded him as something of a leader. 
Having manoevered himself into a position of trust and limited authority, 
O'Reilly approached the German military commander of Jersey, Prince Van 
Baldeck, seeking travel papers to get to Germany. O'Reilly later told Irish 
Intelligence officers that his idea was to make contact with the Irish 
Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, and to get back home to 
neutral territory. But the Germans had other ideas. Van Baldeck did a deal 
with O'Reilly, telling him he would get his travel papers for Germany on
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condition he brought as many Irishmen with him as he could persuade to work 
in German factories to assist the war effort. The German commander also 
insisted that O'Reilly make sure that there were no British agents or 
Irishmen with pro-British views among them.
With promises of good pay, generous holidays and their return passage to 
Ireland to be paid for once the war was over, O'Reilly managed to recruit 
no less than 72 Irishmen. They set off for Germany on 5 July 1941. But one 
thing the Germans had not bargained for was the ability of Irish labourers 
to celebrate the end of seasonal work on Jersey coupled with the promise of 
lucrative work in the Fatherland. The train journey from the North coast of 
France to Germany degenerated into something close to bedlam with 
O'Reilly's new recruits spending their savings on a massive drinking spree 
which caused havoc.
Reconstructing the events two and a half years later, Irish Army 
Intelligence officers noted that:
on the journey from Jersey through occupied France, the party was 
anything but well-behaved. They had a fair amount of money saved and 
proceeded at once to get completely drunk and out of hand...the train 
was divided into various compartments acccording to nationality. 
O'Reilly's party invaded all compartments of the train and on several 
occasions pulled the communication cords causing an amount of confusion. 
As accepted leader of the party, he [O'Reilly] had to bear the brunt of 
the criticism.4
On arrival in Germany, the Irish were put to work in the Hermann Goring 
armaments factory in Watenstedt. O'Reilly wrote to his parents in Kilkee on 
27 July 1941 saying he had a job as an interpreter to the German forces at 
Watenstedt.
Despite Prince Van Baldeck's optimism, O'Reilly's men never quite 
measured up to the German role model of industrial workers and the train 
disorder proved not to be an isolated incident. The Irish were kept apart 
from other nationalities. They disregarded rules, coming back drunk at 
night, singing and shouting, and - most dangerously from the German point 
of view - switching on factory lights during the blackout. Tiring of the 
continuous complaints from the German authorities about his men's drunken
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behaviour, O'Reilly decided it was time to leave. In September, just two 
months after arriving in the Third Reich and two years into the war, he 
applied for a job in Berlin writing articles for German Radio's new nightly 
Irish service. At the Radio Centre in Berlin, the Kilkee man was given a 
microphone test and hired. The fact that he got the job was not altogether 
surprising as he was then the only Irish national in the Irland-Redaktion, 
a fact which upset O'Reilly and brought him into conflict with his 'Irish' 
colleagues who were in fact German, French, English and Russian. When 
O'Reilly first arrived at the Radio Centre in September 1941 there were 
only a handful of regular contributors to the Irland-Redaktion. They 
included James Blair, one Sonja Kowanko who gave talks under the name of 
Linda Walters, two Frenchmen named Piche and Keroer, and the German 
director Dignowity.
O'Reilly did not begin broadcasting to Ireland immediately. He was first 
given the job of scripting short articles of Irish interest for Blair who 
used the fictitious name Pat O'Brien on air. Later on, both O'Reilly and 
his friend Liam Mullally would use the same cover name, Pat O'Brien, for 
their broadcasts. But O'Reilly also used his real name when delivering his 
first few radio talks in October 1941. Irish Army monitors heard O'Reilly 
broadcasting on 2 8 October 1941 and reported that: 'Talk dealt with
religion. Ireland in the Penal Laws was compared with Russia under 
communist rule.'5
In January 1942, Dorothea Susan Hilton, who broadcast under her maiden
¿Tname of Susan Sweney, joined the Irish team. O'Reilly told G2 officers 
later that:
Hilton proved unreliable and fond of drink, and Blair's services were 
not satisfactory as he was believed to be getting stale. Following a 
scene in which Susan Hilton used endearing terms to Blair while he was 
in the announcing box and still on the air, their services were
ndispensed with.
The pair were sacked in March 1942, and John Francis O'Reilly was 
promoted, not only taking over Blair's 'Pat O'Brien1 talks but also putting 
out three general news bulletins a night. Although O'Reilly had his own 
ideas about what should be broadcast to Ireland, he was never given a
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totally free hand to do as he thought fit. Hartmann considered him a 
relatively low-key member of staff compared, for example, to Francis Stuart 
whom Hartmann found 'highly intelligent'. Both Hartmann and Stuart were 
lecturers at Berlin University. Consequently, Stuart got a freer hand in 
choosing the subject matter for his broadcasts, although even in his case 
the texts had to be submitted in advance, first to Hartmann and then the 
English section. O'Reilly, who was not an academic, did channel his own 
ideas to Stuart for use in the latter's weekly talks entitled 'Through 
Irish Eyes'. In fact, O'Reilly, Stuart and the IRA man Frank Ryan met from 
time to time to discuss the contents of Stuart's broadcasts. However,
Stuart found neither man to be of the slightest help to him. Stuart saw 
O'Reilly as a 'pretty nasty character. He was a sort of mercenary, not that 
he ever did any fighting'. Stuart notes that O'Reilly 'lived in great 
style' and adds: 'I was very suspicious of him because he could easily have
pbeen a double agent'.
O'Reilly's former career pattern did not augur well for his tenure at 
the Radio Centre, and a difficult working relationship with Hans Hartmann 
caused him some unease. O'Reilly had a row with Hartmann when the German 
academic insisted that O'Reilly read lengthy extracts from Wolfe Tone's 
diaries on air. Hartmann had purchased Irish and English language versions 
of the diaries while working as a folklore student in Ireland four years 
earlier and felt they contained a pertinent message for Irish listeners. He 
had incorporated them as a regular feature of his Irish talks since taking 
over the service in December 1941. But, angry at being asked to read what 
he considered to be 'uninteresting' material, O'Reilly handed the Wolfe 
Tone scripts back and told Hartmann what he thought of them. However, the 
Clareman was rapped over the knuckles and told to carry on. O'Reilly was 
also upset that musical items played on the Irish programmes had no 'actual 
Irish basis'. Eventually, he decided to look for another job. In June 1942, 
just nine months after joining the radio service, O'Reilly made contact 
with an American working for an S.S. unit. The American got him an 
interview with an S.S. official who sounded O'Reilly out about working in 
Spain as an agent gathering military intelligence from refugees, 
shipwrecked Allied sailors and others. O'Reilly, who by this time wanted to 
get home to Ireland, told the S.S. contact that he would prefer to be sent 
on a mission to Northern Ireland. The German official said he would need at
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least six months' intensive training for such a task. Three days later, 
O'Reilly was summoned back to the same S. S. bureau and told his application 
to work as a German intelligence agent had been approved. But it was to be 
another three months before he found out what the Germans had in mind for 
him. From June to September 1942 O'Reilly continued working for Hartmann's 
small radio team. Then suddenly he was summoned back to the S.S. office and 
informed that the past three months had been spent checking out his 
credentials and reliability. He was told to leave the radio and prepare for 
specialised training as a spy.
Back at the Radio Centre, O'Reilly told Hartmann of his decision to 
leave. After the war he wrote, 'I knew I could trust Dr Hartmann. He 
appeared to have considerable influence in the Foreign Office. He was a 
member of the National Socialist party and he was obviously attached to 
Ireland'. Alarmed at losing a genuine Irish member of his team of 
announcers, Hartmann contacted Helmut Clissmann who, in 1942, was attached 
to the German Army's Brandenburg Regiment. Clissmann was not able to 
intervene. Hartmann agreed to O'Reilly's departure once he had found an 
Irish substitute. The substitute was O'Reilly's friend Liam Mullally, an 
English language teacher at the Berlitz school in Berlin. As Mullally began 
work at the Radio Centre, O'Reilly made his way to Bremen on 17 September 
1942 to begin training as an espionage agent. So it was that by the age of 
twenty six, John Francis O'Reilly had made the transition from customs 
official to seminarian, from hotel receptionist to potato picker, from 
interpreter to armaments worker and on to broadcaster and spy. The Kilkee 
man was now about to embark on what he called 'my great adventure into the 
Intelligence branch of the German Navy in Bremen'. He still had over a year 
to wait before the journey home would become a reality. Ahead of him lay a 
tough training programme in wireless telegraphy as well as the construction 
and repair of radio sets. He also received instruction in the use of 
invisible inks, and how to condense intelligence reports to a minimum. As 
1942 drew to a close, plans were afoot to send O'Reilly home aboard a U- 
boat bound for the west coast of Ireland. But when he returned from three 
weeks leave in January 1943 he was told the U-boat plan had been dropped. 
The same month, he was transferred from Bremen to Hamburg for further 
training.10
The various branches of the Nazi intelligence services could not
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apparently agree on what to do with their new recruit. Francis Stuart felt 
the Clare man wanted to return home to Ireland for purely personal reasons, 
while some Germans involved felt O'Reilly would be unreliable as a spy. 
O'Reilly then became the subject of top level discussions within the Nazi 
spy hierarchy. Edmund Veesenmayer, the Nazi's so-called coup d'etat 
specialist, had been picked by Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, to stir up 
rebellion in Ireland. His master plan to return IRA leaders Sean Russell 
and Frank Ryan to Ireland fell through when Russell died aboard a U-boat on 
14 August 1940, just 100 miles west of Galway. Despite the setback, 
Veesenmayer still harboured a desire to get Frank Ryan back home to take 
over the secret task originally assigned to Russell. He felt the moves to 
get O'Reilly to Ireland were interfering with the more important Ryan plan, 
and asked Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (German counter 
intelligence) to cancel the O'Reilly plan. Veesenmayer directed his right- 
hand man Kurt Haller to draw up unflattering assessments of both O'Reilly 
and Liam Mullally. The latter, it had been planned, might be sent back on 
the spying mission with O'Reilly. Haller pulled no punches in his report 
for the Foreign Ministry, describing O'Reilly as a 'pig-headed 
opportunist', and Mullally as 'an irresponsible, albeit affable, 
chatterbox'. Veesenmayer's efforts caused O'Reilly's departure by U-boat to 
be cancelled in January 1943. But O'Reilly was an SS recruit, and the SS 
wanted to press ahead with their plan to return O'Reilly and another 
Irishman, John Kenny, to Ireland. Consequently, unknown to either the 
Foreign Office or Abwehr, O'Reilly was dropped over his home area of County 
Clare from a German aircraft at 2 a.m. on IS December 1943. The parachute 
landing was made four miles from Kilkee, just across the Shannon estuary 
from the transatlantic flying-boat harbour at Foynes, where the noise of 
the Luftwaffe plane's engine would attract less attention. O'Reilly was 
carrying a wireless transmitter/receiver in a brown suitcase, and £300 in 
cash. But the Telefunken transmitter never sent secret messages back to 
Berlin and ended its days gathering dust at the military archive in Dublin. 
Within hours of landing, O'Reilly was arrested and taken to Arbour Hill 
prison in Dublin. John Kenny was also captured shortly after parachuting 
over Clare three days later.11
O'Reilly and Kenny's swift discovery was due to the fact that British 
Intelligence had tipped off G2 that the Luftwaffe planes were on their way
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to deliver a 'human cargo'. Liaison between Irish and British Intelligence
12was well developed by that stage of the war.
The two parachute incidents put a strain on Eamon de Valera's policy of 
neutrality. The arrival of O'Reilly and Kenny coincided with increasing 
pressure on de Valera's government by the American Minister to Ireland, 
David Gray, who wanted Axis diplomats expelled from Dublin. The Dublin 
government tried to keep the arrest of both men secret but, despite strict 
press censorship, a newspaper did report that an injured man had been found 
in a field in Clare. It would also have been difficult for G2 to prevent 
rumours of the parachute drops spreading since injuries sustained by Kenny 
on landing had been treated at hospitals in Kilrush, Ennis and Dublin. 13 A 
report of the parachute drops also featured in a secret weekly report drawn 
up for the American Office of War Information in Washington by Dan Terrell, 
who was a press attaché with the U.S. legation in Dublin. 14
Fearing the parachute incidents would reflect badly on Ireland's 
delicate policy of neutrality, de Valera instructed Joe Walshe, Secretary 
of the Department of External Affairs, to cable Ireland's representative in 
Washington, Robert Brennan, with instructions to lobby the State 
Department. 15 The Kilkee parachute landings continued to cause diplomatic 
ripples for some time. On 21 February 1944 the U.S. ambassador in Ireland, 
David Gray mentioned the arrival of O'Reilly and Kenny in a diplomatic note 
to de Valera requesting that Axis diplomats to be expelled from Dublin. De 
Valera rejected Gray's demand. 16
The Germans' plan to use O'Reilly as a spy backfired badly because,
while the Clareman was imprisoned in Dublin, G2 tricked him into disclosing
a secret code he had been trained to use for relaying radio messages back
to Germany. During the night of 5/6 July 1944 O'Reilly escaped from
Arbour Hill prison in Dublin, but he was quickly recaptured and spent the
18remainer of the Emergency in custody.
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?■ G A R P A  S i O C H A N A
£500 
REWARD
T h e  above s u m  will be p a id  to any  p e r s o n  giving In for­
m ation  re su l t in g  in the  a r r e s t  of JOHN FRANCIS O’REILLY, 
in te rnee ,  w ho  e s c a p e d  fro m  c u s to d y  at A rb o u r  Hill 
PfttPflfjpn r^ihlin_ o n the a ight  o! 5 t h-6th  J u l j ,  1 9 4 4
L u d e d  by P a rach u te  In C lare, 16 th  Decem ber. 1943 , and  bad been In custody  since th a t dale.
DESCRIPTION: -B o r n  Kllkee, Co. Clare. 7tb August, 1916 ; height 5 ’ 11;": 
weight 152 lbs.; fair hair; blue eyes; fresh com plexion; slim build; wore 
dark brown suit w ith  red str ip es; black sh o es; rubber soles and heels, 
believed size 10; bare head; sports shirt. May be wearing a light grey 
showerproof overcoat.
Information may be given to any Garde Station.
Proportionate rew ards w ill be paid for information concerning  
th is m m  which will assist the Garda in locating him.
A Garda 'Wanted' poster for John O'Reilly, 
issued after his escape from Arbour Hill prison 
in July 1944. O'Reilly was recaptured at the home 
? L n 1S father in Ki l k e e , Co Clare. He used the 
¿500 reward money, collected by his father, to 
buy a pub in Dublin after the war.
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Liam Mullally
Liam Mullally worked as a Berlitz language teacher in Europe during he 
1930s and early 1940s. The war years found him in Berlin sharing a villa 
with John O'Reilly. When O'Reilly left the radio service in September 1942, 
as has been stated, he recommended that Liam Mullally be given his job. 
Mullally was subsequently interviewed by Hans Hartmann, and in mid-
1 9September took over O'Reilly's 'Pat O'Brien' broadcasts to Ireland.
The Irish Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock, who kept an eye 
on the comings and goings of the small ex-patriate Irish community,
reported back to Dublin that Mullally was working part-time at the radio
2 0and part-time at the Berlitz school. According to Francis Stuart,
Mullally was:
a bit malleable in the Germans' hands and went in a lot for this anti-
atheistic, Bolshevik menace [propaganda]. I remember once in
Berlin... towards the end of the war, I said to him 'I wouldn't like to
be in your shoes if you're here when the Russians come'...that terrified
poor Mullally; between not being able to give it up [his broadcasting
2 1job] and dreading what would happen if the Russians came.
With O'Reilly's departure, Stuart notes that he and Mullally were for a
period the only Irish left working for the Irland-Redaktion. Stuart claims
that Mullally 'lived life on the black market like many of these foreigners
did'. Stuart's overall assessment of Liam Mullally was that 'he wasn't a
bad sort, but pretty timid, and he didn't know what to do'. Stuart adds
that Mullally was 'a sort of black marketeer who had drifted to Germany,
2 2and was not any great credit to Ireland'.
According to his fellow broadcaster Susan Sweney, Mullally was
2 3eventually 'given the sack for inefficiency, although efficient'. But he 
could well have feigned inefficiency to force the Germans to let him go, as 
Francis Stuart recalls that Mullally 'managed to leave' before the end of 
the war. From Berlin, Mullally went to Vienna where he met Susan Sweney in 
the city's press club. Mullally was employed in Vienna as a valet to Norman 
Baillie-Stewart, who for a while had worked with William Joyce in the 
English radio propaganda service in the Reich capital, when Mullally 
returned on a brief visit to Berlin, Stuart met him and noted that:
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He must have been living in great style...he said, 'I have an easy job. 
Baillie-Stewart gets special rations on the black market, and all I have 
to do is exercise his dog mornings and evenings'. In the midst of a war, 
when defeat is looming them in the face you know, this old carry-on. 24
Frank Ryan
Frank Ryan, a leading IRA figure in the 1930s, featured in Nazi 
Germany's plans to engineer a coup d'état against de Valera in 1940. He 
accompanied the IRA leader, Sean Russell, aboard a U-boat destined to land 
both men on the Dingle peninsula in August 1940. But Russell died of a 
perforated ulcer aboard the U-boat and the mission was aborted, with Ryan
O  r  O  £returning to Berlin. Though Ryan had broadcast on Radio Madrid for the
Republican government during the Spanish civil war - in which he fought
with the International Brigade against Franco's forces - he never broadcast
for the Nazis who harboured him in wartime Berlin. Even if he had wanted to
broadcast to Ireland, the Nazis would not have allowed him to do so since
his presence in the Third Reich was supposed to be a highly guarded secret.
Ryan did however contribute indirectly to German Radio's Irish
propaganda effort by advising Francis Stuart on the content of his weekly
broadcasts. 27 In 1943, Ryan advised the German Foreign Office against
launching a propaganda service aimed at Irish-Americans. In mid-1944 Ryan
was planning to accept an invitation from Hans Hartmann to join the Irland-
Redaktion as a translator and advisor. Although he had made arrangements to
get travel papers to visit Hartmann in Luxembourg, Ryan fell ill and died
2 8in a Dresden sanitorium on 10 June 1944. °
Francis Stuart
The Irish author, Francis Stuart, made his first broadcast to Ireland 
from Berlin on St Patrick's Day 1942. He continued to work for the Irland- 
Redaktion for almost two years until January 1944. The major role which he 
played there is considered in detail in chapter four.
William Joseph Murphy
William Murphy from County Armagh had, like Liam Mullally, worked as a 
language teacher in Europe before the outbreak of war. He had made several 
trips home to his native Bessbrook during many years' service with Berlitz
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in Germany, Holland, Belgium and Yugoslavia. When war was declared, Murphy 
was working with Berlitz in the German city of Essen where he was arrested 
as a British citizen by the police and thrown into prison. But he was freed 
two days later after protesting that he was Irish and thus a neutral, 
despite holding a British passport. Murphy continued to teach in Essen, but 
had to report regularly to the police.
In mid-1942, the Berlitz teacher was contacted by a John Freeman who 
claimed to be Irish and worked for an Essen publishing company called 
Verlag Girardet. Freeman tried to recruit him for a spying mission to 
Ireland. Murphy was taken to an Abwehr office in Bremen where one Hauptmann
Steffens gave him details of the mission, which was to report on the effect
of German bombing raids in Northern Ireland. Anxious to persuade the 
Germans to send him home to Ireland on any pretext, even spying, Murphy 
applied for and got an Irish passport from William Warnock and then 
surrendered his British passport. But a series of heavy Allied bombing 
raids on Essen led to confusion and to the abandonment of the spy mission. 
Murphy lost track of Freeman and resigned his teaching job to take a new 
one with Berlitz in Berlin. On 22 November 1943, two days after he got to 
the Reich capital, the Berlitz school in Berlin was destroyed in an air 
raid, leaving Murphy out of work.
The Bessbrook man managed to trace John Freeman to a house at
Florastrasse in Berlin where he tried to reactivate the Irish spy mission.
But a chance meeting with an American in a Berlin café got Murphy a meeting 
with William Joyce, alias Lord Haw Haw. In January 1944 Joyce took Murphy 
on for a month's studio trial in Berlin, paying him 20 marks a day. 
Afterwards, Murphy briefly joined Hans Hartmann's Irish service in 
Luxembourg. Hartmann recorded Murphy's voice to see if he would make 
suitable announcer material but the test was a failure and Hartmann told 
Murphy that he also considered him unsuitable as a translator. Since Murphy 
had got a month's contract, Hartmann had to keep him on for another three 
weeks. He saw out his time working two hours a day. He described this 
experience as follows:
Most of my work was thrown into the wastepaper basket...the section of
the Luxembourg Rundfunk in which I was employed was engaged solely on
broadcasts to the Irish Free State. The work on which I was engaged was
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at first the translation of war and general news items from the tape
machines. But later, as I was unqualified to translate these with
sufficient speed, I was given the job of translating from various German
newspapers, articles marked by Hartmann. Most of the articles given to
2 9me to translate were hostile to British and Allied interests.
A week after starting work with the Irish team in Luxembourg, Murphy was 
surprised when Hartmann's secretary introduced him to another Irishman, 
Henry Freeman. Henry was a brother of John Freeman30 who had tried to 
recruit Murphy for the Irish spying mission. Henry, who claimed he was in 
Luxembourg to do a radio voice test, asked Murphy why the project had 
fallen through and announced that he had taken the assignment over from his 
brother John, who was ill. Another meeting with Hauptmann Steffens was 
organised in Essen at which Murphy was presented with a list of information 
which the Germans wanted from Northern Ireland and Britain concerning 
details of factories involved in the Allied war effort.
Murphy was sent to Berlin to get a visa for Ireland from the Irish 
legation there. On 9 April 1944, he met Con Cremin who was operating from 
new premises. Cremin had replaced Warnock who returned home after the 
former legation in Drakestrasse was destroyed in an air raid in September 
1943.31 Cremin was wary of Murphy's motives for wanting to return home and 
bluntly told him: 'I hope you have no idea of working for the Germans over
there, because if you have you'll be put in gaol'. Murphy assured Cremin he 
had no intention of spying. The diplomat then pointedly reminded him of 
John O'Reilly, the broadcaster-turned-spy who had been dropped by parachute 
over County Clare just four months earlier and who was at that moment 
detained in prison in Dublin. Murphy recalled that Cremin 'asked me if I 
knew who had sent O'Reilly over, as it had almost caused a serious 
diplomatic breach'. In the event Cremin's suspicions were such that Murphy
T 2never got his visa.
With no job to support himself, Murphy sought out Francis Stuart whom he 
had met during his brief stay in Luxembourg. According to Murphy, Stuart 
had said he could get him a job as an English teacher at Berlin University. 
Calling at Stuart's flat he discovered that Stuart, like himself, had a 
desire to return to Ireland. Stuart suggested that Murphy return to Bremen 
and ask the Abwehr to land them both in Ireland by U-boat along with a
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secret transmitter for the IRA. But when Murphy put Stuart's proposal to an 
Abwehr agent called König, in Bremen, the latter dismissed it as 
'nonsense'. Murphy returned empty-handed to Berlin. He claimed later that 
Stuart put him in touch with officials at the Nazi's secret 'black' 
propaganda unit, Büro Concordia, located at the Reichssportsfeld where the 
1936 Olympic Games had been staged. Stuart denies Murphy's version of 
events and says that he (Stuart) never had any links with Büro Concordia.
On 1 August 1944 the Bessbrook man began a month's trial with Concordia, 
recording talks which were scripted for him. He received 60 0 marks for the 
month's trial but did not stay around to hear if he was to be permanently 
engaged or not. He had decided to leave Germany at the earliest 
opportunity. On the pretext of returning to Luxembourg to get luggage and 
personal property which he had left in an hotel, Murphy left Berlin by 
train on 1 September. He stayed in a Luxembourg hotel and, when the U.S. 
Army liberated the Grand-Duchy on 10 September 1944, Murphy surrendered to 
American troops and asked to be put in touch with British Intelligence 
officers. 33
Elizabeth Clissmann (née Mulcahy)
Neither Elizabeth Clissmann (née Mulcahy) nor her husband, Helmut, ever 
broadcast to Ireland during the war. She was, however, connected with a 
propaganda initiative aimed at preventing U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's re-election in 1944. The Clissmanns were consulted about the 
plan by the German authorities and their advice was sought on the idea of 
beaming anti-Roosevelt propaganda to Irish communities in the United 
States. According to the Clissmanns, they decided to derail the initiative 
before it started. In March 1944 Elizabeth Clissmann travelled from Denmark 
to Luxembourg where the Irland-Redaktion was then located, in order to 
investigate the effectiveness of Hans Hartmann's Irish propaganda 
programmes and whether they could be adapted for Irish American listeners. 
Her negative report on the situation in Luxembourg, which she sent to the 
Foreign Office, helped to ensure that the anti-Roosevelt propaganda plan 
never got off the ground.
Elizabeth Mulcahy was from Sligo and her husband Helmut Clissmann hailed 
from Aachen in Germany. The two had met while studying in Dublin in the 
1930s - she at UCD and he at Trinity. In the late 1930s Helmut Clissmann
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was in charge of the German Academic Exchange service which enabled Irish 
university students to spend a year studying in Germany while their German 
counterparts travelled to Ireland. These included Hans Hartmann and Hilde 
Poepping who both worked with German Radio's Irish service during the war. 
By the outbreak of war in September 1939, Helmut had married Elizabeth and 
the couple left Ireland for Berlin. In Germany Helmut Clissmann worked for 
German Counter Intelligence, the Abwehr, and was involved in plans for the 
invasion of England, codenamed Operation Sea Lion. Later he was attached to 
the Brandenburg Regiment of the German Army, while his wife sought shelter 
from Allied bombing attacks on Germany by moving with their children to 
Copenhagen. After the war the couple again took up residence in Ireland 
where they still live. 34
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Chapter 4
Portrait of the writer at war: Francis Stuart
Francis Stuart began writing radio scripts for German Radio's English 
service as early as February 1940, just a month after starting work as a 
lecturer in Berlin University. But over two years were to pass before he 
himself sat in front of a microphone; that was on Saint Patrick's night, 17 
March 1942, when his first broadcast went out from the Rundfunkhaus in 
Berlin. From the end of July 1942 he contributed weekly talks nearly every 
Wednesday night until leaving the service in January 1944. The talks went 
out under the general title of 'Through Irish Eyes'.
The five war years in Berlin, out of a career spanning seven decades, 
were to haunt the writer for the rest of his life. In 1990 a profile of 
Francis Stuart labelled him as 'ever the outsider, still unrepentant'. Yet, 
characteristically, Stuart dismissed the fuss created by his wartime role, 
maintaining he was a writer first and foremost and that all other 
activities and consequences were peripheral. 1 Half a century after the 
Second World War, Stuart was capable of stirring a very public row in the 
press by inviting journalists to 'a celebration to mark the 51st 
anniversary of a party on St. Patrick's Day 1940 in the Hotel Kaiserhof,
Berlin'. But no sooner was Stuart attacked in print for having been linked
2to the Nazis, than he was defended by someone else.
Born in Australia in 1902, the son of a Protestant farming family from 
County Antrim, Stuart was just three and a half months old when his father 
committed suicide in an asylum. In December that year, Stuart's mother Lily 
brought her infant son home to Antrim. Later they moved to Dublin. Stuart 
was sent to boarding schools in England, including the prestigious public 
school, Rugby. Years later he told an RTE interviewer that:
the public school, of course, put the fear of God into you. If you 
survived, you know, it was meant I think in those days for the British 
foreign administration, these people who went out and ruled over the 
blacks in goodness knows where, Somalia and India. Well, I never went 
out there but I was in other institutions, various prisons for instance. 
But in some ways I never went through such real constant harrassment [as 
at Rugby] . 3
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In 1920, Francis Stuart married Iseult MacBride, the daughter of Maud 
Gonne MacBride and the French political activist Lucien Millevoye. Maud 
Gonne MacBride1s first husband was Major John MacBride, later executed for 
his part in the 1916 Rising, and their son Sean became Irish Minister for 
External Affairs in 1948. According to Stuart's biographer, Geoffrey 
Elborn, neither he nor Iseult MacBride wanted to marry, and 'both knew that 
it was a mistake'. During the Civil War, Stuart was imprisoned at 
Maryborough (Portlaoise) and later at the Curragh, after taking the 
Republican side in the conflict.
Over the following fifteen years, Stuart pursued his career as a writer, 
but eventually he grew disillusioned with Ireland and sought a break from 
the tension created by his marital difficulties. In fact, it was an 
approach in 1939 by Iseult to Helmut Clissmann that led to Stuart's being 
offered a lecture tour in Germany. He left for Berlin in April 1939 on a 
voyage that was to change his life. The National Socialists had been in 
power in Germany for six years at that stage. Of his decision to visit 
Germany, Stuart's biographer wrote: 'No informed person was unaware of what
was happening in Germany, but even as late as 193 9, Stuart was naive in his 
judgement of Hitler and the Third Reich'. Elborn quotes Stuart seeing 
Hitler as 'a kind of blind Samson who was pulling down the pillars of 
Western Society as we knew it, which I [Stuart] still believed had to come 
about before any new world could arise...'
Some of Stuart's political naivety was reflected in an interview he gave 
to Sean Rafferty for BBC Radio:
I don't like the great dictators, they're another form of establishment. 
I mean I went to Germany, and so on, and had a certain idea I could go, 
which proved false. It's no good excusing myself. Good gracious, I've 
made the most disastrous mistakes, and they've worked out reasonably 
well for me luckily. They could have been even more disastrous. Stalin 
attracted me very much at one time, and I tried to get to Russia but I 
couldn't manage it...Suddenly, I saw the new Germany. I crossed to the 
shady side of the street where the criminals lurk, and I became one of 
them. Not through choice. In fact, it was a very painful experience. I 
seem to take it lightly [being] a social outcast, isolated. It's a 
terrible experience to be a social outcast. It’s one thing to be in
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prison here in Ireland because you fought on the losing side, but you 
were a patriot, or were considered such later, and it was nothing to be 
ashamed of. But to be in prison in Germany, to be imprisoned by the 
Allies after the war, you became an associate of criminals. You were one 
of these people who advocated, I don't know what, concentration camps or 
extermination of Jews, by implication. And that was for me a very 
salutary experience, to know what it was to be, not only among the 
defeated, but to be among the condemned. Because if you can't understand 
the condemned, if you can't enter into the extraordinary situation of 
condemned people and isolated people, I can't write the sort of novels 
that I try to write. 5
Asked if he was aware of the dangers of Nazism, Stuart told the RTE 
interviewer John Skehan:
I was fully aware of the Nazis. But I had the feeling that anything was 
better than what I'd come from. I don't mean Ireland. I mean the whole 
set up, England, Ireland. It seemed to me that we had reached a point of 
utter drabness, mediocrity. I went to Berlin simply - I won't say 
simply, my motives were more mixed - but partly because here was a man 
who seemed to me, he was going to pull down the whole structure, and I 
believed in that pulling down.
¿rAsked by the interviewer if that man was Hitler, Stuart replied 'yes'.
In another RTE interview, Stuart appeared to admit that going to Germany on 
the eve of World War II was a mistake:
By going to Nazi Germany I was morally wrong. I was associating myself
with, as I've said in my novels, the executioners rather than the
victims. As to the Allies, I had and I have still only contempt for them
because they were more hypocritical than the Nazis. Hypocrisy to me is
worse, I won't say worse now than brutality. The brutality of the Nazis
was. . .it's not for me here now in the studio. . .we know all that. No, I
was associated with some very corrupt people, and I was guilty. But I've
never in my mature life tried to have a guiltless posture. I was guilty
7in many ways.
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When asked by this author if he ever felt he had been taking the side of 
evil against the side of good while in Berlin, Stuart replied:
No, I didn't. I felt I was too closely involved with a brutal and 
barbarian régime for my own good or for my own liking. That I was 
opposed to good, I never felt for a moment, because I never felt that 
the Allied nations were anything but probably equally evil. Although, 
equally or not, it's a very fine point, but at least probably even more 
corrupt and more hypocritical. X was oblivious to the fact that I was 
involved. As long as they looked like - although to me they didn't - as 
long as they were victorious, I specially felt that. When it was obvious 
they were going to lose the war, to be on the side of the losers at the 
end of such a huge war was to me as a writer a very valuable experience. 
I went to Germany under a misapprehension of course...I thought Hitler 
would have been some sort of international revolutionary destroying the 
whole system, which I soon found he was far from.
One observer of the post-war treason trials in Germany and Britain 
presumably had Stuart and his Irland-Redaktion colleagues in mind when 
writing, in 1952, that:
On that service [the Irish radio station in Berlin] educated men, some 
of them writers of standing, simpered pietistic sentiments combined with 
carneying praises of the régime which was murdering and torturing
gmillions of their fellow-Catholics in Poland.
Once in Berlin, Francis Stuart made contact with Professor Walter F. 
Schirmer, head of the University's English Department. During the war, 
Schirmer also worked at the Foreign Office as deputy head of the section 
controlling German Radio's foreign language transmissions. Stuart completed 
his lecture tour which, apart from Berlin, took in Munich, Hamburg, Bonn 
and Cologne. He was then invited by Schirmer to lecture on English and 
Irish literature at Berlin University starting in the autumn term. He 
accepted the job and returned to Ireland in July 193 9 to wrap up his 
affairs there. 10
Between Stuart's arrival back in Dublin and his eventual return to
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Berlin in January 1940, events were taking a turn which, as well as 
affecting his own life, would affect the future course of world history. On 
the bi-lateral Irish-German level, secret contacts had already been 
established earlier in the year between the IRA and the Abwehr, of which 
Helmut Clissmann became a member on his return to Germany in 1939. Parallel 
with these developments, the IRA had launched a bombing campaign in 
Britain. The campaign reached a peak on 25 August 1939 when five people 
died in an IRA bombing in Coventry. On 1 September, Germany invaded Poland. 
Two days later the governments of the United Kingdom and France declared 
war on the Third Reich. Despite the grave turn of events, Stuart went ahead 
with his plans to lecture at Berlin University, and left Ireland for the 
second time in December 193 9. Of his decision to go, Stuart says: 'When the
war looked like breaking out, I didn't want to be caught here [in Ireland]. 
I mean, for a writer to have been all those years where nothing had ever 
happened, it was necessary for me to get away ' . 11
As well as taking up his university lecturing post, Stuart was also 
acting as an IRA courier on that trip to Berlin. Before leaving Dublin, he 
had been summoned to a meeting with IRA chief of staff, Stephen Hayes, and 
Jim O'Donovan who masterminded the IRA's bombing campaign in England. The 
IRA wanted Stuart to contact the Abwehr in Berlin and ask for a new radio 
transmitter, the previous one having been seized in a police raid. They 
also wanted him to request that a liaison officer be sent to Ireland.
Stuart was given half a piece of paper to take to Berlin where the other
12half would help to identify him as the genuine IRA courier. Dismissing 
what he saw as the IRA's playacting 'like you read about in the old spy 
books', Stuart says that he got rid of the torn piece of paper when he 
reached London. The Irish writer continued on to Berlin, via Switzerland, 
with no means of identifying himself to German Intelligence:
Either they believed me when I got to Germany or they didn't. I couldn't 
care less really. They didn't believe me at first but then there was a 
man, also who'd been here [in Ireland] a long time and spoke Irish, 
called [Franz] Fromme. They asked me, 'was there nobody here to vouch 
for you?', so I said, 'If you can get hold of this Fromme, he was in 
Berlin'. They rang him up and he came round and vouched for me . 13
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Stuart wisely decided not to ask his new employer, Professor Schirmer, 
to vouch for his identity as this would have tipped off the university 
authorities that he was something more than a humble Irish lecturer. Yet, 
despite the apparently secret nature of Stuart's IRA links, according to 
Hilde Poepping, who met Stuart at the University of Berlin, Stuart 
'stressed wherever he went that he had come on a mission of the IRA, though 
he never explained to which group inside the IRA he belonged' . 14 Contrary 
to what had happened with the Abwehr, Stuart had no identification problems 
at the Foreign Office as he had taken the precaution of getting a letter of 
introduction from Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Dublin, to Ernst 
von Weizsäcker, State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry. Stuart asked for 
and got a valuable letter from the State Secretary explaining his role as 
an Irish neutral lecturing at the university, and adding that Stuart's 
teaching activities were known and approved of by the German Foreign 
Office. 15
Stuart's meeting with von Weizsäcker on 4 February proved to be the 
unintended springboard for his initiation into the Nazi propaganda system. 
Stuart himself tells the story like this:
Von Weizsäcker asked me had I listened to William Joyce's broadcasts at 
the beginning of the war when I was at home in Ireland. I said, partly 
as a joke but partly there was some truth in it... 'He's winning the war 
for you single handed with his propaganda'. Von Weizsaecker said 
'Really?'. I think that remark of mine was repeated to the Propaganda 
Ministry because shortly after that I was asked would I write some talks
-1 ¿Tfor him [William Joyce].
In fact, it was the German Foreign Office that requested Stuart to write 
some talks for Joyce. Stuart's diary entry for 18 February 1940 noted:
Was asked by Dr Haferkorn of the Foreign Office if I would write some 
talks for William Joyce...I agreed and wrote three, the first of which 
Joyce will broadcast tonight and, as I have no radio, have arranged with 
William Warnock to spend the evening with him at our legation and listen 
to it there. The theme of my contributions, which I know is not exactly 
what either the Germans nor Joyce want, is a recollection of some
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historic acts of aggression on part of the United Kingdom, similar to
17those which British propaganda is denouncing the Nazis for.
Stuart's role as Lord Haw Haw's scriptwriter was destined to be short 
lived:
As it turned out the talks I wrote were not what Joyce wanted. Above all 
they were not what the German propaganda [people] wanted - there was 
naturally nothing anti-semitic, nothing in great praise of Hitler -- 
because they had no interest in British atrocities throughout the 
ages ' . 18
While settling into his new job at the university, Stuart, then 37, met
a 24-year-old student from Danzig named Madeleine Meissner who was studying
Arts, English and Philosophy. She attended his English literature lectures,
and the two decided to live together the following year. Two and a half
years later, Madeleine would regularly introduce Stuart's weekly radio
talks, and after Iseult's death in 1954, she would become Stuart's second
wife. Having collected back pay from the university which had accumulated
since the Autumn of 193 9, Stuart decided to throw a party to celebrate St
Patrick's Day, 1940. His guests that night at the Hotel Kaiserhof, not far
from Hitler's Chancellery, included diplomats; writers; a national
newspaper editor; Herr Hauptmann, the head of the German Red Cross; and
last but not least, William Warnock, from the Irish legation. Stuart and
Warnock became friends, sometimes making up a threesome for golf along with
the diplomat's secretary, Eileen Walsh. Unwittingly or otherwise, Walsh
later supplied material for Stuart's broadcasts by giving him old Irish
newspapers, often months out of date. Stuart was also able to listen to
foreign radio broadcasts on Warnock's radio set and his own receiver -
19something the German public were forbidden to do by law.
A month later, Franz Fromme got back in touch with Stuart to introduce 
him to Hermann Goertz, an Abwehr agent who was in training for a secret spy 
mission to Ireland to make contact with the IRA. Stuart gave Goertz his 
wife's address at Laragh in County Wicklow for use as an emergency safe- 
house. Later, Stuart regretted doing so as Iseult was arrested by the 
police after Goertz made straight for her house when he parachuted into
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Ireland. This was not Stuart's final contact with German intelligence.
Abwehr agent Helmut Clissmann introduced Stuart to Kurt Haller, a close
associate of Foreign Office operative Edmund Veesenmayer who in 1940 was
trying to arrange the return of IRA leader Sean Russell to Ireland by U-
boat. Calling at Stuart's Berlin flat one evening in early August, Haller
asked the Irish writer if he would sail secretly to Ireland aboard a Breton
fishing boat to set up advance links with the IRA prior to Russell's
return. Stuart agreed but that part of the plan was abruptly dropped before
2 0Russell set sail for Ireland a short time later.
The winter of 1940 saw Francis Stuart working as a translator at German 
Radio's Drahtloser Dienst (wireless service), assisted by Madeleine who did 
secretarial work there in the late afternoons. Stuart explains his role 
there as follows:
I worked at translating German news bulletins into BBC English, so- 
called. Well, it passed in a German sense as excellent BBC English. I
don't think it was that expert. I put these items into BBC English and
. 21they'd be broadcast to England. That was my main job there.
It was while translating the German news bulletins into English that 
Stuart met William Joyce's wife Margaret. He had also seen Lord Haw Haw 
himself briefly at the Berlin Press Club, but the two did not get on, and 
Stuart never exchanged more than a few words with him, because 'something 
about Joyce I didn't like was perhaps his deeply anti-Irish background, as 
indeed all these Mosleyites had...he was very anti-Irish in his early days 
in Galway, and had collaborated with the Black and Tans 1 . Stuart saw Joyce 
as a man of 'extraordinary courage', but also 'quite a heavy drinker'. 
Perhaps understandably, given Stuart's republican credentials, he kept his 
distance from Joyce during the war, despite broadcasting from the same 
radio building in Berlin. Stuart got on better with Margaret Joyce whom he 
described as 'a very pleasant, ordinary Englishwoman'. He recalled sharing 
cups of tea with Mrs Joyce and Madeleine during bouts of translation work 
in the editor's office at the Rundfunkhaus. According to Stuart, Madeleine
Meissner got to know Mrs Joyce very well and liked her but when Stuart
2 2himself was present the two women never discussed politics. Madeleine 
recalled watching a night-time bombing raid with William Joyce from a
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window in the Radio Centre after everyone else had fled to an air raid 
shelter:
He had remained in the office, gone to the window and looked out at the 
sky with the bombs falling in the distance. I stayed with him after he 
had assured me that the bombers did not, as yet, drop their bombs over 
residential districts, but concentrated on the industrial surroundings 
of Berlin...that night, standing at the dark window, gazing out at the
bombs, I was impressed by him and was glad to have shared those few
2 3moments with him.
Despite the progress of the war and the advent of Allied bombing raids, 
Stuart was more than ever determined to stay on in Germany and said of this 
decision later:
I had the opportunity of doing something that would cut me off from all 
the b i e n  p e a s a n t s in society. I do not regret it. I don't stand over
what I did but I don't regret the consequences though they were painful.
24Without them I could not have become the writer I am now.
He repeated the line to anyone who would listen, including influential 
top Nazis like the one he met in a Berlin nightclub in 1941 with Helmut 
Clissmann and Frank Ryan:
In the club, off the Kufurstendamm, we drank two or three bottles of 
champagne. We met two of Ryan's friends. One was wearing his party 
swastika badge on a little gold plaque which meant he was a founder 
member of the Nazi party. I thought it was funny, because these were 
rare and extremely influential people, that Frank Ryan, who had come 
from the International Brigade in Spain, had such a friend. Towards the 
end of the evening, this friend of Frank Ryan said to me: 'I suppose
you'll stay on here in Germany when the war is over?'. He meant, of 
course, when Germany has won, because in 1941 it looked to most people 
as if it would. I replied: 'Well, no I won't, because I write in English
and I want to live where English is spoken', and he said, 'But, if as I 
understand, your readers are in England or America, perhaps after being
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in Germany you will lose some of them1. And I said: 'Do you know what?
When this war is over, wherever I am I hope it will be the losing side, 
because if it's the winning side it will be intolerable for me. I hope 
I'll be among the losers and the guilty'. [The top Nazi then turned to
Frank Ryan and asked if Stuart was joking. Ryan replied] 'I don't know
2 5what he means, but he's certainly not joking'.
After spending the summer holidays of 1941 in Vienna, Stuart gave up his
2 6translation work with the Drahtloser Dienst. It was a difficult time for 
Stuart who had been thinking seriously about leaving Germany before Hitler 
invaded Russia on 22 June 1941. Stuart says that: 'I would have got out,
but there was no getting out after that'. In fact, before Operation 
Barbarossa, when Germany and the Soviet Union had a peace pact, Stuart had 
made enquiries about moving to work in Moscow. He describes what happened:
I wanted then to go to Moscow. I made an application. I taught English, 
not only at the university, but also at a technical college and I had 
some Soviet students at the time when Germany and Russia had this pact. 
There were two young Soviet men, they had quite a bit of English. We 
used to have conversations and I asked them would it be possible for me 
to lecture in a school or in a university in Russia. They said 'by all 
means', and they gave me an introduction to somebody at their embassy on 
Unter den Linden. I went round and was asked, naturally, quite a few 
questions. I think the sponsorship of this young man [Stuart's student] 
was a help to me. I left them details. They phoned me a few weeks later 
to say the application was in Moscow and it was being processed. Then 
the attack on Russia came and that was that. Later, some White Russians, 
whom I'd got to know quite well in Berlin, told me 'you were lucky. You 
wouldn't have lasted any time in Moscow'. I don't know about that. These 
were White Russians [anti-communists] and they had to put another aspect 
on it . 27
Stuart continued his main work as a lecturer at Berlin university, where 
he met Hans Hartmann who was writing his doctoral thesis based on the 
folklore studies he had carried out in the Donegal and Connemara Gaeltachts 
from 1937 to 1939. After taking charge of the revamped Irland-Redaktion in
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December 1941, Hartmann asked Stuart to contribute weekly talks on the 
Irish service. The two men got on well, with Hartmann considering Stuart to
be 'a very intelligent man whom I highly appreciated. He was a sincere man
2 fland often didn't hold back with criticism'. Stuart for his part thought 
Hartmann a very scholarly man, and he admired the fact that someone was 
doing something to counteract the Allied propaganda which Stuart found 
hypocritical. Stuart described Hartmann's approach to him to do the 
broadcasts:
He asked me would I do a weekly broadcast. I made some conditions that I
would do it, but it would be largely as a neutral to a neutral [country]
and, in so far as it had any influence at all, with the emphasis on
remaining neutral. There was a flood of Allied propaganda coming into
all countries, and Ireland, with not a single voice counteracting that
in any way. I had perhaps some naive and ambitious ideas that one or two
2 9voices raised might do some good.
Hartmann was glad to get someone of Stuart's calibre on his new Irish 
service. There were few Irish nationals in Berlin at the time and Irish 
people willing or able to broadcast were fewer still. Realising that Stuart 
was a 'good catch' for the radio service, Hartmann ensured he was given a 
build-up not afforded to other radio speakers. On the night of 17 March a 
talk on the life of St Patrick was followed by a special announcement read 
out by Madeleine Meissner who told listeners that 'the well-known Irish 
writer Francis Stuart will speak at 9.45 p.m. present Irish time over our 
usual stations DZD 28.43 metres and Oslo 1154 metres...'
Stuart's first talk spared nothing in hammering home a strong message in 
support of Irish neutrality and against the presence of American troops in 
Northern Ireland. He told his Irish audience:
I am not trying to make propaganda. You have had plenty of it and I only 
hope that you have now a good idea of what is true and what is false.
Had I wanted to make propaganda I could have done so during my two years 
in Germany. I only want to put forward my idea of Ireland's place in the 
world and her future, which I am perhaps able to view with greater 
clarity from a distance. 30
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Yet, Stuart said of his talks after the war:
It was naturally [propaganda]. If the Germans hadn't thought it of some 
benefit to their war effort I wouldn't have been taking up time. It was 
anti-propaganda more than propaganda. It was trying to, quite 
ineffectually I imagine, undo some of the very one-sided propaganda
T 1coming from other sources.
Stuart had not planned to broadcast regularly, but Hartmann phoned him 
on 16 July 1942 to ask if he would contribute talks twice a week. Stuart 
noted at the time:
It is difficult, though not impossible, to refuse. I do not feel any
strong desire for this business. But might do so for a bit. I have not
much illusion about its effectiveness, which in the mass of radio
3 2broadcasts would be very small.
With holidays from university lecturing giving him more free time,
Stuart agreed to work with Hartmann, but only once a week. Stuart's St 
Patrick's Day talk was followed by three others on 29 March, 5 April and 25 
May. He began broadcasting regular weekly talks on 24 July 1942, though the 
title 'Through Irish Eyes' was only adopted beginning with his talk on 5 
August 1942. Stuart continued talking to Ireland almost every week until 
January 1944. His talks were broadcast twice a week from September 1943, at 
Hartmann's request. It can be argued that 'Through Irish Eyes' did not 
follow the strict propaganda line of other contributors to German Radio. It 
did not contain, for example, any military high command dispatches, 
eulogies of Hitler, nor denunciations of the Jews. It was more in the 
nature of a fireside chat from one Irish person to another. Stuart made 
much of his Antrim and Wicklow connections and mentioned both counties 
regularly to emphasise his own 32-county republican outlook. The talks 
were, by design, heavily pro-neutrality and anti-Allies. 33
Long after the war, Stuart said of his broadcasts: 'I hardly ever met
anyone who heard me. I don't think anyone really listened. ' 34 But, whatever 
the size of his wartime audience, his talks were closely monitored in 
official circles both in Britain and Ireland. BBC monitors listened to
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Stuart's every word, while in Dublin, Army intercept branch officer Captain 
John Smyth commented that Stuart's talks:
were, in the main, what one might expect from an exile with acute 
nostalgia and an inherent dislike of partition. He always took great 
trouble to explain that he was not a propaganda medium for German ideas, 
but only the spokesman for the Irish colony whose one wish was that 
Ireland should remain neutral. While he frequently denounced partition, 
the execution of [Thomas] Williams [a 19-year-old IRA man hanged on 2 
September 1942 for killing a Catholic policeman in Belfast] and the 
punishment of IRA men in the Six Counties, he was not sufficiently 
violent to stir up anti-British feeling effectively. 35
Captain Smyth noted that from early 1943, Stuart's broadcasts became 
more pro-German. He noted: 'On January 30th, 1943, Stuart, with but scant
apology, launched into a eulogy on the German 6th Army in Stalingrad and in 
the course of it said, "I readily admit that, when it comes to finding 
words, the publicists of the democracies can far outdo us", thus more or 
less identifying himself with pro-German propaganda. From this date, 
although still maintaining that he is no propagandist, Stuart has been 
steadily and openly pro-German'. According to Captain Smyth, before Stuart 
commenced his weekly talks, 'German broadcasts to Ireland consisted mainly 
of the Report from the Führer's H.Q., innocuous talks in Gaelic by Hans
Hartmann, and the Flashback - a daily extract from Irish history which
3 6dealt chiefly with British atrocities in Ireland'.
But it was Francis Stuart's radio references to Irish affairs, rather 
than any German matters, that were to cause the greatest upset in 
government circles in Dublin. Frederick Boland, Assistant Secretary at 
External Affairs, had called in Hempel to protest about a broadcast on 2 
December 1942 in which Stuart criticised the convictions by a Belfast court 
of the IRA's Northern commander Hugh McAteer. Boland told the German 
diplomat that:
the holding up of McAteer on the German radio as a hero was likely to be 
resented by many people here and to furnish a concrete example for use
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by those who charged Germany with aiding and abetting the IRA against 
3 7the government.
In the run up to the Irish general election on 22 June 1943, Stuart 
delivered a series of talks advising people not to vote for Fine Gael. On 8 
May, Stuart told his listeners:
The overwhelming majority of you are at one in your wish for a free and
united country, and as far as I know there isn't one who'd ever threaten
this except a handful of so-called Irishmen either belonging to or in
~l Otouch with the Fine Gael party.
The talks were attracting the attention not only of Irish Army monitors 
but also the Department of External Affairs and senior members of the 
government. On 26 May, G21s Colonel Dan Bryan sent transcripts of five 
recent Stuart broadcasts to Boland who immediately forwarded two of the 
scripts, including the broadcast of 8 May, to Frank Aiken, Minister for the 
Coordination of Defensive Measures. 39 Far from gladdening the heart of de 
Valera, the Taoiseach saw Stuart's call for a vote against his political 
opponents as unwarranted 'interference' in Irish affairs by a foreign 
power. De Valera, who was both Taoiseach and Minister for External Affairs 
at the time, instructed his staff to send a formal protest note to William 
Warnock at the Irish legation in Berlin for the attention of the German 
Foreign Office.
To set Dublin's formal protest to Berlin in context, it should be noted 
that, in the years leading up to and including the war period, political 
and other potentially controversial topics were either treated cautiously 
or not at all on the Irish and British airwaves. The news departments and 
news output of the 1940s contrast sharply with today's 24-hour broadcast 
news operations. For example, Radio Eireann's news staff for most of the 
Emergency comprised just three people putting out three bulletins a day, 
and only two bulletins on Sundays, 40 although news increased from 9.8% of 
total hours broadcast in 193 9 to 15.2% in 1945.41 The wartime conditions 
coupled with Ireland's neutrality increased the tendency towards caution, 
with Radio Eireann news bulletins having to be read over to Frank 
Gallagher, the head of the Government Information Bureau, before they were
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broadcast. On occasions of critical importance they had to be read over to 
de Valera as well. All war news had to be given as it came from both sides, 
which often resulted in ‘a wearying series of claims and counter-claims' . 42 
Weather reports were strictly banned from the airwaves in case they could 
give assistance to war planes. Following an attack on Hitler in one 
broadcast sermon, Radio Eireann's Director, Seamus 0 Braonain, 'tried to 
get advance scripts of sermons', but 'the ecclesiastical authorities 
refused' . 43 The tough controls also applied to Irish newspapers. 44
Caution in matters political was not confined to broadcasters in Dublin. 
In Northern Ireland, the BBC was barred from reporting the Dail election in 
June 1943, and as early as April 1940, senior BBC staff in Britain and 
Northern Ireland had been warned that because of the 'extremely 
delicate... relations between Eire and Northern Ireland...reference to 
either country in news bulletins and elsewhere should be carefully 
watched' . 45 Throughout the United Kingdom, while:
the BBC was subjected to periodic governmental criticism of its news 
coverage... there was no need for coercive control, apart from censorship 
applied in the interests of security, which was anyway extended to the 
press. The BBC saw itself as part of the war effort, and hence the 
question of its pulling in a very different direction from that deemed 
officially desirable did not arise. 46
However, one BBC wartime controller complained in June 1940 that:
The BBC News works under more sanctions, and therefore more slowly, as
well as more accurately, than the press. Foreign broadcasters work
differently. This means that foreign radio stations, both European and 
American, are frequently ahead of the BBC. Such priority may, and often 
does, reach the British public, e.g. through Haw-Haw' . 47
It appears to be the case that censorship was implemented more 
comprehensively in Ireland than in either Switzerland or Sweden, despite 
the objectively greater danger of their position. It is said that 'the 
contempt frequently expressed for Nazi behaviour in the Swiss and Swedish 
press provoked furious reactions in Berlin. Nothing comparable was
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4. P , . .permitted in Ireland'. In the circumstances, it is not surprising to read
the terms of the protest note which was cabled by Boland to Warnock on 2 7 
May 1943:
Francis Stuart has been making broadcasts to this country discussing the
forthcoming elections and advising people to vote against Fine Gael.
Such broadcasts are an unwarrantable interference in our internal
affairs and are apt to prove most embarrassing and harmful to the
government. Please act immediately to ensure that nothing of the kind
4 9will be broadcast in future.
However, Boland's cable was too late to stop another election 
broadcast50 by Francis Stuart on 29 May, for Warnock did not visit the
German Foreign Office until 31 May when he personally handed the protest
note to Herr Hencke. Afterwards, Warnock cabled Dublin:
Saw new Under Secretary of State Hencke this morning. He stated matter 
would be attended to. There could be no question of intentional 
interference in Irish internal affairs. 51
The next day, 1 June, Hencke reported to his superiors at the Foreign 
Office -.
The Irish Charge d'Affaires yesterday handed me this aide-memoire in 
which objections are made that the Irish citizen Francis Stuart has used 
the German radio to influence Irish choice in choosing sides in the war. 
The Charge d'Affaires added orally that his government had no objections 
that the German radio talks about Ireland, e.g. even in an anti-English 
sense. However, when an opposition party in Ireland is attacked by the 
German radio his government suspects Germany is applying pressure on
COIreland to take sides.
While the incident led to a cooling of relations between Germany and 
Ireland for a time, Francis Stuart, who had sparked off the protest, 
thought the whole affair amusing. It backfired on him however, because soon 
afterwards Warnock refused to renew Stuart's passport which had expired:
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I went to our legation, but the Irish government would not renew it 
because it disapproved of my broadcasting. I know, because Warnock was 
our Chargé d'Affaires, and I heard this from a secretary [Eileen Walsh] 
at our legation. He was asked by de Valera to go to the German Foreign 
Office and make a formal protest because there was a general election 
here and I had mentioned the elections and the voting. So Warnock put on 
his top hat and morning suit [laughs] and went to the German Foreign 
Office and lodged a protest that the Germans were allowing me to 
interfere in a sovereign state which was neutral. Of course, the German 
Foreign Office couldn't care less. 53
Eileen Walsh told the author that Stuart's suggestion that Warnock wore 
a top hat and morning suit was 'nonsense', although she confirmed the 
remaining details. 54
In the event, de Valera lost his overall majority in the election, but 
remained in power with the backing of a new farmers' party, Clann na 
Talmhain. One historian describes Fine Gael's loss of thirteen seats as 
'disastrous' . 55
The Allied bombing campaign against Germany was gaining momentum as the 
summer of 1943 continued. Hamburg was incinerated in a continual wave of 
Allied bombing that lasted from 24 July to 3 August. 56 In Berlin, the air 
raids were making life difficult for the announcers at the Rundfunkhaus. 
Francis Stuart remembers that:
actually broadcasting you don't have time to think of your safety. We 
had rubber masks or mouth-pieces. You weren't speaking directly into a 
microphone, you were speaking directly into this rubber thing, like when 
you are under anaesthetic, so that the noise of bombs are presumably
excluded. But I think the vibration still interfered with the
5 7acoustics.
By August 1943 the bombing had forced some of the radio's staff to 
relocate from Berlin to Luxembourg, where the occupying German forces had 
taken over the radio studios. Francis Stuart and Madeleine Meissner went 
there with the rest of the Irish service on 12 August that year. 59 In her 
memoirs Madeleine wrote:
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RAF attacks on Berlin increased. Buildings crumbled like sandcastles.
More and more gaps yawned in the streets and soon you could see miles
and miles of the city flattened out. It was difficult and dangerous to
work under these circumstances, so the English and Irish Redaktion moved
for safety's sake to Luxembourg. Work was carried on from the Luxembourg
Sender (radio station). Francis went as he still gave his weekly talks
S 9to Ireland, and I went with him as I introduced his talks.
A month after the move to Luxembourg, the Irish legation in Berlin was 
destroyed in an air raid, along with all Warnock's records of Irish 
nationals in Germany at that time and, of course, the protest note sparked 
by Stuart's election broadcasts. 60
Stuart and Madeleine appreciated the calmer atmosphere in Luxembourg: 
'there were, thank God, no air raids and drink was no problem', she 
wrote. 61 But three months after moving, in November, they were temporarily 
back in Berlin, - she to resume her studies at the university, and he to 
accompany her. Stuart had negotiated leave of absence from the university 
before going with the radio team to Luxembourg. The couple were lucky to 
survive a bomb attack which wrecked their rooms in the wilmersdorf district 
of Berlin on 22 November 1943. They returned to Luxembourg as soon as
possible, but Stuart eventually fell out with the radio directors there and
6 2left his job after delivering a final talk to Ireland in January 1944. He 
describes his decision to stop broadcasting as follows:
I was pressurised. What I did say on one broadcast, perhaps more than 
one, was that if I suddenly stop broadcasting it would be because I 
refused to say certain things, and that's why up to the present I'd 
never been asked to say things which I wouldn't agree to. But then they 
began to suggest to me that the Bolsheviks, as they called them, must be 
extremely unpopular in Catholic Ireland, and wouldn't it be good if I 
cashed in on this and began talking about the Russian atrocities and the 
atheistical world view. I immediately refused because of all countries 
waging war...the only one which was waging what one might call a really 
honourable war were the Russians. They had been attacked in an extremely 
vicious and underhand way. They were protecting their country. They 
weren't carrying out devastating bombing on civilians such as the
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Germans and the Allies were. Whether if they'd had the bombers they 
would have, that's another matter. But they weren't doing it, and 
therefore I refused to make anti-Russian or anti-Bolshevik propaganda. 
Then my broadcasts were terminated. I didn't get into a camp, but I was 
threatened with all sorts of things, and certain facilities I'd had were 
withdrawn from me. That was the end of my broadcasts.
Although Hans Hartmann was Stuart's boss in Luxembourg, the Irish writer 
bore no grudge against the German for his sacking. Stuart considered 
Hartmann 'extremely sympathetic, he understood the political situation in 
Ireland'. Stuart adds: 'Hartmann told me he was walking on eggshells,
between being sympathetic to the Irish, which he was, and satisfying the 
authorities who wanted certain topics mentioned1. But Stuart told this 
author that despite the authorities' demands for more anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda broadcasts 'which they thought would go down well in Catholic
6 4Ireland...towards the end, the Germans never listened to the programmes'.
Out of a job in Luxembourg, Stuart returned to Berlin in February 1944 
and resumed his university lectures for a while. According to William 
Murphy, Stuart also worked at this time for a black propaganda unit of 
German Radio:
Stuart suggested that I should take up a job with the people with whom
he was working, which turned out to be a secret radio station under the
control of the German Foreign Office. Stuart and I went to the Reich 
Sportsfeld, Berlin, where the station was situated...I started work at 
this station on, I think, 1st August 1944. This station was named Biiro 
Concordia. 65
Stuart denies that he ever worked with the Biiro Concordia. Murphy 
claimed that Stuart and himself hatched a plot to persuade the Nazis to 
send them both back to Ireland in a U-boat carrying a secret transmitter 
for the IRA. But when Murphy put the proposal to an Abwehr agent in Bremen, 
it was dismissed as 'nonsense'. Murphy also claimed that Stuart purported
to have been chosen by the Nazis in 1940 to deliver a shipment of arms to
the IRA in the event of the Sean Russell landing being successful. When 
asked about these points by this author, Stuart commented, 'As far as I
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know and from what I heard from a German Abwehr officer, Kurt Haller, at
the time, the William Murphy you mention was, or became, a minor British
Intelligence agent. He gave all sorts of testimony to help his own
ambiguous position'. Stuart describes Murphy's allegation that he was
7involved with Biiro Concordia as being 'libellous'. In a subsequent 
interview with this author, Stuart repeated that William Joseph Murphy had 
been a British agent. He recalled meeting Murphy in Luxembourg when the 
latter 'had a lot of forged notes, English money', and thinks he also met 
him in Berlin. Stuart told the author that Murphy's statement about his 
[Stuart's] planned role in accompanying a shipment of arms for the IRA 
following Russell's landing in Ireland, was 'basically correct'. Stuart 
adds: 'I was to travel with Captain [Christian] Nissen on a Breton fishing
boat with arms on board. I asked Haller what would happen if we were 
stopped. Haller said Nissen would scuttle the ship. I hoped it would not 
come to anything, which it did not. I had no wish to leave Germany'. Stuart 
continued: 'Murphy's claims that I worked in Concordia are fantastic. I
never worked for Concordia, I had no interest in it. It would have gone 
against all my principles. That would have been a betrayal of my 
beliefs' . 68
The tide of events was now turning against Francis Stuart, just as time 
was running out for Nazi Germany. In the capital of the Third Reich the 
situation was deteriorating. The Allies had stepped up the intensity of day 
and nighttime bombings from late February 1944. On St Patrick's Day, Stuart 
and Madeleine visited Frank Ryan in Loschwitz sanatorium near Dresden. The 
man in whom the Nazis had placed such hope was dying, following a stroke.
He passed away, aged 42, on 10 June, and his funeral at Loschwitz cemetery 
was attended by only a handful of people including Stuart and Madeleine, 
Elizabeth Clissmann, and Hildegard Lubbert, a pharmacist who was Ryan's
g 9companion and had looked after him in his final months.
Meanwhile, on 10 May 1944, the English Department of Berlin University 
had been hit by a bomb and destroyed, putting Stuart again out of a job. He 
would have had no lecturing post after July anyway because, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 'July Plot' bomb attempt on Hitler's life, the 
Nazis ordered the closure of all institutions not directly connected to the 
'Total War' effort, including universities.
After enduring more day and night bombings, Francis Stuart and Madeleine
94
IMeissner eventually left Berlin by train for Munich on 10 September 1944 - 
exactly five years and one week after the outbreak of war. The coming 
months were filled with uncertainty, anguish and hunger. Following the 
collapse of Nazi Germany, the couple spent nine months in a detention 
centre which was controlled by the French Army. Released without charge, 
they made their way to live in Paris, and later moved to London. In 1958
they returned together to Ireland where Francis Stuart continues to live
• 7 0and work as a writer.
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Francis Stuart pictured at his home in Dundrum, 
Dublin, 1989
96
Chapter 5 
The Motley Crew
Apart from Ludwig Mühlhausen and Hans Hartmann, whose roles have already 
been described, eleven others who were not Irish nationals broadcast to 
varying extents for the Irland-Redaktion. Some, like the Frenchmen Count 
Keroer and Michel Piche, did not survive once the first head of the nightly 
radio service, Wolfgang Dignowity, was replaced by Hans Hartmann in 
December 1941. Others, like Nora O'Mara, Mona Brase and Charles Budina made 
only a few broadcasts to Ireland. There were some, however, who proved to 
be more durable. The position of Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping) was 
unique in that she worked as an assistant to Adolf Mahr in the Foreign 
Office while Mahr was organising the launch of the new nightly Irish 
service. She told the author that the Foreign Office 'tried hard to 
influence the Irland-Redaktion'. In December 1941, Spickernagel was 
transferred from Mahr's office to become Hartmann's assistant, a post she 
retained for 12 months. Sonja Kowanko, the Russian-born secretary to the 
Irish team, had been educated in France, England and Italy. She contributed 
talks under the pseudonym 'Linda Walters'. James Blair and Susan Sweney - 
while having Irish connections - were not Irish nationals. In autumn 1942 
they were both sacked from the Irland-Redaktion for a misdemeanour. 
Madeleine Meissner stayed with the Irish team as a part-time announcer for 
as long as her lover Francis Stuart did. She introduced most of his weekly 
talks from March 1942 until he stopped broadcasting them in January 1944.
Count Keroer
Count Keroer was a 24-year-old French nobleman from Brittany, recruited 
to the service in its infancy by Dr Dignowity. Keroer's presence in an 
'Irish' radio team was partly explained by the fact that Dignowity had done 
most of his recruiting in Paris. In Adolf Mahr's estimation, Keroer had 
good English but didn't know Ireland at all. When Dignowity was removed 
from the Irish service, it is believed that Keroer moved to the French 
broadcasting section in the Rundfunkhaus, and may also have helped to 
produce Breton nationalist propaganda. 1
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Michel Piche
Another Frenchman called Michel Piche was also a member of German 
Radio's initial 'Irish' team recruited in Paris by Wolfgang Dignowity.
Piche had lived in America where he worked as a journalist for several 
years. He spoke English with an American accent but, according to Adolf 
Mahr who met him in Berlin in August 1941, Piche did not have a good radio 
voice. Dignowity groomed the Frenchman as an announcer for a new two-part 
radio programme beamed nightly to Ireland. The first half of the programme 
would carry news aimed at an Irish audience, while the second half 
comprised a short talk linked to what the Germans considered to be the most
important propaganda event of the day. Mahr complained that Piche knew
onothing at all about Ireland.
Mahr was not the only one to notice that Dignowity's team did not have a 
single Irish member. Within weeks of the launch, John O'Reilly joined the 
staff at the Berlin Radio Centre and had a run in with Piche and Keroer. 
O'Reilly commented:
Dr Dignowity's knowledge of Ireland, like the other members of his 
staff, was purely geographic. Resentment was shown to me by the two 
Frenchmen and the Englishman [James Blair]. They regarded me as an 
interloper in the Irish section. But within a few weeks, having found my 
feet, my Irish spirit of independence asserted itself and I did not 
hesitate to point out that they, in fact, were the intruders. This was 
the Irish section and I was an Irishman. All the artistry in the world 
could not make a shamrock out of the fleur-de-lis or the English rose.
If they were not prepared to cooperate with me, well, the English 
section was next door and the French section was just down the 
corridor. 3
By the time Hans Hartmann took control of the Irish section, Piche, 
Keroer and Dignowity had been moved elsewhere. Keroer - or indeed Piche, 
though it is not clear if the latter hailed from Brittany - may have 
provided the model for 'Michel', the Breton character who appears in 
Francis Stuart's post-war, semi-autobiographical, novel B l a c k l i s t  S e c t i o n
H. Stuart told the author that the Breton, like all the other characters in 
the book, was based on a real person. Stuart adds: 'There were quite a few
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Bretons staying in Berlin in the Schöneberg district. I very briefly met 
one or two of them'. In B l a c k l i s t , 'Michel1, a French newreader with German 
Radio, is described as 'a Breton nationalist... here to get the Germans to 
give Brittany independence if they win the war ' . 4
James Blair
James Blair was recruited to the Irish service in the summer of 1941 by 
Dr Wolfgang Dignowity. He was born in Dublin on 1 July 1904 of British 
parents and told Adolf Mahr at the Foreign Office that his father was 
Scottish and his mother of Irish extraction. After spending his early 
childhood in Dublin, he later moved with his parents to Paris where he 
worked as a proof reader for an American newspaper published in the French 
capital. 5 By 1941, Blair was 'down and out' in Paris and 'running errands 
for the Irish embassy', according to Susan Sweney who saw him there.
William Warnock described Blair as 'a decent sort of fellow....who had 
drifted to Berlin'. When he could, Blair sent money to his parents who were 
still living in Paris.
When the nightly Irish service was launched, Blair did not broadcast 
under his own name. Instead, from September 1941 to March 1942, he used the 
alias Pat O'Brien. Blair was groomed by Dignowity to represent the Irish 
'man in the street', although he had apparently not visited Ireland since 
his childhood. 7 When John O'Reilly joined the service in September 1941, 
as seen earlier, he had a confrontation with Blair 'the Englishman' whom he 
accused of being an 'intruder' in the Irish section. O'Reilly told Blair 
that if he wasn't prepared to cooperate with him 'the English section was
onext door'. But Blair stayed on with the Irish service and continued 
working there even after Dignowity had been replaced by Hartmann in 
December 1941. To make his broadcasts sound more plausible, Mahr insisted 
Blair visit him at the Foreign Office every day, beginning in September
Q1941, to be supplied with suitable propaganda scripts. According to Hilde 
Spickernagel, Blair was 'an unfortunate creature' who spent part of the day 
at Mahr's small Irish section in the broadcasting department of the Foreign 
Ministry. Dr Spickernagel adds: 'James Blair was expected to write short
talks on subjects suggested to him by either Dr Mahr or me, which he then 
took to the Funkhaus [radio centre] to be broadcast there. He [Blair] 
certainly had no proper journalist's training - none of us had . ' 10
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In 1942, Blair and his broadcasting colleague Susan Sweney were both 
sacked from the Irish service by Hartmann because Sweney had used endearing 
terms to Blair while he was still talking on air. After Blair's dismissal, 
John O'Reilly took over the Pat O'Brien radio talks. James Blair later 
found another broadcasting job with the Nazi's Inter Radio company based in 
Graz, Austria. 11
Blair was among a group of people named as collaborating with German 
Radio's Irish service in a secret memo drawn up at the end of 1942 by 
William Warnock at the request of Frederick Boland at the Department of 
External Affairs. Warnock's memo, which was passed to G2 on 4 January 1943,
listed the Irland-Redaktion staff as James Blair, Liam Mullally, Nora
12O'Mara, Hans Hartmann and Hilde Spickernagel.
Immediately after the war Blair helped two of his former radio 
colleagues, Francis Stuart and Madeleine Meissner, to obtain freedom from 
French military custody at Dornbirn, Austria, by intervening on their 
behalf with a French Army General. After his release Stuart went to Paris 
where Blair again helped the Irish writer, passing on some of his English 
language students to him for tutorials. 13
Sophie 'Sonja' Kowanko
Kowanko was a 25-year-old Russian emigree from Leningrad. Born in 1916, 
a year before the Bolshevik revolution, her parents fled the chaos to 
settle in Paris where she grew up. Later, she was also sent to schools in 
England and Italy, and spoke the languages of her host countries fluently. 
John O'Reilly noted that Kowanko had an extensive knowledge of German 
despite the fact that she had been in the Third Reich for only a few 
months. He thought the Russian girl 'exercised more influence on the 
running of our section than her position as a typist would seem to 
warrant'. In fact, Sonja Kowanko's role in the Irish radio service went far 
beyond that of a humble typist. Once a week the Russian contributed a radio 
talk beamed at Irish women listeners under the cover name of Linda 
Walters. 14
When Susan Sweney (below) joined the service she struck up a close 
friendship with Sonja Kowanko. The two shared a flat in Berlin's 
Klopstockstrasse, and played billiards and drank together. Francis Stuart, 
who met both women at the Rundfunkhaus, commented on their relationship:
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'They seemed inseparable. We took it they were lesbians, which they very
likely were. ' 15 Since Kowanko knew far less about Ireland than Sweney, the
latter provided ideas for her 'Linda Walters' talks. While working with
Hartmann's team, Kowanko attracted the attention of the Gestapo who were
monitoring her private mail. On Gestapo orders she was transferred to
factory work, although the precise reason for the Gestapo's displeasure is
unknown. 16 Sweney lobbied senior Foreign Office officials to get her friend
released from the factory. After a month of manual labour, the Russian was
given a six-month contract with Inter Radio in Berlin beginning at the end
of 1942. Sweney later joined her friend at Inter Radio, also on a six month
contract, because 'Sonja and I wanted to be together'. By the time
Kowanko's contract ran out in May 1943, both she and Sweney had saved
enough for the Russian to be able to return to Paris and rejoin her family
there. Remaining in Berlin, Susan Sweney continued to send Sonja Kowanko
17money in Paris whenever she could spare it.
The fact that Kowanko had broadcast under the name Linda Walters did not 
emerge publicly until John O'Reilly's account of his wartime experiences 
was published by a London newspaper seven years after the end of the war. 
During the war the true identity of Linda Walters foxed Colonel Dan Bryan 
and his men in G2. On 17 September 1941, an Irish army monitor,
Commandant Sean Neligan, picked up one of the first 'Linda Walters' talks 
from Berlin. Notwithstanding her continental background, he thought she 
'spoke with a cultured Dublin accent1. Neligan noted that, 'her talk was 
non-political and related to German women and their activities in the 
home'. Neligan's memo was incorrectly filed under a German called Erwin C. 
Kaefer alias R. Walther. The Garda special branch told G2 that Kaefer 'has
paid frequent trips to Ireland from 1938-1940'. G2 wrongly assumed at the
9time that Linda Walters may have been Kaefer's wife.
Nora O'Mara (also known as Roisin Ni Mheara-Vinard)
Nora O'Mara played a minor role at the radio station, having been 
brought to Francis Stuart's attention in 1940 by the German spy Hermann 
Goertz. Before he left for Ireland on a spying mission, O'Mara had worked 
as Goertz's secretary. Pregnant and abandoned in Berlin by her Ukrainian 
lover, O'Mara was taken in by Stuart as a lodger in his flat. They later 
developed a relationship which lasted through the birth of Nora's baby
101
daughter but foundered when Stuart fell in love with Madeleine Meissner.
While working as a translator for German Radio, Stuart agreed to take on
2 0Nora O'Mara as his secretary there.
Reporting to the Department of External Affairs in Dublin on the make-up 
of the Irish section in German Radio at the end of 1942, William Warnock 
noted that 'a Miss Nora O'Mara, born in England of Irish parents, but not 
an Irish citizen, speaks occasionally, I believe. She has been in Germany 
for some years ' . 21 When Susan Sweney met O'Mara at the Irland-Redaktion, 
she 'wrote dialogues for her, especially to help her owing to her domestic 
circumstances' . 22 O'Mara never disclosed her identity on air, using only 
the first name Roisin. The Irish Army's archive of German broadcasts to 
Ireland between 1939 and 1945 contains the transcripts of only two 
broadcasts by Roisin. The first, monitored at 9.45 p.m. on 2 June 1943, was 
a talk on the 'Broken Treaty of Limerick'. The second talk was monitored at 
the same time on 14 July 1943 and featured Roisin quoting a long passage
from Padraig Pearse's 'The Spirit of a Nation'. Her talk was followed by a
— 2 3band playing the Irish national anthem.
When O'Mara published her memoirs24 in 1992 they caused controversy by
suggesting, among other things, that photographs of the victims of Nazi
concentration camps were actually pictures of victims of the 1945 Allied
bombings of Dresden. 25 She discloses that she began her radio work in
2 GBerlin by broadcasting the news in English to Poland. Later she claims 
that Francis Stuart and herself were 'involved in regular radio broadcasts 
to Ireland' with Hans Hartmann's team. Of Hartmann she comments: 'It was
obviously a great relief to him when I offered my assistance. He proposed
that I go ahead and prepare programmes and broadcasts - a chance not to be
2 7lost for me to make contact on air with Ireland.'
As well as her broadcasting work, O'Mara writes about her own varied 
life. She claims to have been abandoned as a child and to have been adopted 
by the wealthy Anglo-Scottish family of General Sir Ian Hamilton. Later she 
moved to Berlin to train as an actress. During the war she met Hitler's
deputy, Rudolf Hess and married in turn two Nazi officers, both of whom
2were killed in the war. Both before and since the publication of her 
memoirs, O'Mara has refused requests from this author to answer questions 
about her wartime activities and her relationship with Francis Stuart. 29 
In her memoirs O'Mara explains that her decision to undertake propaganda
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work for the Nazis was motivated by her desire for Ireland not to become 
involved in the conflict. She writes:
If a war breaks out what part will Ireland have in it?...From my point 
of view, as a war orphan of the 1914-18 war whose father had been 
seduced by lies to fight on England's side on the understanding that 
Ireland would be given its freedom in return, I convinced myself that I 
would do all in my power to ensure that that never happened 
again...England would initiate a powerful propaganda campaign to demean 
this nation [Germany] which was so sympathetic to us. It would be my 
duty to do my part to stifle this propaganda in time. I expressed these 
opinions to the Department of Culture of which I was a member and which 
was under the direction of the Department of Public Affairs and Dr 
Joseph Goebbels...I assured him that if the worst came to the worst I 
would be ready to give my services for the sake of Ireland's 
neutrality. 30
Of the effect Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion programmes would have in
Ireland, O'Mara notes: 'One could hope and trust in God that these
programmes were listened to over there as a counter attack against the lies
which England no doubt was directing at Ireland to inveigle her to no
3 1purpose into the war.'
In his post war memoirs, John O'Reilly did not refer to all his 
Rundfunkhaus acquaintances by name. However, by a process of elimination 
there can be little doubt that he was referring to Nora O'Mara when he
wrote:
One person who aroused my interest, probably more than all others 
combined, was a mysterious young woman whose exact part in the wartime 
intrigues of the Third Reich I have never been able to fathom. She 
seemed to have a finger in every political pie, and yet she appeared to 
remain very much in the background. She was slightly built, pretty but 
not strikingly so, with very little colour in her cheeks. Her hair was 
long, jet black, and parted severely in the middle. There was such a 
depth of sorrow in her large, dark brown eyes, that I always thought of 
her as 'Deirdre'. Although she appeared to have some Irish background I
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never learned what exactly it was or whether she had Irish parentage. 
Despite her good looks and her enigmatic personality there was very 
little of the glamorous Mata Hari about 'Deirdre'. What puzzled me most 
about her was that she appeared to maintain equally friendly contacts 
with the various espionage groups of the Wehrmacht, the Admiralty, and 
the S.S. Their Intelligence Departments normally maintained completely 
separate identities. They exchanged neither agents nor information, 
though their activities frequently overlapped. Yet here was 'Deirdre', 
attached to every group but tied to none! Although she never actually 
broadcast32 she had some inexplicable connection with a weekly musical 
programme known as 'Irish Half Hour'. She was a frequent visitor to the 
broadcasting station and we met there often, though never by 
appointment. Whatever secrets she had, she kept them well, talking but 
little, listening a lot. But I could see that she was widely travelled, 
well educated, and of good stock. I have a feeling now that she played 
an influential part in the shaping of my career from the time I finished 
broadcasting, in September 1942, until I landed in County Clare from a 
German bomber in December 1943.33
Hilde Spickernagel (née Poepping)
Hilde Poepping worked as Hans Hartmann's assistant in the wartime Irish 
service of German Radio from the time he took charge in December 1941 until 
the end of 1942. Like Hartmann, Poepping first developed an interest in 
Ireland as a visiting student in the 1930s. She travelled from Berlin and, 
on 30 October 1937, enrolled in the Arts faculty at University College 
Galway. The young German spent the academic year attending English lectures 
in Second and Third Arts. She resided with the family of UCG's Professor of 
Chemistry, Thomas Dillon. As a student, Dillon had been a member of the UCD 
IRA group in Dublin run by Frank Ryan. In Galway, Hilde Poepping wanted to 
write a thesis on the English author, D.H. Lawrence. However, on the advice 
of her hostess, Geraldine Dillon, - who considered that D.H. Lawrence's 
writings were 'rubbish', - she instead began writing a doctoral thesis on 
the Irish author, James Stephens. Returning to Germany in the autumn of 
193 8, Poepping 'met Ludwig Mühlhausen and tried to improve my Irish with 
his help. He ran a department of his own in Berlin University but did not 
have many students.' Her thesis on Stephens, which also dealt with 'the
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interplay of literary, economic and political studies in Ireland from 1900 
to 1930', was published by the Institute of Celtic Studies in Berlin in 
1940.34
During her stay in Galway, the German woman had developed a lasting 
friendship with the Dillons. Professor Dillon's daughter, Blâth, travelled 
to Berlin in 1939 to stay with the Poepping family, and spent the summer 
holidays walking in Bavaria with her friend Hilde. 35
In mid 1941, Hilde Poepping got a job at the Foreign Ministry as one of 
two assistants to Dr Adolf Mahr who was by then in charge of the ministry's 
Irish broadcasting desk. Her knowledge of Ireland and ability with 
languages made her a natural choice for such a postition. In December 1941, 
she was transferred from the Foreign Office to work as assistant to Hans 
Hartmann who had just been named as new head of the Irland-Redaktion. 36 On 
31 December 1941, Poepping joined Hartmann and others in broadcasting a 
special 25-minute New Year's greetings programme to Ireland. The broadcast 
was picked up by BBC radio monitors at 9.30 p.m., via the Oslo transmitter 
on 1154 metres. The BBC's transcript of Hilde Poepping's contribution read 
as follows: 'Fraulein Hilde Poepping, a former exchange student at Galway,
said that all her friends who had spent some time in Ireland sent their 
greetings, except her friend Martin Klot who was killed in action in Russia
o 7fighting to protect the women and children of Europe from Bolshevism'.
A year later, when asked to provide a written profile of the Irland- 
Redaktion in Berlin for the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, 
William Warnock wrote:
The Irish Section in the Broadcasting House is run by Dr Hartmann who 
spent several years with Dr Delargy at the Folklore Institute 
[Commission], and his principal assistant is Dr Hilde Spickernagel, née 
Poepping, who was an exchange student in UCG. Neither of them feel very 
suited to political propaganda, and I think that both of them look
"5 Qforward to the day when they can resume their academic life again'.
Warnock's assessment of the power structure within the Irish section 
concurred with information supplied to G2 by John O'Reilly after his return 
home in December 1943. Having interrogated O'Reilly in Arbour Hill Prison,
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Dublin, Colonel Dan Bryan drafted a memo detailing the Kilkee man's 
activities in Germany. The memo included the following reference:
Shortly prior to [March 1942] the broadcasting had been taken over from
the Ministry of Propaganda and was under the control of the Foreign
Office, the directors of O'Reilly's particular section being Hartmann,
1 9Mahr and Hilde Poepping.
Poepping, now Mrs Spickernagel, remained working as Dr Hartmann's 
assistant until December 1942 . She summed up for the author her duties at 
the Irland-Redaktion during the 12 months she worked there:
I more or less ran the office work, suggested subjects for talks to 
[James] Blair, and saw to it that everything was typed for the reading 
of 'our' news service, usually read by [John] O'Reilly. I helped out 
with the reading a few times, five to six times altogether, when 
O'Reilly was absent. I never wrote talks or commentaries myself ' . 40
She explained her reasons for leaving the Irish service as follows: 'In
the second half of 1942, I was expecting a baby and owing to some trouble
during this pregnancy I had to stop working in December 1942 already, and
did not go back to the Irland-Redaktion after the baby was born in April
1943.'41 Hilde Poepping had earlier married a fellow student, Karl
Spickernagel who perished in the conflict, leaving her to raise a baby son,
also named Karl. In the summer of 1943, she was, like many other young
mothers at the time, evacuated from the capital to the relative safety of
the countryside, in her case 'the wilds of East Pomerania'. She had no
further contacts with either the Foreign Office or the Radio service, and
'could not listen in to their broadcasts - our broadcasts - owing to the
lack of a suitable radio set! ' . 42 After the war, Dr Hilde Spickernagel
returned to the academic world, teaching English in Berlin secondary
schools, and was eventually appointed a school principal. Today she lives
41m  retirement m  Hanover.
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Madeleine Meissner
A native of Danzig, where she was born in 1916, Meissner was a 
student at Berlin University when war broke out in 1939. The following year 
she attended lectures in the English Department given by Irish author 
Francis Stuart whom she married in 1954. When Stuart began his radio talks 
for the Irish Service in March 1942, he was regularly introduced on air by 
Meissner who accompanied him and the rest of Dr Hartmann's team to 
Luxembourg in August 1943. Meissner and Stuart spent the post-war years 
together in Paris and London before returning to Ireland in 1958.44 
Madeleine Stuart (née Meissner) died in Dublin on 18 August 1986.
Mona Brase
Born in Dublin, Mona Brase is the daughter of the late Colonel Fritz 
Brase, an ex-German Army bandmaster who, from 1923 to 1940, was director of 
the Irish Army's School of Music. Colonel Brase died in Dublin in 1940, 
while his daughter was attending secondary school in Berlin. He had been a 
member of Adolf Mahr's Irish branch of the Auslandsorganisation but left it 
in the mid-1930s when requested to do so by the Irish Army. In 1934 Colonel 
Brase wrote to the Army's Chief of Staff, Major-General Michael Brennan, 
asking permission to set up a local branch of the German National Socialist 
party in Ireland. Permission was refused. 45
At the outbreak of war Mona Brase was warned against risking her life by 
returning to Ireland by sea and so she spent the war years with friends of 
her parents in Berlin. On 31 December 1941 a special New Year's Eve 
broadcast beamed to Ireland by German Radio began with a pre-recorded piano 
recital, a Schubert impromptu, by Mona Brase. 45 Just over four months 
later, Mona Brase broadcast the only radio message she would deliver from 
Berlin during the war. It was directed to her mother in Dublin to mark the 
anniversary of her late father's birthday, on 4 May 1942. Unknown to Miss 
Brase, every word of her brief personal message was transcribed by the 
BBC's secret monitoring unit at Evesham in Worcestershire. 47
During the war in Berlin, Mona Brase met Adolf Mahr and William Warnock 
at the Casino on the Landwehrkanal, a favourite rendezvous spot where 
members of the small Irish community and their German friends gathered to 
chat and drink beer. Despite knowing her socially, Warnock refused to renew 
Brase's Irish passport when it expired in 1943, 'being wary of anyone he 
felt was closely associated with the Germans'. Brase saw the heavy bombing 
of Berlin commence in November 1943 and recalls horrific incidents,
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including the deaths of 6 8 people burned into their seats in an air raid
shelter under the Bayerhaus on Berlin's Kufürstendamm. The couple who had
looked after her in Berlin committed suicide together as the Red Army
advanced on the city in April 1945. Such suicides were a common occurrence
at the time. By then Mona Brase had left school and was working as a nurse
in a military hospital near Berlin, having commenced medical studies the
previous year in Münster. On 19 April 1945, less than two weeks before the
Red Army hoisted the Soviet flag over the Reichstag, Brase and her
colleagues from the hospital left the area in a convoy of ten trucks. After
spending three months in a displaced persons camp at Lübeck, the British
offered to send her back to Ireland since she held an Irish passport,
albeit expired. Mona Brase was eventually able to return home to Dublin
4where she was reunited with her mother.
Charles Budina
Charles Budina was born in Germany on 12 December 1900. His family,
originally from Kahla in Thüringia, moved to Ireland in the 1920s in order
to escape the economic depression which had hit their hairdressing
business. Living in Blackrock, Co Dublin, Budina worked as a ladies'
hairdresser with Prost1s and built up a large local and German clientele.
According to Charles Acton, who knew Budina, the German had 'grandiose
ideas' which would take him far beyond the realms of hairdressing. In the
late 192 0s, Budina became friends with Acton's stepfather, Hugh Digues La
Touche who lived at Kilmacurragh, a magnificent 17th century country house
in County Wicklow. They formed a company called Irish Resources to mine
manganese (a black mineral used in glass-making) and to quarry granite for
a new cathedral in Dublin's Merrion Square. The cathedral was never
actually built. In September 1932 Budina leased Kilmacurragh from its owner
4 9Mrs Isabel Digues La Touche to run it as an hotel.
Budina renamed the property the Kilmacurra Park Hotel. He was joined 
there by his wife Clara and brother Kurt who had trained as a professional 
butcher in Germany. The family worked hard to build up the hotel business 
and Charles Budina himself travelled from Kilmacurra daily for the first 
year or two to work at Prost's hairdressing salon in Dublin. He was one of 
the first people to run day coach trips at weekends from Dublin to County 
Wicklow - catering for factory staff outings - and in addition he was well
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Charles Budina (right) wearing German military- 
uniform in wartime Berlin, talking to Harry Greiner
109
supported by the small German colony in Dubin including the German 
Minister, Herr Hempel. 50 Members of the German Association - a German- 
Austrian group that also met regularly in Dublin's Red Bank restaurant, 
where 'a swastika flag was draped ceremoniously over a table at the top of 
the dining room' - made tourist excursions to Kilmacurra. Adolf Mahr was 
prominent in the German Association.5*
Despite the success of his hotel business, the outbreak of war in 193 9 
changed Budina's plans. According to Charles Acton: 'When the war started,
Budina had the idea of going back to Germany and making an enormous amount 
of money, which he would plough into the business, through English-language 
broadcasting... he spoke broken English with a strong Dublin accent. ' Acton 
describes Budina's ideas as 'wildly optimistic', and adds that, 'like so 
many people, he thought the war would be over within a year at the most'. 
Acton is convinced that the German's motive for going to Berlin was purely 
financial and adds that, 'I don't think Budina had any political ideas as
COsuch. He would not have been a Nazi.' According to a friend of Budina's, 
Mrs Margaret Greiner, 'Budina was not a Nazi party member.' Of his decision 
to go to wartime Berlin, Mrs Greiner says that 'he wanted a change of air 
and did not think it [the war] would last' . 53
On 11 September 193 9 Budina left for Germany while his wife Clara 
remained at Kilmacurra with their four children and nephew Gunther. 54
Charles Budina made two broadcasts to Ireland during the war while 
serving as a soldier with the German Army. The first was part of the 
special New Year's Eve programme from Berlin, opened by Mona Brase's piano 
recital, on 31 December 1941. In that broadcast, Budina sent greetings to 
his wife and other members of his family, telling them he was a soldier 
based in occupied Paris. He added that 'Kurweis, Arano and Kurt are well 
and are at home on leave. ' 55 Budina's second and last broadcast from Berlin 
was made almost six months later on 13 June 1942. But this time, as well as 
sending greetings to his wife Clara and children, he included a political
■ ^ f tmessage telling listeners that Germany 'will win this war outright'.
While at the Radio Centre to make that broadcast, Budina was introduced to 
John O'Reilly by Hans Hartmann with the words 'a countryman of yours'. 
O'Reilly described their meeting:
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I looked in disbelief at this alleged Irishman in his uniform of the
regular Wehrmacht. On his arm was the P.K. denoting Propaganda
Kompanie. 57 I knew that no foreigners were accepted as members of the
German regular army. Aware of my doubt, the soldier then admitted that
he was German. He was married to an Irish girl and owned an hotel in
Ireland. On the outbreak of the war he had reported for service in the
5 8German army, leaving the management of the hotel to a friend.
Charles Budina was later sent to the Eastern front where he was wounded
5 9by gunfire and eventually taken prisoner by the Red Army. He returned to 
Ireland in 1946 and, according to Mrs Greiner who saw him at that time, 'he 
was a disillusioned and broken man. He wanted to get back to the hotel 
business but it never happened because - though Kilmacurragh had been 
bought in his name during his absence - he did not have the money to get 
the business going again. His biggest mistake was going to the war but at 
the time he thought "I need a break" ' . 60 John O'Reilly met Budina again in 
the Irish midlands in the spring of 1952, and 'found that fate had been 
cruel in the treatment of the big, hearty, bright-eyed soldier of 1942'.61 
The friend whom he had asked to look after Kilmacurra, accountant Diarmaid 
O'Connor, had exercised an option to purchase the property in Budina's 
absence. Budina's wife had, meanwhile, gone to live with a pro-Nazi
Ç. OCroatian hairdresser named Palcic. Budina himself died, following a heart 
attack, on 4 January 1954.63 His widow Clara began legal proceedings 
against Diarmaid O'Connor, making various allegations including 
mismanagement of Kilmacurra. The long drawn out case was eventually decided 
in O'Connor's favour. In the 1960s the estate was bought by the Department 
of Lands. Today, Kilmacurragh House, - originally constructed in 1697 and
one of the few surviving Queen Anne-style country mansions in Ireland, -
6 4lies empty and in ruins.
Susan Hilton (née Sweney)
Born in India in 1915, Susan Hilton was a British citizen whose father 
came from Donegal. Using her maiden name of Sweney, she broadcast for 
Hartmann's Irish service for approximately nine months from January 1942. 
She also broadcast on Berlin's Scottish service under the name of Ann 
Tower. Her story is related in the following chapter.
Ill
Johann Mikele
This speaker gave regular talks to Ireland from October 1943 to July- 
1944 when the Irish service was based in Luxembourg. Johann Mikele is 
thought to have been the speaker's real name, rather than a pseudonym, 
since most of the cover names used by the Irland-Redaktion were Irish 
ones. 65
Greetings from the German Colony
On 31 December 1941, former members of the German colony in Ireland 
broadcast a special programme of New Year's greetings from Berlin. They 
included: Dr Robert Stumpf who had worked as a radiologist in Baggot Street 
Hospital, Dublin; Karl Künstler, an engineer; and Dr Hilde Sutter, formerly 
an exchange student at University College Galway. Also taking part in this 
broadcast were Hans Hartmann, Charles Budina and Ludwig Mühlhausen. The 
broadcast, which began with a piano recital by Mona Brase, featured 
announcements made on behalf of Herr (Karl) Krause, Harry Greiner (a German 
engineer who, in 1935, had helped to launched the Solus lightbulb factory 
in Bray), and Mrs Esther O'Sullivan from Kilkenny.
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Chapter 6 
Suitable Pseudonyms
A number of persons broadcasting to Ireland used pseudonyms. One member 
of the Irland-Redaktion even used three different names. She was Susan 
Hilton, née Sweney, otherwise known as Ann Tower. A British subject, Hilton 
was the only member of the Irland-Redaktion to stand trial after the war. 
But before considering her circumstances, we will attempt first to identify 
some of those who broadcast to Ireland under assumed names.
The P hantom  B r o a d c a s t e r s
In addition to the Irish section's regular announcers and occasional 
speakers who used their real names on air, fictitious on-air names were 
also used either to protect the identity of announcers, or simply because 
some speakers' real names did not sound Irisn enough. Hilde Spickernagel 
thought some of the pseudonyms were 'rather too romantic to seem likely' . 1 
Dr Spickernagel notes that it wasn't only broadcasters' names that were 
made up: 'life stories were also frequently invented or modified, some of
them being quite incredible'. Dr Spickernagel cannot now throw any light 
on who might have provided the on-air pseudonyms. One of the best known 
cover names was 'Pat O'Brien', and predated both Hartmann and Mahr. It may 
have been chosen by the first head of the Irish service, Wolfgang 
Dignowity, or more likely by his employee, James Blair, who was the first 
person to broadcast under the 'Pat O'Brien' title. 3 According to Mahr, the
sobriquet 'Pat O'Brien' had been chosen 'to imitate the Irish man-in-the-
4street1 .
It was small wonder that Irish Army monitors in Dublin had such 
difficulty in tracing Pat O'Brien's background. Quite apart from the fact 
that such a person did not exist, the cover name was used by no less than 
three different speakers. Beginning with Blair in September 1941, the 'Pat 
O'Brien' label was later used in turn by John O'Reilly and, when the latter 
left the radio in September 1942, by Liam Mullally. From Blair's point of 
view the name had the advantage of conveying a more Irish image than he 
might otherwise have achieved, having spent most of his life in France as a 
Brtitish citizen. 5 For a while G2 thought 'Pat O'Brien' was a real person. 
On 14 September 1941, Commandant Sean Neligan of the Army's intercept
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service picked up one of James Blair's first 'Pat O'Brien1 talks. He 
reported to G2 ' s Dan Bryan that 'the announcer introduced to the microphone 
Pat O'Brien who gave a talk on the BBC. I have not heard this speaker 
before' . 6 Bryan was eventually tipped off about the true identity of 'Pat 
O'Brien' by William Warnock.
Coincidentally, the more famous Lord Haw Haw title also had three 
'owners'. One of the English section's speakers, Norman Baillie-Stewart, 
noted that: 'The first Lord Haw Haw of the Berlin Rundfunk [radio] was not
William Joyce or myself, but handsome, six feet two inches tall, Wolff 
Mittler, a man with both snobbish manners and an aristocratic voice.
Mittler was a Polish-German with curly blond hair, who had received his
osecondary education in Britain.'
There were other, short-lived cover names on the Irish programmes, such 
as Maureen Petrie, John Costello, Ella Kavanagh and Sheila Ni Kearney (all 
in the 1942-43 period) which appear to have been used only once or twice on 
air. Among the female broadcasters at the Irland-Redaktion, Sonja Kowanko 
used the name Linda Walters on air. Kowanko was a fluent English speaker 
but had never been to Ireland and knew nothing about the country. 
Consequently, her talks were scripted by her friend and colleague Susan 
Sweney.
One of the great mysteries of the band of phantom broadcasters concerns 
a certain Patrick Joseph Cadogan. This broadcaster spoke regularly on Irish 
and Irish-American topics for German Radio's transmissions to Ireland. The 
Cadogan talks, which frequently included anti-semitic references, were 
first picked up by the BBC and Irish Army monitors at the beginning of May 
1943. The talks continued until October 1943. Maurice Irvine, who monitored 
the Cadogan talks for the BBC, says that Cadogan was the nearest equivalent 
to Joyce that he had come across on the Irish service, and adds: 'he didn't
give the impression of being a man of any great culture or education'. When 
asked about Cadogan's accent, Irvine said:
It seemed to vary a bit. Predominantly American in his vocalisation and 
his intonation, but maybe occasionally a certain more Irish element came 
across. The name Cadogan is not a particularly Irish one, but he may 
have been born in Ireland and spent some early years there, and was then
Qtaken to the States and brought up there.
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According to one wartime colleague, Joyce was 'brilliant' at imitating 
an American accent. 10 In an effort to establish Cadogan's real identity, 
the author asked four former members of the Irland-Redaktion about the 
mystery broadcaster. Francis Stuart comments, 'The Irish service did not 
have any Cadogan in it. There were only three or four of us: myself, Susan 
Sweney, Liam Mullally and Hartmann. Cadogan must have been a cover name for 
someone else, perhaps someone in the English service. ' 11 Hilde Spickernagel 
knew of no one called Cadogan. She left the Irish service at the end of 
1942, over four months before the Cadogan broadcasts began. Dr Spickernagel 
adds: 'Blair, as far as I can remember, had no American accent but then an
-1 nAmerican accent is very easy to imitate.' The author also wrote to Roisin
Ni Mheara (Nora O'Mara) at her home in Germany to enquire about the
identity of Cadogan, but no reply was forthcoming. Hans Hartmann himself 
told the author that, 'there was no person of that name broadcasting in the 
Irland-Redaktion and I cannot recall ever hearing of Mr Cadogan'. But 
Hartmann suspects that William Joyce may have been behind the Cadogan 
talks, and comments:
Perhaps he [Cadogan] was a figure set up by quarters outside the Irland- 
Redaktion to convey propaganda to certain Irish listeners. I may call
attention to the fact that I had refused, towards the end of the war, to
allow William Joyce to speak to his 'Irish followers' in the frame of 
the Irland-Redaktion as to my mind this field was adequately covered by 
the contributions of Francis Stuart dealing mainly with cultural 
aspects. 13
On the possible link between Cadogan and William Joyce, Maurice Irvine 
comments: 11 would be very doubtful about the identification of Cadogan
with Joyce. Even given that Joyce could put on a convincing American 
accent, the quality of their voices was in my recollection quite different 
- Joyce's sharp, cutting, mocking, Cadogan's somewhat rough and earthy. ' 14
So who was Cadogan? Given his English public school background, Francis 
Stuart is unlikely to have been able to effect a convincing American accent 
and, in any case, he has denied any role in the Cadogan episode. 15 James 
Blair is a possible candidate for the title. He had been sacked from the 
Irland-Redaktion in 1942, and later joined the Nazis' Inter-Radio service
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in Austria. He could have been integrated into the English service or 
elsewhere by mid-1943. Despite his lack of an American accent, he could 
have effected one. Blair had a knowledge of U.S. affairs having worked as a 
proof-reader on an American newspaper in Paris. Michel Piche is an 
improbable candidate, despite having worked in America and being able to 
speak English well, because Maurice Irvine would have picked up his 
underlying French intonation. The most likely explanation, which Francis 
Stuart hints at and Dr Hartmannn suggests, is that William Joyce himself 
did the Cadogan talks. Few other people in the English service would have 
had the capacity to script detailed material of Irish and Irish-American
interest. 16 In addition, Joyce never hid his anti-semitism, and neither did
17the person delivering the Cadogan talks.
The U n h o ly  T r i n i t y : Sw en ey ,  H i l t o n  a n d  Tower
Not many people could claim to have been shipwrecked twice and thus
washed up on the shores of occupied Europe in World War II. But Susan
Sweney was one such person. Born into an Anglo-Irish colonial family in
Trickinopoly, India, on 2 February 1915, Sweney was destined through a
bizarre set of circumstances to become, twenty five years later, a
propaganda broadcaster for the Nazi radio service. Her father, Cyril Edward
Sweney, was born in Donegal in 1890 and grew up in Wales. Later he worked
for the British-controlled Indian Civil Service and became Deputy Inspector
General of Police in Madras. Susan Sweney's brother Edward was born in
Madras in 1912, and later moved to Ireland where he became a poultry farmer 
18in County Meath.
When asked to comment on his sister's wartime role in broadcasting and 
her anti-Allied stance, Edward Sweney said that, having been born in India, 
his sister had seen the British treatment of Mahatma Gandhi and his 
followers. Later, he said, she had received rough treatment at school in
IQEngland and had reacted against the class divisions of British society.
In 1936, at the age of 21, Susan Sweney married George Martin Hilton, a 
Scottish mining engineer from Dumfries. Also in 1936, she became a member 
of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the group founded four years 
earlier by Sir Oswald Mosley and of which William Joyce was also a member. 
Two years later she left the BUF, 'because of the public attacks by the 
Union against the Jews', and moved to Dublin where the Garda Special Branch
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noted she was living at number 8, Upper Mount Street. Back in London in 
January 1940, she rejoined the BUF and edited its newspaper V o i c e  o f  t h e  
P e o p le until May that year. Her work for Mosley's fascist paper attracted 
the attention of the police who raided her house and seized belongings. By 
that time Sweney's health had been affected by the death of her young son 
and she decided to leave England to join her husband who was working at the
9 0Mawchi tin mine in Simla, Burma. But her ship, K em m en d m e , was fated
never to reach its destination, being sunk by the German raider A t l a n t i s  on
13 July 194 0 in the Indian Ocean on its way to Rangoon. Sweney along with
the other passengers and some crew from Kew m endine were put aboard a
captured Norwegian vessel-turned-prison-ship, T i r r a n n a . With 293 prisoners
on board, T i r r a n n a headed for German-occupied France but on 22 September
1940 she was torpedoed off Royan by the British submarine T una. The
T i r r a n n a took only two minutes to sink with the loss of 87 lives. The
survivors, including Hilton and a 'frequently intoxicated1 Irish doctor
named Thomas McGowan (who had been the K e w m e n d in e ' s medical officer) were
taken ashore and housed at the German naval quarters in Royan until
December 1940 when Hilton made her way to Paris. In the occupied French
capital she earned 500 Reichsmarks for giving what she described as an
21'innocuous broadcast' about her maritime adventures.
Mrs Hilton's potential as a propagandist must have been spotted by the
Germans in occupied Paris for she was allowed to work as a journalist,
based at the Hotel d'Amerique in the rue Rochechouart. According to Eileen
Walsh, a secretary at the Irish legation in Berlin, Hilton established very
2 2close contacts with high ranking German Army officers in Paris. But, 
according to Mrs Hilton's own account given to MI5 in mid 1945, she helped 
British merchant seamen to escape from occupied Paris with the assistance 
of an Irish priest, Father Kenneth Monaghan of St Joseph's Catholic Church 
on Avenue Hoche, and of an Irish lady called Miss Fitzpatrick. Then, in 
June 1941, three members of the Deutsche Fichtebund, the German overseas 
propaganda organisation, visited Hilton in her Paris hotel to sound her out 
about the possibility of undertaking an overseas mission for them. Hilton 
later travelled via Brussels to Berlin with the head of the Fichtebund 
(FB), Theodore Kessemeir, and Oscar Pfaus, former head of the FB in America 
and then FB leader in Hamburg. At the beginning of 193 9 Pfaus had been 
chosen by German Intelligence to make contact with the IRA in Dublin. The
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Germans asked Hilton if her nerves were strong enough to undertake work for 
them in Ireland, the United States or Portuguese East Africa. But she 
refused on the grounds that she 'didn't want to do anything dirty'. In 
Berlin she undertook a series of jobs starting with telephone intercept 
work and was later taken to see top secret U-boat centres and other
military installations so she could produce a propaganda book on Germany's
21military strength and capabilities.
But radio broadcasting was destined to be her principal occupation for 
the next couple of years in wartime Berlin, beginning with scripting 
religious sermons for broadcast on a secret Biiro Concordia station 
(Christian Peace Movement) followed by personal talks for another Concordia 
station beamed to Scotland called Radio Caledonia. For broadcasting these 
talks from September 1941, under the name of Ann Tower, she received 300 
marks a month. In choosing the name Tower for the Scottish broadcasts, 
Hilton was not simply using a cover name but part of the maiden name of her 
mother, Dorothy Tower-Barter. Although never broadcasting under her married 
name, Mrs Hilton did not attempt to hide her identity, using her maiden 
name of Susan Sweney for all the broadcasts to Ireland following her 
recruitment by the Irland-Redaktion where she gave her first talk on 2 
January 1942. 24
Francis Stuart contributed his first radio talk for the Irish service on 
17 March 1942. He saw Susan Sweney at this time and remarked years later 
that:
she was a nice sort. A great disadvantage for her was that she was 
evidently a heavy drinker, normally. In those days drink was less 
[available]. She didn't seem to have access to the black market. She was 
always seeing where she could get the next drink, poor woman. She was a 
nice woman mind you. I never saw her outside [the radio centre], but I 
heard from others who knew her more socially that it was always where
would she get the next drink. I never heard any of her broadcasts. . . 1
2 5don't know if we could have got them in Germany.
On 26 March 1942, Susan Sweney used official German Radio notepaper to 
write a letter to her brother Edward, then living at The Moat House in 
Oldcastle, Co Meath. The letter read:
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My Dear Edward, by now you will have heard that I am here working at the 
above address [77, Kaiserdamm, Berlin]. Maybe you sometimes hear me. I 
speak mostly at 8.15 [p.m.] over the station Rennes and some other 
shortwave, but I never can remember. I suppose you have got the mater's 
[mother's] address. I haven't, so I am enclosing this letter for you to 
send on to her. I am well and fortunate to be alive after the fun and
games I have had all over the world. Cheerio, your many times drowned
2 6sister, Susan.
As well as being read by the Gestapo, the letter was intercepted by 
British Intelligence who tipped off their Irish counterparts in G2. It 
threw the spotlight on Edward Sweney who never received his sister's letter
but who became instead the subject of an official investigation. G2 drew up
2 7a file on Susan Sweney, delving into her father's Donegal origins. 
British-Irish contacts at military intelligence level were well developed 
at that stage of the war and so it was a British official, not an Irish 
one, who was dispatched to check up on Edward Sweney at his poultry farm in 
Oldcastle. Almost 50 years after the event, the latter recalled it in
detail. The official sent to The Moat House was, according to Sweney, John
Betjeman, then attached to the British diplomatic representation in Dublin 
as a press and cultural attaché. Sweney remembers that Betjeman:
called at my place in the 1940s in a car when no one had cars, and asked 
whether the local church had pews in it or not. I told him I didn't know
but suggested he could get a chair to stand on and look through the
2 8church windows and see for himself.
Betjeman's question was presumably intended as a pretext to engage
Sweney in conversation, but the poultry farmer did not take the bait. At
around the same time Sweney also received a phone call from the German
Minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, but he says that he can no longer recall 
2 9what Hempel said.
Back in Berlin, Susan Sweney was having doubts about the course of the 
war and was concerned about possible consequences for her after the 
conflict. On 19 May 1942 she wrote from her flat at Klopstockstrasse in 
Berlin to her friend Biddy O'Kelly who lived at Pine Hill on the Vico Road
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in Dalkey, Co Dublin. Lamenting the war, she told her friend that, 'It is 
we who will be to blame if there is another war, just as it is our parents' 
fault that there is a war now. Each generation makes mistakes and God knows 
we are suffering now'. Explaining her role in the radio service the letter 
continued:
I write transmissions, perhaps you hear them. Every day there's 
something or other. At the moment they are running two of my series 
called 'Have you forgotten?', and 'Places in the News'. Then I speak my 
own commentaries. I feel such a fool, but then at other times I think I 
am perhaps speaking to you and to other people I know. Try and tune in 
and let me know what you think and what other people think. I want to 
know whether I can show my face in Ireland after the war or not . 30
In the letter, Susan Sweney tells of her loneliness in Berlin and asks 
Biddy O'Kelly to send 'news of that unfortunate husband of mine, who might 
be dead in the jungles of Burma or a prisoner of the Japanese, or alive in 
some other part of the world wondering where on earth his wife has got to'. 
Later, at the Rundfunkhaus, she continued the letter telling her friend of 
drinking and billiard sessions with a Russian colleague, the secretary of 
the Irland-Redaktion and part-time broadcaster, Sonja Kowanko. Sweney 
wrote:
I am sitting in my office now. The radio is playing softly and a 
Sondermeldung [special announcement] is coming through. There is a green 
tree looking in at the window. The traffic is rolling along the street. 
Night is coming and I am smoking my little pipe. I like smoking a pipe, 
it soothes me. The only thing that disturbs me is that when I raise my 
eyes I see maps on the wall...map after map. They seem to be part of my 
life now. I think when I die, a map will be found wrapped round my 
heart. 31
When Eileen Walsh of the Irish legation investigated Susan Sweney's 
circumstances at about this time she reported that the broadcaster had 
'sunk to a low level'. But Walsh also noted that Sweney was far from being 
one hundred per cent pro-German, adding that 'while she was willing to say
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what she thought of the British, she did not hesitate to tell the Germans
1 9what she thought of them'. Almost a month later, on 10 June 1942, Susan 
Sweney wrote to her friend Biddy O'Kelly again, this time displaying 
obvious signs of depression:
Never have I felt so utterly homesick and shut away as I do now. Biddy, 
nothing can ever make up to me for these years of unbelieveable, soul- 
destroying loneliness. I try to shake these morbid thoughts off me. I go 
to the races and gamble as hard as I can. I work hard so as to forget. 33
Despite her reservations about whether or not she could show her face in 
Ireland after the war, Sweney continued to do what the German propagandists 
asked of her, including an anti-Jewish broadcast on 19 July 1942.34 But, as 
the autumn of 1942 approached, she was to commit a professional error that 
cost her her job at the Radio Centre in Berlin. According to Eileen Walsh, 
Sweney had trouble at work and left. The details of what happened emerged 
over a year later, in December 1943, when John O'Reilly was interrogated by 
G2 officers in Dublin following his parachute drop into County Clare. In 
the course of a debriefing on the Irish service of German Radio, O'Reilly 
told Colonel Dan Bryan that Susan Sweney had proved unreliable on the radio 
and was fond of drink. In addition, James Blair was proving unsatisfactory 
and was believed by the radio's bosses to be getting stale. O'Reilly then 
told Bryan that 'following a scene in which Susan Hilton [Sweney] used 
endearing terms to Blair while he was in the announcing box and still on 
the air, their services were dispensed with'. 35 This was around September 
1942. Sweney disappeared after that and O'Reilly thought she had gone to 
Spain. However, James Blair moved to another broadcasting job with the 
Inter Radio company and, in January 1943, Sweney reappeared and also joined 
Inter Radio. 36
In the summer of 1943 Sweney was preparing to embark on a grand tour of 
some of the Third Reich's main cities with a view to preparing propaganda 
material for Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. But as she undertook her tour 
of Germany the Gestapo was voicing concern about Sweney's true loyalties.
In June 1943 the Gestapo's Gottingen office detailed her itinerary around 
the country but, more importantly, it clearly labelled her a suspected 
Allied spy. The Gestapo document, dated 30 June 1943, was addressed to the
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district administration of the National Socialist party and referred to 
'the Irish journalist Hilton, who is a spy-suspect'. Her address was given 
as the Kant Hotel in Berlin's Kant Strasse. The document detailed a wide- 
ranging trip around the Reich that had been arranged by the Propaganda 
Ministry, taking in Bayreuth, Passau, Vienna, Salzburg, Munich, Innsbruck, 
Augsburg, Biberach, Heidelberg, Koblenz, Cologne, and Gottingen. The 
purpose of the tour was to allow Hilton to gather material on the life of 
the Roman Catholic Church in the Third Reich and, by producing a propaganda 
brochure, counter Allied propaganda that the Catholic Church was being 
crushed in Germany. Hilton was also under instructions to take pictures of 
churches ruined in British and American air raids, and write about them in 
her article destined for foreign consumption. The document ended with the 
Gestapo's Gottingen office chief instructing the local Nazi party
administrator that 'when Hilton turns up in Gottingen I want to be informed
3 7immediately so we can supervise her'.
It is not clear exactly what prompted the Gestapo to label Sweney as a 
spy suspect. Elements in the Gestapo may have thought her on-air blunder 
was a deliberate attempt to sabotage part of the radio propaganda effort. 
There was also the question of her refusal two years earlier to undertake a 
mission for the Fichtebund and the role she had played in helping British 
sailors to flee occupied Paris. In any case, by mid-1943, the Gestapo was 
anxious to keep a close eye on her movements and was adamant that she could 
not depart from the agreed itinerary without the express permission of the 
Propaganda Ministry.
Later in the war, Susan Sweney was allowed to move from Berlin to Vienna 
where she broadcast what she termed 'little talks' for RRG's 'Voice of the 
People' programme. She was paid 50 marks for each broadcast. In Vienna she 
accepted an invitation to join an SS undercover unit thinking this would 
give her 'the opportunity of getting out into Yugoslavia'. She was supposed 
to spy for the SS on resident Americans as well as Germans suspected of 
helping the Allies. Instead of informing the SS, Sweney claimed after the 
war that she 'endeavoured to warn them all'. In 1944, Sweney visited the 
Turkish Consulate in Vienna to try and get a visa to leave the Third Reich. 
When the Gestapo discovered what she was doing they imprisoned her. On 2 6 
August 1944 she was transferred to Liebenau internment camp, north of Lake 
Constance near the town of Meckenbeuren. She was still being held at
122
Three faces of Mrs Susan Hilton,
( n é e  S w e n e y ) .
Left, a 1936 passport photograph.
1936
Left, after her discovery in Liebenau 
camp, Germany, April 1945.
Below, living in England in 1960.
1945
1960
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Liebenau when it was liberated by the Allies at the end of the war, by 
which time she was suffering from severe malnutrition. Sweney remained in 
the camp in the custody of the Allies until December 1945 and gave a series
"5 Oof sworn statements to MI5 interrogater Reg Spooner.
Seven months after the end of the war in Europe, Susan Sweney was taken 
back to England to face charges of assisting the enemy. Accompanied by a 
woman MI5 officer she crossed the channel by ferry to Dover on 11 December
~3 Q1945. On arrival on English soil she was formally arrested and charged. 
The London T im e s carried the story on page two in its 'News in Brief' 
section as follows:
Scotland Yard announces that Mrs Dorothea May Therese Susan Hilton was 
detained on her arrival at Victoria Station from the Continent yesterday 
and charged with an offence under the Defence (General) Regulations 
193 9, and will appear at Bow Street Court. 40
When she appeared before Sir Bertrand Watson at Bow Street Magistrates' 
Court, Sweney was charged, under her married name of Dorothea Hilton, with 
assisting the enemy by taking employment in the German Radio propaganda 
service. Her solicitor told the court that everything she had done for the 
Germans was done with a view to getting out of Germany. She was committed 
for trial at the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey) on 5 February
1946. After a postponement the trial eventually took place on 18 February 
1946, when she faced a total of ten counts of assisting the enemy. The 
prosecution evidence was compiled by special branch Detective Sergeant 
Albert Gibson who was based at the London Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner's office and was a witness at the trial. 41
Mrs Hilton was described as a British subject on the charge sheets, 
though for the Gestapo she had been an 'Irish journalist'. The question of 
her actual, legal nationality was shrouded in mystery. Though she was born 
in India thirty two years before that country gained independence from 
Britain, her father was a Donegal man and she had lived for some time in 
Ireland in the late 193 0s. It was presumably on the strength of the latter 
two points that she had applied for, and been given, a temporary Irish 
passport from Count O'Kelly de Gallagh at the legation in Paris early in 
1941. However, the document was not renewed on application to the Berlin
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legation the following year. Nontheless, Sweney had kept her passport 
locked up in a safe at the Concordia studios in the Reichsportsfeld in 
Berlin. To add to the confusion, Sweney also carried a German passport. 
Hilde Spickernagel points out that: 'not only were interim passports handed
out by the Irish legation to people who claimed to be of Irish origin, but 
also fully valid German passports with pictures and all the necessary 
stamps were made out by the German authorities; thus the lady generally 
known as Susan Hilton once showed me a German passport she also held in the 
name of Ann Tower' . 42
In court, Mrs Hilton faced the following counts, namely that she:
1. Made a record for broadcasting propaganda on behalf of the enemy, 
between 1 December 1940 and 1 June 1941.
2. Conspired with other British subjects - Donald Palmer, John O'Reilly, 
John Brown, Gilbert, Dorothy Eckersley, James Clark, Liam Mullally and 
other persons unknown - to broadcast propaganda on behalf of the enemy.
3. In September 1941, entered the service of the Bureau Concordia, a 
section of the German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret 
propaganda.
4. In December 1941, prepared propaganda on behalf of the enemy, for 
broadcasting.
5. In January 1942, entered the service of the Irish Redaktion, a 
section of the German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret 
propaganda.
6 . In January 1942, prepared, from material provided by the German 
Foreign Office and by the German Propaganda Ministry, propaganda for 
broadcasting by the enemy.
7. In September 1942, broadcast propaganda on behalf of the enemy.
8 . In January 1943, entered the service of Inter Radio, a station of the 
German Broadcasting System, broadcasting secret propaganda.
9. In January 1943, prepared propaganda for broadcasting by the enemy.
10. In October 1943, entered the service of the Schutz-Staffel (SS), a
German paramilitary organisation engaged in internal security 
43operations.
Hilton pleaded guilty to count 1, as well as counts 3 to 9 inclusive.
She pleaded not guilty to counts 2 and 10. Consequently, the second charge,
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of conspiracy, was not proceeded with. The tenth and final charge of SS 
membership was also dropped, despite her earlier admission to MI5 at 
Liebenau camp that in 1943 in Vienna she had been recruited by a local SS 
group to watch Americans and others. The guilty pleas meant that only the 
minimum of evidence was revealed in court. Hilton put herself at the mercy 
of the court and was sentenced to 18 months in prison without hard 
labour. 44
Edward Sweney describes his sister's imprisonment as 'an injustice' and 
believes she was 'very badly treated by the British, considering she had 
played a non-combattant role through radio programmes aimed at women 
civilians'. He also told the author that his sister 'may have been 
dragooned into doing it', adding, 'she is innocent of any blameworthy act. 
Her name should be cleared because what she did was inoffensive and caused 
no one any trouble. All her sentiments were pacific, in pursuit of peace, 
humane, and of extreme national value - because it was in the name of peace 
- at a time of terrible conflict. She was the victim of very cruel 
circumstances. I do not like to see any being exploited and cruelly 
treated. Susan was, in point of fact, incarcerated by the Germans and this 
fact should have been emphasised at her trial instead of which, apparently, 
it was ignored at great prejudice to a fair trial. 45
Susan Sweney's case is certainly unique among wartime propaganda
broadcasters in that she managed to be imprisoned by both Nazi Germany and
Britain, each considering her to be an enemy collaborator. The facts that
she was twice a prisoner of the Nazis, had refused to undertake spying work
for them, had tried to flee the Third Reich and had been found half-starved
in a Nazi internment camp were apparently never raised at her 1946 Old
Bailey trial which was disposed of in less than a day. It is noteworthy
that charges against her of conspiracy and SS membership were dropped
without explanation by the prosecution team, giving the public impression
that the case dealt purely with someone accused of broadcasting enemy 
4 6propaganda.
As to what motivated Susan Sweney to go to Nazi Germany, it appears to 
have been a mixture of coercion, naivety and adventurism that turned sour. 
Her brother told the author that his sister was 'an exhibitionist' who was 
'very immature and driven by fame'. He also described her as 'a person who 
needed a good deal of guidance. She was easily led, highly volatile, a very
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impressionable person, generous but hot-tempered'. After her release from 
prison, Susan Sweney worked as a courier travelling to South America and 
Australia. She later ran a farm and pet business in England where she died 
on 30 October 1983, aged 6 8 . 47
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Chapter 7 
'God bless and save Ireland':
The Broadcasts of 1939-41
The millions of words of propaganda that Germany beamed to Ireland 
during World War II gave neither a warning of Nazism's brutal excesses nor 
any hint of defeat for the Axis powers. But one thing the broadcasts did 
show was that German Radio, for the first time, was paying some sort of lip 
service to Ireland's nationhood and to her identity. During the sixteen 
years that German Radio had been in existence up to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, Ireland had rarely if ever been mentioned. The records of 
German Radio's output in the 1929-36 period show only one mention of 
Ireland, - that was on Wednesday, 8 May 193 5 when the radio service carried 
a report of an international football match between Germany and Ireland 
held that day at Dortmund. The home side was victorious. 1 With the outbreak 
of hostilities just over four years later, sporting clichés were swopped 
for straightforward propaganda.
1 9  3 9
As early as 5 September 1939 German Radio's domestic service was 
praising the neutrality policies of Presidents Vargas in Brazil and de 
Valera in Ireland. 2 On 27 September de Valera was asked in the Dáil if he 
knew about:
a recent broadcast from the Hamburg Radio Station about 12.15 a.m. on 
the night of the 13th or 14th September, during which an announcement 
was made that Sire had better come out from under Mr Chamberlain's 
umbrella; and if he will state whether he has made appropriate 
representations to the German government. . . 3
De Valera's reply revealed that he was fully aware of the role of 
propaganda even at that early stage of the conflict:
I have heard talk of such a broadcast, but I am not sure whether, in 
fact, such a reference to Ireland was made, or whether this is not 
another sample of the ridiculous rumours which have been passed from
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Larry Slattery from Thurles, Co Tipperary (pictured 
centre, lying on hospital bed) became one of the 
first British prisoners of war when his RAF plane 
was shot down over Germany during the first week of 
September 1939. This photograph shows Slattery being 
interviewed for German Radio. The interview was used for 
propaganda purposes in bulletins to Britain to show 
that prisoners of war were being well treated.
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mouth to mouth recently. I have made no effort to secure the text of the
reported broadcast, and have made no representations to the German
government. In the present circumstances, when wholesale propaganda is
used as a method of warfare, I think it would be foolish to take serious
notice of incidental remarks like those referred to in the deputy's 
4question.
German Radio's English-language services were already up and running, 
and William Joyce had made his debut on air from Berlin on 11 September 
1939.5 The broadcasts from Germany attracted the attention not only of 
politicians but also Army Intelligence and by the beginning of November 
they had prompted a concerned letter from G2's Colonel Liam Archer to the 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joe Walshe. Under the 
heading 'German Wireless Broadcasts', and addressing the note to 'Dear 
Joe', Archer wrote:
It has been stated on good authority that incidents which were not 
reported in the Irish press and in connection with which it is presumed 
the censor allowed no messages to pass, were reported on the German 
Wireless. Further, it is reported that some of those incidents were 
actually reported on the German Wireless on the evening of the day on 
which the incidents took place. A case in point is the carrying of the 
banner by the Kerry football team at an All-Ireland match in Croke Park. 
If the statement is true that this incident was reported on the German 
Wireless on the day of the incident it would be a very strong indication 
that there is some form of illicit wireless communication between this 
country and Germany. If you are still paying attention to the German 
Wireless and note any incidents of this kind, I should be glad to have 
details. The other matter affecting the German Wireless is presumably 
one more directly affecting your Department. It would seem that 
misleading or unfounded statements with regard to affairs in this 
country have been broadcast from German stations. A broadcast from one 
station, evidently intended for Africa, on one occasion stated the IRA 
were still carrying on their fight against British Imperialism. It also 
stated that all posters in connection with ARP [Air Raid Precautions]
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had been torn down and that damage had also been done to ARP shelters.
CBelfast or Northern Ireland were not mentioned in this connection.
Despite Archer's assumption to the contrary, it appears that External 
Affairs was not listening to German Radio. Consequently, G2 took charge of 
monitoring foreign radio transmissions at the end of 1939 and kept External 
Affairs and some other government departments informed of the more relevant
nbroadcasts.
One of the first transmissions monitored by the Irish Army was a talk in 
Irish by Professor Ludwig Miihlhausen on Sunday 10 December 193 9 via the 
Hamburg transmitter from 8.25 p.m. to 8.40 p.m. Dublin time. The Army
monitor noted the German's mixture of Kerry and western dialects, and
reported him as saying that:
it was a pleasure to talk over the air to his Irish friends imagining 
himself seated beside the fire with the smell of turf in his nose. He 
characterised as lies statements about the persecution by the Germans of 
Czechoslovak and Polish Catholics, and reminded his listeners of the
atrocities committed in Ireland by the Black and Tans and the
Auxiliaries. 8
Completing his report the following day, the monitor attached a cutting 
from the I r i s h  P r e s s headed 'Talk in Irish from German radio station' 
revealing that the Professor of Celtic Studies at Berlin University was
'well known in Irish university circles', and 'has made repeated visits to
. . 9  . .the Kerry, Galway and Donegal Irish speaking districts'. In addition to
Irish Army monitors, the German Minister to Ireland, Eduard Hempel, was
also listening to Miihlhausen's talks. On 13 December 193 9 he reported in a
telegram to Berlin that:
Here Irish language radio had an outstanding effect. Received widespread 
recognition. In particular, the government has been pleased because of 
this 'first international recognition' of the Irish language. With view 
to the propaganda content, I recommend a careful and gradual approach; 
initially rather an overall view of our cultural relationship to 
Ireland, old Irish culture and the altruistic interest and activity of
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German research for its revival. Furthermore, descriptions of German 
lifestyle, through which a better opinion of today's Germany can be 
fostered by means of unobtrusive direction to known focus points. Avoid
the expression Gaelic language rather than Irish language which is
preferable here. Miihlhausen's knowledge of the language and expressions 
which represented the local ethnic character very well, were indeed 
acknowledged. 10
The impetus for the launch of Muhlhausen's Sunday night broadcasts, as 
was seen above, originally came from the Propaganda Ministry. 11 Neutral 
Ireland did not escape Goebbels' notice and in his diary of 28 November 
1939 he noted the IRA's bombing campaign in London.
1 9  4 0
On 8 February 1940, Goebbels recorded in his diary the execution of IRA 
men Peter Barnes and James Richards (also known as Frank McCormick) in 
Birmingham the previous day for their part in the Coventry bombings, 
commenting, 'We seize on this with all our might. This gives us ammunition
for several days. I keep impressing my people with one basic truth: repeat
12everything until the last, most stupid person has understood. 1
On 30 April 1940, the question of German Radio broadcasts about Ireland 
was raised in the Dail again, this time by a Labour T.D. who asked de 
Valera:
if he is aware of the unfriendly references to this country by certain 
German radio stations, and, if so, whether he has made or proposes to 
make representations to the German Government in the matter.
De Valera replied:
I know there is a report in circulation of alleged unfriendly references 
to Ireland in recent German broadcasts. But I have not been able to 
discover anyone who claims to have actually heard the references, and 
the investigations I have made lead me to believe that the report is 
unfounded. 13
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In early May 1940, the Dominions Office in London 'asked the BBC if Nazi 
broadcasts to Ireland could be jammed, and if it was known how many people 
in Eire listened to BBC broadcasts'. In the event they never were jammed, 
nor does it appear that an estimate of the BBC's Southern Irish audience 
was ever produced. 14
Advances by the German armed forces provided the propagandists in Berlin 
with continuing opportunities. On 9 April 1940 the Germans seized Denmark 
and invaded Norway capturing the capital, Oslo. A month later on 10 May, 
Germany invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. With the Dutch 
Army surrendering on 14 May and Belgium capitulating on 2 7 May, the German 
Army continued its advance westwards, entering Paris on 13 June 1940.15 
Despite the wave of conquests which gave Nazi Germany control of most of 
the European mainland from Poland to the Atlantic coast, the weekly Irish 
language talks from Berlin had little to say apart from exhorting Irish 
listeners to 'keep your neutrality'.
On 28 June 1940 an instruction was issued to the German Army High
Command 'to the effect that in order to mislead the enemy, all available
information media should spread the word that we [the Germans] are
preparing a landing in Ireland. . . ' 16 There is no evidence that the Irland-
Redaktion complied with this instruction but the following day, 2 9 June
194 0, German Radio's shortwave German-language service to North America
carried a commentary on the naval war, by Vice Admiral Friedrich Luetzow,
17which mentioned Ireland's refusal to join the conflict.
In the wake of the Germany's military victories in Western Europe, the 
BBC began to take an interest in the material that Miihlhausen and Hartmann 
were broadcasting to Ireland. On 1 July 1940, Angus Matheson of Glasgow 
University began work as a Gaelic monitor and translator with the BBC
*1 Qmonitoring service at Evesham. For the whole of 1940, Miihlhausen and 
Hartmann together provided the only German Radio commentaries explicitly 
for Ireland. These were all in Irish. A study of original BBC monitoring 
reports of both speakers provides a useful comparison of their propaganda 
styles. For example, on 10 November 1940, Hartmann gave a 15-minute talk 
beginning with the words 'This is the German Radio in Berlin, Dr Hartmann 
speaking' followed by a potted history of the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler's 
rise to power. Hartmann said Hitler had:
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remained faithful to his promise to remove the injustice of the 
disgraceful Treaty of Versailles. He was prepared to do that peaceably 
but England and France did not allow him. They declared war on Germany 
in order to carve up Germany completely.
Concluding his talk, Hartmann brought in an Irish angle saying, 'I am 
sure that you have heard of the great number of English ships that are 
being sunk by German U-boats to the west of Ireland. 1 He then summarised 
the exchanges between Churchill and de Valera over the Treaty Ports and
Ireland's neutral stance, signing off his talk with the customary slogan
1  9'May God bless and save Ireland.'
2 0Hartmann categorises Mühlhausen's talks as 'aggressive propaganda'. 
Mühlhausen rarely introduced himself by name on the radio. His voice was 
however easily recognised by Angus Matheson who had worked with the leading 
European Celtic language experts before the war. A 15-minute talk by 
Mühlhausen on 2 0 November 194 0 was characterised not so much by pro-German 
sentiments as by a wealth of anti-British invective. While covering the 
same ground (the Treaty Ports, Irish neutrality, etc.) as Hartmann had done 
ten days earlier, Mühlhausen's style was markedly different. Beginning with 
a list of examples to prove what he saw as England's lack of regard for 
smaller nations, he said:
The English do not like to place their own precious lives in danger. The 
English do not like to make use of their own soldiers in war. They 
prefer to sacrifice other peoples and nations for the glory of the 
Empire.
Mühlhausen then countered an RAF statement on unlimited warplane 
production in England saying:
That is of no consequence. A few days ago, Coventry, the great centre 
for the production of aeroplanes and motors, was reduced to a pile of 
scrap iron. Bombs weighing altogether hundreds of millions of pounds are 
dropped every night on the English cities. There is no counting of the 
number of armaments and munitions factories etc., which have been 
destroyed in London and other places.
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After outlining Germany's seemingly unlimited power, Miihlhausen 
gradually introduced his Irish angle:
Greece has been the last small country to be dragged into the war by the 
English. The same fate is in store for them as for Norway, Holland, and 
Belgium when England managed to get them involved. The English cannot 
and will not give any effective help to the Greeks. The English cannot 
in the present position give any help to any of the small nations in 
Europe. No one today has any faith in or respect for the English. The 
Turks have understood this better than the Greeks. The whole region from 
the coast of France to the coasts of Japan are united, and neither 
England nor any other power can ever break this bloc. The English have 
not abandoned their claims to the Irish ports. It would be tantamount to 
a second annexation of Ireland if the English succeeded in obtaining the 
Irish ports again. I am sure that the Irish nation, though it is indeed 
a small nation, is sufficiently strong to resist this move. Ireland 
would never again be free from English control if she willingly handed 
over her ports to the English. The English already deeply regret that
they gave Ireland sufficient liberty to be able now to remain a neutral
21state. May God bless Ireland, and may Ireland save herself.
The broadcast was made against the background of a British landing in 
occupied Greece on 3 November 1940, and the Luftwaffe's blitz bombing of 
Coventry on 15 November 1940.22 A month later, on 15 December 1940, 
Miihlhausen returned to an Irish theme, this time Ireland's fate in the 
event of an English victory:
If England succeeded in defeating Germany, Ireland would be lost sooner 
or later. The English would take revenge on Ireland because she was 
neutral in this war instead of sacrificing her life for the Empire.
There would be then no one in the world who would prevent the English 
from bringing Ireland once more under subjection and from destroying 
Irish freedom. On the other hand, if we succeeded in defeating the 
Empire, Ireland, the whole of Ireland, Ireland from Belfast to Cork, 
would be free forever from English control. We only smile when we hear 
the English say that we would swallow up Ireland. There is no doubt
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whatever that we will succeed in defeating England this time. Stand firm
then against the English now, and the whole of Ireland will at last be
21free. God bless and save Ireland.
Miihlhausen's talk was considered sufficiently strong by the BBC monitors 
for it to be 'flashed' in condensed form, two hours after transmission, to 
the relevant authorities in London. 24
1 9  4 1
The events of 1941 were to prove crucial in determining the outcome of 
the Second World War and consequently the Germans' Irish propaganda drive 
as well. Mid-way through the year, Hitler - having turned his attentions 
away from Western Europe (the plan to invade England was postponed in mid- 
September 1940) - launched his surprise attack on Russia, Operation
Barbarossa, on 22 June 1941. America entered the conflict following Japan's
2 Sattack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.
At the start of 1941 German Radio's programmes to Ireland consisted of 
two talks a week in Irish by Miihlhausen and Hartmann. But by the end of the
year the service had expanded to include a nightly programme in both Irish
2 Gand English, with Hartmann overseeing the operation. As seen m  chapter 
8, the impetus for launching a more in-depth radio service for Ireland came 
in March 1941 from the German Foreign Office functionary, Dr Adolf Mahr, 
but test transmissions for the new daily service did not begin until late 
August 1941.27 It is one of the anomalies of the German propaganda drive 
that key events of Irish interest, such as the Luftwaffe raids on Belfast 
in May 1941, the accidental bombing of Dublin's North Strand by the 
Luftwaffe (31 May 1941), and Frank Aiken's failed arms-buying mission to 
America (also in May), went without comment on German Radio's Irish service
but were mentioned in dozens of languages by German Radio announcers
2 8broadcasting to the rest of the world.
The controversy over Britain's attempt to introduce conscription in 
Northern Ireland provided German propagandists with valuable material. In 
fact, Radio Eireann had unwittingly given the Germans all the ammunition 
they needed on the conscription issue by broadcasting an anti-conscription 
statement from the Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal MacRory. On 22 May
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1941, Radio Eireann carried MacRory's statement in which he quoted a letter 
from the Irish Catholic bishops in May 193 9 saying:
Any attempt to impose conscription here would be disastrous. Our people 
have been subjected to grievous injustice in being cut off from one of 
the oldest nations in Europe and being deprived of their fundamental 
rights as citizens of their own land. In such circumstances, to compel 
them to fight for their oppressor would be likely to rouse indignation 
and resistance... an ancient land made by God was partitioned by a 
foreign power against the vehement protests of its people. Conscription
was an old trick to compel those who still lie under this grievous wrong
2 9to fight on the side of its perpetrators.
Six days after the cardinal's statement was broadcast, Hans Hartmann - 
who regularly monitored Radio Eireann broadcasts for suitable propaganda 
material30 - jumped on the conscription bandwagon, commenting:
A few days ago, Irishmen gave the governments of the Six Counties and 
Great Britain to understand that they had resolved to resist 
conscription in the Six Counties by every means at their disposal. I 
hope that in the end they will have their reward for their bravery and 
steadfastness. At any rate Irishmen have proved up to now that they have 
been able to achieve their objects by their courage and loyalty.
Hartmann then gave his listeners a long lecture on the history of the 
United Irishmen movement from 1792 onwards, adding:
The United Irishmen failed to achieve their objects because many of 
their leaders were too weak. The position of the island at present is 
somewhat similar to its position 150 years ago, but I believe that this 
time the leaders will be stronger. 31
On 31 May 1941, the Luftwaffe accidentally bombed the North Strand area
"3 9of Dublin, killing 28 people and damaging up to a thousand homes. At the 
same time, the conscription controversy, culminating in the British 
Government's decision not to introduce it compulsorily in Northern
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Ireland, 33 gave German propagandists a welcome diversion for listeners in 
Ireland and elsewhere. Thus, at the beginning of June 1941, German Radio's 
foreign services were telling the world that 'It is impossible that the 
Germans bombed Dublin intentionally', as well as reporting that 'London has 
abandoned the proposal of introducing conscription in Northern Ireland'. In 
the first week of June, audiences from Hungary to Spain to Norway were kept 
abreast of Irish affairs by the Germans who reported that 'the U.S. Deputy 
Naval Attaché in London' had left to visit Ireland', and while Ireland's 
request for U.S. arms had been refused 'the USA has agreed to ship 500,000 
tons of petrol to Eire ' . 34 These broadcasts were somewhat at odds with 
Berlin's weekly Irish language talks which did not always comment directly 
on current news events. At the end of the first week in June, Ludwig 
Mühlhausen was forecasting that 'The Celtic race will come into its own 
again if England collapses' and he called on Irishmen to stand united 'to 
free the island' . 35
The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, ensured 
that no anti-Soviet broadcasts were heard on German Radio from that August 
date until Hitler attacked Russia on 22 June 1941. From then on, the radio 
propagandists in Berlin got the green-light to play the anti-Communist 
card. On 2 9 June 1941, a week after Operation Barbarossa, Mühlhausen 
countered Allied suggestions that Hitler, like Napoleon before him, would 
be repulsed:
The present German invasion of Russia cannot rightly be compared with 
Napoleon's invasion, a comparison which hostile propagandists are fond 
of making. Many had then been forced to join Napoleon's army. But there 
is a great difference now. Almost the whole of Europe is on the side of 
Germany of its own free will. I am sure that the Irish people also are 
well pleased, for I have had many occasions to learn of the Irish hate 
[sic] of Bolshevism.
After listing Germany's military successes against Russia in the 
preceding week, Mühlhausen praised the Führer as follows:
Hitler was the man who succeeded in bringing about German unity and in 
giving the whole of Europe the hope of unity and happiness. It will be
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difficult for many people to forget their own ways and to acquire a 
common European feeling, just as it took the German people many years to
O Cunderstand the aims of Adolf Hitler.
On 9 July, it was Hartmann's turn to relay the new anti-Soviet attitude 
to Irish listeners, repeating the German High Command's line justifying 
Barbarossa, namely that Russia had been planning an attack on Germany. As 
well as accusing Stalin of putting hundreds of thousands of homeless 
children to death, Hartmann compared Bolshevik rule to British rule in 
Ireland, saying that in Russia:
our soldiers witnessed scenes of misery and oppression which could not 
be surpassed. The inhabitants were living in squalor which could not be 
compared with the poorest inhabitants of other European countries. If 
anyone wants a comparison, one must recall the hard times in Ireland 
under Cromwell's rule. The fate of Russia under Bolshevik rule is 
comparable to the fate of Ireland under English sovereignty, and it is 
to be noticed that these two powers have now entered into an alliance.
Before signing off with his customary phrase 'God bless and save 
Ireland', Hartmann listed Bolshevik misdeeds against farmers, and even 
summoned George Bernard Shaw to the defence of Barbarossa, telling his 
audience:
The Bolsheviks intended to make an attack on Germany and Europe. Bernard 
Shaw wrote a letter to the New S t a t e s m a n and said he could find no other 
reason for the war between Germany and Russia, except that Hitler 
believed that Stalin was about to attack, and that Hitler attacked 
Russia to forestall Stalin. Bernard Shaw is right in this. Military 
actions in the East prove that millions of soldiers with thousands of 
planes and tanks were awaiting Stalin's orders to deal Germany and the 
whole of Europe a death blow.
Miihlhausen was on the air again on 10 August, explaining a three week 
silence on the Russian campaign by the German High Command with the proverb 
'A careful devil keeps a closed mouth'. He then gave details of the
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fighting, adding: 'Bolshevik Russia will soon lie prostrate before us.
There will remain nobody in Europe then to prevent us defeating England, as 
Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bolshevism were defeated'. 
Mühlhausen's talks, which had become irregular during 1941, were in fact 
drawing to a close. At the BBC monitoring centre in Evesham, Angus Matheson 
recorded Mühlhausen's penultimate broadcast to Ireland on 13 August 1941, 
just two weeks before the start of test transmissions for Adolf Mahr's new 
nightly Irish service. 38
On 8 September 1941, BBC monitors noted for the first time a talk 'In 
English for Ireland' on the Zeesen transmitter at 8 p.m. on 28.45 metres. 
The broadcast quoted a report in The T im e s that more U.S. technicians were 
arriving in Northern Ireland. 39 A week later, monitors at McKee Barracks in 
Dublin discovered that not only was Berlin devoting nightly English-
language talks to Ireland, but that one of the speakers had a name...Pat
O'Brien. Sean Neligan of the Army's Intercept Branch informed G2's Dan 
Bryan: 'the daily broadcast from Germany To Our I r i s h  F r i e n d s , usually
transmitted on 2 8 metres, was put out on the broadcast band 30-31 metres at
1900 hours GMT last night, 14 September 1941. The announcer introduced to
the microphone Pat O'Brien who gave a talk on the BBC. I have not heard 
this speaker before'. G2 made efforts to discover who Pat O'Brien was, 
opening a file on a P.J. O'Brien, but by the end of September they were 
still no wiser, with Dan Bryan informing his staff: 'O'Brien obviously not
same man, but should be looked up again'. G2 had no way of knowing that Pat 
O'Brien was a cover name being used at that stage by James Blair and later 
by broadcasters John O'Reilly and Liam Mullally. 40
Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen gave one last regular talk on 24 September 
1941 - although he was also to broadcast a brief message on 31 December 
1941 as part of a special New Year's Eve programme. Under the heading 
'Bolshevik menace to Ireland', he warned his audience in September that 
Stalin and Churchill had made a pact to destroy Germany, adding:
If they do, Bolshevism will spread through Europe and throughout 
Ireland. From the monasteries of Ireland, Christianity came to the 
continent of Europe. There is a close tie between Ireland and Germany, 
and yet England and America in union with Russia want to bring Ireland 
into the war against Germany. 4 1
140
On 21 October, BBC monitors tuning into the Axis-controlled Rome 
transmitter (which is not known to have been used by the Irish service) 
came across a 'talk by an American who frequently contributes views on 
various subjects'. That night, at 3.10 a.m. the anonymous American 
delivered a 22-minute talk on 'U.S. interference in Ireland'. The fact that 
the broadcast was, as the monitors noted, 'In English for North America'
(on 30.74 metres), made it almost certain that the target audience 
comprised the millions of Irish-Americans living in the USA. The speaker 
accused Churchill and Roosevelt of 'meddling' in Ireland as they had done 
in Yugoslavia, and added: 'The Irish people know the value of Anglo-Saxon
promises, and their character is different from the Serbs'. The speaker 
then quoted at length from a letter by de Valera's government colleague 
Frank Aiken - published in the New R e p u b l i c of 23 June 1941 - rejecting a 
call by Professor Francis E. MacMahon asking Ireland to return the Treaty 
Ports to England to help the war effort. Then, speaking directly to his 
Irish American target audience, the speaker concluded:
To Irishmen, to Irish Americans, perhaps the most significant phrases of 
this letter are those in which the writer reminds us that England, while 
pretending to fight for the freedom of small nations, still treats 
Northern Ireland as a hostile and conquered country. As Roman Catholics, 
true Irishmen are perhaps willing to forgive, but cannot forget that 
they were held outcast by the English, and were denied their rightful 
seats in parliament. England now wishes she could expunge the past.
Irish Americans are determined that America shall not interfere in Eire 
as she did in Yugoslavia. 42
That broadcast broadly followed Adolf Mahr's guidelines recommending the 
use of Radio Rome to target Irish audiences. 43
On 27 October 1941, Commandant Sean Neligan reported to Dan Bryan that:
In the programme broadcast last night from Germany to 'Irish Friends' a 
new commentator was introduced. His name was stated to be 'John 
O'Reilly'. He is definitely Irish and speaks with a southern accent.
This commentator has been making short announcements for the past week,
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and it appeared to me as if he were undergoing instruction in the art of 
announcing, etc. The subject of his broadcast, which was the most 
effective so far directed to this country, was a talk on Russia in 
respect of religious matters,- comparison being drawn between Russian 
anti-religious activities and the Penal Law era in this country, etc., 
etc. The commentator spoke with a thorough knowledge of the facts as 
regards this country and the broadcast was the most effective of the 
series up to date. The announcer previously referred to as of Indian 
extraction, and whose name is now given as 'John Costello', appears to 
have been dropped in favour of the newcomer' . 44
Contrary to their earlier difficulties in trying to identify the 
ficticious 'Pat O'Brien', G2 had no such trouble with O'Reilly. The Kilkee 
man's secret file contains a wealth of personal detail. The announcer 'of 
Indian extraction' was probably one of a number of Indian nationalists 
based at the time in Berlin's Rundfunkhaus. 45
By early November 1941, BBC monitors were picking up the first in what 
was to become a regular series of items on British atrocities during the 
Irish War of Independence. While Francis Stuart had pioneered the idea of 
recollecting 'historic acts of aggression on the part of the United 
Kingdom' in the small number of scripts he wrote for William Joyce early in 
194 0, the idea was refined by Adolf Mahr for delivery on air by O'Reilly 
under the title 'Flashback into Irish History'. BBC monitors recorded the 
first such example on 6 November 1941 under the heading 'Anniversary item 
dealing with incidents of 6 November 1919, 1920 and 1921 during the 
troubles in Ireland'. The 'Flashback' remained a regular feature of the 
Irland-Redaktion's output until 1944, usually preceding the news 
bulletins. 46
With Irish, Indian, Breton, Flemish, Ukrainian and other nationalists 
gathered in Berlin, and many of them working in close proximity in the 
Rundfunkhaus, it was natural that propaganda ideas would be exchanged as 
the broadcasters mixed socially. William Joyce, for example, played chess 
with Subhas Chandra Bose 'who was living in Berlin as the leader of the so- 
called Indian freedom fighters' and who broadcast anti-British propaganda 
to India. 47 The Indian nationalists' radio propaganda sometimes spurred
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comparative themes from the Irland-Redaktion, such as on 19 November 1941 
when 'Pat O'Brien' (James Blair) told listeners:
Ireland and India are akin in their relations to England. Both have been
robbed and have fought desperately and persistently for independence. In
the 18th century the Ulster wool industry was ruined. Identical measures
were taken in India to stifle her industries. British products were
substituted for Indian ones, and Birmingham and Manchester were built on
the ruins of Indian trade. Recurrent famines followed. Ireland was
turned into a charnel house during the artificially created famine of
1845-1848. England did nothing to alleviate the hardship. She continued
to import food from Ireland and prevented Ireland from importing food
from elsewhere. India was subject to terrible periodical famines which
4 8swept away millions of the population'.
Only a few months later, Chandra Bose was telling his listeners that:
'if India had been allowed to remain neutral, like Ireland, there would 
have been no possibility of India coming within the arena of the present 
war. . . ' 49
On 30 November 1941, Hans Hartmann contributed a 15-minute talk in Irish 
titled 'Germany, the Saviour of Europe' in which he said:
While Germany took the lead against the Bolshevik terror, Britain opens 
her door to Russian propaganda: the democracies will pay for their 
misdeeds. Meantime, Germany is restoring the Soviet's damage and is 
recognising private property as the basis for all human institutions, a 
policy to which she will adhere after the war...As for England, she 
declared war on Germany and allied herself to the devil. Ribbentrop 
recently said that England is paying dearly for the war. Her allies have 
one by one been defeated. Russia, her last friend, is doomed, and her 
naval blockade has failed while Germany has gained lands, mines, 
factories, all the raw materials that she and Europe need. It is Hitler 
who has saved Europe, and England will go on sinking lower. 50
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, on 7 December 1941, featured in 
the nightly news items for Ireland and was discussed by 'Pat O'Brien' alias
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James Blair who had been supplied with a suitable script by Adolf Mahr at 
the Foreign Office. Throughout December, the Irland-Redaktion's news 
summary and 'Pat O'Brien' talks were always preceded by 'Flashbacks' to the 
War of Independence, thus giving the impression that what happened in 1920 
was as important for Ireland as what was happening in 1941, if not more so. 
On 17 December the following 'Flashback' conveyed the general tone of the 
item read every night by John O'Reilly:
As usual we are beginning our programme this evening with a flashback 
into the history of British terrorism in Ireland. Exactly twenty one 
years ago today, that is to say on Thursday, December 17th 1920, British 
Crown forces waging war upon the civil population of Ireland, committed 
more acts of savage terrorism. At midnight, British auxiliary police 
walked into the home of Michael Edmonds of Tipperary town. He was taken 
from his bed to some hills nearby, where his British abductors shot him 
through the brain in cold blood. Further to this typically ruthless 
murder, Black and Tans burned down homes in Tipperary town, where the 
murder had taken place, and in Swanlinbar, Co Cavan. Twenty one years 
ago, the British were prepared to stoop to the lowest form of murder and 
brutal intimidation. They did not care because they thought they were 
triumphant. Today, however, they would prefer to have these atrocities 
forgotten because they now realise they are now being beaten themselves, 
and they fear retribution. 51
On 28 December 1941, Hans Hartmann gave his first talk to Ireland since 
taking over as head of the Irland-Redaktion. The 15-minute broadcast 
contained the twin themes of support for Irish neutrality coupled with 
strong criticism of the USA for abandoning her neutral stance and entering 
the war:
Ireland stands alone in the midst of great nations who are engaged in 
war to the bitter end, and it might appear that she would never be able 
to maintain her neutrality, especially as the USA, on whom she placed 
all her hopes, is participating in the war. [The USA has] done nothing 
for years but interfere in the affairs of others and force their own 
views upon foreign governments or certain groups in opposition to those
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governments...As regards Mr Roosevelt and the capitalists and Jews in 
America, it is difficult to discern any nobility or sense of hounour in 
their conduct...but the man in the street in America, the workers, the 
poor, the Irish and others, have not changed their opinion. Roosevelt 
and his friends have led them into a war against their will. They are in 
it now and there is no remedy.
Forecasting that Roosevelt might now send American troops to Northern 
Ireland, Hartmann warned his listeners that:
The fine edifice of the Republic would collapse immediately if the Irish 
government did not succeed in avoiding war and maintaining neutrality.
In addition, it is likely that in such a case the war would be fought on 
Irish soil despite the long-standing friendship between Germany and 
Ireland. This means that there is no other course open to the Irish 
people, if they have sense and do not wish to commit suicide, but to 
defend their neutrality at any cost. As for the Irish living in the USA, 
I am sure that they fully understand the conduct of Ireland, though a 
great part of them are at present on the side of the government in the 
American war. I should not like to see Ireland completely destroyed and 
to see everything achieved after the last war brought to nothing 
again...The greatest vigilance is called for. God bless and save 
Ireland. 52
Hartmann's call for Ireland to defend her neutrality was broadcast on 
1154 metres via the Oslo transmitter relayed from Zeesen. The first use of 
the Oslo transmitter for the Irish service had been monitored by the BBC on 
9 December 1941.53 As 1941 drew to a close Hartmann's team comprised 
Kowanko, Blair, O'Reilly and Poepping as well as Hartmann's sister-in-law, 
Gertrud Neugebauer, who worked as a typist. On 31 December 1941, Hartmann 
and his team put out an end of year programme for Ireland at 12.3 0 p.m. The 
I r i s h  P r e s s reported the broadcast as follows:
In a special New Year's Eve broadcast from Germany, over the Oslo Radio, 
greetings were sent by former members of the German colony here. The 
broadcast opened with a recital by Fräulein Mona Brase, daughter of the
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late Col. Fritz Brase, Director of the Army School of Music. Dr Hans 
Hartmann, speaking in Irish, referred to the folklore he had collected 
in Ireland, and Dr Robert Stumpf, formerly a radiologist in the Royal 
City of Dublin Hospital, followed. Engineer Karl Künstler said that Herr 
Krause, who has married since leaving Ireland, and Harry Greiner joined 
with him in sending greetings. Fräulein Dr Hilde Sutter, who had been an 
exchange student in Galway, said that all the other exchange students 
are well, except Martin Fluss who was killed in Russia. Charles Budina, 
formerly of Kilmacurra Park Hotel, Co Wicklow, who said that he is now a 
soldier in Paris, sent greetings to his wife, other members of his 
family, and friends, and added that Kurweis, Arano and Kurt are well and 
are at home on leave. The announcer then read a message from Mrs Esther 
O'Sullivan to her father, relatives and friends in Kilkenny, saying that 
she is well; and the broadcast ended with a message of greeting in Irish 
from Dr Ludwig Mühlhausen, the well known authority on folklore and 
phonetics. 54
The regular nightly programme to Ireland also went out that night on the 
Zeesen transmitter at 8 p.m. starting with a 'Flashback' feature covering 
the year 1920 , and for the first time disclosing the source of the 
'Flashback' material. BBC monitors reported the item as follows:
Flashback to British terrorism in Ireland. Twenty-one years ago today 
British Crown forces burnt Irish homes and farm crops in Co Tipperary.
We will give the official figures for British acts of murder and other 
forms of terrorism in Ireland during the year 1920 alone. The figures 
are official and are to be found in the document entitled 'The Struggle 
of the Irish People' which was adopted at a January session of Däil 
Eireann in 1921, and addressed to the elected representatives of the 
people of the USA. In 1920, the number of Irish citizens known to have 
been murdered by the British amounted to 203. Apart from this there were 
1,184 armed assaults by the British on unarmed Irish citizens. The 
British police and military carried out 48,474 raids on Irish houses and 
institutions. There were 7,287 political arrests. 705 Irish citizens 
were deported...
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That run-down was followed by a detailed talk on 'Neutrality in British 
Eyes' which noted that England:
has toyed with the idea of occupying the Irish ports for a long time.
But even her crazy politicians admit that the idea is too dangerous. It 
doesn't really matter to England whether she or one of her Allies does 
the occupying. England would actually prefer that one of her Allies 
should do the dirty work. What ally would do England's dirty work in 
this case? England remembers that the USA has a large Irish population 
who were forced to emigrate there owing to the criminal effects of 
English policy. England now thinks that were America to occupy Southern 
Ireland, the native Irish would not object because of their relatives in 
the States. Ireland would, in fact, welcome Mr Roosevelt's soldiers who 
would then come, not in the name of England, but in the name of the 
American Irish. It is all part of the neutrality game as played by 
England. Were the Irish to object to this skilful procedure, they would 
of course be in the wrong, since anyone not participating in England's 
war is immoral and suicidal. 55
That night's programmes concluded with a 25-minute broadcast of New 
Year's greetings at 9.30 p.m., which may have been a recording of the 
earlier transmisión along with some additional material broadcast live in 
the Berlin studio. BBC monitors noted that Hartmann's assistant Hilde 
Poepping 'said that all her friends who had spent some time in Ireland sent 
their greetings, except her friend Martin Klot who was killed in action in 
Russia fighting to protect the women and children of Europe from 
Bolshevism' . 56
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Chaper 8
The Mahr Propaganda Initiative of 1941
When Adolf Mahr began to draw up his Irish propaganda initiative for the 
German Foreign Office early in 1941, German Radio had already been 
broadcasting to Irish listeners for over a year. But the propaganda 
broadcasts of the previous twelve months could hardly be compared with 
German Radio's programming for its European service which totalled eleven 
hours a day in 193 9. Berlin's Irish audience had to be content with a 
weekly 15-minute talk in Irish on Sunday nights. 1 Mahr regarded this 
situation as most unsatisfactory but his decision to attempt to change it 
meant that he would have to face down the Propaganda Ministry.
The rivalry between Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels and Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop for control of the state broadcasting system came to a 
head at the end of 1940 when Foreign Office radio officials were physically 
ejected from rooms in Berlin's radio centre. Balfour notes that:
when SS members of the AA [Foreign Office] were sent to reinstate them, 
RMVP [Propaganda Ministry] staff in shirts of the same colour were 
deployed to obstruct. Himmler then intervened to prevent two groups of 
his subordinates from coming to blows. But the upshot must have been in 
the RMVP's favour because for the rest of the war that Department did 
become the main point of liaison [with German Radio/RRG] although the AA 
were allowed to deal directly with the RRG at the level of individual 
programmes, on the very real ground that propaganda, where hours were 
often decisive, could not be conducted by the lengthy exchange of 
memoranda. Thereafter matters seem to have become more peaceful, at any 
rate as regards the RRG External Services.
But if it is the case that the dispute was resolved generally in favour 
of the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Office was to succeed at least in 
effectively controlling the Irish service. Clearly the Foreign Office still 
had a major influence in aspects of policy relating to radio broadcasts. 
This is evident from the circumstances in which consideration was given to 
a special report prepared by Mahr for Ribbentrop and entitled 'Radio 
Propaganda to Ireland'. In his report, which was originally drafted in mid-
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March but not sent to the German Foreign Minister until May 1941, Mahr 
explained that:
The time has come to increase propaganda in the direction of Ireland.
The Iraq war represents a type of Dunkirk for English prestige. It also 
affects other satellite states. This upsurge can already be felt by the 
anti-interventionists in the USA since the Balkan campaign. Thus a 
large-scale psychological attack would also be called for in the Irish 
sector. The Irish themselves feel that important decisions are in the 
air at the moment which could determine their fate too. Indeed, things 
have calmed down around the military bases but the bombings of Belfast 
have brought the war closer to home. They emphasise a new aspect of the 
Ulster problem and hit a sore spot of the first degree. Through Ulster, 
one part of the island is involved in the war either actively or 
passively. With England's destiny the Ulster question will be decided 
too...we should now take this into account in our propaganda. 3
While Mahr indicated that the propaganda drive stemmed from current 
events in the war, his one time assistant at the Foreign Office, Hilde 
Spickernagel told the author its origins lay with Germany's decision, in 
late 1940, to halt preparations for the invasion of England, codenamed 
Operation Sealion. Dr Spickernagel adds:
Though the heavy bombing of English cities went on until 1941, that 
means that from October 194 0 onwards, German interests were all in 
favour of, 1. keeping Ireland neutral, 2. not working up problems of 
what was then called partition, and 3. broadcasting news that might 
interest the Irish, while stressing points of view on international 
questions as seen by the Germans...The idea was to hand out German 
points of view to the population of a country which by then everybody 
hoped would manage to remain neutral. 4
Mahr's report for Ribbentrop ranks alongside the German Army's invasion 
handbook for Ireland, M i l i t a r y  a n d  G e o g r a p h i c a l  S p e c i f i c a t i o n s  on I r e l a n d , 5 
as one of the most remarkable documents on Ireland to have appeared during 
the war. Running to fifteen pages of detailed text, the report begins with
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a synopsis of the political situation in the country, North and South. It 
then goes on to cover a wide variety of topics under a number of headings 
and sub-headings which include: 1. Listenership, 2. Radio reception, 3. The 
language question, 4. Additional Irish listeners (i.e. outside Ireland), 5. 
The lack of (German) programmes in English, S. Cancellation of the reasons 
for caution [over using strong propaganda which might have impeded Irish 
neutrality], 7. Expansion of possibilities for propaganda directed to 
Ireland, 8 . Secret (shortwave) stations, 9. The structure of propaganda 
programmes, 10. Topics for such programmes, 11. Irish neutrality, 12. 
Blockades and the war of nerves against Irish neutrality, and 13. The 
Northern Ireland question. 6
A full English translation of the Mahr report has been prepared for this 
thesis and is included in A p p e n d i x c . Consequently, it is the author's 
intention here only to summarise the main points, to explain how it was 
accepted by Ribbentrop, and to outline Mahr1s subsequent moves to establish 
his personal control over the radio's new nightly Irish propaganda service 
arising from his original report.
It is not known if Mahr consulted any colleagues, or Irish people living 
in Berlin or elsewhere, when formulating his report for Ribbentrop.
However, the report, destined only for a select group of Ribbentrop's 
advisers and the Foreign Minister himself, leaves little to the 
imagination. Mahr begins by spelling out some basic facts and figures 
relating to the country in which he had lived for twelve years. He does so 
in terms which would suggest he was assuming that anyone reading it would 
have no prior knowledge of Ireland. He includes information on population 
and the historical reasons for partition, noting that in Ireland:
there is little understanding of and absolutely no sympathy for National 
Socialism, mainly for reasons related to the Church. However, our fight 
against England gains great respect for us in strongly nationalist 
sections of the population...In today's difficult situation, most 
circles agree with de Valera's policy of neutrality, even those more 
sympathetic to England.
In attempting to explain Northern Ireland to his Foreign Office 
superiors, Mahr summed up: 'Two thirds of the population are more English-
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minded than the English themselves. A third, i.e. approximately 350,000 
people, are Catholics, mainly nationalists, and ill-disposed towards 
England'. As regards the number of radio sets in the 26 counties - a 
crucial statistic if his propaganda drive was have any effect - Mahr
Oestimated that it 'probably amounts to 250,000'. In relation to licenced 
radio sets, Mahr's estimate was well wide of the mark. The number of radio 
licences held in 1939, the year he left Dublin for Berlin, was 166,275. By 
194 0 (the most up to date figures he could have obtained) the number had 
risen to 180,563. However, from 1941 to 1945 the number of radio licences 
actually fell, and Mahr's 'guesstimate' of a quarter of a million was not, 
in fact, reached until 1948. Assuming Mahr had the latest statistics from 
Hempel in Dublin, he was still overestimating the number of radio sets in 
the country by almost 70,000. Mahr did make provision for the fact that 
only half his estimated 250,000 sets could receive continental broadcasts, 
so his estimate of the maximum possible audience would total 125,000
Qmultiplied by the average number of listeners per set.
In attempting to paint a picture of a target radio audience in the 2 6 
counties, Mahr said that up to the outbreak of war in September 193 9 
'listenership was more or less restricted to urban and rural 
intelligentsia'. BBC programmes, he added, 'are obviously far superior to 
the broadcasts from Athlone' which 'farmers in the West, insofar as they 
were listening at all, only listened to'. The BBC's role in providing 'a 
desired connection to the outside world' for Irish listeners, coupled with 
a developing interest in 'English language broadcasts from Germany 
'particularly in nationalist circles' in the North, were for Mahr two good 
reasons for launching English language propaganda specially tailored for 
Ireland. 10
On what he called 'the language question', Mahr explained that:
approximately five per cent of the population of Eire speaks Irish as 
their native tongue. They like to listen to the Gaelic language 
programmes from Germany (it flatters their linguistic identity), but as 
an important language in the political sense Gaelic is not relevant. The 
only Irish native speakers live in the West and are mostly small 
farmers. Gaelic broadcasts from the continent can hardly be received by 
them...however, not only native speakers listen to Gaelic broadcasts,
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but also a politically much more important element, namely language 
enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of society throughout the 
whole country, who initially had to learn the Gaelic language. In Gaelic 
language policy, which they defend with all their might, they see a 
nationalist political factor of the first order, and the Gaelic 
broadcasts from Germany naturally have a very positive effect on them. 
These must therefore be maintained. 11
Mahr was apparently unaware of the fact that both Mühlhausen and 
Hartmann's weekly Irish talks had a regular following in the Gaeltacht 
regions, particularly in Donegal. He appears to have played down the number 
of Irish speakers so that his new English-language service could be 
launched at the expense of expanding the existing Irish-language service. 
For one reason or another, he did not include a key statistic from the most 
recent Census of Ireland, that of 1936, which reported that no less than
23.7 per cent of the population over three years of age (i.e. 666,601
12people) could speak Irish.
In asking Ribbentrop to maintain the Irish-language propaganda 
programmes at their current level of two talks per week, but adding that 
'their extension would be pointless', Mahr may have been trying to settle a 
score with Mühlhausen who had launched the talks in 1939. According to 
Hilde Spickernagel, Mühlhausen 'was very keen on linguistic problems of the 
Irish and other Celtic languages, which, for example, did not interest Mahr 
at all. I do not think there was any love lost between the two of them' . 13
Adolf Mahr was keen to court Irish listeners beyond Ireland's shores and 
wrote in his report of a potential audience of millions around the world in 
such places as London, Glasgow, Liverpool, Australia, the United States and 
Canada. In Britain, Mahr estimated that at least a third of the one and a 
half million Irish 'would have nationalist sympathies. In Canada and 
Australia the situation could hardly be less favourable than this. In the 
United States, the percentage of consciously pro-Irish people is rather 
higher'. Mahr put the Irish American population at 5 to 6 million plus 
150,000 in Canada and a further 250,000 in Australia, adding: 'all this
without consideration of half-breeds totally absorbed in Anglo-Saxon 
culture'. This target audience of 'approximately ten million people with an 
Irish ethnic identity' had, Mahr said, 'the possibility of indoctrination
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against England, which is of no less quantity and importance than the 
listenership in the motherland' . 14
Further on in his report, Mahr complained that 'Gaelic nationalists on 
the entire island [of Ireland] and the emigrants who are unable to speak 
Gaelic, are not addressed at all by their Irish identity because our 
programmes in the English language are not aimed in their direction. In 
those English language programmes, Irish questions have so far been avoided 
intentionally'. He added that, 'the possibility of anti-English radio 
propaganda by means of the old Irish culture has not been made use of at 
all'. Mahr told Ribbentrop, 'the time has come to increase propaganda in 
the direction of Ireland' and abandon the caution on 'strong propaganda' 
which, it was feared up to then, could 'have detrimentally influenced the 
English attitude towards Eire', and impeded 'de Valera's adherence to Irish 
neutrality' . 15 Thus it may be seen, the Foreign Office in Berlin was keenly 
aware of Irish sensibilities and deliberately chose to ignore any problems 
which German broadcasts to Ireland might cause for de Valera's government.
In formulating his propaganda 'menu', Mahr noted that 'the Irish feel 
the question of reunification, and with that the final and total breaking 
free of the whole of Ireland from the British system, is entering a last, 
decisive phase'. Mahr had his own, very specific, ideas of the sort of 
propaganda that would help steer Irish minds away from the Allied cause. 
These included news and news commentaries, talks, and programmes 'to appeal 
to the independent national identity of the Irish around the world, to 
strengthen the neutral position of the country', and 'elimination of the 
Ulster injustice'. Other topics to be dealt with included what Mahr termed 
'horror propaganda', for example, 'the infringements of law by the English, 
and their cruelties when conquering and oppressing the country (Cromwell's 
scandalous deeds, etc.)...persecution of Catholics. A nearly inexhaustible 
topic. Particularly suitable for Rome [radio station] ... the epic Irish War 
of Independence'.
Mahr was against jamming BBC news bulletins for Irish listeners on the 
basis that it might have the opposite effect, but he wanted German 
propaganda broadcasts to Irish-Americans in the United States to begin 
'urgently', and at least 'three times a week'. Parallel to this white 
propaganda operation to the States, Mahr advised setting up a secret G- 
station (G = geheim or secret) designed to 'express the views of the
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American Irish'. To reach the Irish-Australian audience, Mahr wanted 
another secret shortwave radio station located in Japan. He told the 
Foreign Office that suitable speakers for the American and Australian
stations could be recruited among 'Irish inmates of prisoner of war
17camps'.
In targeting Irish-Americans, Mahr wanted to use them to lobby opinion 
against U.S. entry into the war. He commented: 'a strong Ireland propaganda
drive serves the cause of the anti-interventionists in the USA. The Irish- 
Americans are an important element from the point of view of U.S. domestic 
politics, and the interventionists have made great efforts to win them over 
in favour of the war, so far without much success'. Germany, Mahr said, had 
to 'give the Irish-Americans active support in their fight for [American] 
neutrality', and he wanted the propaganda programmes to refer to 'the 
significance of the Irish for America. Emigrated to the land of freedom 
because of England. Should they bleed under the American flag for England? 
(Germany no threat to America). That would mean denial of the American
ideal, and even if there were Americans prepared to do this, the American-
_ 18 Irish are not'.
Playing the religious propaganda card, Mahr made it clear that the
programmes to Ireland were destined for Irish Catholics only. Programmes
would mention 'intolerance by Ulster Protestants, past and present', while
emphasising 'the courageous adherence to the Catholic religion by the Irish
despite all the suppression', and 'Ireland's spiritual achievements in
missionary work past and present'. But, Mahr displayed his own indifference
to Catholicism when suggesting that Radio Rome should broadcast programmes
of Irish interest in English (with strong German influence on the programme
format): 'the name Rome (the Papal city) will always find a certain
receptive spiritual atmosphere in Ireland. This can be beneficial for talks
on Catholic-religious tendencies, which have little conviction from our 
1 9point of view'.
Irish neutrality, according to Mahr, 'can also be considered as the 
sharpest condemnation of the English-Jewish war. All the Irish in the whole 
world should follow this attitude of their motherland. The self- 
righteousness, hypocrisy and cruelty of English politics are shared by the 
malicious agitators [i.e. interventionists] in the USA'. He described 
Ireland as 'this poor country [which] has become victim to military actions
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by the English power in Northern Ireland. If many of the inhabitants had 
their say, particularly the nationalists, the country would be part of 
neutral Eire. The separatists [i.e. Protestant loyalists] in Belfast must 
take the greatest blame for things getting out of hand. The nationalists
now have to suffer with them the bombardments in this English-Jewish war,
2 0which continues despite repeated peace offers on behalf of Germany'.
Mahr advised that the radio should accuse England of 'witholding cargo 
space' on vessels, thus 'artifically tightening' the economic blockade of 
Ireland and creating food, fuel and other shortages as part of a 'war of 
nerves'. He also urged that 'declarations by Catholic bishops from the 
recent past' and 'statements by de Valera' be used on air to bolster claims 
to Irish unity. Under the heading 'Conclusion', Mahr wrote:
The overthrow of British Imperialism is unavoidable since it has 
afflicted Ireland with so many crimes. With it, it will bring Ireland's 
reunification so that it can sever all remaining connections to the 
British Empire. Then Ireland will see the fulfilment of its indefeasible 
right to total sovereignty. Only then will the reconstituted sovereign 
Irish nation be able to fully contribute, in friendship with all peoples 
and without link to other powers, to the rebuilding of the true
international community of peoples which has been destroyed by England's
21plutocraic and un-Christian imperialism.
When Mahr's propaganda report was eventually discussed at a top level 
Foreign Office conference in Berlin, presided over by Ribbentrop himself, 
on 22 May 1941, the Dublin museum director had his way. The main thrust of 
his proposals was accepted by the German Foreign Minister, which in effect 
meant work could begin immediately on implementing them. In fact, Mahr's 
report was only one of several considered for action at the Wilhelmstrasse 
conference, the official report of which was titled 'Meeting about
2 2propaganda for countries standing under the yoke of Great Britain'. Those 
attending the one and a half hour conference considered not only Ireland 
but also propaganda initiatives for India, the Arab world, South Africa, 
Canada and Australia. The conference minutes show that while Mahr was not 
in attendance, his immediate Foreign Office superiors - to whom he had sent 
his report - were. These included Gerhard Ruhle who, as well as being a
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member of the Reichstag, was head of the radio section (Rundfunkabteilung) 
at the Foreign Office. Also present was Markus Timmler who was in charge 
of Section Ru Xb at the Foreign Office dealing with radio propaganda to the 
British colonies. 24
The high powered nature of the conference was evidenced not only by the 
presence of Ribbentrop, but also by his Under Secretary of State, Paul 
Woermann, who opened by indicating that some preparatory work on the 
propaganda plan had already been done in Berlin. Woermann's attendance at 
the conference was significant, not just because he was Director of the 
Political Division in the Foreign Office but also because of his inside 
knowledge of secret German attempts to influence events in neutral Ireland. 
These included the attempted landing in Ireland of IRA leader Sean Russell 
from a German U-boat in August 1940, in addition to the dispatching of 
agents to Ireland including Hermann Goertz who remained at large for 
eighteen months. 25 As early as 10 February 1940, Woermann had backed the 
idea of covert operations in Ireland, telling Ribbentrop that 'by reason of 
its militant attitude towards England, the IRA is a natural ally of 
Germany' . 25 Germany's diplomatic representative in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, 
had opposed the Russell landing plan, warning Woermann 'of the consequences
•ynof German interference in Ireland'. Woermann and Ribbentrop both believed 
in covert intervention in Ireland, with the Foreign Minister even going so
far as to select a coup d'état specialist, Edmund Veesenmayer, 'to foment
2 8rebellion in Ireland'.
In addition to Ribbentrop, the propaganda conference in Wilhelmstrasse 
was attended by ten officials including a Dr Stahlecker, described as a SS 
Brigade Leader. The conference minutes reveal that Ribbentrop supported the 
propaganda initiatives presented for all six areas under discussion.
Ireland was the third region considered, after India and Arabia. The 
meeting decided that while no declaration would be made in Ireland 
regarding the propaganda plan, 'from now on, the Irish should be addressed 
particularly in English language broadcasts, whereas the Ulster question 
should not be touched upon. In consideration of the restricted spread of 
the language, Gaelic broadcasts are not to be increased. On the other hand, 
a special station (probably Rennes) should be solely employed for 
propaganda for Ireland (English-language) ' . 29
Mahr had got what he wanted; a green light from Ribbentrop to launch
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regular English-language broadcasts to Ireland. However, the minutes of the 
22 May conference make no mention of Mahr's suggestions for a secret 
transmitter in Japan to beam programmes to Irish-Australians, nor another 
one to target Irish-American listeners.
Adolf Mahr was not alone in wishing to court Irish and Irish-American 
radio listners. In the late Spring of 1940, the Dominions Office in London 
'was seriously looking into' the question of improving relations with Eire' 
and asked the BBC for the size of its audience in the 26 counties. The 
Dominions Office had even asked the BBC to investigate the possibility of 
winning 'a greater audience' in Ireland by broadcasting 'items of special 
Irish or Catholic interest', and 'a Gaelic period'. But when these ideas 
were sent to the BBC's Northern Ireland Director, George Marshall, on 4 May 
1940, he flatly rejected them. Marshall predicted that Irish language 
programmes from Belfast would 'bring a great deal of criticism from 
listeners in this region', and he pointed out that the BBC's 'Scottish 
items in Gaelic certainly fall on deaf ears as far as this area is 
concerned' . 30
Where the Dominions Office had failed, however, the Ministry of 
Information in London was destined to have more success. According to 
Cathcart, the BBC was put 'under strong pressure from the Ministry of 
Information to produce programmes designed to encourage listening in 
Eire ' . 31 In February 1941, just a month before Adolf Mahr began drafting 
his propaganda report for Ribbentrop, a meeting took place in London of top 
officials of the Ministry of Information amd senior BBC executives. The 
Ministry began 'to press even more determinedly for programmes for Eire' . 
The result was that objections from both the Northern Ireland government 
and the BBC in Belfast were by-passed, and a new BBC radio programme called 
I r i s h  H a l f  Hou r was launched. 33
The Irish government was also at this time considering ways of making 
its perspective known beyond its national boundaries. As early as 1937, de 
Valera's government had been anxious to establish 'an independent means of 
communicating Ireland's stance on political issues and of making direct 
contact with friendly powers in the event of an emergency'. To this end, 
the installation of a low-powered, shortwave transmitter at Athlone was 
completed in February 1939, and Radio Eireann made its first shortwave 
transmission (relaying the day's normal output) on St Patrick's Day, 17
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March 1939.34 The 1.5-kW shortwave transmitter in Athlone was partly- 
intended to remedy the 'defect' whereby all radio-telephone communications 
with the outside world had to go through London. However, the transmitter 
proved ineffectal and Gorham noted that 'a last attempt was made during the 
three months from December 1940 to March 1941, when the shortwave 
transmitter went on the air for an additional half hour between 4 a.m. and 
4.30 a.m. - a good listening hour in America, allowing for the time 
difference between the two countries, though a bad time so far as reception 
conditions were concerned. When it too failed, shortwave transmissions from 
Athlone were reduced to daily relays of the 6.40 p.m. and 10.10 p.m. Radio 
Eireann news - hardly the brightest jewel in Radio Eireann's crown' . 35
The Irish shortwave experiment was dogged by reception difficulties in 
America, coupled with the fact that beaming programmes to the United States 
during normal Irish broadcasting hours missed the peak listening period in 
North America. By January 1940 only 200 reception reports had been received 
from North America by Radio Eireann. Even during 1941, when Radio Eireann 
continued relaying two news bulletins a day via shortwave to America, the 
reception reports from the Irish legations noted 'a fading and erratic 
signal' . 36
There was, of course, a huge contrast between Athone's small 1.5-kW 
transmitter, through which de Valera hoped to reach American audiences, and 
Germany's comparatively giant resources which included seven 50-kW 
transmitters at Zeesen, one of which was later occasionally put at Mahr's 
disposal to reach the same audiences. 37 Despite Mahr's sense of urgency 
about starting English-language broadcasts to Ireland and to Irish- 
Americans, Ribbentrop had made it clear at his Berlin conference on 22 May 
1941 that 'the action plan will have to be put back by some time, two to 
four weeks'. The reason for the delay appeared to be a lack of technical 
preparedness, as the conference report noted that Ribbentrop 'gave 
instructions that the preparations have to be speeded up and efficiency 
improved so that not only will there be no technical difficulties but also
3  QGermany will be fully prepared to deal with any counter measures' - 
presumably radio jamming and counter-propaganda from the Allies.
Even with the backing of the Foreign Office, Mahr's propaganda 
initiative took another three months to take shape. The first transmissions 
for the new daily Irish service did not begin until the end of August 1941.
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In the interim, 28-year-old Wolfgang Dignowity was appointed as first head 
of the service. The circumstances surrounding Dignowity's appointment, by
the rival Propaganda Ministry, came to light in a memorandum written by
— 19Adolf Mahr for his Foreign Office superiors on 9 September 1941. In the
memo, Mahr reveals that another meeting, concerning the setting up of an
expanded Irish radio service, was held under the aegis of the Propaganda
Ministry in Berlin on 27 May 1941, just five days after Ribbentrop's
conference. That meeting was attended by representatives of Goebbels1
Propaganda Ministry, German Radio’s shortwave service (DKW), and Kult R -
the Foreign Office's cultural/political division dealing with broadcasting 
4 0matters.
As soon as he found out that the 27 May meeting had taken place, Mahr 
arranged a meeting with Walter Kamm, who was in charge of German Radio's 
European programmes section. Mahr already knew Kamm from his daily visits 
to the secret Concordia propaganda unit. On 5 June, Mahr sought an 
assurance from Kamm that the Foreign Office's broadcasting section would be 
involved in establishing the new Irish radio service. But Kamm told Mahr 
that the Propaganda Ministry was appointing Dr Dignowity as head of the 
Irland-Redaktion. Mahr then arranged to meet Dignowity 'as quickly as 
possible' but Dignowity appears to have kept him at bay, since the earliest 
appointment date arrived at was 16 July. On 15 July, Dignowity cancelled 
the meeting, telling Mahr he was ill. On 17 July, Dignowity travelled to 
Paris to put together his 'Irish' team comprising a Russian, two Frenchmen 
and an Englishman. The new 'Irish' team got together for the first time in 
Berlin on 22 August 1941 at a meeting also attended by Dr Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger. 41 According to Mahr, the nightly Irish programmes began on 
either 26 or 28 August 1941 (his records were incomplete). Mahr finally met 
Dignowity on 5 September when he had a 'working session' with him. Another 
working session followed on 8 September. This was also attended by James 
Blair, the English journalist whom Dignowity had recruited in Paris, and 
Mahr's assistant, Hilde Poepping. 42
Mahr was unimpressed with the team Wolfgang Dignowity put together to 
broadcast to Ireland. The day after their second meeting Mahr drafted his 
memo which spared little in criticising what he saw as the shortcomings and 
unsuitability of the entire staff. With a detectable tinge of sarcasm, Mahr 
told his Foreign Office bosses that 'this international team contains only
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one person who knows Ireland a bit from his own experience, namely Dr 
Dignowity himself' . 43 As far as Mahr was concerned his memo eventually had 
the desired result. Dignowity lasted only five months as head of the 
Irland-Redaktion, being removed in early November 1941. The two Frenchmen, 
Piche and Keroer, were removed also. There can have been little surprise in 
the choice of Dignowity's successor to run the Irish service. Hans Hartmann 
was well qualified for the job having spent two and a half years in Ireland 
before the war, in addition to which he had been broadcasting regularly in 
Irish to Ireland for over a year, though when Dignowity had set up his team 
Hartmann was not included in it. 44 Most importantly from Mahr's point of 
view, Hartmann was known to Mahr having worked with him for a time at the 
National Museum in Dublin and having been a regular visitor to Mahr's 
Dublin home in the late 1930s.
By Christmas 1941 Mahr had installed as head of the Irland-Redaktion a 
man who could not only be expected to do his bidding but who would also 
ensure that for the remainder of the war Ribbentrop, and not Goebbels, 
would dictate Germany's propaganda policy for Ireland. Given the stormy 
background to the fight for control of the various propaganda services, 
Goebbels' attempt to take over the new Irish propaganda initiative while 
keeping the Foreign Office at arm's length, was predictable. Less 
predictable was Mahr's success, with the help of Kiesinger, in seizing the 
Irland-Redaktion for Ribbentrop and holding onto it until the end of the 
war.
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Chapter 9 
'To see England broken one day':
The broadcasts of 1942-43
1 9  4 2
Consolidating his position as head of the Irland-Redaktion during 1942, 
Hans Hartmann added a number of new members to his team of announcers. In 
particular, Hartmann scored a major propaganda coup in persuading the 
writer Francis Stuart to contribute a weekly radio talk. Frank Ryan advised 
Stuart on the content of some of the talks. Also recruited to the team was 
Susan Sweney who had refused to undertake a spying mission to Ireland for 
the Germans in 1941. In September, Hartmann lost the services of his 
announcer John O'Reilly, who volunteered for a spying mission to Ireland. 
His place at the Radio Centre was taken by Liam Mullally. On the war front 
in November, the Axis retreat at El Alamein, and the Russian counter­
offensive and encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, presented 
the propagandists with a major dilemma,- how to present such defeats as 
victories?
Susan Sweney began broadcasting for the Irland-Redaktion on 2 January 
1942. Her first talk in the series 'Germany speaks to Ireland' warned Irish 
listeners against the dangers of allowing their country to be turned into a 
battlefield following America's entry into the war. She said Roosevelt's 
words about using bases in the 'British Isles' carried a peculiar 
significance for the 26 counties. She recounted her experiences of 
destroyed towns and cities in war-torn France, and appealed to all Irishmen 
to be on their guard, adding that,
Many millions of Irishmen in America will be with Irishmen at home in 
resisting Roosevelt's aggression, should it come openly or through 
Britain as the back door to Ireland. 1
Sweney was back on the air four days later with a similar broadcast 
strongly linked to neutrality, and warning that:
Irish bases given to the USA would be bases given to England and would 
be, quite justifiably, targets for German bombers. The Irish are turning
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once more to those in America for help, but, this time, not for aid to 
fight for freedom but aid not to fight, to preserve such freedom as they 
have attained.
The following day, 7 January 1942, just a month after Pearl Harbour,
Hans Hartmann assured his listeners of Japan's naval supremacy in the 
Pacific:
Mr Roosevelt drove Japan to war by every sort of threat and by economic 
means. He believed as the result of his knowledge of naval warfare that 
it would only take the U.S. navy a short time to defeat Japan.
According to Hartmann, Japan was succeeding militarily, while the 
British Empire was:
falling to pieces and I am certain that many of the dead generations of 
Irishmen would envy the lot of those living at present because they may 
be fortunate enough to see England broken one day. God bless and save 
Ireland. 3
Ten days before American soldiers were posted to Northern Ireland, the 
BBC's Indian service was hinting at a German invasion of Ireland, 
commenting: 'It is very unlikely that the Germans could succeed in a sea­
borne invasion of Britain, and if attempting an airborne invasion they are 
more likely to aim at Ireland, which, even if it succeeded, would be 
embarrassing for Britain, but not fatal. ' 4
The arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland on 26 January 1942 
provided a prime propaganda topic for German Radio whose 'black' station 
Workers' Challenge broadcast the following:
Well, workers, there's great news for us today. The Yankees have come. 
Now we're on the hog's back. All we have to do is to cheer like hell.
But it seems that not many yankees have come after all, and, just by a 
sort of funny misunderstanding, they haven't gone on to Europe. They 
aren't in France yet. In fact, they're in Northern Ireland. Just a few 
of them...to show that the good old Stars and Stripes are doing
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something. Stick them in Ulster. Against who? Good Lord, surely they 
don't think that Ulster needs defending against the Southern Irishmen 
today! It's all very queer. They seem to have gone to a place where 
there isn't any war going on. Now that's a remarkable thing, because in 
most wars the great and wise generals like to send their troops where 
they can meet the enemy. But, perhaps cunning politicians like Mr 
Franklin D. Roosevelt don't. Anyhow, don't be taken in with any 
propaganda about the Yanks who are in Northern Ireland. Roosevelt didn't 
mean them to be soldiers. He meant them to be tallymen, to make sure we 
pay as much as we can to the American capitalists. 5
BBC wartime monitor Lorna Swire, who recorded some of the Workers' 
Challenge broadcasts, recalls them as 'a ghastly attempt to ingratiate 
themselves with the "working classes"... with all the dreadful swearing 
which they thought the workers would like. They didn't, and in any case the 
station was badly received' . 6
Five days after the arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland, Susan 
Sweney delivered a detailed reaction from the Irland-Redaktion. She told 
Irish listeners that 'the question of the American expeditionary force 
having been landed on Irish soil' was forcing people 'to say and do certain 
things which are absolutely the antithesis of what they might really think 
and feel', and she continued:
The English choose to refer to the place of disembarkation of the 
American troops as the United Kingdom. At the same time the Americans 
choose to refer to that part of the world as Little America. Between the 
two of them they ought to make up their minds, but the point is that 
American troops are now on Irish soil. It has been reported that 
millions of Irish in America have sent messages to President Roosevelt 
affirming their loyalty to the United States... What is far more to the 
point however is that the Irish in America should not be false to their 
mother country... Ireland has managed to remain strictly neutral up to 
now in this war, and it certainly would be tragic if through selfish and 
brutal interference from Roosevelt or anyone else, that neutrality, 
which has been guarded so jealously, should be lost. Unlike America, 
Ireland clearly has steered a neutral course. The people most closely
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concerned are the Irish who live in other parts of the world. They are 
the ambassadors of their country and if Ireland desires to remain 
neutral, in every sense of the word, then it is up to these very people 
to do everything in their power to support her...The Irish people do not 
for one moment think that Roosevelt has any altruistic motives in 
landing troops in Ireland. He wants to make sure that he can follow up 
his actions of smash and grab against the British, and having taken due 
note of his gangster methods up to now, it is hardly to be considered 
improbable that he would stoop to anything in order to achieve his ends. 
Smash and grab is his motto, but Ireland does not want to see herself 
first smashed and then grabbed by any nation, let alone by one which has 
no interest at heart except to cash in where there might be big
business... The Irish in America cannot but remember that those left
behind expect from them loyalty and understanding in these days when the 
things for which the patriots fought may so easily be lost through the 
selfish greed of one warmongering individual and his evil crowd of 
reckless followers on either side of the ocean. Never before has it been 
more necessary to keep calm and watchful.
With so much emphasis placed by the Irland-Redaktion on Ireland's 
struggle for independence, it was natural for the service to focus at 
Eastertime on the 1916 Rising. Hans Hartmann celebrated the anniversary on
5 March 1942 with a special talk in Irish on 'The spirit of Easter Sunday,
1916', telling his listeners:
There is an old custom in Ireland to climb to the top of the hills on 
Easter Sunday to watch the rising of the sun, and the day is still 
sometimes called the 'Sunday of the sun'. For many centuries, they no 
doubt associated the rising of the Easter sun with the coming freedom of 
Ireland and the banishing of the foreigner from their land. They 
certainly kept the spirit of freedom alive, although it nearly died 
under English oppression, and in 1916, on the morning of Easter Sunday 
or the 'Sunday of the sun', they made an attempt to break the bitter 
darkness of English tyranny and to reach the light of the sun. Instead 
of going to seek the rising of the sun on the top of the hills, as was 
the custom of their forefathers, the Irish rose early on Easter Sunday
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morning and gathered in the streets to make another attempt to smash the 
bond between England and themselves. They were ready to give their lives 
for the cause of Irish freedom, and from that uprising came the freedom
Oand independence of the Irish nation.
After translating the 13-minute programme, the BBC monitor, Jane 
Charleton (who had just taken over from Angus Matheson, then transferred to 
code-breaking work) noted: 'This was a special broadcast to the people of
Ireland for Easter Sunday and consisted of a short talk by Dr Hartmann (in 
Gaelic), followed by the reading of three poems in English and of the 
proclamation made on Easter Sunday 1916 by the Irish Republican Army, 
interspersed with selections from Bach.'
By contrast, the following day's broadcast to Ireland contained an anti- 
Jewish talk based on William Bulfin's tale of a Jewish pedlar in Ireland in 
R a m b l e s  i n  E i r i n n . The commentator, who remained anonymous, noted Bulfin's 
'reference to the connection between British aristocracy and the Jews. This 
reference is all the more remarkable as it was made in the year 1907 when 
the link up between British Imperialists and Jewry was by no means so 
apparent as it is today'. Part of Bulfin's story was quoted as follows:
I was given to understand that these Jewish pedlars are to be met with 
in many parts of Ireland. I was sorry to hear about it. I was told that 
some of them, out of the profits of their trade, have already 
established themselves in Dublin and other cities as wholesale merchants 
and moneylenders, and, added the Ballymahon man who gave me the 
information, they have two patron saints, Moses and the Duke of Norfolk. 
'The Duke of Norfolk?', I asked in some surprise, 'what has he got to do 
with the Hebrew race?' 'Oh you see', he explained, 'the Duke is a soft 
hearted man and his pity always goes out to the landlords and the Jews 
and the police and the Lord Lieutenants of Ireland, and all the other 
poor downtrodden [wretches] ' . 10
From 1942 to 1945, Hartmann made an effort to put out special programmes 
to Ireland on St Patrick's Day. The talks were linked by Irish records, 
some of which Hartmann had brought with him from Ireland and some he had 
found in the Rundfunkhaus music library. 11 One wartime listener recalls
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hearing: 'A German male voice choir singing Irish songs phonetically. They
had obviously been drilled thoroughly although they didn't understand a 
word of what they were singing. It was amazing to listen to, and showed the 
dedication of the programme makers. The theme music chosen to introduce the 
Irish section's normal programming was a Fritz Brase arrangement of the 
traditional jig "The Frost Is All Over" ' . 12 Apart from serving to identify 
the station to listeners, the repeated use of the same songs - many by John 
McCormack - was due to a shortage of Irish records in the Rundfunkhaus as 
one Irish service contributor, Nora O'Mara (Roisin Ni Mheara) recalls:
I reluctantly inveigled a shy Irish housewife who was married to a 
German to participate in Riders to the Sea. She agreed for Ireland's 
sake but her effort failed when she broke down in tears upon hearing the 
beautiful melody Sliabh na mBan played as background to Yeat's play, The 
Pot of Broth. There were six or seven old 78s of Irish music to choose 
from. 13
For his first St Patrick's Day programme as head of the Irland- 
Redaktion, Hartmann persuaded his Berlin University colleague, Francis 
Stuart, to contribute a special talk. Although Stuart had written some 
talks for Joyce at the English service in 1940, this was the first time he 
had broadcast anything himself. Stuart told the author he had only agreed 
to do the talk on the basis that he would have a free hand in writing it 
and would not be under any influence as to its contents. 14 Despite this, 
his talk reflected the Irland Redaktion's twin themes of early 1942: 
support for Irish neutrality and opposition to the arrival of U.S. troops 
in Northern Ireland. The BBC recorded Stuart's talk as follows under the 
heading 'Ireland's place in the new Europe':
I am not trying to make propaganda. You have had plenty of it and I only 
hope that you have now a good idea of what is true and what is false.
Had I wanted to make propaganda I could have done so during my two years 
in Germany. I only want to put forward my idea of Ireland's place in the 
world and her future, which I am perhaps able to view with greater 
clarity from a distance. What a blessing it is that we are celebrating 
this day at peace, not having escaped war by dishonourable and cowardly
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means, but by refusing - as far as lay within our power - to waver from 
a strict and fearless neutrality. As an Ulsterman it is galling to me 
that a large number of foreign troops are today occupying that corner of 
our country. But though we have escaped the war, and I hope may be able 
to do so until the end without sacrificing anything of our national 
integrity, we cannot nor do we desire to escape taking our share in 
building the new Europe. There are two points to consider. Whether we 
like it or not, and personally I do not dislike it, there will be no 
such thing as complete isolation, political, economic or cultural. 
Nations will have to live as members of a group or family, with as much 
individual freedom as members of a family have but with certain duties 
and responsibilities towards the family. We do not fall clearly to any 
group, but I believe it is of the utmost importance that we follow our 
early tradition and turn towards Europe. I believe we can rebuild our 
country only by belonging to the great European tree, and neither to the 
British Commonwealth nor to the American sphere. We have been far too 
much cut off, have had too little contact with countries that have 
something to give us, and on the other hand, have been surrounded by 
communities whose life is based on money and the power of money. Whether 
we turn to England or the United States we see the god of money, and in 
the case of America we were sometimes forced to appeal to this god, but 
all the same it was and always will be an alien god to us - just as it 
is a completely alien god to Europe, and when one European country, 
France, ceased to begin to believe in that modern heresy, then the light 
went out of her and she collapsed. Ireland belongs to Europe and England 
does not belong to it. Our future must lie with the future of Europe and 
no other. 15
The same day, 17 March 1942, members of the Irland-Redaktion including
John O'Reilly, joined Adolf Mahr and other former members of the German
colony in Dublin, as guests of William Warnock at the Irish legation in 
"L 6Drakestrasse. Two days later an anonymous talk entitled 'American 
Catholics and the war', summed up Mahr and Hartmann's chosen angle on Irish 
neutrality:
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American Catholics realise the dangers and possible complications which 
may arise for the American people when Uncle Sam sends his soldiers 
overseas. They know very well that the president is playing a very 
dangerous game with dynamite. They know furthermore that every soldier 
on Irish soil for instance, may be the yet slumbering spark to the fuse 
which may blow Ireland's so long safeguarded neutrality and independence 
to bits. Remembering the fact that the cradle of an overwhelming 
majority of America's Catholics stood in Donegal, Cork and Mayo, we 
understand their anxieties to keep America out of the war, and their 
opposition to President Roosevelt's hypocritical imperialistic war 
ciirns .
Francis Stuart gave his second talk, 'Ireland and the new Europe', on 29 
March and his third, 'Easter 1916: Ireland's safety in 1942', on S April in
the course of which he said:
As this evening I walked about the Berlin streets as a neutral, I 
remember the country [Ireland] has nothing to do with the war being 
forced by Britain. I know that had those few men not barricaded 
themselves into a few buildings in Dublin that day 26 years ago our 
position now would be a very different one. The spirit of Easter Week is 
the one thing which will bring us safely through this crisis. Please
God, we shall be able to remain neutral to the end, but if we were to
fight, it would certainly not be for any so-called ideal. We, knowing 
what lies behind them, have had enough of those to make us sick. God 
preserve us from all such cant; for us Irish there is only one reality, 
our own life on our own soil free from the tyranny of money. I hope and 
believe that the end of this war will give us back our national unity,
and that the struggle which began in its latter phase on that Easter
18morning in Dublin will then be, at last, at an end.
Stuart delivered his fourth talk, 'Ireland's obligation to Europe', on 
2 5 May. By the end of March 1942 the Irland-Redaktion had moved house from 
two rooms at the rear of the Rundfunkhaus in Berlin to two smaller rooms 
nearby at 77, Kaiserdamm. The Kaiserdamm premises had no studios, so 
broadcasters from the Irish team had to cross the narrow
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Brettschneiderstrasse to broadcast their material from the Rundfunkhaus. 19
The Irish service occasionally departed from its regular programme 
formula to allow personal messages like the one Mona Brase relayed to her 
mother in Dublin on 4 May 1942. BBC monitors noted Brase 'played three of 
her father's compositions for piano forte' to mark the anniversary of his 
birth. 20
As the year went on, Allied bombers stepped up their raids on German 
cities. On 30 May the RAF mounted a 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne, 21 but 
even before that Hartmann was admitting to Irish listeners: 'it is true
that they [the British] can destroy a certain number of German towns'. On 
10 May, Hartmann commented:
The British are trying to terrorise the German people by bombing their 
towns in preference to carrying out any major war operations agains the 
German Army. But the German people are not to be frightened so easily. 
They understand that they have behind them a fine army which has fought 
effectively on various battlefronts from Narvik to Crete in Europe, and 
under Rommel in North Africa. For a whole Winter too, the German 
generals have held their lines against incessant Russian attacks on the 
Eastern front. The performance of the German army on every front has 
been something to be proud of, and their leaders have won fame 
throughout the world.
Hartmann then read out a list of British and American military retreats, 
and concluded that British air attacks on non-military and residential 
areas, which had cost over 500 lost planes, were 'of no military value at 
all. ' 23 On 16 May 1942, the Irish service introduced 'a new Saturday 
feature entitled "The British character"'. An extract ran:
And now for a valued opinion on the subject of British administration, 
this time from a member of the British ruling class, Sir Walter 
Strickland. Sir Walter Strickland ought to be particularly well informed 
on this subject because his brother, Major General Strickland, was 
responsible for a number of atrocities in Ireland, among which was the 
burning of seven Irish homes in Cork city on New Year's Day 1921.24
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Hartmann continued his talks in Irish throughout the month, telling 
listeners on 17 May that the Six Counties was:
an armed camp, filled with American and British soldiers, tanks and 
aeroplanes out of the province of O'Neill. It is time that the 
Protestants of the province and, indeed, the whole people of Ireland, 
realised that no prosperity or peace is in store for them except through 
union with their Catholic brethren.
Two days later, German home stations reported that U.S. troops stationed 
in Northern Ireland 'have been further reinforced. The part of the island 
stolen from the Irish, which was terrorised by the Britons until a year
ago, is now under U.S. control. Among the Americans in Northern Ireland
2 6there are many Jews dressed up as officers'. On 20 May Hartmann said:
Irish partisans must have watched with bitterness and rancour as America
sent millions of soldiers to the Six Counties... some partisans do not
agree with their government, and would be glad to be rid of foreign
troops, for I am sure that in recent years their esteem for their
Catholic countrymen in the South has increased...but, alas there is
still in the Six Counties a party as hard as nails, who are afraid of
losing some of their hoarded wealth if they yield to general Irish
opinion. They would rather send the whole country to hell than surrender
2 7a single privilege.
The latter two talks by Hartmann were beamed at North America as well as 
Ireland. After taking charge of the Irland-Redaktion, Hartmann had begun 
quoting extracts from Wolfe Tone's diary in Irish. His first recorded use 
of the diary was on 28 January 1942.28 On 24 May, he prefaced a diary 
quotation by disclosing the source of the material as follows:
I have had to give my talk in Irish this time. I apologise to listeners 
who may not know Irish. On the other hand I hope that those people who 
have known Gaelic from the cradle or who learned it at school will be 
glad to hear this language broadcast sometimes from Germany instead of 
our English news. Personally I should be very glad if I could in this
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way persuade those people who do not know Irish to begin learning it. A 
few weeks ago in the Gresham Hotel in Dublin, there assembled some of 
the men who had fought during the Rising of 1916 and in the fight for 
freedom up to 1921. It was an occasion for renewing old friendships and 
reviving the memories of old struggles in the cause of freedom. One 
speaker said that he hoped there would be unity soon between North and 
South. Great changes have come about in the state of affairs in Ireland 
since the days of Wolfe Tone, especially in the position of the 
Catholics, but we must admit that it is a sad thing to speak of the 
United Irishmen. They failed to win freedom for their country. Listen
now to Wolfe Tone's account of events in Ireland; it has been translated
_ 2 9into Irish by Padraig 0 Siochfhradha...
When Hartmann asked John O'Reilly to broadcast 'lengthy extracts from 
the life of Wolfe Tone', the Clare man handed them back to Hartmann saying 
they would be of no interest to Irish listeners. But O'Reilly 'got rapped 
over the knuckles for doing this and was told to carry on ' . 30 While 
Hartmann and O'Reilly were relating segments of Wolfe Tone's diary to Irish 
listeners, fierce battles were continuing on the Eastern front. On 12 May 
the Russians began the Kharkov offensive, with the Germans counter 
attacking five days later. By 28 May, the battle of Kharkov had ended in a 
Soviet defeat. On 31 May, Hartmann took Irish newspapers to task for 
repeating 'lies originating in English papers' regarding the military 
campaign in Russia. He described Russian losses in the battle of Kharkov 
amounting to '250,000 Soviet soldiers taken prisoner, and the capture of 
1 , 2 0 0 armoured cars, 2 , 0 0 0 large guns, aeroplanes and other war materials'. 
He continued:
This was the fiercest battle fought in this war so far on the Eastern 
front, and the Russian soldiers were better equipped with arms and war 
materials than the Germans at Kiev last year [the Germans took the city 
of Kiev on 17 August 1941]. The Soviets, and more particularly the 
British and Americans, were so scared as a result of this defeat that 
they had not the courage to admit the catastrophe. It would be difficult 
to surpass the nonsense that is at present being broadcast by the London 
and New York radios, and I wonder if there is any person in either
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country still ready to believe those lies. The British and their allies 
must be so ignorant concerning military affairs that they cannot 
distinguish between victory and defeat. There is a prevalent opinion 
that the German Radio and Press are strictly censored. All I can say is, 
that if nonsense of a similar sort were being published by the German 
radio and press, the people would break their radios and have no other 
use for the newspapers than to bring them to a certain place. It is a 
great pity that so many of these lies originating in English papers 
should also appear in the Irish papers. But apparently that cannot be 
helped. Therefore listen to our English and Gaelic news. Believe me when 
I say that the Soviets have suffered a great defeat in this latest 
battle. 31
In mid-June 1942, the Irland-Redaktion granted air-time for another 
personal message introduced as follows: 'Mr Charles Budina of Kilmacurra 
Park Hotel, County Wicklow, will send a greeting to his wife and children 
in Eire'. Budina's talk was recorded by the BBC:
Charles Budina speaking. Hello everyone. I am on leave for a few days in 
Berlin and, as a resident of Eire, I would like to say a few words to my 
family and friends across the water. First I want to thank most 
sincerely my friends in Eire who passed the New Year's Greeting I 
broadcast on to my wife who is still in Eire. I have since received the 
good news that my wife received my message. And now may I ask any of my 
friends who may hear me the same favour this time, if they would be so 
kind as to pass this message on to my wife in case she does not happen 
to be listening in. I am keeping well and fit, but except for this 
opportunity to talk to you, my dear Clara, and to you my darling Helga, 
Esther, June and Dermott, my furlough means little without you. The time 
will come when I shall be with you again. I hear that the British are 
talking about invading the Continent, and their preparations that we 
know they are making indicate that Churchill is all set for the new 
Dunkirk. Well, if the British are going to start another fight on the 
Continent, I can tell you they will get a very hot reception, and our 
boys are very keen on trying to improve on what they did to the B.E.F. 
[British Expeditionary Force] at Dunkirk as this may repay the bombs on
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Paris and food for India, bombs on Berlin and the British forces in 
Ireland. We have well cultivated fields growing food for the home front, 
and in the fields there are happy young boys and girls helping. What a 
striking difference in everything now to what I remember in 1918. What a 
different spirit when everyone knows what the job is that has to be 
done, and they go right to it. There is no wavering, no doubt about what 
to do. The British have told us what they intend to do to Germany and 
the rest of Europe if they win. We take men like Vansittart, Captain 
Balfour and others seriously. There is no necessity for them to tell us 
what they intend to do. We know them well, and we know their mentality. 
This was the real source of the Versailles Treaty. We will win this war 
outright. There is not a manjack in Germany who thinks two ways about 
it. Whatever sacrifices we may have to make, we have got to see this 
thing through. We are pretty confident in the future and what it will 
bring. The British can bomb our civilians, but they can't prevent us 
from building up the new European order. In fact we are now in a 
position to do excatly what we like, and the British can do nothing. 
Moreover, bombing German civilians won't help to save British and 
American ships from being sunk. Last month our U-boats sent almost 
1,000,000 tons to the bottom. The time is coming when the after effects 
of this are going to be felt.
At about the same time, O'Reilly became involved in an extraordinary 
incident in studio in which a dramatic announcement of a planned coup 
d'état in Dublin by British sympathisers was first scheduled for delivery 
on air, and then dropped on Hartmann's orders at the last moment. O'Reilly 
described the incident in his memoirs :
One evening when I was preparing the last transmission [of the day] for 
Ireland, Dr Hartmann handed me a script to be broadcast. On reading this 
I was astounded to see the names of prominent Irish and Anglo-Irish 
personalities who, it was stated in the script, were engaged in a plot 
to overthrow the Irish government and form a provisional pro-English 
government until British occupation forces arrived. This report, or 
script, came from the German Foreign Office. It was divided into two 
sections. The first part was to be broadcast that night and the
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remaining portion on the following night. The first part was, in fact,
broadcast to Ireland by me. It consisted of a warning to the Irish
people to be ready for an important disclosure on the following night.
As I sat before the microphone on the following night with this document 
before me, and ready to broadcast, I heard a tap at the window of my 
cubicle. It was Dr Hartmann. He opened the door of the cubicle and, 
without comment, picked up the document from the table before me. He 
then substituted for it an innocuous commentary whose contents I cannot 
now recall. After the transmission I went to Dr Hartmann's office to 
find out the reason for the withdrawal of the sensational announcement 
at the last moment. He told me that a few minutes before I was due to 
broadcast the second half of the document, he had received an urgent 
telephone call from the Foreign Office to stop the broadcast 'at all 
costs'. I never learned the reason for this surprising action, nor what 
happened to make the Foreign Office authorities change their decision so 
suddenly. I was astonished. But I felt that if there were any truth in 
the allegation contained in the document, the Irish people and the Irish 
government should be fully warned. 33
At 8 p.m. on the night of 19 July 1942, Irish Army monitors picked up a
broadcast by Susan Sweney, part of which ran:
In America there were and are millions of Jews. In the U.S. the Jewish 
population, which was only 937,800 in 1897, was estimated in 1927 to be 
4,228,029 and this figure must have been doubled during the past 15 
years. Suppose then that there are eight million Jews in the U.S., and 
that is only a minimum estimate, it means that the population of the 2 6 
counties is only one third of the Jews in the U.S. In New York alone 
there were 1,873,390 Jews in 1927, now a safe estimate would be three 
million, almost the entire population of Ireland. 34
Although there had been occasional anti-Jewish references on programmes 
to Ireland before this one, Sweney's talk was the most blatant to date. The 
technique of giving listeners Jewish population statistics, with the 
inference that the exploding numbers were out of control, tied in perfectly 
with Hitler's so-called 'final solution' to exterminate the Jews, whom he
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looked on as Untermensch (sub-humans). When questioned by the author about 
anti-Jewish comments in Irland-Redaktion programmes, Hartmann said that 
while he was under pressure to broadcast such material, which was supplied 
from a central reporting pool, he strenuously resisted it. 35 In addition, 
as head of the Irish service, Hartmann was obliged to attend the daily 
conference of radio managers at which the Sprachregelung (broadcasting 
directives) were handed down. Susan Sweney herself told British military 
investigators in 1945: 'All my talks were sheer propaganda directed against
the war and the Irish coming into the war, saying that it would do Ireland 
no good. Hartmann wanted me to attack England, and I was furnished with 
items of German news and typed material from the Foreign Office and 
Propaganda Ministry setting out the tendency of the days's propaganda I was 
to follow. ' 37
On 24 July 1942, Francis Stuart broadcast another commentary to Ireland. 
He may have welcomed the intellectual stimulation of preparing these talks 
as a diversion from the pressures of teaching, as he wrote in his diary:
'My work at the university is often a nervous strain. The debate class 
means trying to get a few silent girl students to open their mouths about 
some God-forsaken subject and keeping this up for three-quarters of an 
hour. ' 38 Stuart's broadcast was monitored in Dublin and included the 
following:
We should calculate on nothing but our own power of endurance as a 
nation. If we remain true to Ireland's great tradition during the 
present conflict we shall not lose any real friends by it. Do not be 
afraid of that. The only friends we will lose are friends not worth 
keeping of which there are some in America and as many more in England. 
But in the long run we shall only gain by our refusal to be interested 
by the whole conflict which is raging in the Anglo-Saxon countries. A 
little more patience and endurance, especially for those of you in the
, -3 qNorth, and our place in the world will be securer than ever before.
Stuart's broadcast of 24 July heralded the series of weekly talks 
entitled 'Through Irish Eyes'. His diary entry for 1 August 1942 noted:
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Wrote the first of weekly talks to broadcast to Ireland. Had lunch with 
Frank Ryan and discussed these with him. He agreed that they must not be 
propaganda in the sense that the flood of war journalism from all sides 
has become, and that of course they must support our neutrality. He 
suggested, and I fully agreed, that there must be no anti-Russian 
bias. 40
On 5 August 1942, Stuart told his listeners:
This talk is a kind of introduction to a series that I hope to broadcast 
to you at weekly intervals. It is certainly not that I have any desire 
to join the ranks of the propagandists, but I believe that neither you 
nor I have the right to cut ourselves off from the storm that is raging 
around us, no matter how much we may feel inclined to do so. Being 
neutral does not mean to remain unaffected by, or insensitive to, events 
that are going to determine the sort of civilisation that is about to 
develop in Europe. In this series of talks I hope to comment on some of
these events and tell you some of my ideas as they effect Ireland...I am
heartily sick and disgusted with the old order under which we've been 
existing and which had come to be from the great financial powers in 
whose shadows we lived. If there had to be a war, then I wanted to be
among these people who had also had enough of the old system and who,
moreover, claimed that they had a new and better one. . . 1 had begun to 
see that no internal policy for Ireland could ever be completely 
successful unless joined to an external one that would not shed our 
ancient links with Europe and European culture...I not only want to 
bring something of Germany and German ideas to you but I also try, in 
Berlin University and elsewhere, to make people here, and especially 
young Germans, conscious of Ireland and interested in her problems and 
outlook.
Indulging in a bout of homesickness - understandable, perhaps, since it 
was over two and a half years since he had seen Ireland - Stuart told his 
audience:
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At times I get such a longing for home, for that peculiar atmosphere 
that is symbolised in different ways for each of us. I see again the 
Antrim boglands where I spent my boyhood, a small farmhouse and a row of 
trees around one side of it for shelter, and a bicycle leaning up 
against a whitewashed wall. I feel now that the very mud on the tyres of 
that bike is sacred and at such times even to speak to you at home - 
some of you perhaps listening to me from that very bogland - is 
something...It is true that only a comparative few of us at home had a 
clear vision of Ireland as a nation. Most of us have simply not that 
gift; most of us are too busy farming or shopkeeping or being 
politicians to have much conscious idea of our national destiny. All 
that matters is that there are always a few with enough vision and 
energy to plan for the whole nation. But it is not to this section of 
that that I want to address these talks. It is to as many of you as will 
listen to me, whether you have much interest or not in the problems of 
Europe, there is only one thing that I take for granted in you, and that 
is that you think strongly about Ireland even if it is only a few small 
fields or a line of hills. I want to speak to all of you who have that 
feeling for some corner of our country. As to those comparative few who 
not only love Ireland but who are ready to sacrifice all for the freedom 
of Irish soil, I do not flatter myself that I can teach you anything. I 
will only say this, that you may now feel isolated and alone, but have 
patience. The past has belonged to the politicians and the financiers, 
the future is going to be yours. 41
While a study of Stuart's talks in the 1942-44 period reveals that he 
stuck to his pledge not to include anti-Russian bias in his commentaries, 
Hartmann and Mahr ensured there would be no pro-Russian bias either. 
According to Stuart, his own refusal to incorporate anti-Russian material 
in his talks was the key issue on which he later split with Hartmann and 
left the radio service in January 1944.42
At the same time as Stuart was beginning his weekly talks, the Nazi 
Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) was reporting that in Ireland 
'the BBC propaganda has no influence. German broadcasts are preferred'.
Some observers have described such SD reports as 'misinformation' since 
they included inaccurate predictions of an American occupation of the 26
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Counties in spring 1943, as well as predicting cooperation, albeit
unofficial, between the IRA and de Valera's government. 43
In Dublin meanwhile, Eduard Hempel, the German Minister, was monitoring 
the broadcasts from Berlin and advising the Foreign Office on reception 
strength and the suitability of programme content. As early as Christmas 
193 9 Hempel had advised the English service of German Radio to play up the
fact that people in Ireland were sending 'cigarettes and Christmas gifts to
German PoWs in England'. In mid-1940, when Hempel feared a British invasion
of Ireland, he 'urged Berlin to cut down propaganda that played up the
British threat and suggested German assistance in reunifying the island'. 
Hempel then drafted his own radio script with a request that it be 
broadcast on the English service immediately, though there is no evidence 
that it ever was. It read:
The English have up till now tried without success to undermine Irish
neutrality. They are now planning, though rather late and under
pressure, to promise concessions on Northern Ireland. By doing so they
hope to win over the totally disinterested Irish people and to prepare
them for an end to neutrality and involvement in the British war...but
Ireland knows the value of English promises from the [First] World War.
The infamous Ireland-hater Churchill wants to do the same as was done to 
44John Redmond.
Early on in the propaganda war, Hempel had complained that German 
'propaganda techniques were at times flat-footed and he criticised the 
research and analysis that went into the broadcasts. He told Stuart to make 
a plea to the proper authorities in Berlin to show more sensitivity in 
their transmissions' . 45 Hempel had also advised against anti-English
4 Gpropaganda on the radio but this was disregarded by the Irland-Redaktion.
On 30 August 1942, Stuart attacked the death sentences passed in Belfast 
on six IRA men found guilty of murdering an RUC constable. He conveyed to 
his listeners:
the sympathy of the many Germans who have spoken to me of the fate of 
the six Irishmen condemned to be hung in Belfast. It is the first time 
that I have ever been asked to say something in these talks to you and I
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do it very gladly because I know the people who have asked me, and I 
know that their feeling comes from their hearts. I am not going into the 
question of the trial. The accused men all denied the only charge which 
would have given their captors the slightest excuse on legality to do 
what they intend to do. Perhaps the facts are possibly simple. These 
Ulstermen, whose corner of Ireland is overrun with foreign troops, 
whatever views there may be about the diplomacy of their action, [it] 
was a natural one.
Stuart then appealed to Churchill to lift the death sentences, adding:
For its size, Ireland has poured out more blood, tears and sweat than
any other nation. We do not know whether, having asked your own people
for such endurance, you believe you can give a final recompense. That is
not our affair. What is our affair is that Irish blood, sweat and tears
should not have been spilt in vain. And we tell you now that the blood
of those six Irishmen will be about the last that you and your fellow
statesmen will have the opportunity to spill within the seclusion of 
4 7prison walls.
One of the six IRA men, 19-year-old Thomas Williams, was executed in 
Belfast on 2 September 1942 prompting the following commentary from the 
Irish service the next day:
German public opinion has reacted very keenly to the tragic news of the
Belfast execution yesterday, and the stirring reports of anti-British
and anti-American demonstrations all over Ireland which came in today.
Horror and indignation at this newest act of British terrorism have
given room to a sincere feeling of admiration for the indomitable Irish
4 8spirit which revealed itself in these acts of protest and rebellion.
On 17 September 1942, Francis Stuart noted in his Berlin diary that: 'A
message came through from Hempel saying my radio comments on the Belfast 
death sentences had "Gute Wirkung" (a good effect). If my talks have even a 
minute influence in helping to keep our neutrality they aren't just waste, 
as I often think. ' 49
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After a year working for Hartmann's team, John O'Reilly 'had become a 
little tired of the routine work of broadcasting every night'. The Kilkee 
man was soon to offer his services for a spying mission to Ireland, but 
another factor that led him to quit the radio was what he described as 'his 
keen resentment [concerning] the unwarranted interference of the English 
section in our Irish section broadcasting'. In his post-war memoirs 
O'Reilly recalled that while William Joyce was 'supremely indifferent to 
all competition', another English service staffer whom O'Reilly identified 
only as 'X, an Anglo-German' (probably either the Glasgow-born Eduard 
Dietze or the English-educated Wolff Mittler) 'resented the presence of our 
Irish section. On more than one occasion he tried to curtail our 
broadcasting. Eventually he succeeded in persuading the authorities to have 
our scripts brought under the control of the English section'. 50
Hans Hartmann confirmed to the author that all scripts prepared by his 
Irland-Redaktion had to be submitted for approval to the England-Redaktion 
before being broadcast. He added: 'The Irish department was no more than an
appendix to the English department, and the censorship was done by the 
English department. ' 51 The extent of the English service's interference in 
Irland-Redaktion affairs is disputed by Hartmann's wartime assistant, Hilde 
Spickernagel, who told the author: 'The English section handed the
translation of the daily Wehrmachtsbericht [defence forces report] to the 
Irland-Redaktion, but to my knowledge there was no other attempt of the 
English section to influence the programme of the Irland-Redaktion.' 
However, Dr Spickernagel 'never took part' in the radio managers' daily 
conferences which Hartmann attended, and so could 'only guess' at who 
handed down the broadcasting directives there, and 'whatever may have been 
discussed at those daily conferences' . 52
As 1942 drew to a close, Francis Stuart was being closely listened to in 
Dublin, not so much by a loyal audience as by officials at the Department 
of External Affairs and G2. In one of his December 'Through Irish Eyes' 
talks Stuart commented on prison sentences passed on three IRA men 
including the IRA's Northern commander Hugh McAteer:
These three members of the IRA, sentenced for so-called high
treason... belong to the same great tradition as the soldiers of the past
who made it possible for a part of our country to stay out of this
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war...These men who have just been sentenced by a British court belong 
to the advance guard of our nation. Most of you who are listening to me 
have other work in the life of the community, but all of us are Irish 
with the same interests and the same goal in the end. McAteer and his 
comrades in a British prison, you on your farms or in your shops doing 
this dour but necessary work. The time is past when any of you can look 
on the men without sympathy or understanding... The time is past for 
these small internal hostilities. We must stand firm in the face of all 
that threatens us as one people. 53
For the first time since starting his weekly talks Stuart had, unknown 
to himself, forced the Department of External Affairs to protest to Dr 
Hempel about the Irish writer's propaganda line. Drawing up a report of his 
meeting with the German Minister, a senior official at External Affairs 
recorded:
I told Herr Hempel that, while it was quite true to say that large 
sections of opinion in this country resented and protested against the 
imprisonment by the Six County authorities of men for activities arising 
out of the crime of partition, it might be regarded, even by the same 
sections of opinion, as quite a different thing for Germany to champion 
the cases of such men. Hugh McAteer was said to be a member of the IRA. 
In a recent IRA leaflet he was described as Chief of Staff of that 
organisation and his name was on the list of men wanted by the police 
here in connection with the murder of Detective Sergeant O'Brien. That 
being so, the holding up of McAteer on the German radio as a hero was 
likely to be resented by many people here and to furnish a concrete 
example for use by those who charged Germany with aiding and abetting 
the IRA against the Government. Herr Hempel said he quite saw the point 
and agreed with what I said. He thought it very probable that neither 
Francis Stuart nor anybody else in Germany knew who Hugh McAteer was. I 
gathered he would draw Berlin's attention to the point. 54
While dilpomats in Dublin argued the toss over Francis Stuart's comments 
on the sentencing of three IRA men in Belfast, it seems that no one in the 
Irland-Redaktion was overly concerned about the main thrust of the war. For
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example, Rommel's retreat from El Alamein (2-3 November 1942) as well as
C  ITthe mammoth battles involving the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad appear 
to have gone unreported by Hartmann's team. The Stalingrad commentaries for 
Ireland only began once the Germans had lost the battle, and El Alamein 
appears not to have been mentioned at all. Similarly, Stuart's diary for 
the period just before Christmas 1942 reveals that he was more concerned 
with press criticism of his broadcasts than anything else: 'Was shown an
April number of the illustrated English weekly P i c t u r e  P o s t , in which it 
said the Irish were not impressed by my promises. What promises, for 
heaven's sake? But I shall have to get used to worse than that and from 
more serious critics.' His diary for 19 December 1942 shows that Hartmann 
was continuing to screen Stuart's talks carefully: '[I] mentioned the fact
of the refusal by Irish government to renew my passport in my weekly 
broadcast talk [script], and showed it to Hartmann who rang just now and 
said it would have to be taken out because the British must not get to know 
of it. For all I know it may have been done on the advice of the 
British. ' 56
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In many ways 1943 proved to be the turning point of the war, heralding 
the tide that turned against the Third Reich and in favour of the Allies.
As a result, German Radio's small Irish service had fewer military 
victories to trumpet. Hitler had launched the attack on Russia, Operation 
Barbarossa, on 22 June 1941. Eighteen months later the fate of his eastern 
campaign hinged on the fighting at Stalingrad, one of the epic battles of 
World War II. In mid-September 1942, the German Army Group B had entered 
the suburbs of Stalingrad but their advance was checked in mid-November 
when the Russians opened their counter offensive to defend the city. By 22 
November, units of the Red Army had met up at Kalach thus encircling the 
German Sixth Army in Stalingrad. In mid-December 1942 the German General, 
Erich von Manstein, opened a counter attack to relieve the Sixth Army. By 
February 1943, however, the battle was over with General von Paulus 
surrendering the remains of the German Sixth Army to Soviet troops. The 
actual surrender, on 2 February, merely confirmed what had been known in 
Germany for some time: that the eastern campaign was foundering along with 
Hitler's hopes of winning the wider war.
Despite the setbacks, normal programming continued on the Irland- 
Redaktion. Liam Mullally took over from John O'Reilly at the offices in 
Berlin's Kaiserdamm. In May, Francis Stuart provoked an official rebuke 
from Dublin due to his comments in the run-up to the Irish general election 
of June. In the summer of 1943 increasing Allied air attacks forced a large 
part of the German broadcasting services, including the Irish team, to 
leave Berlin. The Irland-Redaktion went off the air in the last week of 
July, its staff moved to Luxembourg in mid-August and recommenced
r nprogrammes from there in mid-September.
In the early months of 1943, German Radio's programmes for Ireland 
described the defeat at Stalingrad in terms of German bravery and triumph. 
An Irish Army monitor noted that 'on 30 January 1943, Stuart, with but 
scant apology, launched into a eulogy on the German Sixth Army in 
Stalingrad and in the course of it said: "I readily admit that, when it 
comes to finding words, the publicists of the democracies can far outdo us" 
- thus more or less identifying himself with pro-German propaganda. From 
this date, although still maintaining that he is no propagandist, Stuart
CT Qhas been steadily and openly pro-German'. For some reason the monitor
1 9  4 3
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chose not to quote an even more pro-German part of the same speech by-
Stuart, which said: 'What the men, officers and generals of the German
Sixth Army are doing at Stalingrad is altogether beyond the ordinary
5 9standards of bravery.'
The talk which, perhaps more than any other, prompted G2 to conclude 
that Francis Stuart had become 'openly pro-German' was broadcast from 
Berlin on 6 February. BBC monitors heard it too and reported it as follows:
Last Wednesday the German people received news of the end at Stalingrad. 
If I were a German I would be proud to belong to a nation which could 
produce such men. As it is, I am glad to be among them. If Ireland is to 
come nearer Europe, two things are necessary, a better understanding in 
Ireland of Europe, especially of Germany, and a better understanding of 
Ireland on the Continent. Besides speaking to Ireland about Germany, I 
speak to Berlin University students every week about Ireland. Today I 
spoke of Liam Lynch and Cathal Brugha, of Yeats and Synge and Pearse, 
for a nation's soul is revealed in its soldiers and poets. I would refer 
again to Stalingrad. The Irish would understand what the German people 
felt. This had moved Germany more than any other event of the war, for 
while such victories as the fall of Paris might be attributed to the 
perfection of the German war machine, this is a triumph of flesh and 
blood. 60
On 1 February 1943 Hartmann told his Irish-speaking listeners that:
the German Sixth Army, with their Rumanian and Croat allies, had 
succeeded in frustrating one of the Soviets' main objects. Their bravery 
enabled the German Command to withdraw in good order and prepare strong 
positions against the Russian tanks. But owing to their stand, the 
German lines were unbroken. The army in the south of Stalingrad under 
General Paulus was now destroyed, but in the north of the city forces 
still held out. However, no one could say how long they would be able to 
do so. Nevertheless, for two months they had held down hundreds of 
thousands of Russian soldiers, and their bravery would never be 
forgotten. 61
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The following day, Hartmann evoked 'the spirit of the Stalingrad 
defenders', saying, 'when nothing else was left these men defended
themselves with knives against Soviet guns and aircraft. The bravery of
6  2these men was saving Europe from Bolshevism'. On 6 February, Hartmann 
admitted that Stalingrad had been 'a severe blow':
There is no denying that the Soviets have succeeded in advancing. They 
have not broken the German lines everywhere but they have inflicted 
heavy losses. It is too early yet to give a complete account of what 
happened at Stalingrad. It is interesting to note that German transport 
planes succeeded in evacuating 47,000 wounded soldiers. Nonetheless, 
Germany has suffered a severe blow. What is the opinion of Europe on the 
situation now? Some people are still blind to the danger confronting 
them. They imagine they could defend their own little countries if it 
were necessary. But other people are more sensible. It can be said that 
great uneasiness is spreading in Europe. And this uneasiness will 
certainly increase, although Mr Churchill is doing his best to weaken 
the minds of people who feel it. But words cannot alter the laws of 
history. There is a natural law in the unfolding of history, and it will 
be seen in due time how fruitless it is for anyone to rebel against 
it . 63
The broadcasts by Hartmann and Stuart broadly followed Goebbels1 
directives at the time. On 3 February 1943 the Propaganda Minister had 
instructed the German press that, 'Henceforward, the heroic struggle of 
Stalingrad will become the greatest epic of German history. The task of the 
press is to establish the link with world history and make Stalingrad into 
a myth which will fortify and dedicate all future generations of our 
people. ' 64
In March 1943 special talks for St Patrick's Day were again prepared, 
including this one by Francis Stuart:
Here in Germany, and in other parts of the Continent, cut off from our 
own country, we decided that this was not a time for sentiment, that you 
would not want us to talk about the harp, the shamrock or the green 
fields of Erin. We therefore speak only a few words which will be
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simple, sincere, and from the heart. To begin with, it is you, of 
course, who should be speaking to us, and not us to you. There is so 
much we would like to know that we cannot hear from newspapers, or the 
speeches of politicians. A special privilege would be a few words from 
one of you Irish nationalists in the North. We know well what you felt 
when the first news of the American occupation of the Six Counties came 
through; and during those terrible weeks when six men were condemned to 
death and one hanged in Belfast gaol. We have shared all these emotions 
with you, and we have shared the other events of this war which have 
particularly affected our country. In all this we are one family. But 
even though we are far from home, we know there will be many of you who 
for a few hours will forget everything in the excitement of a game of 
hurley, the first flat racing of the season, or whatever other sport you 
may decide on to celebrate the holiday. And, my God, that is what we
would like to be doing too - to forget this war and all the rest of it,
at Croke Park, or Baldoyle, or wherever it might be. And one day we 
will. One day we will have a great hurley match, or a great race meeting
to celebrate peace, and we will hold it outside Belfast, to celebrate
the return of the Six Counties. 65
Later that St Patrick's Day, the Irland-Redaktion sought to assure 
neutral countries of Germany's respect for their rights:
The fear of Bolshevism grows in proportion to its proximity. The New 
Order is already established in the hearts of those determined to 
preserve their homes and culture. Some agitators have been referring to 
the position of neutral countries, especially Spain and Ireland, and 
saying that they would prove good jumping-off grounds for an Allied 
expedition in Europe. Germany has always respected the rights of 
neutrals and will always do so in future. Britain and America do not 
hesitate to violate the rights of small nations in their endeavours to 
widen the sphere of the war. The position of Ireland on the outer rim of 
Europe is unique. The Irish resolve to keep out of the war has been 
categorically stated by de Valera. Everyone in Germany understands this 
viewpoint. The hardships imposed by the war on Ireland are serious; our 
sympathies for Ireland are deep, for we realise that for centuries her
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people have been suffering from brutal British oppression. Today, on St
Patrick's Day, we can assure the sons and daughters of Eire that they
6 6have a definite spot in every German heart.
Throughout April, Hartmann kept up a steady stream of talks in Irish on
a variety of subjects. On 13 April, he scoffed at Allied attempts to open
up a second front, reminding Irish listeners that 'German soldiers stand
6 7ready to repel any attack, and ready too, to attack England'. On 17 
April, he accused 'the Jewish Bolsheviks and their English friends' of 
remaining silent about the Katyn massacre of Polish Army officers, adding:
London and Moscow have put their heads together to concoct a plausible
excuse, but the only thing they can think of is to blame it on the
Germans, or to say that there were prehistoric graveyards in the
vicinity, and that it is these which the Germans have found. No one has
ever heard of prehistoric corpses shot through the necks or with Polish
army uniforms. Nothing more cynical has ever been uttered. It is a
6 8cynicism of which only Jewish Bolsheviks could be capable.
On 19 April, Hartmann put a brave face on military developments telling
his audience 'the Russians are worn out by the heavy losses sustained
during the winter' and 'in Tunisia, the Axis forces have evaded the attempt
6 9to encircle them at Mareth and again at Sfax'. The following day,
Hartmann used the occasion of Hitler's birthday to eulogise the German 
leader:
This is the Führer's 54th birthday, and this is an occasion for us to 
return him thanks for all he has done for us, and to pray to God to give 
him health and strength during the coming year to work for his people. 
With most great men, people see only their glory. They tend to forget 
all the hardship and suffering they may have endured. You in Ireland 
have had many great men, perhaps more than any other nation on earth. 
Therefore I believe you will regard the struggle of the German nation 
and the work of the Führer with understanding... The whole German nation 
is engaged in a desperate struggle under the leadership of the Führer, 
but everyone in Germany has absolute trust in his power to clear away
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all difficulties m  the way of Germany and of Europe.
At the same time, Francis Stuart began a series of talks to coincide
with the run up to the Irish general election scheduled for 22 June 1943.
Of the many talks he had broadcast in the previous 12 months, only his
comments on Hugh McAteer had prompted a mild protest by External Affairs.
But when the writer committed - what the Irish government saw as - an
'unwarrantable interference in our internal affairs', things took a more
71serious turn culminating in a formal diplomatic protest to Berlin. Stuart 
launched his election offensive on 10 April:
Tonight I'm going to say a few words about the coming elections. I have 
never in these talks taken any sides in party politics, and I'm 
certainly not going to do so now. As a matter of fact until we are a 
free and united nation I don't see how we can have anyway these party 
politics in Ireland because there can only be one aim of any party and 
that is the return of the Six Counties and the independence of our whole 
island from foreign domination. If there is any party or any individual 
candidate whose aim is less than this or different to this then I hope 
and believe that you will show the true spirit of Ireland by rejecting 
these people. That must be, and I believe will be, the first 
consideration before you in the coming election. The second will, I 
think, be your desire to remain out of this war, and I share that desire 
with you...It is not my business to go into detail about who you will 
vote for but in general I will only say that those who during the last 
years have shown themselves most determined to keep the 26 Counties of 
Ireland outside the influence of the great financial powers are those 
best fitted to guide you through the rest of this world crisis. We must 
not forget that an election confined to the 26 counties cannot be the 
full and free expression of the people of Ireland. It's only a makeshift 
and not a very satisfactory one at that. And secondly I think that in 
voting you should also give special preferences to those men who have 
shown themselves sincerely concerned for the welfare of the whole people 
of Ireland, and reject those who seem to look on the question of 
unemployment as a decree of destiny which is outside their power to do 
anything about. But above all don't think I am taking it on myself to
7 0
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try to dictate to you how to vote. I have no such idea. It is simply 
that the very fact of my having been at what I may call the centre of 
Europe during most of this war has given me a kind of bird's eye view of 
Ireland and events at home that may have a certain interest and value 
for you. I am far from Ireland and beyond the reach of all the opposing 
camps, the party cries, and I see clearly that in reality we have only
1 nneed of one party, a party that stands for a free and united Ireland.
On 8 May, Stuart had further advice for Irish voters. Though part of his 
speech was inaudible to Irish Army monitors, they reported that in a 
reference to Fine Gael, Stuart said:
It is no good believing that party protesting that they too have always 
advocated neutrality... the small section that believe in a close 
cooperation between us and the great Atlantic powers should give Fine 
Gael their one vote. And the handful of Dáil members with this outlook 
are or have been members of this party. It is as well that this should 
be made quite clear. It may not be so easy to make it clear inside 
Ireland, therefore I take this opportunity of stating it.
Stuart added: 'I do not for a moment anticipate any such gains [for Fine
Gael], but on the contrary I think that this party will dwindle into 
insignificance.' Just before the monitors in Dublin noted 'broadcast 
abandoned at this stage owing to noise', they were able to hear Stuart say:
The overwhelming majority of you are at one in your wish for a free and
united country and as far as I know there isn't one who'd ever threaten
this except a handful of so-called Irishmen either belonging to or in
71touch with the Fine Gael party.
In mid May, Stuart changed tack, advising Ulstermen serving with the 
British Army to mutiny. Prompted by fresh hints of conscription in Northern 
Ireland following the election of Sir Basil Brooke as Prime Minister there, 
Stuart broadcast the following advice:
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It is just possible, though unlikely, that they will force you into 
their army, but it is quite impossible to make you fight their battles 
for them. They cannot make you fight for the continued occupation of 
your own corner of Ireland. For that is what, among other things, any 
military success for the British and American forces means. Therefore if 
the worst should come to the worst and any of you be conscripted and be 
sent to one of the battlefields, you have only to wait for a suitable 
opportunity and go over to the Germans. That has been proved to be not a 
very difficult thing to do in the latest form of warfare where there are 
no very determined lines and where there is rapid movement. As I say, 
you have simply to submit to the training and all the rest and wait 
patiently until you are actually at the front and then, having arranged 
a suitable plan among your fellows, even if you happen to be only two or 
three who will probably be split up among different regiments, you can 
go over to the Germans or to the Italians as the case may be, and I can 
promise you that you will be received as friends and well treated as 
soon as you've explained who you are. For the case of the Six Counties 
is well known here in Germany. It is true of course that you will be 
separated from your families and friends at home, but at least that is 
better than that you should get killed in fighting for the continuance 
of the enslavement of those families and friends under the government of 
Sir Basil Brooke. And I say you will be treated with every 
consideration, both during the war and as long after it as you would 
have to remain away from your home. 74
On 29 May, just over three weeks before the Irish election, Stuart 
returned to the attack on Fine Gael:
Even if these elections were to result in our most reactionary party 
getting into power, which however will certainly not be the case, it 
would not mean that Ireland as a nation would renounce her struggle 
towards unity and independence. It would simply mean that the struggle 
would become even more difficult and the ends be delayed. Most of our 
politicians have made election speeches in which one might think that 
our existence as a nation depended on them remaining in power. That is 
certainly not so. The most that any political party can do is to remain
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faithful in all their legislative activities to the spirit of Irish
nationalism, as expressed both for and suffered for, through the
centuries until today. They are not inventors of this spirit, they are
not even the custodians, so to speak, of it, for you are that. The most
that they can do is to see that the official policy of the 26 counties,
7 5internal and external, does not contradict it.
On 31 May 1943 the government in Dublin made a formal protest about
these broadcasts directly to Berlin. The protest was not made public at the
time, possibly because the government had no wish to boost Francis Stuart's
audience through controversy. Neither was the protest revealed to the Dail.
The Oireachtas had been dissolved on 26 May, pending the June election, and
the new Dail did not sit until 1 July 1943.76
Stuart was right about Fine Gael's prospects in the election. In the
event, the party lost 13 seats. De Valera's Fianna Fail party lost its
overall majority but remained in office thanks to support from the new
farmers' party, Clann na Talmhain. 77
In the wake of the election, Hempel 'advised the German radio and press
to take the line that de Valera, by his clear, energetic and successful
78policy, had earned the trust of the people'. Hempel's propaganda advice
was ignored. The Irish diplomatic protest had achieved the desired effect
in that neither G2 nor the BBC heard any more Irish 'election' talks from
Germany between 31 May and the election on 22 June.
Stuart's talks in April and May 1943 were not the only occasions on 
which German Radio had commented on elections or advised people how to 
vote. On 12 October 1942, the black propaganda unit Station Debunk appealed
to listeners in the USA 'to avoid voting for Franklin's party at the coming
7 9[congressional] election'. On 14 January 1943, the Irish Service had 
welcomed the defeat of the Unionist candidate Sir Knox Cunningham in the 
West Belfast by-election, saying 'while this one by-election won't bring
about the liberation of the Six Counties from the Anglo-American yoke, it
8 0is undeniably a step in the right direction'. Neither was German Radio 
alone in giving electoral advice during the war. In March 1943, the BBC's 
Danish service urged listeners, prior to their election, to 'vote 
Danish...choose a Rigsdag [parliament] of men who will say no to any 
further concessions to the Germans'. 81 BBC policy varied from service to
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service however. In June 1943, the BBC was barred from covering the Irish 
general election by Churchill's Tipperary-born Minister for Information, 
Brendan Bracken, who commented: 'The public would be horrified if they
heard anything from the BBC about de Valera and those lousy neutrals: 
people of Irish stock overseas are heartily ashamed of Eire's 
attitude. . . ' 82
On 2 May, monitors in Dublin's McKee Barracks reported the following 
announcement from German Radio: 'We will now present our listeners in
Ireland, Mr Patrick Joseph Cadogan who comes to us from New York where he 
has made his home for the last twenty years. Mr Cadogan will give you a few 
comments on current events.' Cadogan:
It seems to me that the sufferings of the peoples of Ireland, 
Newfoundland and India, in fact of anywhere that cursed, blood-spattered 
and so-called democratic flag of Brittania flies, should stand out as a 
warning to all; 'abandon hope all ye who enter here', as the only slogan 
that can be adopted by any nation foolish enough to enter into any 
alliance with Britain. Having travelled extensively throughout the 
British Empire and having seen the loving care England bestows upon her 
colonies, especially India, and at one time Ireland, it is not 
surprising to see wide awake nations shun the English government like a 
plague. 83
Although only on air for five months from 2 May to 1 October 1943, 
Cadogan's talks are notable in that they contained far more anti-Jewish 
material than other speakers. Fifty years after the war, none of the 
survivors of the Irland-Redaktion could remember anyone named Cadogan ever 
having worked there. This suggests that the name was a cover for someone
Q Aelse, perhaps William Joyce. Two nights after his first broadcast,
Cadogan was back again reminding Irish listeners of the two and a half 
million Irish people who died or were forced to emigrate by the famine 
between 1841 and 18 51, commenting:
The death or emigration of these two million and a half souls, an 
irreparable loss to Ireland, can be laid to England's door. She alone is 
to blame for she could have prevented both famine and emigration. 85
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On 5 May 1943, Cadogan began a series of anti-Jewish talks, commenting 
on: 'The demand of the English Jews that Anglo-Saxon broadcasting
corporations refrain from broadcasting any plays with a Christian theme or 
tendency, the reason being of course that the reawakening of Christianity 
in England might provoke anti-Jewish feeling.' Cadogan ended his talk 'with 
a fervent prayer that Saint Patrick may smile on Erin's Green Isle and keep 
her free from this Jew-instigated war. I say good night to you all my Irish
Q Cand Catholic brothers and sisters'. On 18 May, Cadogan felt moved to 
lecture his Irish listeners again on the 'evils of Jewry and Bolshevism', 
commenting:
These two terrible evils, Judaism and Bolshevism, are so real, that I 
must bring home to you my fellow Irishmen, the great danger to our 
country, to our holy faith, that lies in the Jewish plans...Be on your
guard for the protection of our holy Catholic faith and for the
8 7salvation of Ireland.
On 20 May, Cadogan said that while he had voted for Roosevelt in 1932, 
the U.S. President had:
surrounded himself with a Jewish brains trust from whom he took his 
orders... Since Roosevelt's first election, there has been a steady 
influx of Jewish influence into every stratum of life in America. Even 
in the city of New York where once upon a time we Irish proudly and 
capably ruled in politics, the police force, and the fire department, 
the Jews have gained complete control, and the good names of the Irish 
cops, such as Kelly, Murphy and McDermott, have been replaced by Cohen, 
Goldwyn and Sax. 88
On 23 May, Cadogan revealed more about himself, saying:
Today I attended Holy Mass in a beautiful church in the suburbs of 
Berlin. Somehow this little church reminded me of another little church 
in Bundoran, Co Donegal where my family used to spend the summer
Q Qvacation.
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In later talks, Cadogan quoted lengthy extracts from the speeches of the 
Canadian-born Catholic priest, Father Charles E. Coughlin, who had been 
banned from major American radio networks for 'attracting an anti-Semitic 
following' . 90 By the end of May, Cadogan's talks had attracted the
attention of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, which was
91supplied with transcripts of them by G2.
On 1 June, Cadogan was on air at 7.15 p.m. refuting Allied claims that 
'German achievements in the East...have only been possible by slave methods 
and by starving the local population'. He told listeners:
These assertions are entirely false and vicious. The German methods
differ very much from the methods adopted by England in her colonies. A
sample of English organisation and controlling methods has been stamped
in the memory of all Irishmen in such a way that it is impossible to
ever forget. The peoples of those territories occupied by Germany have
9 2been granted, as far as possible, self administration.
An Irish Army monitor added the following note to the transcript:
'Speaker goes on to speak of wonderful conditions under which people live 
in German-controlled territory. ' 93 An hour and a half later, Cadogan was on 
the air again launching into yet another anti-Jewish tirade:
It is obvious that in England and America the spirit of Jewry has
triumphed over the spirit of Christ. Perhaps some of us have been slow
to perceive the least connection between Jewry and Godless
Bolshevism... In all countries who have not effectively protected
themselves and their national life from the menace of organised Jewry,
the Jews have axed and elbowed their way to first of all places of
influence and then finally to offices of paramount power. So safeguard
your neutrality in Ireland by safeguarding Ireland from Jewry. Safeguard
your holy Catholic faith by combating by all means anti-Christ, and the
9 4anti-Christ today is Judo-Bolshevism.
On 22 June - polling day in Ireland and, coincidentally, the second 
anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Russia - Hartmann was still predicting 
a Soviet defeat:
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Today, after two years of war [in Russia] we can say that we are far 
stronger in men and material than when war broke out. It is noteworthy 
that, during the same time as were built the astonishing defensive works 
from Norway to France and on the Mediterranean coast, the Soviet Union 
has lost up to the present about 20 million men, killed, wounded, and 
taken prisoner; almost 50,000 big guns, over 40,000 planes and at least 
26,000 tanks... the supply position of both soldiers and civilians in the 
Soviet Union is very bad and gets worse daily. Severe famine seems 
likely from the end of this Summer. 95
The next day, 23 June, Hartmann was admitting that:
very heavy damage has been caused to the beautiful [German] city of 
Krefeld. Whole districts have been destroyed. When workers returned from 
one of the factories outside the city they could not find their houses.
Many of them lost their wives and children in a single night, but one of
9 6the workers said that in future they would live by their machines.
On 25 June, Hartmann spelled out Germany's preparedness to repel any 
Allied invasion:
England has been talking and threatening invasion of Europe so much that
everyone thinks it is time she did something to show she is in earnest.
It is a matter of indifference to us in Germany. We know England has
enough ships and men to make landings at different places. We are
waiting for them. Our defences are completed and we have hosts of
experienced soldiers to man them, and to drive back into the seas any of
9 7the enemy who do succeed in landing.
On 2 9 June, Hartmann was trying to turn an RAF attack on Cologne 
Cathedral to propaganda advantage:
Today will be remembered as a black day in the history of mankind. An 
English air raid has destroyed the great and beautiful cathedral church 
of Cologne. I need not say that it is a terrible loss, not only for 
Germany but for the whole of Europe. Few people have not heard of this
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lovely and marvellous church; people from many lands, including Ireland,
have visited and heard Mass in it. It will be difficult for anyone, and
especially for any Catholic, to restrain his tears on hearing that the
greater part of the aisles no longer exist. It is for England a lasting
shame. Hundreds of years will not suffice to efface the crimes they are
committing over Germany. Berlin political circles say that the cruelty
being displayed by England is one of her most deeply ingrained
qualities. It is true, and to anyone who doubts it, one need only point
to the terrible things done by the same gentlemen in Ireland - the Penal
Laws, the churches destroyed or burnt, the lonely rocks where Mass was
celebrated by hunted priests, the thousands of gravestones and cairns
throughout the land where someone was done to death by the English. But
it is becoming evident that all the English have not easy consciences.
Some of them are becoming anxious. They fear that some day they will
9 8have to pay a terrible price for what they have done.
On 1 July, Hartmann returned to the same topic, telling his listeners:
The anger of Europe at the bombing of Cologne Cathedral increases day by 
day. This evil deed has aroused in the heart of everyone in Germany a 
cold hatred for England. The cathedral is a national monument, quite 
apart from its importance as a shrine of the Catholic faith...the 
English knew it was a national monument, and they bombed it in an 
attempt to weaken the morale of the German people. We hear however that 
many people have asked the bishop not to clear away the ruins, but to 
leave them as an eternal monument to the cruelty of the English air 
raids."
But as well as commenting on the increasing Allied air attacks, Irland- 
Redaktion staffers were falling victim to them. Because of the bombing a 
decision was taken to move the service out of Berlin to the relative safety 
of Luxembourg. Hartmann's regular listeners heard him deliver one of his 
last talks from Berlin on 7 July 1943, in which he said:
And now friends, here is a note about my daily talks in Gaelic. I shall 
not be able to give these talks for some time to come, but I hope that
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we shall have Gaelic on our programme again before the day of the Gaelic 
League commemoration [31 July]. Until then my best wishes to you all. 100
Francis Stuart delivered his final broadcast from Berlin on 24 July, 
still emphasising the neutrality angle:
By our passive opposition to American policy in this war we may 
sacrifice a certain immediate popularity in that country. We may not be 
included amongst those small nations to be saved by Mr Roosevelt and his 
gang, but one thing is certain; in a few years there is going to come a 
reaction, both in England and America, to this war, to the whole policy 
behind it and to the whole hyprocritical spirit in which it was waged.
It will be a reaction even more violent than the one after the last war, 
that produced amongst other things, a flood of pacifist literature. 
Roosevelt and his gang of warmongers are going to be swept into 
obscurity and discredited a good deal more thoroughly than even Wilson 
was. People in America, and especially our own people in America, are 
going to see very clearly that there was after all a great deal to be 
said for our neutrality. 101
The Irland-Redaktion then went off the air for nearly two months. Just 
how bad the situation had become for the broadcasters in Berlin, was 
described by radio announcer Madeleine Meissner who wrote of buildings in 
the capital crumbling 'like sandcastles'. The Irland-Redaktion team - 
including Hartmann, Stuart and Meissner - moved to Luxembourg on 12 August 
1943 although some of the radio's other European services remained in 
Berlin where the Rundfunkhaus was eventually hit by bombs on 22 
November. 102
When Hartmann and his colleagues arrived at the Radio Luxembourg studios 
it was not the first time German Radio had used the facilities. The 
Luxembourg transmitter had been incorporated into the Reichsrundfunk 
network four weeks after the German invasion of the Grand-Duchy on 10 May
1940. The former Director-General of Radio-Télé Luxembourg, Gust Graas, 
described the German - and later American - control of the radio station as 
'five years of humiliation' . 103
The first sign that the Irish service had resumed broadcasting (although
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listeners were not made aware of the relocation) came on 18 September 1943 
when Francis Stuart announced he would be giving his talks twice a week 
from then on. Hartmann had persuaded him to double his on-air 
contributions, having by then lost the services of most of his team 
including John O'Reilly, Susan Sweney, James Blair, Liam Mullally, Sonja 
Kowanko, and Hilde Poepping. Patrick Joseph Cadogan was back on the air 
too, on 1 October 1943, delivering one of his last talks. 104 Throughout the 
Irland-Redaktion's year-long stay in Luxembourg the Irish Army picked up 
regular talks to Ireland by a broadcaster named Johann Mikele. 105
Stuart was on the air again on 16 October seemingly anxious to convince 
listeners that he was still living in, and broadcasting from, Germany:
I came here to Germany in 1940 because I saw it was essential that at 
least one or two Irishmen should be here in Germany while there were 
thousands in England and America. But I am certainly not sorry that I 
came. But here from Germany I can say what no Irishman would be allowed 
to say anywhere else, neither in England, America, nor in Ireland 
itself. I can speak to you here from Germany and tell you the truth 
about this war, and I shall go on doing so as long as the hospitality of 
the German Wireless is given me, even although there may be a group at 
home who would do whatever they can to stop me speaking to you and to 
impute to me motives of personal gain or ambition.
Stuart's side-swipe at the 'group at home' was presumably aimed at de 
Valera's government which had succeeded in silencing his series of 
'election advice' broadcasts in the three weeks before the June 1943 
general election. In case the Dublin authorities did not get the message, 
Stuart added:
I have the greatest suspicion and dislike for all politicians, and, so 
far as I come under their notice at all, they have the same suspicion 
and dislike for me . 106
Hartmann's resumption of talks in Irish was noticed by the BBC - on 
514.6 metres, the Calais transmitter - on 25 October 1943 when he commented 
on the 'war in the Pacific and Far East, and Mountbatten's visit to see
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Chiang Kai Shek'. On average, Hartmann's talks were being picked up 
every two days by the BBC in the closing months of 1943 . The general tenor 
of Hartmann's talks in November and December 1943 was overwhelmingly anti- 
Soviet, displaying German disquiet that, pending the opening up of a second
1 f )  Qfront, the main threat would come from the East. From the studios of 
Radio Luxembourg, Hartmann told his listeners on 23 November that 'the 
Anglo-Saxon intention of abandoning Europe to Bolshevism if they should
1  A  Qsucceed in winning the war, is becoming more and more apparent'. After 
reporting the ejection of British troops from the Aegean islands on 24 
November (the battle took place 12-16 November) 110 Hartmann told his 
audience the next day that:
while living in Dublin and at Carna and at Gweedore he had come to love 
the Irish people and to have a deep admiration for their ancient Gaelic 
culture. Ireland has given much to Europe in the past and could give a 
great deal in the future. He thought it unlikely that Irish culture 
would die out, but there was one danger against which he would warn the 
Irish people. Bolshevik ideas were very prevalent in England, and they 
might find a fertile breeding ground among the Irish workers now in 
England whose poor living conditions rendered them very susceptible.
Such people could do grave harm to the native culture on their 
return. 1 1 1
On 26 November, Hartmann applied the same theme to moslems in the Arab 
countries of the Near East. The Soviets, he said, were trying 'to spread
Bolshevik ideas' in Arab cities and ports where the inhabitants 'are
1 1 2susceptible to foreign ideas'. On 20 December, the Irish service was 
telling its listeners that 'Germany was strong enough not only to defend 
Europe from North, South, East and West, but also to adopt the offensive. 
Whatever happened, England would be an unimportant country after the 
war ' . 113 On Christmas Eve, Hartmann stressed the neutrality line, recalling 
times past in Dublin. The monitor's report read:
He was thinking today of the time he had spent in Ireland, and 
especially his last Christmas there in 1938. He described a party for 
Irish and German children in the Gresham Hotel, Dublin, at which he
X 0 7
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played the part of Father Christmas. After the distribution of presents 
a concert was held, and it would be difficult to find anywhere a merrier 
or more peaceful scene. But then came the war, first starting in a 
corner of Europe and then spreading till now it enveloped almost the 
whole world. He was very glad however that the Irish government had been 
able to preserve the peace in Ireland, or at least in the greater part 
of the country. Men were not forced to shed their blood for the British 
Empire. The English and their allies had caused immense sufferings to 
the people of Germany; so that Christmas this year could not be as 
peaceful and happy as it was before the war. But it would be a Christian 
Christmas; Germans at home and at the front could celebrate it, and all 
would at least have some hours of pleasure, and would derive from them 
solace and strength and renewed vigour to continue the war more 
determinedly than ever. In conclusion he again congratulated Ireland on 
her escape from the horrors of war and hoped she would continue in her 
present course until all danger was past. 114
On 26 December, Hartmann said Eisenhower's appointment as supreme 
commander of all Anglo-Saxon forces in Europe meant that:
the famous British Navy would be for the first time under American 
command. This merely confirmed the opinion he had often expressed, that 
England's power was rapidly decreasing and that it was the American 
intention gradually to absorb the British Empire. He referred to the 
United States [naval] base in Londonderry and said that it would not 
tend to increase the friendship between the people of Ireland and 
America; indeed this friendship was getting weaker, especially as it was 
becoming evident that the Americans would never willingly abandon the 
positions they had acquired. 115
By the end of 1943, programme output to Ireland had been reduced from a 
maximum of one hour a night in the first half of the year, while based in 
Berlin, to a simpler format of only one nightly talk at 7.15 p.m. after the 
move to Luxembourg, though during 1944 the output was increased to three 
bulletins per night. From Berlin, Hartmann's service had been able to use a 
number of transmitters to broadcast to Ireland. These ranged from the
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powerful shortwave ones at Zeesen (on 28.45, 31.35 and 41.44 metres) - also 
used by the England-Redaktion - to alternative transmitters in Rennes 
(431.7 m) and Calais (514.6 m). The Oslo transmitter (1154 m) was used from 
the end of 1941 until mid-1943, while all Irland-Redaktion talks for North 
America used Zeesen's shortwave facilities.11®
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The Nazis' Irish-American Propaganda Initiative
In March 1941, as we have seen, Adolf Mahr proposed to Ribbentrop the 
idea of setting up a secret transmitter or G-sender to reach the Irish- 
American audience in the United States. Mahr wanted the station to 'express 
the views of the American Irish' . 1 Mahr's proposal was, in fact, a 
variation of one made by Goebbels on 30 October 1939 when the Propaganda 
Minister had ordered discussions with the Foreign Office and the Army's
High Command about setting up two secret stations, one purporting to
_ ? broadcast from inside France and the other from Ireland. But Goebbels'
secret Irish station never got going. According to one account this was
'probably because there was no one available who could speak as if he were
a native of Dublin or Cork'. A bogus French station called La Voix de la
Paix (the Voice of Peace) was launched in February 1940. Although operated
from Germany, the station pretended to be transmitting from French soil. 3
In the same month, a new secret station beamed at Britain, the New 
British Broadcasting Station, began operations in Berlin with William Joyce 
producing many of its scripts. 4 Other black propaganda stations followed. 
They included Radio Caledonia (for Scotland), Workers' Challenge (aimed at 
working class listeners in London's East End), Lenin's Old Guard (for 
Russia), the Christian Peace Movement Station (for Britain), the Nutcracker 
(for the Netherlands), Radio Humanité (for France), as well as Radios Free 
America, Free India, and the Voice of Free Arabia. In late 1942, another 
German black unit, named Station Debunk, was beaming anti-Allied propaganda 
to the United States, purportedly from Northern Ireland. 5
At one time or another during the war the Germans ran a total of 19 
black propaganda stations all pretending to broadcast from their target 
areas but emanating, in fact, from Germany or her occupied territories. 
'White' stations, on the other hand, were those which did not attempt to 
conceal their real sympathies or place of origin. Each of Germany's black 
stations was run under the umbrella of Büro Concordia whose nominal head 
was Adolf Raskin but whose day-to-day running was in the hands of Erich 
Hetzler. Hetzler had lived in England for thirteen years and had studied at 
the London School of Economics. Later he was recruited as an England 
specialist on Ribbentrop's staff in Berlin and remained as a personal
Chapter 10
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¿rassistant to the Foreign Minister until the start of 1940. Adolf Mahr was 
a daily visitor to the Concordia offices at Berlin's Sportsfeld where he 
represented the Foreign Office and, as already stated, was in touch with 
Walther Kamm who was variously in charge of overseas shortwave services and
nthe European service's medium and long wave sectors.
Given his regular contact with the Concordia operation, it is not 
difficult to see where and how Adolf Mahr came by his idea of a secret 
station aimed at Irish-Americans. In the event, however, the idea was not 
immediately adopted by Ribbentrop though white propaganda programmes were 
occasionally relayed to North America by the Irland-Redaktion in 1942 and 
1943.8 Mahr wanted to use the Irish-American lobby to swing public opinion 
in America against U.S. entry into the war. Yet, by the time Mahr had 
fought off a challenge from the Propaganda Ministry for control of the 
Irland-Redaktion, and had succeeded in getting his nominee, Hans Hartmann, 
named as head of the new Irish service, it was almost Christmas 1941. By 
that time America had already entered the war, following the Japanese 
attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December. Thus the 
major objective of the G-sender was already lost. 9 Other German Radio 
services had, however, been broadcasting to the United States from the very 
beginning of the war, and by February 1941, German shortwave transmitters 
were beaming eight hours and ten minutes of programmes per 24-hours to 
North America. 10
In the early months of the war, an estimate of Americans 'interested' in 
listening to German shortwave radio programmes put the number at half a 
million. A survey of shortwave radio listening in America carried out in 
January 1941 by the American Institute of Public Opinion for the Princeton 
University Listening Centre, showed that almost one person in three had a 
radio set which could receive shortwave transmissions from Europe. Of 
these, 5.94% had listened at least once in the previous month (i.e.
December 1940) to programmes from Germany. The survey's findings were later 
revised downwards because of confusion among those polled over radio 
programmes coming directly from Europe and programmes relayed from Europe 
by American radio stations. Consequently, the Princeton Listening Centre 
concluded that 'the total audience for any and all European shortwave 
broadcasts must lie between 5% and 10% of the adult population, that is 
between three million and seven million listeners. The German radio's
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audience on any given day was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 
150,000'.11
Given these figures, Adolf Mahr was probably being over-optimistic in
attempting to influence the substantial Irish-American population against
U.S. intervention in the war. But, given that there was an audience there,
he may have been justified in believing that his initiative was worth
trying. Dr T. Ryle Dwyer puts the Irish-Americans at 'about 15% of the
population of the United States' in the 1939-45 period. 12 With a total U.S.
population of 132,457,000 in 1940,13 Dr Dwyer's estimate means that the
Irish-American population, at the time Mahr was writing, was just below
twenty million. Mahr himself put the number at only five to six million.
Whatever the real number of Irish-Americans, Dr Dwyer notes that 'their
political importance far outweighed their numerical strength. For one thing
their concentration in the most populous states and their tendency to
support Democratic candidates made them a very potent force within the
14Democratic Party'.
The Irish-Americans' traditional support for the Democratic Party would, 
in fact, have made more difficult Mahr's task of swinging the lobby against 
Roosevelt, a Democratic President. Mahr may not have been aware that, as 
early as 25 September 1939, the propaganda Ministry had issued a directive 
to German newspaper editors advising that the isolationists (i.e. the non­
interventionists) in America 'have little chance of success'. Goebbels' 
directive also noted that the Americans as a whole were pronouncedly 
hostile to Germany, adding: 'The whole American people want the English to 
win...The only issue in dispute between Roosevelt and the isolationists is 
whether or not America should take an active part in the war . ' 15
When the American CBS Radio reporter, Harry Flannery, took over from his 
predecessor in Berlin, William Shirer, at the end of 1940, he noted that 
Propaganda Ministry officials were sounding him out about American Catholic 
opinion on the war. The officials included Otto Dietrich, head of the 
Propaganda Ministry's press division. Flannery wrote:
The Nazi papers said opposition to involvement in the war was increasing 
in the United States and that organisations were being formed to prevent 
entry. I did not believe these stories and told the Nazis so. They 
pointed to Gallup poll reports. I said they were misrepresented.
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Dietrich, Krause and Frolich [Propaganda Ministry personnel] asked often 
about the attitude of Catholics toward the war and called attention to 
speeches made by some Catholic leaders. 'The Catholics', I replied, 'are 
not united as a group on any such matters .'16
Barnouw reflects the division in U.S. public opinion over the war:
The isolationists accused Roosevelt of wanting to lead America into a 
re-enactment of the 1914-18 bloodbath - and one that would, once more,
settle nothing...Some businessmen felt that Hitler would win the war and
17that America should be prepared to do business with him.
Whatever the intricacies of the internal U.S. debate on participation in
the war at that early stage, Adolf Mahr could have gained more satisfaction
from a later U.S. poll. This was reported to London by Britain's
representative in Dublin, Sir John Maffey. On 20 January 1941, Maffey noted
'that the American Institute of Public Opinion had announced that more than
63% of Americans questioned in a recent poll wanted Eire to give up her
neutrality and let the British use the Treaty ports. But in a special poll
conducted among first and second generation Irish-Americans, 52% had
10opposed any abandonment of Irish neutrality'. Such poll results lent 
credence to Mahr's initiative to target the Irish-Americans and use them 
not only to swing opinion against American participation in the war, but 
also to frustrate any British attempt to repossess the Treaty ports at 
Lough Swilly, Berehaven and Cobh.
While the attack on Pearl Harbour at the end of 1941 had put an end to
Mahr's ambitious plan to mobilise Irish-American opinion against U.S. entry
in the war, another related propaganda challenge was to present itself to
the Germans; namely preventing the re-election of U.S. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt in November 1944. Presumably the hope in Berlin was that a
less hawk-like candidate for the White House would seek an early end to the
war and so help Germany to retain her original borders. As already
indicated, Roosevelt had been the target of Nazi propaganda in the run up
to the 1940 election when German Radio broadcast 'diatribes against the
T9President, the press and the Administration'.
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While Irish-Americans had 'voted almost en masse for Roosevelt in both 
1932 and 1936 ' , the situation was different in 1940 because of the war in 
Europe. In early November 193 9, in order to aid Britain and France, 
Roosevelt succeeded in having the U.S. arms export embargo lifted despite 
'a shower of isolationist criticism, much of which emanated from Irish- 
American circles'. Roosevelt's Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, 
though 'backed by most isolationists... had little to gain from isolationist 
themes'. On 5 November 1940 Roosevelt won comfortably by 449 electoral 
college votes to Willkie's 82.21
Even after his election, 'the Nazis continued to try to influence 
opposition to Roosevelt in the United States'. In January 1941, German 
newspapers accused the U.S. President of 'moving towards dictatorship', and 
labelled him 'Enemy of Peace Number 1, War Prolonger Number 1, and War 
Profiteer Number l ' . 22 As early as 1942 it was clear that the German 
Foreign Office was considering what propaganda tactics to use against 
Roosevelt in the run up to the 1944 election for the White House, as well 
as any role the Irish-American lobby could play in this context. On a visit 
to Berlin in 1942, Charles Bewley, who had been Irish Minister to Berlin 
from 1933 to 1939, was approached by a senior Foreign Office official who 
asked his advice on how to deprive Roosevelt of the Irish vote through 
propaganda. Hans Dieckhoff, the former German ambassador to Washington who 
was now head of the department for Anglo-American affairs in the German 
Foreign Office, invited Bewley to his office in the Wilhelmstrasse:
The object of the visit was not clear to me. However, Dieckhoff at once 
put an end to my curiosity with the words, 'We believe you to be a 
friend of Germany and we think your knowledge of Irish opinion may be of 
use to us.' I assured him that any knowledge I might possess was at his 
disposal. 'What we want to know', continued Dieckhoff, 'is whether there 
is any propaganda which might help us to detach the Irish vote from 
Roosevelt in the coming election. It is of the greatest importance that 
Roosevelt should be defeated.' I considered for a moment, then I said, 
'There are two possible lines of propaganda which might influence the 
Irish vote, but I am convinced that you will not adopt either of them.' 
Dieckhoff smiled. 'That's possible', he said, 'but I would like to know 
what they are.' 'Well', I said, 'in the first place you could lay
206
emphasis on the fact that the German Army has liberated the Christian 
churches in the Baltic states from communism and restored freedom of 
worship. 1 He shook his head. 'I see your point', he said, 'but we are 
not allowed to use that propaganda.' 'I expected nothing else', I told 
him. 'Is it worthwhile mentioning the other possible line?' 'I would 
like to hear it', said Dieckhoff. 'You could secure at least a portion 
of the Irish vote for an anti-Roosevelt candidate if you promised that 
in the event of a German victory Germany would create an Irish Republic 
for the whole island including Ulster. 1 He shook his head again. 'It is 
contrary to the policy of the German government to make any declaration
9 1during the progress of the war on its intentions after the victory.'
While the two propaganda lines suggested by Bewley were ruled out by the 
Foreign Office official, they could easily have been broadcast on a secret 
station - as Mahr had proposed the year before - purporting to be either 
the voice of the Irish-American population inside the United States or the 
voice of Ireland appealing to Irish-Americans.
In the summer of 1943, the Foreign Office again sought advice on 
propaganda tactics to prevent Roosevelt's re-election. This time it was 
from the IRA man Frank Ryan, then living in Berlin. His biographer, Sean 
Cronin, notes that Ryan:
wrote a memorandum, which was supposed to be highly secret, strongly 
disagreeing with any such plan. Since Ireland was not at war with 
America and the success of the plan depended on convincing the listener 
that the broadcast was from Irish soil, the scheme might well have 
provoked a violent American response. In this situation and perhaps in 
others, Ryan's consultative role helped Irish neutrality. 24
On 26 August 1943 a meeting of the German Foreign Office's North America 
[broadcasting] Committee was held to discuss the status of various black 
propaganda stations. Foreign Office official Dr Kurt Georg Kiesinger told 
the meeting that while:
a Polish secret station was already in its early stages of 
existence ... to address mainly Polish [army] officers...the Croatian
207
station was disrupted by sabotage. Finns and Hungarians were not
reachable by any programmes at the moment...now a suitable person for
the Irish station was available. Irish people in the USA could be
2 5addressed twice weekly through this station.
The identity of the 'suitable person' was not revealed to the meeting 
but the Foreign Office may have been under the initial impression that 
Frank Ryan (after he was asked but before he wrote his refusal) would agree 
to broadcast, or write scripts for broadcasting, to the target Irish 
American audience. In his 1941 outline for the U.S. propaganda plan Mahr 
wrote that:
One requirement would be co-operation with the American services [of 
German Radio]. The newscaster must speak with an American accent.,.such 
programmes would certainly be followed with great interest in 
Ireland...it should be endeavoured to recruit suitable speakers, even 
collaborators amongst the Irish inmates of prisoner of war camps.
If the North America Committee was following Mahr's advice, then the
'suitable person' could have been recruited from a wide field of candidates
and may not even have been Irish. It would seem that the Foreign Office did
not intend using anyone from Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion for the secret
American broadcasts. Hartmann had already left Berlin for Luxembourg with
Francis Stuart two weeks before the North America Committee's meeting and
2 7he had not been consulted on the question.
In addition to Bewley and Ryan, Helmut Clissmann - then an Army cadet in
Hanover - and his wife Elizabeth were also asked for their opinions on the
2 * propaganda plan. Whoever revived the Irish-American G-sender plan in
1943, it was Mahr who, in 1941, had originated it albeit for another
objective. He was also involved in the later project and it was hardly
coincidental that when Elizabeth Clissmann was sent to Radio Luxembourg in
March 1944 to investigate the feasibility of the G-sender proposal, Mahr
2 9happened to be there. However, according to Mrs Clissmann, Mahr was 
'trying to halt the project because he knew it would not work ' . 30 She adds 
that: 'Dr Mahr happened to be there for some of the days that I was there.
But he came only for a visit maybe once a month. But [there was] no
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regularity, he turned up now and again.
Helmut and Elizabeth Clissmann told the author that 'the German
political machine, and especially Ribbentrop the Foreign Minister, wished
at all costs to stop Roosevelt getting elected for a fourth term'. Posters
had appeared in Berlin describing the American President as 'Public Enemy
Number One'. The order 'came down from Ribbentrop to launch an anti-
Roosevelt campaign on radio. Veesenmayer at the Foreign Office was given
the job of carrying the order through. It was decided that the message
would be to try and persuade the Irish, Polish and Italian minorities in
America that the U.S. should get out of the war in Europe'. The Clissmanns
o 2say they 'saw at once that this would not work with the American Irish'. 
Elizabeth Clissmann described the background to the G-sender plan:
It was 1944, the year in which Roosevelt was seeking election for the 
fourth time in the United States, and Goebbels for his propaganda 
purposes had chosen as a theme...that Roosevelt should be created as a 
kind of a horror image; Public Enemy Number One, using the expression of 
course from Chicago long before. He was to be pictured in the minds of 
everybody as Public Enemy Number One, and if possible this picture was 
to be transmitted to ethnic groups in the United States in order to 
prevent him being re-elected. I don't know what that was meant to 
achieve had they even succeeded, which of course was completely 
impossible really. If it hadn't been Roosevelt it would have been 
somebody else. It is inconceivable that it would have made the slightest 
difference to the war effort...It was decided to divide the ethnic 
groups - Polish, Italian, Irish - people who, for one reason or another, 
might possibly be against America's war effort. The Italians, of course, 
and Irish were the most likely. The Irish since they were looked upon as 
having a traditional conflict with England, or vice versa, and the 
Italians of course. I don't know anything about what was done on any 
other front, but vis-à-vis the Irish in America, the concept was that an 
Irish [radio] station should be set up in Germany, or within the German 
orbit, purporting to come from Ireland, which would carry propaganda 
supposedly from Ireland against Roosevelt. The Propaganda Ministry had 
really nobody who would be capable of advising them as to whether such a 
thing could be done or not. They searched around for people who knew
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Ireland and could be asked for their advice and they came, among others, 
on my husband Helmut. He was a cadet in army school, training to be an 
officer, and his commanding officer saw no reason to let him go, apart 
from the fact that Helmut of course didn't want to go anyway. So, in 
order to deflect any emphasis on Helmut, and at the same time to be sure 
that whoever was asked for advice would give negative advice, it was 
suggested that I should be fetched from Copenhagen, should be warned as 
to what was afoot so that I would inevitably take the proper negative 
attitude, and to go through the motions. Part of the motions was going 
to Luxembourg to see how the Irish transmitter in Luxembourg (which was 
the only one that was transmitting Irish affairs to Ireland, and might 
know something about Irish affairs) worked, and specifically also what 
they knew, where they got their Irish news from. So I went there for a 
week. 33
Because of the importance of her mission to Luxembourg, Elizabeth 
Clissmann was granted travel permits, which were rare at that time, to 
leave Copenhagen for Hanover where her husband was in barracks. She arrived 
by boat and train in Hanover to find 'the house of a friend bombed, and the 
moon shining through where the roof should be, and dozens of cats wandering 
around mewing. It was very strange. Another friend's house was unoccupied 
with two milk bottles and a newspaper outside the door'. She finally took 
refuge in an air raid shelter. Later, she was briefed on the Irish radio 
station project by her husband who had been granted special leave from the 
barracks. Next stop was Luxembourg. 34 Mrs Clissmann's account of her one 
week visit to Radio Luxembourg in March 1944 provides an insight into the 
chaotic conditions prevailing in the displaced headquarters of German 
Radio's European services. Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion, along with other 
sections, had moved to the Grand-Duchy in August 1943 to escape the 
increasing Allied bombing raids over Berlin. 35 The studios were (and still 
are) situated at Villa Louvigny in a Luxembourg city park. Mrs Clissmann 
describes her visit as follows:
It was a very funny week because the purpose of my visit was strictly 
secret, as the Germans call it s t r e n g g e h e i m . So, there was to be no 
explanation as to what I was doing there. I was to just appear, be given
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a desk and a chair in an office, and find my way round, try to find out 
tactfully what was happening. Of course, I immediately became the centre 
of suspicion. Everybody saw his job being at risk. At that time, at that 
late stage in the war, the loss of a job could be fatal because you'd be 
drafted. Therefore, it wasn't just a question of losing your job, it 
might be a question of losing your life. So, there was intense interest 
in my presence there, and resentment. But, on the whole, I managed to 
get over that and made some nice friends, and began to find out what 
they knew. I discovered that, in fact, they had very little information. 
They listened to Radio Eireann when they could. Mostly the reception was 
defective. They got synopses of news from foreign newspapers delivered 
to them, having been translated into German in order to be censored, 
from the central Propaganda Ministry to the various stations. It was 
then busily retranslated back into English which kept everybody happily 
occupied for hours and hours every day. Then out of these synopses of 
newspaper reports they could deduct a certain amount of what was 
happening in Ireland. But, of course, as most Irish people themselves 
realised at the time, I suppose, very little was happening. There was 
the fuel scarcity and the black bread, the death of a parish priest in 
Ballina. Since the news was also censored from Dublin there was 
practically nothing else, which wasn't much help for a German station 
that was going to try to pretend that it was an Irish station. Where 
would you get any information? It was quite clear that there was no 
information in Luxembourg. 36
At the studios Mrs Clissmann met Adolf Mahr whom she had known in Dublin 
before the war. She adds that Mahr:
brought us all from the Irish transmitter on a Sunday to Trier to see a 
memorial monument erected in the 4th century by the Romans who had a 
large woollen industry on the banks of the river [Mosel] there. They 
recorded all the activities of their families on the different sides. 
It's about the height of four or five men, a very imposing thing to look 
at. I never had heard of it, and he brought us all there in the very
*5 ncold, bitter weather and gave us a lecture on it.
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The continuing conflict between the Foreign Office and the Propaganda 
Ministry, particularly over foreign transmissions, put Mahr in a difficult 
position in Luxembourg, as Mrs Clissmann explains:
If, on a transmitter to Ireland, there should be great rejoicing about 
Japanese victories over Americans, it was prefectly obvious that that 
was going to be very counter productive in Ireland. But, it was part of 
the policy of the Propaganda Ministry and more than likely was agreed at 
the highest levels in the anti-Comintern pact. Therefore, it was a 
matter of policy that it had to be pushed through. It was very difficult 
and Dr Mahr was, in these circumstances, the representative for the 
Foreign Office and was the man who tried, without conflict and without a 
loud noise, very quietly, to achieve that certain fixed doctrines would 
not be pushed through on the Irish transmitter... he lived here [in 
Ireland] for many years and he reared his children here. He would, of 
course, know that no Irishman was going to rejoice about Japanese
T Qvictories over Americans.
The war had been going on for four and a half years at that stage, and 
Mrs Clissmann found the radio team:
pleased to be in Luxembourg because it was relatively quiet. There were
no big air raids. The food was much the same as in Germany itself. One 
of the advantages was that there was still some wine, whereas in Germany 
there was practically no wine at all left. I think they felt they were 
in a good place and it was very important to try and stay there. 
Everybody was very worried about how the war was going, naturally, so 
there wasn't any sense of complete relaxation, but in a bad world they
T 9were not m  the worst place.
Mrs Clissmann discovered Hartmann and his team 'working in difficult 
conditions' with inadequate resources. Some of the difficulties appeared to 
be self inflicted though, as she explains: 'I met a German girl who was
responsible for recording Radio Eireann, who, in fact, was off duty [at 10
p.m.] ten minutes before the news programme came through, and who, 
therefore, constantly marked the book "impossible reception", and went
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home. ' 40 The girl told Mrs Clissmann that when she had monitored the Radio
41Eireann news and typed it up, 'no one had paid any attention to it'. Mrs 
Clissmann discovered to her amazement that the Irland-Redaktion did not 
even have a map of Ireland. She told the author:
I wanted to trace where the Bishop of Kilmore sat because I couldn't
remember. In that connection I haphazardly said 'can you show me the map
and I might be able to find it?'. They said, 'well, there isn't any
map'. So they had no news, they had no geographical information or
reference books. It was very difficult. The Bishop of Kilmore had
cropped up in connection with Monte Cassino [the famous monastery had
been destroyed by American bombers on 15 February 1944]. He had made a
statement that the Allies should be ashamed of themselves, destroying
this invaluable historic and cultural centre. This, of course, was a
comment at which the Germans rejoiced and, knowing how susceptible the
Irish were to the utterances of bishops, they wanted to give this full
4 7value. As it turned out the Bishop sat m  Cavan.
As well as Adolf Mahr there were two other pre-war friends of Elizabeth 
Clissmann's in Luxembourg: 'Dr [Hans] Hartmann and his wife [Helen] I had
known in Ireland and I felt very at home with. They were very hospitable 
and I had my evening meal with them most evenings. Otherwise I stayed in an 
hotel. ' 43 Hartmann, in fact, knew of Elizabeth Clissmann's planned visit to 
Luxembourg a full two months before it took place. He had also discovered 
Frank Ryan's memo disagreeing with the plan for a secret Irish-American 
transmitter. According to Cronin:
Hartmann got a copy of Ryan's memorandum, which carried the initials 
F.R. He wanted to know who F.R. was and, on being told, asked for him as 
an adviser to the service. Ryan was annoyed but saw a ray of light in 
the offer. He [Ryan] told Clissmann on 8 January: 'Hartmann was afraid 
of a rival station and asked [Francis] Stuart would I come to Luxembourg 
as an adviser there. I told Stuart to tell him that he (Stuart) had 
heard from Haller (or someone in Berlin) that the whole scheme of a 
geheimsender [secret radio station] is dropped. I thought then that the 
matter ended there. Now Stuart tells me that Hartmann is most anxious to
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meet me and is going to apply for permission to that effect. I see just 
one possible good point in the affair. If Hartmann can give me 
translation work in Luxembourg I've no objection to giving him my
opinion whenever he wants it. So far as I can see, he is the last hope
for me to find something to do. I'm doing nothing about the matter yet. 
I'd like to talk it out with you first and get your advice. ' 44
Cronin speculates that Frank Ryan may have 'thought that he could get to
Ireland more easily from Luxembourg than from Berlin' . 45 Five days later, 
on 13 January 1944, Ryan wrote to Clissmann again:
In a recent letter I mentioned to you about Hartmann. The matter has now 
gone further - more so than I like. The following I have from Haller: 
Hartmann rang him. Hartmann also rang Vau (Veesenmayer). Vau and Haller 
are enthusiastic about the proposal and say it would be very nice for me 
there in Luxembourg. (When I hear that I begin to have doubts naturally. 
However, Vau will throw light on it when he comes back). I didn't ask 
Haller how Hartmann knew Vau was at the Führer Hauptquartier [Hitler's 
field headquarters], nor how he could ring him there. I believe there's 
a 'slight' inaccuracy in Haller's statement to me . 46
During February and March Ryan's health deteriorated as he underwent 
treatment for pneumonia in a Dresen sanitorium. On 2 April 1944 he raised 
the Luxembourg issue again in a letter to Clissmann which is paraphrased by 
Cronin:
He wondered about Luxembourg. Since he knew fewer people than ever in 
Germany it was ridiculous to decline to meet Hartmann. 'He has books - 
especially in my own language.' He could get news and a room. He could 
kill three or four weeks in Luxembourg waiting for summer. As long as it 
was 'clearly understood' he was going there for a holiday 'there'd be no 
cause for misunderstandings on business or political matters' . 47
At the beginning of May 1944 Ryan had made up his mind to go and see 
Hartmann at Radio Luxembourg. On 2 May he wrote to Clissman: 'By the way, 
it might be good if you dropped a line to Hartmann and told him I'll visit
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him early June. 1 Cronin notes that Ryan left the Dresden sanitorium and
'returned to Berlin at the end of May. He needed a passport to travel to
Denmark [to see Mrs Clissmann] or Luxembourg [to see Hartmann] so he had
his picture taken'. But within days he had fallen ill again and died in
4 9Dresden on 10 June 1944.
Following her visit to the Irland-Redaktion in Luxembourg, Mrs Clissmann 
went to the Netherlands to investigate the operation of Concordia's Indian 
transmitter:
When I left Luxembourg it had already been arranged that I should go to 
Hilversum where the Indians had a transmitter for India. There were 
about 23 Indians there and they were transmitting on shortwave. The 
transmissions were being received in India while purporting to come from 
Burma. The British never found out where they came from. It was a most 
successful operation. The success of that operation was what inspired, I 
think, this concept that Goebbels had that one could perhaps fool the 
Americans as to where the transmissions were coming from. But the Indian 
operation was an entirely different one to anything that Goebbels had in 
mind. The most important factor in it was that, when the Indians made 
their agreement with the Germans to set it up, it was a strict condition 
that there should be absolutely no interference. The Indians would run 
it one hundred per cent as they chose and nobody was to interfere. 50
But what happened to the G-sender project, the feasibility of which 
Elizabeth Clissmann had been sent to investigate? The following is a key 
extract from the author's second interview with Mrs Clissmann:
Question: So, when you left Luxembourg, you had made up your mind that 
there would be no secret Irish station?
Mrs Clissmann: I never had to make up my mind at all. I was only sent 
there by my friends to make sure that this thing died as fast as 
possible. It wasn't difficult therefore to find reasons why it should, 
they were ready made.
Q. But you had to report back to somebody in Berlin?
4- ft
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A. Yes. I wrote out a thing to say how hopeless this all was. There was 
no basic information available, there were no people who had the 
necessary knowledge, nothing.
Q. Who did you have to report to? Was it Mahr?
A. No. I think it possibly was to Dr Veesenmayer. Dr Veesenmayer was the 
man for the Foreign Office who was in charge of most Irish things. Most 
Irish things went through him. But I'm not sure that he was still there, 
because afterwards he went to Budapest. So I wouldn't have the slightest 
idea in fact who was there [at the Foreign Office] at the time. But, Dr 
Veesenmayer had been the man I knew best.
Q. So the whole idea died a death. Nobody was disappointed that it
didn't get off the ground?
A. No, because nobody had been involved. Nothing had ever been set up, 
and those few people who knew about Ireland - who had been asked about 
it and were so convinced from the first moment that it could only be a 
mess - were only delighted that it didn't start. 51
As Mrs Clissmann rightly assumed, Veesenmayer would hardly have been in
a position to consider her anti G-sender report since, in March 1944, he 
was named Reich Minister in Budapest - a title which, in effect, put him in 
total control of German-occupied Hungary. By the time the Red Army captured 
Budapest on 13 February 1945, 570,000 of Hungary's 825,000 Jews had
COperished. According to Francis Stuart, Veesenmayer was 'a Jew 
exterminator' , 53 and the military historian Lt. Col. John Duggan notes that 
Veesenmayer 'had proved his ruthless efficiency in liquidating Jews in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for which he was sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment by the Nürnberg tribunal' . 54 In July 1977, in a rare post-war 
interview at his home in Darmstadt, Germany, Veesenmayer told Duggan of his 
'vast admiration' for Mrs Clissmann, saying: 'She was a great Irishwoman,
such fire, such zest and a mother to boot. If only [Frank] Ryan and [Seán] 
Russell had her head or her zeal and initiative things could have been far 
different in Ireland with a better prospect of bringing about a coincidence
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of Irish and German interests.Duggan also notes that Veesenmayer was 
'prepared to use' Frank Ryan whom he regarded 'as a communist who wanted a
united Ireland in a communist sense. He had links with Moscow and was far
left ' , 56
Ultimately, the Germans' Irish-American propaganda initiative of 1943-44 
foundered for the same reasons that the initiative of 1941 had failed: Nazi 
in-fighting coupled with bad timing caused by the rapidly shifting tides of 
war. It will be remembered that one of the main objectives of Adolf Mahr's 
initiative in 1941 - the use of Irish and Irish-American opinion to prevent 
America from entering the war - had already been lost with America's 
declaration of war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December
1941. At that stage, Mahr had barely succeeded in gaining control of the
Irland-Redaktion on behalf of the Foreign Office following months of in­
fighting with the Propaganda Ministry. Similarly, in 1944, precious time 
was wasted as Mahr struggled to counter the thrust of a Propaganda Ministry 
initiative he knew was unworkable. Even if the G-sender initiative had gone 
ahead in a form acceptable to Mahr, the plan would have suffered because of 
the forced retreat of the broadcasters from Luxembourg ahead of an 
advancing American army. This was in early September 1944, - two months 
before the U.S. presidential election. On 7 November 1944, Franklin D.
_  , C  *7Roosevelt was elected to a fourth consecutive term in the White House.
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Chapter 11 
A Faltering Voice:
The Broadcasts of 1944-45
1 9  4 4
The period from January 1944 to May 1945 saw the decline and fall of 
German Radio's Irish service along with the demise of the Third Reich. As 
Allied victories grew in number during 1944 Axis propagandists found 
themselves fighting an uphill battle. The Allies invaded Normandy on 6 June 
1944 (D-Day), the Red Army opened its summer offensive on 23 June, German 
Army officers tried to assassinate Hitler on 20 July, and Paris was 
liberated on 25 August. Hans Hartmann remained in charge of the Irland- 
Redaktion but in January 1944 lost his key speaker, Francis Stuart, in a 
row over anti-Soviet broadcasts. Despite anonymous threats on the 
telephone, Stuart refused to resume his talks to Ireland. In late August 
U.S. forces closed in on Luxembourg. The remaining Irish team - by then 
reduced to Hartmann, a secretary and a translator - moved northwards along 
with German Radio's other European services to Apen, near Oldenburg. From 
there they continued to operate in increasingly difficult conditions before 
disbanding at the beginning of May 1945.1
The year 1944 got off to a bad start for Hans Hartmann. The first of 
many crises arose when Francis Stuart decided he would no longer broadcast 
to Ireland. According to Stuart, he had been asked to talk to Ireland 
'about the Russian atrocities and the atheistical world view', but 
refused. Before ceasing his broadcasts Stuart had warned listeners:
if I don't speak any more it will be because I can no longer say what I 
want, what I think is the truth. I will be asked to say things I don't 
believe, so if I stop talking you'll know why. 3
One of Stuart's final talks included the following references:
It is of no importance at all that the Tricolour should fly from the 
City Hall in Belfast instead of the Union Jack, if Belfast workers are 
to find it as hard to live and support their families as before. Such 
freedom is merely illusion and such nationalism a farce and a
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danger...The first thing to do is to face the truth. Until Dublin 
becomes a much better place for the average working family to live in 
than Belfast, we lose more than half the force of our claim to Belfast. 
This may not be a very palatable statement, but I think that to most of 
you it is quite obvious. 4
No one now recalls who tried to pressurise Francis Stuart into making 
anti-Bolshevik comments on air but it was hardly Hans Hartmann, who valued 
the Irish writer's contributions and did not consider Stuart's personal 
pro-Russian stance to be objectionable. Hartmann told the author that 
Stuart:
was a sincere man and often didn't hold back with criticism, but what I 
realised was that he particularly liked the Russians. As far as I knew, 
or remember, he didn't speak about Stalin or anything else. He just 
spoke about the Russians which was not objectionable because there must 
be a major difference between Stalin and the Russian people. But he 
apparently liked the Russians, which is not objectionable. 5
The two people most likely to have forced Stuart to break with the Irish 
service were Hartmann's boss, the ex-Foreign Office official and then head 
of foreign radio services, Erich Hetzler, 6 and Adolf Mahr, then still with 
the Foreign Office's political broadcasting division and a regular visitor 
to Luxembourg where he kept an eye on the Irish radio propaganda effort he 
had set up just over two years earlier. There may have been more than one 
reason for Stuart's decision to leave Luxembourg at that time. Helmut and 
Elizabeth Clissmann told the author that Stuart 'could not succeed in 
having his German girlfriend [Madeleine Meissner] hired to work in the 
Irland-Redaktion' even though she initially travelled to Luxembourg with 
him in August 1943 'to introduce his talks'. The Clissmanns did add that 
Stuart 'had vowed to leave if they changed his scripts again. That had 
already happened once when the words "due to the interference of the Red 
Army" had been inserted into a script at short notice, and he had 
inadvertently read it out on air. Stuart was vehemently opposed to being
Qforced to take a political position in his weekly talks'. Francis Stuart 
eventually left Luxembourg for Berlin in February. By the time Mrs
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Clissmann got there in March she found Hartmann 'working in difficult
conditions. He was doing a nightly broadcast in Irish at six or seven each
evening and had no direct Irish news of any kind'.
According to BBC monitoring reports, the Irish service at that time was
restricted to using the Luxembourg (1293 metres) and Hilversum (301.5 and
415.5 m) transmitters for its broadcasts. From early 1944, the Irland-
Redaktion appears to have pooled its broadcast items with other language
services. 10 Thus, on 22 February, the Dutch home service carried Cardinal
McRory's 'pastoral letter to young Irishmen not to become infected with
communist ideologies in the United Kingdom' 1 1 and closely parallelled
1 nHartmann's theme broadcast on 25 November 1943. The Irish Catholic 
Hierarchy was unwittingly providing useful propaganda material for German 
Radio's European services at this stage of the war. As well as Cardinal 
McRory's comments, other bishops figured in the broadcast material. On 12 
March, the England-Redaktion reported that:
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Cavan approved de Valera's reply to the 
U.S. demand to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. 
Bishop O'Callaghan stated that de Valera had made a sensible, cautious 
and statesmanlike speech, which had met with the approval of the entire 
population of Eire. In future, continued the bishop, Eire would have to
rely mainly on her own efforts as regards supplies of essential utility
13goods, as shipping would be more difficult than ever.
The same day, the Irland-Redaktion reported no change:
in the prevailing situation in a Belfast prison, where Hugh McAteer, the 
IRA chief of staff, is on hunger strike with a number of other 
imprisoned IRA members. The Minister of Home Affairs was asked in the 
Commons if he would set up an inquiry to investigate the cause of the 
[hunger] strike, but replied in the negative. 14
On 17 March, Cardinal McRory was back again, this time on the German 
Home service, 'condemning the Anglo-U.S. campaign against Irish 
neutrality', and quoted as saying that:
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the British have always treated Eire in a cruel and unjust manner. The 
Irish people will maintain their right to independence and freedom, and 
will have nothing to do with England. 15
Meanwhile, Francis Stuart's decision to stop broadcasting to Ireland was
beginning to have serious repercussions for him. In his diary entry for 23
March, he wrote: 'Just lately, some threats on the telephone, presumably
because I would not give more radio talks. ' 15 Stuart's biographer, Geoffrey
Elborn, noted that the writer was allowed to leave Luxembourg in February
on condition that he reported to the Rundfunkhaus in Berlin. His refusal to
do this 'was punished by a visit from the police in May who removed his
identity papers and passport. He was telephoned in the middle of the night
and told if he did not continue with the talks he would be arrested and
sent to a camp... Pressure had come from the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, but
Stuart's friends who could help were based in the Foreign Office,
1 7especially Weizsäcker'. Foreign Office pressure saved Stuart who wrote in
his diary of 4 May: 'When I called to the police headquarters near the
Alexanderplatz, was given my passport (such as it is) back. A relief! Not
18that, I think, I was in any great danger.'
German Radio's European services continued to broadcast from Luxembourg. 
Items of Irish news were used not only by Hartmann's service but also by 
all the other language services. Some of the propaganda material, like the 
following sent in English to the Far East via Transozean the German 
Telegraph Service, indicated what must have been uppermost in the 
broadcasters' minds, an Allied invasion of the Continent:
The telephone service between England and Eire has now been suspended. 
Ireland is thus almost completely cut off from the outside world. 
Telegrams may still be sent and will be subject to drastic censorship. 
The PMG [British Postmaster General] ... explained that the measures had 
been taken to prevent any leakage of military information about the 
Allied preparations for the invasion of the Continent which might reach 
the Germans via Ireland, since telephone and telegraph services between 
Eire and Northern Ireland will continue to function normally. It will be 
recalled that it was recently reported that the U.S. government had
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requested the government of Eire to break diplomatic relations with
19Germany, but that the Irish government had refused.
This item was repeated on the German home service and the English
n nservice later the same day and was picked up the next day by Free India 
Radio in Hilversum which added:
In neutral opinion this latest measure is directed to prevent news about
the widespread social unrest in England leaking abroad, rather than
21towards guarding military secrets.
To prove its point, Free India Radio's Hindu language service carried a
2 2report on the Belfast dockers' strike the same day. Irish stories were 
also featured on Buro Concordia's clandestine station Radio National which 
falsely claimed to broadcast from within Britain. The BBC recorded a Radio 
National broadcast on 7 April 1944 entitled 'The situation in Ireland':
Ireland is the nearest neutral country to us, and the question of 
whether she is better off comes up when we consider that in England in 
wartime everything previously devoted to pleasure and social benefits 
has been turned over to armament manufacture. Conservation of manpower 
should in itself be conducive to neutrality, when we consider how many 
of our boys are being destroyed for this Jew-made war. We are inclined 
to despise the neutrals out of jealousy that they are out of it. I know 
Ireland is despised more than any other neutral, but we must remember 
her struggle to maintain her newly found freedom and independence, and 
that she is a very poor country whose ambition is to put herself on a 
level with the richer countries of Europe. Owing to her undeveloped 
industries, we could have obtained nothing from her in the way of 
armaments, and we could hardly have expected her to enter the war just 
to supply us with cannon fodder. Ireland is cut off from the rest of the 
world for imports, and dependent on her own imperfect self sufficiency. 
(Reference to Eire's food problems, increase in price of bread, and low 
butter ration). Many people have had to leave the country to find 
employment. Pork products have virtually disappeared, paraffin has been 
cut by more than 50 per cent and candles by 70 per cent. Coal is banned
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for domestic use and electricity and gas are cut by 80 per cent. Clothes 
are rationed to the extreme of having to give up coupons for second hand 
goods, and footwear is so scarce that an appeal had to be made to the 
USA and to Switzerland. The government admits that the present soap 
ration is inadequate. Most of us are inclined to think a country remains 
neutral in order to make money, but this is not so in Ireland's case. 
There are a few countries left who can see a little farther than the 
ends of their noses and so they are wisely staying out of this 
nightmare. Although they are suffering at the moment and we are looking 
down on them, there will come a day when we shall see who were the 
bloody fools to go to war and risk everything for the sake of the Lion 
of Judah. 23
The invasion everyone had been anticipating eventually materialised when 
Allied troops landed on the Normandy beaches on 6 June. Germany's 
propaganda services had to put a brave face on the event they had earlier 
predicted could either never happen or be easily repulsed. In his diary 
entry for 8 June, Goebbels wrote:
The scene we are all obsessed with now is invasion. I am drawing up 
guidelines on how to handle this matter as far as domestic and foreign 
propaganda are concerned. With foreign propaganda it is important that 
we present the news as quickly as possible. For domestic propaganda, 
however, stoicism is needed, giving no inkling of defeatism. Up to now 
we've been successful. Initially our domestic news coverage was somewhat 
brazen, but I put a stop to that. It must be made clear to the enemy 
just how great are the losses they are incurring. That will work best in 
England and the USA. 24
Elsewhere in Berlin, Francis Stuart was visiting the dying Frank Ryan
and found that he still took 'an interest in the news that we brought him.
It was the days of the Allied landings on the Normandy coast and I remember
that his last comment on the military operation was to point out to me what
direction the American drive across the peninsula would probably take. But
2 She was no longer, I knew, deeply involved in it'.
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Little is known about the contents of Hartmann's talks for the remainder 
of the war. This is principally because the BBC's Maurice Irvine was
invalided out of the monitoring service with tuberculosis on 25 July 1944
and a decision was taken not to replace him with another Gaelic monitor. 
Irvine himself thinks that MI5 saw no further value in translating German 
Radio's Irish language talks because the course of the war had irreversibly
n  ¿rchanged in favour of the Allies. Added to this was the fact that, 
according to Irvine and his fellow monitor Lorna Swire, Hartmann's talks 
had become repetitive and added nothing new in terms of military 
intelligence. Swire told the author that Hartmann was 'a crashing bore', 
adding, 'I remember looking at specimens of Dr Hans Hartmann's broadcasts 
and every one dealt with the same topic, viz. the evils of Bolshevism. I
o ndon't think he ever talked about anything else.' All Irvine remembers up
to mid-1944 were talks in Irish by Hartmann and anonymous talks in English
on Irish topics. The Irish Army's monitors did, however, continue to tune
into Hartmann until the end of the war though detailed transcripts were
rarely typed up. In the final nine months of the war brief subject headings
were, for the most part, all that the monitors in McKee barracks 
2 8reproduced.
With American troops closing in on the Grand-Duchy in early September 
1944, German Radio's European services were forced to move again having 
lost the crucial Calais transmitter to the Allies in August. 29 Relocating 
northwards to the small town of Apen, they reassembled in Bremers Hotel. 30 
Hans Hartmann recalls having to leave the Luxembourg studios 'in a hurry 
and I think all the material which was there was captured by the
Americans' . 31 Before leaving, the Germans tried to dynamite the premises
3 2but failed to detonate the charges. A Radio Luxembourg engineer 
'encouraged them to shoot holes in the transmitter tubes - apparently to 
divert them from more catastrophic sabotage. With the arrival of the 
Americans, he dug up from the garden a complete set of tubes he had buried 
there four years earlier for such a day ' . 33
Irish Army monitors had noticed the upheaval in the Irland-Redaktion's 
broadcasting hours and wavelengths. On 1 August 1944 the service was still 
based in Luxembourg and putting out three bulletins a night at 5.15 p.m., 
6.15 p.m., and 7.45 p.m. Irish time on 41.44 metres. The broadcasters fled 
Luxembourg shortly before it was liberated by American troops on 10
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September. A talk by Hartmann on 'Anglo-American supply problems' was 
picked up in Dublin on 23 August 1944 but there followed a gap of over a
month before Hartmann was picked up again on 26 September. By 3 October the
Irish service was broadcasting nightly at 6.45 p.m. and again at 8 p.m. via 
the Bremen transmitter on 396 metres and Hilversum on 301.6 metres. 34
On 17 November 1944, Dublin picked up one of the last Hartmann talks 
reproduced in detail by G2:
Hello Ireland, this is Germany calling you for the second and last time 
tonight over the stations Bremen and Holland. Dr Hans Hartmann will now 
give you a commentary in Irish entitled 'Views on Neutrality'; Go 
mbeannaigh Dia dhibh a chäirde, when the convention was held in
Dumbarton Oaks the new machinery was outlined by means of which the
world of smaller nations is to come under the dictation of the three 
great powers, Russia, England and America. Whatever organisation is 
devised to deal with the affairs of the world after the war, it is clear 
that the smaller nations are to have no voice, even in those matters 
affecting their own destinies. Full power is to be reserved to the three 
great powers mentioned. In their collossal vanity and insolence they see 
no need to consult the right of any state but their own, and for other 
countries there is to be a slavish acceptance of the decisions of these 
self-appointed arbiters of the world's destiny. If they think that peace 
can be established on injustice they are grievously mistaken. There is 
no chance for any country in Europe to save its own culture and religion 
except through Germany who has been, and is still, fighting to establish 
a complete and just peace. 35
As well as Hartmann, the radio team in Apen comprised the acting head of
the foreign radio services, Erich Hetzler, William Joyce and his wife
Margaret, plus other members of the English service, in addition to Poles,
Arabs and Indians working with Büro Concordia. 36 Adolf Mahr was also there,
as his son Gustav told the author: 'Father had remained with...Büro
Concordia all through the endless bombing of 1943-45, finishing up
somewhere in the bogs of Oldenburg, west of Bremen, where they 
1 7disbanded.' The Apen team managed to put out propaganda programmes 
against all odds, thanks mainly to Hetzler's organisational abilities and
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some Rundfunk engineers who provided the necessary technical back-up. 
Throughout the final three months of 1944, G2 monitors in Dublin noted that 
the Free India Committee was broadcasting on the same wavelength as the 
Irish service immediately after Hartmann's news bulletins in Irish and 
English. On 14 December, during a commentary entitled 'More haste less 
speed', an Irland-Redaktion announcer said that 'amidst what one might 
almost say a chorus of Allied voices, the voice of our well-known journal
the I r i s h  I n d e p e n d e n t , points out that German war conduct was remarkably
3 9successful everywhere in the face of Allied attacks'.
No Irland-Redaktion programmes were picked up in Dublin between 14 
December and Christmas but Hartmann was heard on 2 6 December giving a 
commentary on 'Hunger and Communism' . 40
1 9  4 5
Through December 1944 and January 1945 the Irish output from Germany was 
down to only one occasional evening broadcast at 8 p.m. Irish time. This 
was changed to 8.4 5 p.m from 2 5 January. 41 On 11 February a German 
broadcast to Ireland announced that the Fehmegerichte (courts with powers 
of summary execution) 'had been revived and had already taken action 
against collaborationists in Anglo-Irish War style' . 42
In March 1945, Hartmann was back on air twice a night at 6.45 p.m. and
8.45 p.m. On 17 March the Irland-Redaktion put out its last St Patrick's 
Day programme. The 6.45 p.m broadcast was 'completely blotted out by noise' 
according to G2 monitors, but the 8.45 p.m. transmission was picked up. The 
programme began with a song 'The Hills of Donegal' followed by a special 
commentary on St Patrick by Hans Hartmann. There followed another song 'The 
Emigrant', and the programme ended with the Irish national anthem 'The 
Soldiers Song ' . 43 For the rest of March the format beamed to Ireland 
comprised German war communiqués, news in English, news in Irish read by 
Hartmann, and music. On 29 March G2 monitors noted the Bremen transmitter 
was off the air but the 8.45 p.m. Irish programme was picked up on 3 01.6 
metres 'but fades out after nine minutes at 8.54 p.m . ' 44 On 2 April 1945 
the broadcasting hours to Ireland were changed again, this time to three 
times each evening at 5.45 p.m., 8.45 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. This format, 
followed for the first week of April, included Hartmann's news in Irish at
8.45 p.m. and a commentary in Irish by Hartmann at 10.45 p.m. followed by a
3 8
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summary of military news, a musical interlude and political news from
4 5various countries.
By April 1945 the situation for the Germans had become so desperate that
the German News Agency was reporting transmissions by a secret radio
station in 'enemy-occupied Germany by the German Freedom Movement which
4 6bears the name Werewolf'. Goebbels had authorised the use of an old long­
wave transmitter at Nauen for the Werewolves, a Nazi group set up to carry 
out an underground war of sabotage against the invading Allied armies. The 
secret transmitter was on the air from 1 to 24 April 1945.47
On 3 April 1945 Goebbels issued fresh guidelines for the press and radio 
services to devote themselves 'exclusively to re-establishing and 
increasing the power of resistance, the war effort and fighting morale both 
at the front and at home'. The Propaganda Minister wrote: 'The main task of
the press and radio is to make clear to the German people that our Western 
enemies are pursuing the same infamous purposes and the same devilish
4 8annihilation plans against the German people as are our Eastern enemies.'
At 10.45 p.m. on 5 April, the Irish service was again quoting a member of 
the Catholic hierarchy to support Goebbels' line:
The Bishop of Clonfert in Ireland declared recently there will be a
wilder struggle in future than at present for the human souls - a
struggle of the powers of Light and Darkness. Atheism is coming forward 
49once again.
With the military situation becoming hopeless for the Germans, a plan 
was hatched to get William Joyce to Ireland aboard a U-boat but even this 
was considered too risky. Goebbels issued a top priority order on 7 April 
which read: 'The Joyces are at all costs to be kept out of Allied hands.'
Within days Joyce was moved from Apen to Hamburg where he recorded his 
final broadcasts, the last one being transmitted on 30 April. 50 Meanwhile, 
on 16 April Hartmann's service was putting out a commentary on 'The brutal 
methods of the Bolsheviks'. On 17 April at 5.45 p.m. the Irish service 
carried an extract from the day's German war communiqué, music, a general 
talk about the fighting in Germany, followed by more music. At 8.45 p.m., 
Hartmann's commentary was followed by highlights of the world's news. Then 
came music followed by a talk on the San Francisco conference to establish
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the United Nations. At 10.4 5 p.m. Hartmann gave another commentary in Irish
which was followed by news, music and a talk entitled 'What is going on in
Soviet Russia?' On 18 April, the service broadcast 'a talk on Bolshevik
life quoted from R e a d e r s  D i g e s t of December and January last'. G2 noted
that 'about ten days ago, the German legation [in Dublin] were very anxious
to obtain copies of the R e a d e r s  D i g e s t ’ . 51 On 20 April, the three nightly
5 2broadcasts were cut to two, one at 8.45 p.m. and a second at 9.45 p.m.
With defeat staring them in the face, the German Radio team was still 
able to put out two programmes per night to Ireland, though Hartmann 
himself was not broadcasting every night. On 22 April - just two weeks 
before the end of the war, and less than a week after the Red Army began 
its final Berlin offensive and the U.S. Army had taken 300,000 prisoners in 
the Ruhr53 - the Irland-Redaktion programmes went out as normal. The 8.45 
p.m. bulletin contained a German war communiqué, music, military news, more 
music, and political news. At 9.45 p.m. there was military news and flashes 
followed by news from the fronts, music, political flashes from various 
countries and more music. An anonymous commentary entitled 'Autarchy' 
managed to include several Irish references :
Public utterances of British and American statesmen and propagandists 
have made it abundantly clear that one of the very first things the 
western powers, if victorious, want to abolish is the German conception 
of autarchy, meaning economic self sufficiency. They say that in the 
interest of world peace, Germany must be denied the means of an 
independent livelihood. The primary function, of course, is that Britain 
and the USA enjoy the sacred prerogative to rule the world by economic 
power and, if necessary, by hunger and bombs. Ireland was depopulated 
and turned into a cattle ranch not because she wanted to be free but 
because it was in the best interest of the Irish themselves. The farms 
of the Poles were destroyed, their women and children perished by the 
thousands in the concentration camps. We heard from General Eisenhower 
that the Germans will be allowed to grow solely potatoes as the only 
means of subsistence. That Germany is to be transformed into what 
Ireland was a hundred years ago, a country hopelessly overpopulated, not 
because she could not support her people but because the established 
economic order condemned half of them to famine and starvation. We quote
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from a contemporary English source, the Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w  in London, 
September 1835, what Ireland looked like even before the great potato 
blight sounded the death-knell of British colonization in Ireland: 
'Whenever the potato crop becomes even in the slightest degree 
deficient, which occurs once every five or six years, the scourge of 
famine and disease is felt in every corner of the country. Those who 
have never travelled in Ireland can form but a very imperfect idea of 
the distress that generally pervades that unhappy country. Often have I 
seen in one miserable nearly unroofed dwelling, with scarcely a window 
remaining, from ten to twelve and in some instances more families pent 
up together with not an article of household furniture save the 
shattered remains of an old table or a solitary chair without a back. As 
for culinary utensils, an iron pot serves the threefold purposes of tea 
kettle, if they are able to buy tea, a pot to boil the potatoes in or 
the stirabout if they have none, and a vessel to wash the scattered 
remains of their garments. These with perhaps a broken cup and saucer 
make up the sum of the whole of their moveable effects.' So this is what 
the so called Allied Nations hold out as the future of the European 
continent. In the centre a German potato yard turned soon into a 
graveyard, and surrounding it an enormous Kurtal [probably Kugel = 
sphere] under the sway of Moscow, from Lisbon to Istanbul and from 
Narvik to Sicily. 54
As the Irland-Redaktion put out its final programmes, the Second World 
War in Europe was entering its closing days. On 23 April Heinrich Himmler, 
then head of the Volkssturm or People's Army, made a surrender offer to the 
Western Allies. This infuriated Hitler who, from his bunker in Berlin, 
immediately ordered Himmler's arrest. The fighting continued with U.S. and 
Soviet forces meeting near Torgau on 25 April and effectively dividing 
Germany in two. On 28 April the Italian dictator Mussolini was executed by 
partisans, and on 30 April Hitler committed suicide along with his mistress 
Eva Braun in the Fiihrer' s bunker in Berlin. The two had been married in a 
brief ceremony beforehand. 55 Later the same day, G2 monitors in Dublin 
noted something amiss with the evening' s  -broadcasts from Germany. On both 
the 8.45 p.m. and 9.45 p.m. bulletins the monitors noted: 'Broadcast still
announced as coming from Bremen. Usual announcer not on tonight,
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announcer's voice not familiar. ' 56 On 1 May 1945 Goebbels committed suicide 
in Berlin. The regular programme from Germany to Ireland was not 
transmitted on that date but monitors in Dublin noted that 'at 8.45 p.m. 
instead of the usual broadcast to Ireland, the announcer, speaking in 
English, asked listeners to stand by for a special announcement. At 9.45
c np.m. it was announced in German that Hitler had died'.
On 2 May 1945, as the Red Army completed the capture of Berlin and 
German forces surrendered in Italy, Hans Hartmann took the microphone in 
Apen for the last time. G2 monitors heard him read a news bulletin in Irish 
which lasted ten minutes, from 8.45 p.m. to 8.55 p.m. Hartmann's 
contribution was followed by a song entitled 'Come back to Erin'. After 
that came extracts from the German war communiqué. The monitor's transcript 
report read: 'Speaker announced at end of 8.45 p.m. broadcast that this was
the only transmission tonight to Ireland. They would be back on the air at
5 88.4 5 p.m. tomorrow.'
At Bremers Hotel in Apen, Erich Hetzler - then still in charge of what
remained of German Radio's European services - was busy organizing bogus
Dutch identity cards for his foreign staff and 'advised everyone to
disperse and do the best they could for themselves'. With American troops
already in the area, Hetzler 'made a bonfire in the hotel yard of all the
5 Qdiscs, tapes, scripts and paper' and then made his escape by bicycle.
Hans Hartmann was also on his way, heading for the nearby town of 
Westerstede where he had some relations. He recalls: 'The last thing I
heard, when the radio service closed down, was that de Valera declared that 
he was sorry that Hitler was dead, and he conveyed his condolences. That 
was the last thing I heard from Ireland and from de Valera in the war. ' 60
As night fell on McKee Barracks in Dublin on 3 May 1945, Army monitors 
began tuning into the normal wavelength for Germany's Irish programmes. But 
that night there was no one at the microphone in Apen. The monitor's 
transcription sheet read simply: 'German broadcasts, 3 May 1945. 8.45 p.m.
Not heard. 9.45 p.m. Not heard. ' 61
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Chapter 12 
Berlin's Irish Audience
The size of German Radio's Irish audience during the Second World War, 
and in particular the audience for its Irish service programmes, is 
difficult to estimate as no precise figures are available for the period. 
Radio Eireann did not begin official audience research until 1953, though 
In 1939 Radio Eireann's Director, Thomas Kiernan, made the first attempt at 
some listener research but a questionnaire sent to 2,575 householders only 
drew an 11 per cent response. 1 In the late 1930s 'many Irish people saw 
little reason to purchase a licence in order to enjoy the new benefits of 
radio ownership, for in 1938 the Post Office in a drive against pirates 
found 25,000 such. There were probably many more ' . 2 Nevertheless, the 
number of radio licences held in the 26 Counties provides some indication 
of the overall potential listening strength. At the end of 193 9 there were 
166,275 radio licences, or 1 in 17 of the population. Some 40 per cent of 
these were issued in the Dublin area, while Connacht and Donegal 'were only 
sparsely sprinkled with radio sets, if the licence figures were to be 
believed' . 3
Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, who lived in Connemara for two years at 
Cois Farraige, west of Spiddal, from September 193 9, told the author:
It was difficult to hear the Irish talks [of German Radio] because there
were practically no radios. People in the Gaeltacht were desperately
poor and could not afford to buy radio sets. You would have to be a
parish priest or a teacher to afford one. I remember women walking
barefoot along the road, and the parish priest saying women should not
come to Mass barefoot, but they could not buy shoes. People would gather
outside the window of the local post office, trying to listen to one of
the few radios in the locality. I heard Mühlhausen, I knew the thing was 
4going on.
Radio Eireann's annual report for 1941 - the year German Radio launched 
its nightly Irish service - revealed that there were 183,303 current radio 
licences, a rise of 2.1 per cent on 1940. The report put the statistics in 
their historical context, noting that:
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radio licences had increased abnormally from 193 3 when there were only 
45,008, due partly to the popularising of the superheterodyne receiver. 
But new licences were only two per cent up in 1941, due partly to the 
difficulty in getting batteries...
According to the figures for 1941, one in nine people in Dublin had a 
radio licence, but the ratio fell to only 1:12 in Waterford, 1:15 in 
Limerick and 1:16 in Cork. In the Gaeltacht regions, where Mühlhausen and 
Hartmann could expect to have some following, there were even fewer 
licenced radios. The figures show a 1:26 ratio for County Donegal, 1:30 for 
Galway and 1:32 for Kerry. In fact, the 1941 radio licence total of 183,303 
was a peak which fell off for the remainder of the Emergency when batteries 
were unobtainable, and that figure was not reached again until 1947.5
In 1939 Radio Eireann was 'completely ignored by a proportion of the 
population which, either from political sympathy or from sheer snobbery, 
listened only to the BBC ' . 6 But Irish listeners were not only tuning their 
sets to Radio Eireann and the BBC. William Joyce was a big attraction too. 
Fisk notes that 'Irish listeners who tuned into Germany generally recall 
only Joyce's thin and drawling voice on the English service', adding that 
Joyce was popular with Catholics in Belfast who regularly listened to him 
'on the radio, and sometimes turned up their receivers when RUC patrols 
passed their homes' . 7 The government of Northern Ireland did not share this 
enthusiasm for Joyce, and the Prime Minister Lord Craigavon:
was concerned about the effects on working men of the Haw Haw broadcasts 
and stressed that any counter attack should emanate from Downing Street. 
Such a reply would carry much greater weight than any personal views by 
an individual. These broadcasts should be supplemented by speakers 
recruited from the ranks of the labouring classes such as young farmers,
qshipyard workers, etc.
In April 1940, L i f e  magazine reported that 50 per cent of all English 
radio listeners were tuned to Lord Haw Haw. However, Joyce's biographer,
J .A . Cole, noted that BBC calculations for the same period gave Joyce only 
15.7 per cent of the English audience. According to Cole, the Galwayman had 
a similar following in neutral Ireland:
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Interest spread beyond the United Kingdom. No listener research was 
undertaken in Southern Ireland, but it would be a reasonable guess that 
the proportion of listeners was not less than that on the other side of 
the Irish Sea. Those Irish who enjoyed the anti-British jibes for a 
time, until England stood in acute danger and the Germans had once more
demonstrated their lack of respect for the rights of small nations, were
_ _ 9unaware of Joyce's views on Irish independence.
In the 1930s Joyce had been a leading member of Sir Oswald Mosley's 
British Union of Fascists. Cole notes that in Galway in 1920, the Joyce 
family welcomed the arrival of the Black and Tans and the RIC Auxiliaries, 
and William Joyce himself - then only 14 years of age - acted as an 
informer for the British. 10 One person who had no illusions about Joyce's 
views on Irish independence was Hans Hartmann who had spent two and a half 
years in Ireland and had a good grasp of local politics and history. As far 
as Ireland was concerned Joyce was anti-republican and anti-nationalist. 
This would explain Hartmann's swift rejection of Joyce's offer to 
contribute talks to the Irish service. 11
But what of individual listeners' reactions to the Irland-Redaktion's 
programmes? Eimear 0 Broin - whose father Leon briefly shared a holiday 
cottage with Ludwig Muhlhausen in Co Donegal in 1937 - regularly listened 
to German Radio as a teenager in Dublin throughout the Emergency. He 
believes the Irish-language broadcasts were 'just a matter of German 
thoroughness. It was probably very wasteful because very few people, even 
in this country, listened to them in Irish. We listened to them more as a 
matter of curiosity'. 0 Broin says the audience was 'not a very regular 
one. Maybe more people here spoke Irish then than they do now, it's hard to 
know. We weren't listening to them as devoted Nazis or anything of that 
kind, far from it'. 0 Broin adds:
People who spoke Irish mentioned those particular programmes. We had 
friends from the Gaeltacht, the O'Brien family from Connemara. They 
heard these broadcasts. My father would have known people in the 
Folklore Commission. I remember him talking to the former Director, 
Professor Delargy, who knew a lot about this. He knew Muhlhausen. He 
would have been listening in to see what they were up to. It wasn't very
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subtle or very well prepared propaganda really, it was more a projection
of the presence of Germany into Irish-speaking Ireland. Most people here
12listened to Joyce and the other English speakers on German Radio.
Hans Hartmann told the author that he personally had never received any 
reaction from people in Ireland to his broadcasts, adding: 'but the German
Ambassador [to Ireland, Eduard Hempel] reported to the Foreign Office 
several times and I was told there was a fair number of listeners'.
Francis Stuart got the opposite impression of the Irish service's audience 
when he eventually returned home to Ireland in the late 1950s. According to 
Fisk, the details of Stuart's broadcasts were 'not only forgotten but 
almost unknown' . 14 Stuart told this author that 'the signal was feeble and 
difficult to hear in Ireland' . 15 Elizabeth Clissmann's impression is that 
Hartmann had a very big audience for his Irish talks:
From what I heard after the war I think he had a very big audience in
the Gaeltacht areas. I have never actually seen an analysis of what he
said all during that period but I should imagine that he had the
opportunity to be a little bit freer than somebody that was speaking in 
a language that would have been better known to the authorities. 16
When ex-BBC monitor Maurice Irvine was asked by this author if there was 
any evidence the German broadcasts had been widely listened to or had any 
effect in Ireland, he replied:
I never saw any investigation of that at all. In fact, presumably the 
broadcasts were going on while I was still living in Dublin in 1941 and 
the first half of 1942, but I don't remember ever hearing anybody 
mention them or discuss them at all. So I don't think they had any very 
wide impact.
Irvine returned to Belfast in the summer of 1944 and can't remember 
anyone there ever saying anything about the German propaganda broadcasts to 
Ireland. He told the author:
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On the whole I don't think people either North or South were aware of it 
[the Irland-Redaktion] very much. If they were, they didn't pay a lot of 
attention to it. People in general did sometimes mention Lord Haw Haw.
He was a very pervasive influence throughout the whole of the British 
Isles. Probably more people in the South of Ireland were aware of his 
broadcasts than they were of the broadcasts specifically directed to 
Ireland. Whatever feelings one might have had about him, he was a very 
memorable character. His delivery and his somewhat bitter attitudes did 
bring him notoriety.
After listening to Germany's Irish output for 18 months at the BBC, 
Irvine felt Hans Hartmann's broadcast material:
was quite clever and probably did gauge possible reactions of support 
among people who were strongly influenced both by the Irish nationalist, 
and traditional Catholic social, teachings. It was quite cleverly 
slanted to that effect. As far as I personally was concerned, I wasn't 
fanatically pro-British. I tended to be more pro-British than pro- 
German, but Irish people on the whole at that time were fairly genuinely 
neutral in their feelings. They had no very strong commitment to either 
side. I think the propaganda, if it had been at all widely listened to, 
would have tended to ensure that Irish sympathies did not veer too much 
to the Allied cause.
Irvine also felt that German Radio's Flashback series served a purpose 
from the German viewpoint:
It was about Black and Tan atrocities and so on. They put in something 
like that most days if they could find a suitable event to commemorate. 
With the extreme Irish nationalists it could have been moderately 
effective. It tended to link up the misdeeds of the British in the past 
with their current activities, and to alienate any sympathy which there
i  7might have been for the British cause in Ireland.
Alf Mac Lochlainn remembers hearing the Flashback broadcasts and Dr 
Hartmann's Irish talks which he considered 'conventional propaganda' . 18
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Another listener was Gearóid Mac Eoin, now Professor of Old and Middle 
Irish at University College Galway. He told the author:
I remember during the early years of the war hearing broadcasts from 
Germany directed to Ireland in Irish and in English. I was very young 
then and I cannot remember anything of what was said except the 'Twenty
-1 QYears Ago Today' slot in English.
Also listening in the Gaeltacht were UCG students Tomás de Bháldraithe 
and Seán Mac Réamoinn. The latter recalls hearing:
broadcasts in Irish by Mühlhausen while I was a student at University 
College Galway in 1939. During a student rag week I did a skit on the
professor sending him up and calling him Doctor Fullhausen. But Lord Haw
2 0Haw was listened to with greater interest locally as a Galway man.
De Bháldraithe adds that he met Hans Hartmann:
on a train going to Galway before the war, he was going to Carna to 
study folklore. In those days you were not encouraged to speak to your 
academic superiors. [After the war] I never mentioned them [the 
propaganda broadcasts] to him. I thought he would not want to talk about 
them. 21
In the 1960s, when de Bhaldraithe was Professor of Irish at UCD, he 
collaborated with Hartmann who came to record hundreds of hours of local 
Irish dialects in Gaeltacht areas along the West coast. Hartmann was then 
Professor of Celtic Philology at the University of Hamburg where his 
collection of taped Irish speech is kept, and is recognised as one of the 
most important archives of Irish language material in the world.
Another occasional listener to German Radio's Irish talks was the author 
Padraig 0 Siochfhradha whose translation of Wolfe Tone's diaries was used 
on air by Hartmann, though 0 Siochfhradha himself was unaware of this fact. 
0 Siochfhradha's son told the author that his father 'considered these
wartime broadcasts in Irish to be just exactly what they were, i.e. German
2  2propaganda'.
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Seän Q Lüing remembers hearing one of the first Mühlhausen broadcasts at 
the end of 193 9 while in the Kerry Gaeltacht:
I was in the house of a neighbour, Pädraig Bülaeir of Gortmore,
Ballyferriter. This was a social centre for young people of the parish 
who held card sessions there. The radio was turned on in anticipation 
and the young people, all locals who would enjoy the English language 
broadcasts of Lord Haw Haw, expected something in style. We were all 
disappointed. Mühlhausen was anything but an effective speaker. He was 
laborious, ineffective, with slow and poor delivery of words, giving out 
official German propaganda. He was dreary. After a few minutes, interest 
vanished and someone said "Sea, roinn amach na cartai" [right, deal out 
the cards] . 23
One small group of radio listeners in Ireland during the Emergency could 
perhaps not be classed as being in the mainstream; these were the German 
internees in Custume Barracks, Athlone. Some of them had been sent to 
Ireland as spies for the Third Reich including Günther Schütz - parachuted 
into Co Wexford on 12 March 1941 - who told the author:
We listened to all the news programmes in English from German stations. 
Every Friday night there was a transmission based on a newspaper edited 
by Dr Goebbels including his leading article. That was the event on 
Friday nights. We switched on William Joyce, Lord Haw Haw, and I think 
that was one of the most delightful transmissions to listen to. He was 
witty and, in German we would say, geistreich [clever], sharp, 
intelligent and sophisticated. A brilliant mind, Lord Haw Haw. I despise 
still what the British did to Lord Haw Haw, they executed him, they 
hanged him, and it is something despicable that they could have done 
that to a brilliant man like Haw Haw. He was an Irishman but they 
maintained that he was a British subject and therefore a traitor. We 
listened to the BBC and Radio Eireann too, mainly the news, nothing 
else.
When Schütz tuned into the BBC a fellow detainee, Hermann Goertz, 
threatened to report him back in Germany where, Goertz told Schütz, he
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would face the death penalty. Schütz refused to go into detail about the 
incident telling the author that 'one should not speak ill of the dead'. 
However, without naming Goertz, Schütz said of him:
We had one fanatic in the camp. He was such a fanatic that he committed 
suicide when the war was lost. X can't say much good about that 
gentleman. We were antagonists. We disliked each other because whatever 
he tried to do he failed, and most of the things I tried I succeeded in. 
He threatened that he would see to it that we would be brought before a 
court in Germany when we would all return home. Some of us couldn't care 
less, we just ridiculed him. 24
Despite the uncertainty over audience figures it appears that both 
Mühlhausen and Hartmann had a steady following in the Donegal Gaeltacht. 
This may have been because both men stayed in Donegal while studying the 
local dialects; Mühlhausen in Teelin from August to October 1937, Hartmann 
in Bunbeg from mid-January to mid-February 1939, and in Teelin in April the
9 r  ,same year. Local man, Seän 0 Heochaidh, knew the Germans well having met
them both in Donegal at that time. 0 Heochaidh, who also worked with 
Hartmann after the war recording dialects in North West Donegal, told the 
author that Mühlhausen and Hartmann 'were really good Irish speakers and I
9 gassure you that they had a great audience in these Gaeltacht areas'.
One element which put German Radio's Irish service at a distinct
disadvantage to the English service when it came to attracting Irish
listeners was the more restricted broadcasting time it was allocated.
Beginning with a series of weekly talks in Irish every Sunday night by
Ludwig Mühlhausen in late 1939, the nightly bi-lingual (English and Irish)
service did not get under way until 1941 with test transmissions beginning
at the end of August that year. Under the direction of Dr Hans Hartmann,
from December 1941, the service developed from 30 minutes a night to 45
minutes of programming per night. From 21 January 1943, an extra 15 minutes
2 7was added bringing the time devoted to Ireland up to one hour. This, 
however, was still quite small compared to the 15 hours a day devoted to 
English-language programmes from Germany to Britain. In fact, the hourly 
Irish ration was dwarfed by the total of 204 hours of programmes broadcast
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daily in 1943-44 by German Radio's European services in no less than 29 
2 8languages.
Secrets of the Airwaves
One aspect of Germany's wartime broadcasts to Ireland must remain in the 
realm of conjecture due to the lack of any firm evidence; it is, whether or 
not the Irland-Redaktion's programmes were used to transmit coded messages. 
At the BBC, Maurice Irvine listened daily to the Irland-Redaktion's output 
from mid-1943 to mid-1944. When asked if he thought it would have been 
possible for the Germans to hide secret or otherwise coded messages in 
their broadcasts to Ireland, he replied:
It is a difficult question to answer. I suppose it would, theoretically,
have been possible but it never occurred to me to think about that or to
speculate about it at all. It certainly wasn't as overt as, say, some of
the British broadcasts to France which sent messages like, 'The black
goat has eaten the red roses', this sort of thing, which meant something
to the people in the French maquis [underground resistance] that they
were to go to a certain place to pick up arms or expect a landing of
some other agents. But I don't think even Enno Stephan's book S p i e s  i n
I r e l a n d  suggested that secret communications were made through
2 9propaganda broadcasts.
Stephan's 1961 book refers to secret radio codes for use in establishing 
contact between Germany and clandestine radio sets (with the capacity to 
both transmit and receive messages) held by the IRA and German agents in 
Ireland. The existence of such secret transceivers would seem to have 
obviated the need for coded messages via German Radio's programmes to 
Ireland. 30 In addition to the secret radio sets, the German legation in 
Dublin's Northumberland Road had a legally held transceiver which was 
eventually surrendered to the authorities, at the latter's request, in 
December 1943. 31
In an interview with this author, Dr Hans Hartmann was adamant that his
3 9 —radio service had never been used to carry secret messages. In Dublin, 
however, G2 was suspicious of unconnected phrases slipping into certain 
broadcasts to Ireland. One Army monitor reported that: 'Some unusual
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broadcasts have been made to Ireland since 30 January 1943, quite 
irrelevant from a propaganda point of view. In one, on 14 February, a 
monologue by a man called Jerry, with little or no point whatever, was
introduced by the announcer with the words "And you my dear listeners for
one moment, this moment, you have made me so happy", apropos of nothing 
that came before or after. Another broadcast on 24 February 1943, was a 
comedy sketch entitled "The Lady Interviewer" in which the following 
passage occurred':
Maid: I have a young man.
Lady: What is the name of this prince?
Maid: Jobson.
Lady: Not one of the Jobsons of North Dublin?
Maid: No, he comes from Arlen way.
Lady: Do you read much?
Maid: Not much. Mostly the I r i s h  I n d e p e n d e n t and T i t  B i t s .
The monitor noted that 'this passage was, apparently, completely out of 
tune with the rest of the script'. G2 officers did not, however, take the 
trouble to check that day's I r i s h  I n d e p e n d e n t which carried an unusual 
advertisement for the Red Bank restaurant in Dublin - a favourite haunt of 
the small German colony. 33
In November 1942 MI5 informed the Stormont government that since the war 
began:
There have been very few occasions on which items of news incorporated
in the German broadcasts [concerning Ireland] could not be traced to
normal channels of information, e.g. press agents, newspapers, wireless,
etc. There has been no occasion on which information has been included
in the German broadcasts when it was possible to establish the source as 
34an enemy agent.
Dr Richard Hayes was drafted into G2 as their top code breaker for the 
duration of the Emergency. Alf MacLochlainn, who worked with Hayes at the 
National Library after the war, told the author:
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Hayes spoke to me often enough of his counter-intelligence work during 
the war, but never mentioned any monitoring of German broadcasts to 
Ireland...It would strike me as very odd indeed for the German 
intelligence services to use propaganda broadcasts to Ireland as a 
vehicle for secret messages to agents in Ireland. It would have been so 
obvious, and something the Irish authorities would have been sure to 
monitor anyway for diplomatic and political reasons. There were lots of 
other German broadcasts freely heard here, including their domestic 
[German language] news bulletins. Secret messages to agents in Ireland, 
if there were such, could have been much more discreetly embedded in 
that kind of thing. 35
The author of another study of German espionage in Ireland, Carolle J.
Carter, comments that: 'As far as codes in radio programmes were concerned,
what I wrote was as far as I got. In other words there were references
and/or hints but nothing more. , 36
The Abwehr agent Gunther Schütz sounded a dissenting note, however. When
asked if he thought that messages may have been sent in code by German
Radio, he replied: 'Yes, that is very likely but I didn't have any [such]
3 7arrangements with my army intelligence section.'
A wartime BBC monitor, Lorna Swire, says it was her impression 'that the 
Germans were trying to create a fifth column' of people sympathetic to Nazi
o aaims with the broadcasts beamed to Ireland. This view was shared by the 
Garda Siochäna's Special Branch which investigated those named in the 
German broadcasts, as Sean 0 Heochaidh recalls:
Mühlhausen sent me a special greeting over the air which got me into a 
spot of trouble. The authorities were wondering what my connection with 
this gentleman was. Of course, until the matter was explained to the 
department in question by the late Professor Delargy [then head of the 
Folklore Commission, and a friend of Mühlhausen's] they took it for
*3 Qgranted that I was a fifth columnist.
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The Monitoring Services
As the war of words gathered pace from the outbreak of World War II in 
September 1939, belligerents and neutrals alike took steps to listen to 
each other's propaganda. Most countries had official listening posts as 
well as broadcasting services, with the former sometimes acting to supply 
the latter with propaganda material. In neutral Ireland the Army was 
charged with monitoring foreign broadcasts, while in Britain that job was 
undertaken by the BBC monitoring service. In Germany, monitoring was 
carried out at the Seehaus in Berlin.
N e u t r a l  I r e l a n d :  t h e  A r m y ' s  m o n i t o r i n g  r o l e
In Ireland, responsibility for monitoring foreign wireless broadcasts at 
the outbreak of war lay with the Army's intercept branch which came under 
the control of G2. The intercept branch was headed up by Commandant Sean 
Neligan who reported to G2's chief Colonel Liam Archer and, from June 1941, 
to his successor Colonel Dan Bryan. G2 supplied transcripts of material, 
which was judged to be of interest, to the following: Minister for Defence 
(Oscar Traynor), Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures (Frank 
Aiken), Army Chief of Staff (Major-General Michael Brennan to January 1940 
when replaced by Lieutenant General Dan McKenna), Assistant Chief of Staff 
(Major-General Hugo MacNeill from August 1940 to June 1941 when replaced by 
Colonel Liam Archer), Secretary of Department of External Affairs (Joe 
Walshe) . 40
Neligan and his team of monitors, who included personnel with foreign 
language abilities, were required not only to scan the airwaves but also to 
coordinate wireless intercept reports from both Army and civilian sources 
sent to Army headquarters from around the country. Some of these sounded 
more like the result of practical jokes than genuine monitoring reports, 
such as an obscure transmission picked up by G2's Command HQ at the Curragh 
in Co Kildare on 4 October 1941, on 3 00 metres at 8.15pm, as follows: 
'Calling 175, calling 175. Villages appear innocent until little white men 
appear. End of message. ' 41
Army monitors also scanned morse code transmissions and in the early 
hours of 11 January 1942 stumbled on a confidential U.S. State Department 
message lasting two hours and containing details of low to medium level
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American diplomatic postings to various parts of the globe. Eight days 
after the transmission, Dan Bryan notified Joe Walshe that 'the only 
appointment in Ireland was John C. Fuess, now serving Department, assigned 
vice-consul Belfast' . 42
Of the thousands of foreign broadcasts monitored and filed by the Irish 
Army from 1939 to 1945, the vast majority came from the Irland-Redaktion. 
However, transcripts of Irish language broadcasts by Ludwig Miihlhausen and 
Hans Hartmann are few and far between. This is in stark contrast to the 
wealth of material from these two speakers translated and transcribed by 
the BBC, which employed three Gaelic monitors at the behest of MI5.
Despite the menace of global war there were moments of light relief at 
McKee Barracks in Dublin. On 31 March 1942 at 7.15 p.m. monitors logged the 
following from Berlin: 'Economic warfare had been the traditional weapon of
England throughout history. Peoples who she could not subdue through force 
of arms, she tried to subdue by systematic starvation. She was nearly 
successful in Ireland in 1921, she was not nearly as successful against G. 
Boothy in 1941.' A quick-thinking monitor later scored out Mr Boothy's name 
and substituted the African city of Jibouti. 43
Irish monitors were not alone in making such errors in difficult 
circumstances. BBC wartime monitor Vladimir Rubinstein notes the following 
gaffe: 'A Y-Unit monitor was watching Deutschlandsender, when a speaker
declaimed: "Vom Eise befreit sind Strom und Baeche...", a famous passage
from Goethe's F a u s t . The monitor in question promptly typed: "Weather
report: The Reich is free of ice". Ernst Gombrich - by then a supervisor - 
chanced to be listening in with the monitor. When he saw the typed-out 
flash message, he angrily tore the paper out of the machine and gave vent 
to his outraged feelings. The monitor, quite unabashed, retorted calmly:
"We cannot all be as clever as you are, Herr Doktor" . ' 44
Rubinstein outlines the magnitude of the task facing monitors:
'Accuracy, which many of us came to idolise, had two great enemies: the 
need for speed and poor reception conditions. There was little one could do 
about the former. Some of the information intercepted during the war was of 
urgent interest and often minutes counted. Whenever possible we would check 
doubtful words or passages, but there were always occasions when a few 
additional minutes would have been more than welcome to monitors searching 
for perfection. As to poor reception conditions our engineers never gave up
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their struggle to improve interception techniques. Advances were made 
during the years, but the problems facing them as the military situation 
changed were formidable. Transmitters altered frequencies without previous 
announcements, reduced power, went off the air owing to enemy action, and 
were subjected to jamming or other interference. General noise levels and 
poor diction could also be problems, taxing monitors' ears to the utmost, 
but the quest for accuracy was never abandoned. ' 45
In Dublin, Army monitors had to abandon many broadcasts and wrote the 
words 'hopelessly noisy' on transcription sheets. In Berlin, radio 
engineers attempted to ensure that aerial bombardments did not halt 
transmissions, as Francis Stuart recalls: 'We had rubber masks or mouth­
pieces. You weren't speaking directly into a microphone, you were speaking 
directly into this rubber thing, like when you are under anaesthetic, so 
that the noise of bombs is presumably excluded. But I think the vibration 
still interfered with the acoustics. ' 46 when Stuart announced in one 
broadcast that he had seen U.S. prisoners of war in transit at a Berlin 
railway station, his comments were heavily circled in red ink by G2 staff. 
While there is no evidence that such information found its way to either 
British or American Intelligence, the close links between G2 and MI5 would 
suggest that it did. 47
Sean Neligan's team included Captain John Smyth, Captain Ryan and John 
P. O'Sullivan from Chapelizod in Dublin who specialised in listening to 
German radio transmissions. The monitoring team was supported by two female 
stenographers who took shorthand notes of the broadcasts before typing them 
up . 48 The intercept branch was complemented by the Army's Director of 
Signals, Major M.F. Gantly, who supplied G2 with regular intercept logs 
including foreign stations' call signs, names and transmitter locations.
Gantly's team was also responsible for checking wavelengths for illegal
4 9stations operating within the State.
S e c o n d  L i e u t e n a n t  J o s e p h  G. H e a l y
While most G2 staff had no idea who was putting out the Sunday night 
Irish talks from Berlin, one Army officer had inside information. He was 
Second Lieutenant Joseph G. Healy who had been seconded as a linguistic 
expert to the Army's Reserve Officer Corps from University College Cork in 
1939.50 Before the war Healy had developed a close working relationship
244
with the Irland-Redaktion's first speaker, Ludwig Mühlhausen, whom he had 
first met in Hamburg in the late 1920s. Healy was born in Cobh in 1905, the 
son of a local builder. His gift for foreign languages stemmed from his 
Italian mother who was also a noted linguist. Healy spoke Spanish, 
Portuguese, French, German, Italian and Irish, as well as being an expert 
in medieval Latin literature. Graduating from UCC in 1926, he won a 
scholarship which took him to Hamburg to study German as well as Celtic 
philology from 1927 to 1929. Staying with the Mühlhausen family, he became 
a close friend of the German professor who was then lecturing in Celtic 
Studies at Hamburg University. Mühlhausen became Professor of Celtic 
Studies at Hamburg in 1928, and regularly stayed with Healy's family in 
Cobh on his summer visits to Cork, and Kerry where he studied Irish on the 
Blaskets. 51
In the 1930s, Healy and Mühlhausen went their separate ways. The UCC man 
went to study in Spain and Portugal and, in 1936, carried out extensive 
research into Irish-Spanish historical links at the Simancas archives.
Healy took his Ph.D. in Hispanic Studies at Cork in 1936 and was appointed 
as lecturer in Spanish at UCC the same year. Meanwhile, the rise of Hitler 
boosted Mühlhausen's career, assuring the Nazi academic's promotion to a 
professorship at Berlin University in 1937. By July 1937, Mühlhausen was 
settling into his new job as Professsor of Celtic Studies at Berlin and 
wrote, in German, to Healy telling him he would be studying Irish during a 
two month visit to Teelin in South West Donegal from August to October that 
year, adding: 'I am trying, at a distance, to get some way down the road
towards feeling at home with Donegal Irish, and that really is not easy. ' 53
According to a two-page report Healy drew up for Dan Bryan in December 
1939, Mühlhausen had been identified with the German National People's 
Party as well as the Steel Helmet organisation and later the Nazi party. 
Healy's profile - which did not mention his own links with Mühlhausen - 
described the German as an 'enthusiastic Nazi who has corresponded with and 
visited Dr [Adolf] Mahr, Miss Cunningham (Trinity Hall), Dr [James]
Delargy, Prof. MacNeill, Seamus Kavanagh (UCC) etc., and has at present 
living with him one Jimmy O'Toole employed at Siemens Schuckert, Berlin' . 54 
Despite their close academic contacts in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
there is no evidence that Healy was ever attracted to the German's fascist 
beliefs. Indeed, the detailed nature of the report on Mühlhausen that Healy
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wrote for G2 would indicate the contrary position. Healy interrogated most 
of the German spies sent to Ireland during the war, and on one occasion he 
is said to have posed as a uniformed Luftwaffe officer in order to extract 
mission details from the imprisoned crew of a crashed German plane. 55
B r i t a i n :  t h e  BBC t a k e s  c h a r g e
The BBC's monitoring service was created in 1938 but the advent of war 
with Germany in September 1939 led to a fresh wave of recruitment of new 
monitors, many of them refugees from Hitler's Nazi regime. 56 Wartime 
monitor Lorna Swire told the author that 'two weeks before the war started, 
the BBC chartered a London bus after grabbing all the language experts it 
could lay its hands on and sent it to Evesham and they got to work. The BBC 
service was the mother of all monitoring and tutored the American system.
crThose who travelled on the bus were known as the Mayflowers'. The
monitoring unit was based at Wood Norton Hall, near Evesham in 
5 8Worcestershire.
Amongst those recruited by the fledgling BBC monitoring unit was the 
Estonian-born Vladimir Rubinstein who, as a Jewish immigrant in Berlin, 
witnessed the Nazi takeover in 1933 before fleeing to Palestine. In August 
1940 he joined the BBC where his linguistic abilities, particularly his
egmastery of Russian, were highly valued.
From the start, the BBC monitoring service had its work cut out to cope 
with the wave of foreign language broadcasts emanating from Britain's 
wartime adversaries and elsewhere. On the eve of the Second World War 
German Radio's foreign services were broadcasting in 36 languages compared 
to the BBC's ten. By the end of 1943, the Germans were broadcasting in 52 
languages, including Irish, compared to the BBC's total of 45 . 60
The BBC successively engaged three Gaelic monitors at Evesham and 
Caversham, from July 1940 to July 1944, to record the Irish language talks 
from Berlin. The first such monitor was Scottish, the remaining two were 
from Belfast. Lorna Swire recalls that initial attempts to monitor the 
Irish talks at Evesham were unsuccessful: 'The BBC managed to get a very
shy girl from the South of Ireland,- no easy job in those days to import 
anybody. She was introduced to monitoring and someone held her hand for the 
first few days. Then she was left to do Hans Hartmann by herself, whereat 
she promptly fainted! After about another week, she said she needed a
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holiday so the BBC let her go back to Eire and she never returned. 1 No 
one now remembers the identity of the 'shy girl from the South of Ireland'. 
Vladimir Rubinstein told the author that 'one of the English monitors, Joan 
Lyneham, may have listened to broadcasts in Gaelic as well as monitoring 
English-language broadcasts' before the appointment of a full-time Gaelic
monitor. Another wartime BBC employee recalls that Joan Lyneham 'was very
6 2patriotically Irish'.
In her time at the listening service Lorna Swire saw 'quite a few 
phantom figures' pass through: 'The first male English monitor we had was a
man called Blackwell. He put up with a morning's monitoring, went to rest 
on a sofa and departed the same night! There were quite a few like him . ' 63 
She also recalls another monitor's brush with a gang of Irish workers in 
Liverpool: 'A German language monitor, Max Benedict, came to the BBC as a
17-year-old refugee. His mother had smuggled him out of Czechoslovakia via 
Austria and had a pathetic faith he'd be okay in Britain because she had 
been kept alive by British milk supplied by the Red Cross after World War 
I. He got here with scarcely a penny and his first stop was at a doss-house 
in Liverpool which was full of Irishmen. On hearing where he was from, his 
doss-house mates chorused "Ah, Herr Hitler, he's a grand man", thereby 
filling Max with alarm and despondency. He thought he'd escaped from the 
frying pan into the fire! ' 64
The B B C 's  T h r e e  G a e l i c  M o n i t o r s
1. A n g u s  M a t h e s o n
The BBC's first full-time Gaelic monitor took up duty on 1 July 1940. He 
was the accomplished Scottish academic, Angus Matheson, who was head of the 
Department of Celtic at Glasgow University, a post he held from 193 8 until 
1962. Matheson was born in 1912. His parents were from the Isle of Lewis 
and he was brought up on the staunchly Protestant island of North Uist in 
the Western Isles. His interests lay in languages and history and, in 1934, 
after graduating from Edinburgh University with first class honours in 
Celtic, he spent a year studying in Dublin followed by a year in Bonn with 
Professor Rudolph Thurneysen. Pursuing a distinguished career at Edingurgh 
and Glasgow, he edited the fifth and sixth volumes of Alexander 
Carmichael's Carmina G a de l i ca . , a compendium of runes, prayers and songs
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collected from oral tradition in the second half of the 19th century. 
According to the current head of Glasgow University's Department of Celtic, 
Professor Derick Thomson - who worked with him from 1949 to 1956 - Matheson 
had a good knowledge of German and would have met German Celtologists like 
Hartmann and Miihlhausen whose talks he later translated for the BBC. 65
Joining the Evesham monitoring unit in the summer of 1940, just two 
weeks after the German Army entered Paris, the Celtic scholar from Scotland 
found himself in the thick of monitoring what Vladimir Rubinstein described 
as 'field days for the Nazi propaganda machine: special announcements 
reporting German military successes and illustrating the disintegration of 
the French Army together with lengthy descriptions of the shameful manner 
in which Germany was treated during the armistice negotiations in 1918'.66 
Rubinstein recalls Matheson as 'a quiet, roundly man with a nice,
6 7mischievous sense of humour. He was popular with his colleagues'.
Original BBC monitoring reports (i.e. full translations before editing) 
of German broadcasts in Irish Gaelic, held by Britain's Imperial War 
Museum, show that through 1940 and 1941 Angus Matheson was monitoring and
_ , £T Otranslating the series of 15-minute talks by Miihlhausen and Hartmann.
Many of the translations of these talks were edited by Cecil Walsh who 
worked with the BBC monitoring unit from 1941 to 1947. For a brief period 
in September 1941, Matheson's work was undertaken by a stand-in monitor
C Qnamed McDonagh.
In early 1942 Matheson was joined at the BBC by a Belfast woman, Jane 
Charleton. Their work overlapped in February that year so the newcomer 
could get used to the routine. Charleton began monitoring the Gaelic
broadcasts from Germany on her own once Matheson had left the BBC - to
7 0undertake special military service - on 12 March 1942. u A profile of 
Matheson, published in 1968, noted that 'during the later stages of the war 
he was on army service with the Intelligence Corps. Because of his 
knowledge of German much of his work was concerned with the decipherment of 
enemy signals in code. He saw service in France and Belgium following the 
invasion of Europe in 1944, and the end of the war found him on his way to 
India' . 71
After the war Matheson did not discuss his monitoring work in detail.
His colleague for seven years, Professor Thomson, recalls that 'he referred 
to it in general terms'. Peacetime saw a resumption of Angus Matheson's
249
distinguished academic career. He was the first holder of the Chair of 
Celtic at Glasgow, remaining in that position from 1956 until his death at 
the early age of 50 in 1962.72
2. J a n e  C h a r l e t o n
Born in Belfast in 1916, Jane 1Jeanie' Charleton had always been a keen 
student of the Irish language ever since first learning it at St John's 
primary school on the Falls Road. Charleton was a devout Catholic who had 
grown up in the working class district of Hawthorn Street in West Belfast. 
She studied Irish and French at St Dominic's High School on the Falls and 
supplemented her Irish language studies by taking summer holidays in the 
Donegal Gaeltacht where she and her elder sister Mary (known as Molly) 
stayed at Gillespie's Hotel in Derrybeg. In October 1933 Jane Charleton 
attended Queen's University, Belfast, studying French under Professor 
Douglas Savory, and Irish under Professor M.A. O'Brien. She was awarded a
B .A . degree with first class honours in French and Celtic on 9 July 1937, 
and for a short time after her graduation she worked as a junior lecturer 
in Professor O'Brien's department. It was Charleton's high standard of 
achievement in Irish that gained her a job as Angus Matheson's successor at 
the BBC's wartime monitoring service. 73 On 1 February 1942 Jane Charleton 
began work at Evesham, monitoring and translating a talk by Hans Hartmann. 
The broadcast consisted of Hartmann reading an extract from the Irish 
translation of Wolfe Tone's diaries. She handled all the Irish language 
broadcasts from Berlin from then until January 1943 when she was replaced 
by the BBC's third and final wartime Gaelic monitor, Maurice Irvine. 74 
Irvine told the author that Charleton 'left the BBC abruptly because she 
was homesick for Belfast'. Another acquaintance recalls that Charleton 
found the monitoring work to be 'rather boring'. After the war Jane 
Charleton continued to apply herself to the Irish language and was an 
active member of Belfast's Gaelic Choir. She became a schools inspector 
with the Northern Ireland Department of Education, a job she held from 1947 
until her retirement at the age of 60 in 1976. She died in 1981.75
3. M a u r i c e  I r v i n e
Born in 1918, Maurice Bernard Irvine grew up in a three-storey terrace 
house in North Belfast overlooked by Crumlin Road prison. His father ran a
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business repairing typewriters and other office equipment. Maurice was sent 
to school with the Christian Brothers in Belfast, where he was taught 
Irish, as well as French, by Brother Nagle from Cork. Irvine recalls that 
'the Brothers put a good deal of emphasis on the study of the language'. 
Like Jane Charleton, who was two years his senior, Irvine spent summer 
holidays in the Donegal Gaeltacht at Rann na Feirste where he improved his 
Irish with Father Larry Murray from Dundalk and a Belfast priest called 
Father Bradley.
After passing the Leaving Certificate in 1936, Irvine spent five years 
working with the Department of Local Government and Public Health in 
Dublin. After becoming disillusioned with what he felt was a 'dull and 
unproductive' job in neutral Eire, Irvine was visiting Belfast when he met 
Jane Charleton who had been at school with his sister Maureen. Charleton 
was then on the point of departing from the monitoring service and, armed 
with this information, Irvine secured a translation test with the BBC. He 
told the author: 'They gave me this test in Broadcasting House in Belfast,
which was not very rigorous, just to listen to the news in Irish broadcast 
from Radio Eireann and translate it. It dealt with the main news events of 
the day, and because I was usually interested in current affairs I knew 
more or less what was in it anyway. It wasn't a very searching test at all 
but they were obviously satisfied with it and offered me the job.'
Irvine was 24 years old when he began working at Evesham on 9 January
1943. It was his first experience outside Ireland. Despite passing the
BBC's translation test he had not actively spoken or used Irish much for
the previous six years since leaving St Mary's CBS grammar school in
Belfast. 76 Some of Irvine's wartime BBC colleagues remember him well. Lorna
Swire recalls him as 'a very pleasant young man. He was so tall and slim
that we called him "The Wavelength"'. Vladimir Rubinstein also remembers
the Irishman: 'For a brief period he was billeted in the same house with
me. He was very tall and found his bed far too short. So, he moved a
bookcase to the foot of it, resting his feet on one of the shelves when he 
7 7went to sleep.'
One of the first translations Irvine undertook was a talk in Irish by 
Hans Hartmann on 12 March 1943. The subject was the North African
7 pcampaign. Irvine monitored Hartmann's talks from January 1943 to July
1944. What impression did he get of the German academic turned
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propagandist? 'He struck me as being an average, typical loyal German. He 
did not give the impression of being a fanatical Nazi but going along, as 
most Germans did at the time, with the struggle in which their country was 
engaged. Even if he had any doubts about the validity of the National 
Socialist ideology he did not reveal anything of that. 1 Irvine found 
Hartmann's Irish 'clear, well constructed, correct and with quite a good 
accent. Not from Donegal, probably more Connaught or Munster or a mixture 
of the two'.
During his 18 months with the monitoring service, Maurice Irvine only 
recalls one broadcast by Hartmann causing any excitement among his 
supervisors. 'Quite early in my career there, Hartmann spoke about the 
transfer of part of the [Soviet] Army in Siberia to the Western front which 
he took as an indication of German success in annihilating some of the 
Russian forces in the West. There was no other source for this allegation 
so it caused a certain amount of excitement and one was asked to type it 
out immediately'.
Irvine also monitored other Irland-Redaktion speakers, and remembers
Francis Stuart's weekly talks: 'He struck me then as a person who was
rather preoccupied with his own thoughts and a desire to come to terms with
events of the time. Trying to shelter himself from the impact of the
terrible events that were going on but also lending himself (at the time I
felt in a rather unscrupulous fashion) to being used as a tool of German
propaganda, even though he didn't feel himself to be so. This rather
7 9demeaned his credentials as a writer and artist.'
Irvine was occasionally asked to monitor Vatican Radio broadcasts, and 
adds: 'It was assumed that being Irish I was probably a Catholic and able
to understand the background of what the Vatican was saying. 1 He was never 
asked to monitor Radio Eireann broadcasts although records held by the 
Imperial War Museum show that Radio Eireann's English language output was 
monitored from 7 September 1939 right through the war.
Irvine had only been working at Evesham for a bare three months when, in
April 1943, the entire monitoring centre was moved to Caversham Park near 
Reading in Berkshire where it remains to this day. The staff were never 
told the reason for the move which was prompted by Allied fears that the 
Germans would develop a nuclear bomb thus threatening London and 
necessitating the evacuation of BBC Headquarters' staff from the capital. 81
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According to Irvine, he and his colleagues at Caversham Park sensed the
tide of war turning in favour of the Allies when 'around the summer of 1943
there was a feeling of greater optimism among the British population as a
whole, political groups and the press, that the worst was over as far as
8 2Britain was concerned'.
On 2 5 July 1944 Irvine was invalided out of the BBC with tuberculosis on 
25 July 1944. The high pressure work in cramped conditions and a poor diet 
(e.g. one fresh egg per person per fortnight) had taken its toll on the 
Belfast man who spent some time in hospital in England before being
Q Otransferred home for treatment at White Abbey sanatorium outside Belfast.
Irvine was not replaced by another Gaelic monitor and he suspects that 
by the end of July 1944 - with the D-Day landings successfully completed 
and the establishment of a second front under way - MI5 no longer regarded 
the monitoring of German broadcasts to Ireland as serving any practical 
purpose. His suspicions that MI5 controlled the BBC's monitoring role
appear well-founded according to one study which notes that there was
8 4direct MI5 involvement in checking BBC monitors' wartime reports.
However, wartime monitor Vova Rubinstein told the author: 'I have certainly
— 8 5not come across any MI5 involvement at Evesham or Caversham.'
Home in Northern Ireland in 1946, Maurice Irvine was operated on for a
collapsed lung and his health gradually improved. When his father died two
years later he worked for a time in the family machine repair business
before moving to London as a social worker. From 1958 to 196 0 he taught
English with Berlitz in Germany before returning to London where he
married. Afterwards he moved with his family to Cambridge where he and his
wife taught English to foreign students. Now retired, Maurice Irvine lives
with his wife in Brighton on the south coast of England. He is the author
8 Gof N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d :  F a i t h  and  F a c t i o n , published in 1991.
G erm any: D r H artm ann  a t  t h e  S e e h a u s
While Ireland and Britain listened to Germany during the conflict, the 
Third Reich was listening too. However, according to one study of 
broadcasting in the period, the British made far more use of monitored 
material as a source of news and intelligence than the Germans did. In his 
history of BBC Radio's World Service, Gerard Mansell notes that 'even 
though the German Foreign Ministry carried out a certain amount of
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monitoring, its activities in this field were disapproved of by Goebbels
Q nwho regarded them as treasonable'. As early as 2 September 1939, the Nazi
party's newspaper V ö l k i s c h e r  B e o b a c h t e r 'announced a complete ban on
listening to foreign (and not merely to enemy) broadcasts, infraction of
which could at the maximum incur the death penalty'. As the war continued,
German newspapers reported that 'radio criminals' were fined, imprisoned
8 8and, in some cases, executed.
While monitoring by the Irish Army began in earnest in 193 9, the British
Foreign Office had been monitoring Italian and German broadcasts since the
summer of 1937. Germany, however, did not begin monitoring foreign radio
broadcasts until July 1940 and, as with other services, the German
monitoring service - based at the Seehaus in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee -
was the subject of intense rivalry between the Foreign Office and the
8 9Propaganda Ministry.
Radio Eireann was included on the list of foreign radio services to be 
monitored and the person chosen for the task was Hans Hartmann who 
comments: 'I was asked to listen to Radio Eireann broadcasts at the Seehaus
[monitoring centre] and to translate them from Irish to German. However, 
the reception was frequently bad and I was not always able to accomplish 
the translations.' Radio Eireann's output, when available, proved useful to 
Hartmann in putting together topical programme ideas for the Irland- 
Redaktion. 90
According to one study, 'the Seehaus in late 1941 listened daily to 1.75
million words in 36 languages'. It employed over 500 people and 14% of its
staff were non-German. By comparison 50% of BBC monitors were non- 
91British. Despite reception difficulties Hartmann's task of monitoring 
broadcasts from Ireland was not made easier by the fact that Radio 
Eireann's transmitters went off the air simultaneously during air raids on 
Britain and Northern Ireland. This was to prevent German bombers using them 
for direction finding. The BBC had earlier supplied Radio Eireann with 
drive units so the Dublin, Athlone and Cork transmitters could be 
synchronised as a protection against the Germans using direction finding
beams during night raids. The BBC used the same system on all its
9 ?transmitters from the outbreak of war.
One man who might have been chosen to work at the Seehaus was Ludwig 
Mühlhausen. In the event he was not asked but was instead being groomed for
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S.S. work in France. According to Elizabeth Clissmann, the German linguist
read and censored letters in Irish which were destined for [British Army]
93prisoners of war.
The German monitoring service had a more advanced sound recording system 
than its British and Irish counterparts. Irish monitors were backed up by
shorthand note-takers who produced typed transcripts of broadcasts but
94-there was no sound recording equipment at McKee Barracks in Dublin. BBC 
monitors took their own written notes of broadcasts as well as recording
Q Cthem on wax E d ip h o n e cylinders. Germany's technology was far more 
advanced and trial recordings using magnetic tape had begun as early as 
1932.96 By 1939, RRG studios had tape recording equipment as well as 
portable tape recorders. However, wartime supplies of the relatively new 
magnetic recording tape, used mainly by the German Army and German Radio, 
were badly hit by a fire at the main production plant in Ludwigshafen in 
July 1943.97 No recordings of Irland-Redaktion programmes appear to have 
survived the war.
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Chapter 13 
'Having Backed The Wrong Horse'
The end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945 saw the disbandment of 
German Radio's Irish team. Some of those who had worked for the Irland- 
Redaktion were able to revert to their pre-war occupations. They included 
Francis Stuart who, as we have seen, eventually returned to Ireland to 
resume his work as a writer. On his release from Arbour Hill prison, John 
O'Reilly - the parachutist from Kilkee - bought a pub in Dublin. Among 
those who chose to live in Ireland after the war were Liam Mullally, 
Madeleine Meissner, Charles Budina, Mona Brase, and Helmut and Elizabeth 
Clissmann. Nora 0'Mara remained in Germany where she still lives, and Sonja 
Kowanko returned to her family in Paris. Hilde Spickernagel pursued a 
distinguished post-war teaching career in Germany and was later appointed 
as a secondary school principal.
As we have also seen, Susan Hilton was discovered in a Nazi camp in 
Germany at the end of the war. She was brought back to London to face trial 
for 'assisting the enemy' and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. 
Hilton was the only member of the Irland-Redaktion to face trial and 
imprisonment, although others - like Murphy, Meissner, O'Reilly, Stuart, 
Mahr and Miihlhausen - were interned without trial. 1
Members of the England-Redaktion faced tougher sanctions from the 
authorities in London. Norman Baillie-Stewart was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. John Amery was hanged at Wandsworth prison on 29 December
1945. As well as facing charges arising from his broadcasting work, Amery 
was on trial because he had recruited an SS unit from among British 
prisoners of war. On 3 January 1946, five days after Amery's execution, 
William Joyce, the England-Redaktion's chief announcer, was hanged at 
Wandsworth. One of Joyce's biographers makes the point that while 'it 
seemed necessary that a few should be hanged...with the deaths of Joyce and
Amery, the Labour government felt that it had let enough blood to satisfy
9what the press represented as public anger at wartime treason'.
After the war, those who had been the most committed Nazi party members 
of the Irland-Redaktion - Miihlhausen and Mahr - were broken men who never 
managed to put the pieces back together again. The remainder of this
257
chapter examines the post-war circumstances of Adolf Mahr, Heinz Mecking, 
Ludwig Mühlhausen and Hans Hartmann.
A d o l f  M ahr: The F i n a l  Y e a r s
Adolf Mahr - the man who created the daily Irish service of German Radio 
- was never to return to Ireland despite the fact that he was, technically, 
a senior member of the Irish Civil Service technically on leave of absence 
from his post as Director of the National Museum in Dublin. Shortly after 
the collapse of German Radio's European services at the beginning of May 
1945, Mahr was captured by British troops. According to his son Gustav: 
'Father was interned by the British Military Government, being released in 
late spring [1946] probably for reasons of severe bad health. ' 3
Apart from the fact that he was an internee for a year, two other things 
appear to have blocked Mahr's return to his post at the National Museum.
The first was a very public - and, for the government, embarrassing - row 
in the Däil in December 1945. The second was a damning report on Mahr drawn 
up by G2 for the attention of senior government ministers. The row in the 
Däil erupted on 6 December 1945 when the former deputy-leader of the 
opposition, James Dillon, 4 raised the Mahr issue with the Minister for 
Education, Thomas Derrig. In July 1934 Derrig had secured the approval of 
de Valera's cabinet to promote Mahr to the top museum job. 5 The Däil 
exchange was as follows:
Mr Dillon asked the Minister for Education if he will state for how long 
the Director of the National Museum of Ireland has been absent from his 
position; whether he is the same person as Dr A. Mahr, Keeper of Irish 
Antiquities Division; for how long his absence from duty will be 
excused; and when and by what method a successor will be appointed in 
the event of these positions being declared vacant.
Minister for Education (Mr Derrig): The Director of the National Museum 
has been absent from his position since July 1939. He is the same person 
as Dr A. Mahr, Keeper of the Irish Antiquities Division. I am not in a 
position to make any statement regarding the duration of Dr Mahr's 
absence, and as the positions which he held in the museum have not been
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declared vacant, the question of appointing a successor has not yet been 
considered.
Mr Dillon: Am I to understand that this gentleman returned to Nazi 
Germany in time to take part in the nefarious activities of the Nazis in 
that country and now, having backed the wrong horse, he is sitting there 
waiting to come back and land here as soon as the opportunity offers? 
Does the Minister think that such a person is a suitable person to 
reinstate as director of Ireland's museum, and, if he does not, will he 
terminate his employment with equitable compensation and get some 
respectable citizen of this country to discharge the important duties of 
the two offices mentioned in my question?
Mr Derrig: Dr Mahr was appointed the official Irish representative to 
the Sixth International Congress of Archaeology to be held in Berlin in 
August 1939, and he left Ireland in the preceding month to attend that 
congress, bringing his family with him to spend a holiday in his native 
home in Austria. When war became imminent, he tried to return to Dublin 
but was unable to do so, owing to the delay in bringing his family from 
Austria. He then reported to the Irish Chargé d'Affaires, with a view to 
getting a 'safe conduct' to return to Ireland, but it was not possible 
to have this done and he was granted leave of absence without pay until 
circumstances permitted him to resume his position. I am not in a 
position to say anything further at the moment, nor can I say when Dr 
Mahr will be in a position to resume.
Mr Dillon: If this gentleman turns up tomorrow with the battle-stained 
flag of Nazi Germany wrapped around him, will he be reinstalled in this 
position? Will we go on retaining a gentleman seated in Germany for the 
last six years so long as the going was good?
Mr L. J. Walsh: How do you know he is a Nazi? Are all Germans Nazis?
Mr Dillon: I am putting a supplementary question. Will we retain this 
gentleman, or will we say to him: 'Your position is now vacated. If
there is any compensation equitably due to you under your original
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agreement, we will give it to you and advertise the position so that 
some competent Irish scholar can discharge the duties of this job', or 
will we install him indefinitely as the Director of the National Museum?
Mr Derrig: The matter is being considered. No definite decision has been 
come to, pending a clarification of the position as to whether Dr Mahr 
will be in a position to return to his post. The Government may come to 
a decision in the matter. No decision has been come to so far. As I have 
said, the position has not been declared vacant and the question of
appointing a successor does not arise. I do not think the House would
expect me to answer the statement that Deputy Dillon has made, nor do I 
consider it within my province. I think the Deputy has rather exceeded 
the privileges which apply to him as a member of the House in the 
statement he has made regarding a person who is still, technically at
any rate, an officer of the Irish Civil Service.
Mr Dillon: 'Technically' is good. When will you make up your mind about
git, one way or the other?
This exchange signalled publicly for the first time the fact that 
someone who had served the Nazi cause during the war had held, and 
continued to hold, a senior post with the Irish Civil Service. Not 
unnaturally, the government demanded a profile of Adolf Mahr from G2's 
Colonel Dan Bryan. Bryan's report was sent to the government on 19 December 
1945 and told de Valera and Derrig all they needed to know about the 
Austrian archaeologist they had promoted eleven years earlier. It read:
Mahr was born in 18 8 7 and would, therefore, be 6 0 and will attain the 
minimum limit for retiring in 1947. He was the Group Leader of the Nazi 
organisation in Dublin and as such was closely in touch with the German 
Legation and the Nazi organisation in London, and also with the German 
Press Agency in Dublin. He appears to have cooperated with, or possibily 
directed, Helmut Clissmann in at least cultural and propaganda 
activities. Just before the war Mahr was succeeded as Group Leader by 
Mecking. Evidence at my disposal from two sources indicates that Mahr, 
in the later years of the war, directed or controlled the radio section
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which was sending German propaganda to Ireland. This section was 
evidently at this period under the control of the Foreign Office and not 
the Ministry of Propaganda. There are also some indications that Mahr 
was in charge of what was called the Irish Section in the Foreign 
Office. His name has also been mentioned in connection with his radio 
activities at one of the treason trials. Mahr, while resident in 
Ireland, was an open and blatant Nazi and made many efforts to convert 
Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had associations, to Nazi 
doctrines and beliefs. Apart from his pre-war and war activities, which 
brand him as a Nazi of some importance in relation to Ireland and make, 
in my opinion, any question of his immediate return unwise, there is no 
guarantee that further discoveries may not establish that his activities 
in connection with Ireland went further than propaganda. In the 
circumstances I recommend that no consideration be given to his return 
until the situation in regard to Germany and German nationals is much
nclearer.
Bryan's report, coupled with the bruising Dail exchange between Dillon 
and Derrig, effectively blocked whatever chance Mahr had of resuming his 
role as Director of the National Museum. Gustav Mahr sums up the events as 
follows: 'As a result of a campaign launched by certain colleagues of
happier days, claiming that he [Adolf Mahr] had been a Nazi spy in Dublin 
and therefore entirely unsuitable for resuming his post there, the Irish 
government pensioned him off at short notice and only twelve years of
Qactive service to his credit.'
James Dillon was to raise the spectre of Adolf Mahr one last time in the 
Dail almost a year later on 13 November 1946. During a Committee on Finance
Qdebate, the Minister for Finance, Frank Aiken, asked the House to approve 
a supplementary estimate of £1 , 0 0 0 for:
temporary professorships in the Irish Academy... intended for certain 
distinguished foreign scholars who, for reasons arising out of the 
altered conditions on the Continent of Europe, are unable for the time 
being to resume their careers in their home countries.
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Sensing that such a temporary professorship could be a back door into 
the country for Mahr, Dillon went on the offensive again, commenting:
I remember at one time there was a 'wangle' to restore to public 
employment in this country a gentleman who was at one time leader of the 
Hitler Youth in this country and a colleague of the head of the Gestapo 
in this city. I am happy to think that some references which I made here 
helped to scotch that plan and to ensure that the gentleman in question 
having gone back to Hamburg has been left in Hamburg.
An Ceann Comhairle: There is no money for him in this vote.
Mr Dillon: Wait a minute.
An Ceann Comhairle: I have been waiting for several minutes.
Mr Dillon: I wonder is there no money for him in this vote? That is just
the very thing I am working around to. Is Dr Mahr going to represent to 
us that he is a great authority on Celtic remains in and around Hamburg 
and to sit down again in the Royal Irish Academy? If he got wind of the 
word, he would be coming like a tornado. He has been trying it for the 
last twelve months. I have no grudge against him but he took his hook 
out of this country on the eve of the war and thought that he would come 
back with a Brown Shirt and a Swastika -
An Ceann Comhairle: The Deputy is travelling very far outside the terms 
of the Estimate.
Mr Dillon: Will the Minister give us a guarantee that Dr Mahr who is at 
present holding office, on leave of absence without pay, as Director of 
our Museum, is not coming back under this scheme? Is he or any of his 
ilk going to come here under this scheme? I should like a guarantee from 
the Minister on that point.
Replying to Dillon, Aiken told the Dail:
2 6 2
I take it that if the gentleman who was in charge of the National Museum 
were to come back to Ireland to work, it would be in the Museum and not 
in the [Royal Irish] Academy, that he would work. I have no brief for 
him. I do not know whether he will ever come back to this country or 
not. Deputy Dillon wants to take advantage of this Dail to abuse 
everybody, right, left and centre, to kick people who are down, but I 
say this for that gentleman, that he went towards the fighting, unlike 
Deputy Dillon.
Mr Dillon: That is an offensive and impudent observation for you to 
make.
Mr Aiken: No more offensive than the Deputy's.
Mr Dillon: And the Minister is an impudent and offensive man.
Mr Aiken: The Deputy thinks he has the sole licence to be offensive in 
this House. On every occasion on which he can throw dirt on the 
government and on his country, which he hopes will be used to get him 
patted on the back by the enemies of this country abroad, he comes in 
here and throws the dirt.
The chronological sequence of events would suggest that the government 
made its mind up not to allow Mahr back to Ireland soon after it considered 
Colonel Bryan's memo in December 1945. The decision to bar his return would 
most likely have been taken after Mahr's release from internment in April
1946. The Dail debate of 13 November 1946 makes clear, however, that as of 
that date no public announcement readvertising the post of Director of the 
National Museum had been made.
Gustav Mahr concludes the story of his father's post war years:
He had moved to Bonn where he had friends and the chance to carry on 
with his work as a prehistorian, making a scant living on lecture fees 
and research funds and trying to launch out on a new career as director 
of an institute for mining history which had been his special field of 
interest ever since his early career in Austria. He succeeded in getting
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'denazified', so that he could have taken up the job with official 
approval. I, as his son, was to be his assistant and librarian, he was 
to be returned his magnificent library stored at the National Museum [in 
Dublin]. This happy development in his early sixties was too much for 
his ailing heart. He died in May 1951 at Bonn. 10
H e in z  M e c k i n g : D e a th  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  U nion
Heinz Mecking, the man who in July 193 9 had taken over the leadership of 
the Auslandsorganisation in Dublin from Mahr, had been an adviser to the 
Turf Development Board. Like other members of the German colony he left 
Ireland for Berlin on the outbreak of war in September 1939. According to 
Klasmann, the company that had supplied him to the TDB, Mecking became an 
officer in the German Army. In 1941, after the invasion of Russia, Mecking 
was sent there to take charge of turf production. He was later taken
prisoner and died in detention at Tiraspol in Soviet Moldavia on 18
December 1945.11
L u d w ig  M ü h l h a u s e n : I n t e r n m e n t  o f  an SS  o f f i c e r
Ludwig Mühlhausen was taken prisoner by the Americans near Ulm in the 
Spring of 1945.12 The first that Irish Military Intelligence knew about his 
detention was a memo written by the former G2 2nd Lieutenant Joe Healy to 
Army Headquarters on 27 September 1945. By that time Healy had resumed
duties as a lecturer at University College Cork. He told G2 that he had
received a letter from Professor Mühlhausen written in July 1945 stating he
was a prisoner of war in Naples. Healy noted that Mühlhausen held the rank
of an Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) in the SS. 13 In fact, Mühlhausen 
remained in detention as a prisoner of war for almost three years, from May 
1945 until March 1948.14 On his release, one of his daughters described him 
as being 'physically and spiritually destroyed'. Subsequently, the 
professor who had travelled the Gaeltacht areas from the Blaskets to 
Donegal, 'could work scientifically only in a limited capacity' . 15 After 
the war, Mühlhausen's name appeared only once on a scholarly work as editor 
of a collection of fairy tales. 16 Paralysed by a stroke, Mühlhausen died of 
a heart attack on 15 April 1956. His library went to the University of 
Tübingen. 17
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H ans H a r t m a n n T h e  Homecoming
Hans Hartmann's final broadcast to Ireland went out from Bremers Hotel
on 2 May 1945, just 24 hours after the formal announcement of Hitler's
death. 18 The news of Eamon de Valera's visit to Hempel, on 2 May 1945, to
convey his condolences on the death of Hitler came too late to be used by
Hartmann's service which had then gone off the air. With American troops
1 9already in the area Hartmann fled Apen along with the other broadcasters 
and radio technicians. It was every man for himself. Hartmann told the 
author:
I spent the period from 1945 to 1948 in a village near Apen, called 
Westerstede, where I had some relations. In 1945, I was visited there by 
two British secret service officers who interrogated me on the subject 
of British members of the staff of the Irland-Redaktion. At the 
beginning of the interrogation they pointed out to me that they were not
o ninterested in me personally nor the work I had done during the war.
While it appears that Mühlhausen was shunned by his former Celtic
Studies colleagues after the war, Hartmann's friends rallied round him and
his family. Sean 0 Heochaidh, who had worked on Irish dialects with
Mühlhausen in Teelin - and later with Hartmann in the north west Donegal 
areas of Gweedore and Cloughaneely - recalls that:
Mühlhausen was a real Nazi, but to my mind Dr Hartmann was the opposite,
which I think helped to save him in the end...He was fortunate enough to 
end up in the American zone at the end of the war, and the Celtic 
scholars of the world vouched for it that Celtic scholarship could not
do without him. So, I believe it was then that he was freed. Poor
Mühlhausen was thrown into a camp and, after suffering a stroke, he 
died. 21
Sean 0 Süilleabhäin, who had studied with Hartmann at the Folklore 
Commission from 1937 to 1939, was concerned about his friend's fate. He 
told the author:
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When the war came to an end and Germany was defeated, people like 
Hartmann, or anybody who had been against the Western Allies, were 
arrested and put into detention camps. I got a letter from Hartmann at 
the end of the war. He wrote to me from wherever the camp was telling me 
how badly off he and his wife and the children were, for clothes, for 
food and everything. So, I had a very small salary at that time, in 1945 
or 1946, and I went down to the Red Cross office here in Dublin and gave 
them a sum of money, which was a large amount in those days, to be sent 
on to Hartmann and his family. Afterwards, he came specially to Ireland 
to thank me and he said that I had saved their lives. Things were very 
bad in Germany at that time. I was fond of Hartmann, I knew him, and 
when you hear of somebody in trouble you try to help. We escaped the war 
here. I don't know what he said on the radio but there he was, a
prisoner being held with his wife and children. I did that because it
_ 2 2was the only way I could get through to help him.
However, contrary to the impression formed by 0 Suilleabhain and other 
friends of Hartmann's in Ireland, the German never became a prisoner of the 
Allies. Hartmann told the author:
I was never arrested, taken prisoner or put into a detention camp. I 
lived from the outset as a free man in the British zone where the living 
conditions at the beginning were hard in the extreme, causing many 
anxieties and fears which I communicated to my friends abroad. But I 
managed, with the aid of my wife, to make a living by doing 
translations, working in a nearby bog to obtain fuel for heating and
2 3cooking, and by securing most valuable help from friends in Ireland.
In 1948 Hartmann joined the lecturing staff of the University of 
Gottingen where his v e n i a  l e g e n d i (authorisation to lecture) for Celtic 
Philology, obtained at Berlin's Humboldt University, was integrated into a 
more comprehensive v e n i a  l e g e n d i for 'Comparative Philology with special 
regard to Celtic Philology'. In 1953 he obtained the chair of Comparative 
Philology at the University of Hamburg where Ludwig Miihlhausen had worked 
up to 1937. The new post gave Hartmann a free hand to continue his work in 
the Celtic Studies area until his retirement. 24 In the 1960s Hartmann
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returned to Ireland to continue his work on Gaeltacht dialects, as Sean 0 
Heochaidh recalls:
Dr Hartmann came back to Ireland after the war with a van full of 
recording equipment. Again we worked on this recording, and he went back
to Germany with a vast amount of wonderful material from some of the
2 5best speakers in North West Donegal.
Hartmann was also assisted by UCD's Professor of Irish, Tomäs de 
Bhäldraithe, and many Irish language students made the trip to Hamburg
during the 196 0s and 197 0s to work on analysing and cataloguing the
2 6recordings that Hartmann had collected.
Not everyone forgave Hartmann for his wartime role as a propaganda 
broadcaster for the Nazis. One one occasion at a social function in Dublin, 
someone introduced the German to Professor Dan Binchy, with the words 'Have 
you met Dr Hartmann?' Turning on his heel, Binchy replied: 'No, but I heard 
his voice. ' 27 For the most part though, Hartmann was welcomed back into 
circulation by the Celtic Studies fraternity. His acceptance was in marked
contrast to that of the SS officer Ludwig Mühlhausen whom one UCD scholar
2 8termed 'a shadowy person, not much was known about him'. According to
Eimear 0 Broin: 'Professor Mühlhausen's broadcasts were a particular
embarrassment to Celtic Studies academic circles in Dublin, because his
work with the Irish language was highly regarded and was in such contrast
2 9to his activities as a blatant Nazi propagandist.'
Reflecting on his role with the Nazi radio service 45 years later on,
Hartmann described his involvement as 'absolutely accidental', adding:
I had no intention to make propaganda and made no preparations to do so. 
I even lacked the vocabulary I had to use for that. I remember that 
once, when I had to write my first talks, I went to the Irish legation 
to see Mr Warnock with whom I was on very good terms, and I asked him to 
give me some Irish newspapers. From these I got the vocabulary needed to 
translate Wehrmachtberichte [German Armed Forces reports], etc. That was 
all I had, all that I could do. It was purely accidental that I went 
into the propaganda business. I don't consider it to my credit that I 
did it at all. 30
Hans Hartmann now lives in retirement in Cologne, Germany.
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L o r d  Haw Haw: A F o o t n o t e
After his execution at Wandsworth, on 3 January 1946, William Joyce was 
buried in the prison cemetery. This, however, was not the end of the Lord 
Haw Haw story. Some 30 years later, on 20 August 1976, William Joyce's 
remains were reinterred at Galway's New Cemetery. The reinterment followed 
a ten-year campaign by Joyce's daughter, Mrs Heather Iandolo, who commented 
at the ceremony: 'It had been my father's wish to return to Galway some 
day, and I am glad I was able to do this much for him. ' 31
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William Joyce (Lord Haw Haw) following his capture by 
British troops, on 28 May 1945, near the Danish 
border at Flensburg, Germany.
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Conclusion
As regards the role of Irish people in the Irland-Redaktion, it should 
be observed that they were in a clear minority - just six of the twenty two 
individuals identified as having been directly or indirectly involved. It 
must also be noted that of these twenty two people at least one, Mrs Susan 
Hilton, had arrived in occupied France as a prisoner of war - a status that 
could hardly be described as voluntary.
Examining the role of those Irish citizens who were involved, Francis 
Stuart must rank as the most important recruit to German Radio’s wartime 
Irish service. His decision to begin lecturing at Berlin University in 
January 1940 clearly indicates that he had no conscientious objections to 
working in Nazi Germany. His decision to begin broadcasting for the Irland- 
Redaktion in March 1942 further indicates that his original stance had not 
altered substantially from that which first caused him to travel to Berlin 
over two years before. Stuart's university lecturing work, along with his 
early broadcasts, could have marked him out as a rather woolly-headed 
adventurer who had waded rather too deeply into the waters of the Third 
Reich. But a closer look at the available facts would tend to cast him in a 
somewhat different light. The fact that Stuart arrived in Berlin in 1940 
as, among other things, an official courier for the IRA - as well as his 
known contacts with the spy Hermann Goertz - clearly indicates that he was 
far from being an innocent abroad. In addition, some of Stuart's wartime 
talks from the Berlin Rundfunkhaus can be considered as having gone beyond 
even his own definition of 'neutral' broadcasting. The Dublin government 
did not share Stuart's view of himself as a neutral commentator when the 
writer praised the IRA's Northern commander, Hugh McAteer, on 2 December 
1942, nor when Stuart began dispensing advice to Irish voters before the 
June 1943 general election. De Valera indicated his displeasure by formally 
protesting to Berlin about both these matters.
While Stuart himself would claim not to have breached his own code of 
neutral broadcasting in raising the topics about which de Valera had 
protested, the same could not be said of two other important talks by 
Stuart. These were, his description of the German Sixth Army's defeat at 
Stalingrad as 'a triumph of flesh and blood' (6 February 1943) and his 
appeal to British soldiers from Ulster to mutiny (15 May 1943). On his own
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admission Stuart recognised that the latter broadcast could have brought 
about his execution by the British. For that very reason, he claims that he 
arranged to fall into the hands of the French Army at the end of the war.
John O'Reilly's role is notable less for his broadcasting abilities than 
for the fact that he volunteered for a spying mission to Ireland.
O'Reilly's radio contributions were not comparable with Stuart's either in 
content or duration. O'Reilly's talks were mostly written for him, while 
Stuart made an effort to originate his own material. In addition, Stuart 
stayed twice as long with the radio service as O'Reilly did - 23 months 
compared with 12 months. Despite the seriousness attached by the Americans 
to O'Reilly's spying mission, one must, on balance, be inclined to accept 
O'Reilly's own version of events: that, having realised the inevitability 
of Germany's defeat, he duped the Germans into flying him home.
Can any of those who broadcast for the Irland-Redaktion be considered as 
traitors? Since the target audience for most of the transmissions to 
Ireland - apart from a small number of broadcasts which, in mid-1942, were 
simultaneously beamed to North America - was in neutral territory, the 
answer to this question must remain in the negative. British subjects who 
broadcast for the England-Redaktion were considered to be traitors who had 
'assisted the enemy1, and two of them, William Joyce and John Amery, were 
hanged in London's Wandsworth prison after the war. But those who had given 
their services to the Irland-Redaktion were never considered as traitors, 
or even law breakers, by the Irish authorities. However, the situation with 
regard to the Irland-Redaktion's staff was complicated by the fact that, 
according to Stuart and Hartmann, William Joyce may have been behind a 
series of 1943 broadcasts on the Irland-Redaktion's wavelength which were 
made under the cover name 'Patrick Joseph Cadogan'. A further complication 
arises from the fact that Mrs Dorothea Susan Hilton had broadcast on German 
Radio to England and Scotland before January 1942 when she joined the 
Irland-Redaktion and broadcast to Ireland under her maiden name of Susan 
Sweney. One of the ten counts that Mrs Hilton faced at her treason trial in 
London in 1946 charged her with having 'entered the service of the Irish 
Redaktion, a section of the German Broadcasting System'. But it appears 
that MI5 was only interested in bringing British citizens to trial because, 
with the exception of Mrs Hilton, the British never sought to prosecute 
other members of Hartmann and Mahr's radio team. Four other members of the
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team were, however, interned without trial at the end of the war: 
Miihlhausen, for three years by the Americans; Mahr, for one year by the 
British; and Stuart and Meissner for nine months by the French. Two others 
were interned without trial while the war was still on: John O'Reilly, for 
18 months by the Irish authorities; and William Murphy, for nine months by 
the British.
C o - o p e r a t i o n  o r  co u p  d ' e t a t ?
At the end of 1941 Hitler considered that 'the occupation of Ireland 
might lead to the end of the war', although this notion of a German 
occupation was in the context of a possible Irish request for such help 
consequent on a British attack on Eire. 1 Overall, Hitler's interest in 
Ireland never appears to have been more than peripheral. Similarly,
Goebbels welcomed the propaganda opportunities offered by IRA activities on
the one hand and de Valera's neutrality policy on the other but this is as
— 2 far as his interest in Irish affairs appears to have gone. Goebbels
Ministry of Propaganda did, however, approve the establishment of the
limited Irish-language radio service started by Miihlhausen three months
after the war began.
What is certain is that Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, - 
perhaps because of his years as ambassador in London from 193 6 to 193 8 - 
took a far closer interest in Irish affairs than either Hitler or Goebbels. 
As we have already seen, Ribbentrop considered the Celtic races in Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales to be labouring 'under the yoke' of England and, 
presumably, awaiting the chance to liberate themselves from the common 
enemy in London. Thus, while part of Ribbentrop's team, including Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger and Adolf Mahr, were actively using propaganda to support 
Irish neutrality - a stance which was intended to help German U-boats by 
keeping Ireland's Treaty Ports out of British hands - other aides of the 
German Foreign Minister were plotting either to overthrow de Valera's 
government or foment rebellion in Northern Ireland, or possibly both. 3 Both 
Edmund Veesenmayer and Paul Woermann were involved in the top secret, but 
ultimately abortive, plan to send the IRA leaders Sean Russell and Frank 
Ryan from Germany to Ireland. 4 Ireland, in fact, was to prove one of the 
few failed missions undertaken by Veesenmayer who was Ribbentrop's coup 
d'etat specialist. 5 In 193 9, Veesenmayer had encouraged Slovakia to secede
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from Czechoslovakia. 6 In 1941 Veesenmayer engineered a coup d'état in 
Croatia; by mid-1942 he had eliminated the Jewish male population from
Serbia, and in 1943 he set about taking similar measures in Slovakia; in
- 71944 he organised a coup d'etat m  Hungary.
Mahr's plan to use radio propaganda to turn Irish audiences around the 
world against the Allied cause was, in common with Veesenmayer's 
intervention strategy, far from being in tandem with the overt approach of 
the German Foreign Office in supporting de Valera's policy on neutrality.
It can be concluded that Ribbentrop's attitude towards Ireland - and, by 
extention, the attitude of the Nazi hierarchy collectively - was dictated 
as much by duplicity as it was by opportunism and expediency.
The B e r l i n  T r o i k a
The Nazi authorities could count themselves lucky to have had the 
services of people like Mühlhausen, Mahr and Hartmann because few others, 
if any, in wartime Berlin would have possessed the same knowledge of 
Ireland, its people and language. Of these three, Hartmann was the least 
committed to Nazi ideology, being a language enthusiast first and foremost. 
Mühlhausen joined the Nazi party in 1932 and used it to further his own 
career, while Mahr joined up in 1933 in the hope that a strong Germany 
would force the return of his native South Tyrol region from Italian to 
Austrian control. Hartmann also joined the Nazi party in 1933 but for 
reasons which were far from ideological. He was, in fact, obliged to join 
in order to get state funding for his university studies and to qualify for 
extra funding for his student exchange visit to Ireland from 1937 to 1939. 
Hartmann was also the junior member of the trio. He was only 3 0 years of 
age when war broke out in 1939 compared with Mühlhausen's 51 years and 
Mahr 's 52 .
Hartmann's claim to have been an 'accidental' propagandist is largely 
borne out by the known facts. In 1940, as a student at Berlin University, 
he would have found it difficult - if not impossible in the climate of the 
times - to refuse the request by Mühlhausen, his professor, to help out 
with a weekly radio talk in Irish. Uppermost in Hartmann's mind, later on, 
was the fact that radio work would save him from military service and 
probable death at the Russian front.
Unlike Mahr and Mühlhausen, Hartmann had a genuine regard for the Irish
273
along with their traditions, culture and language. On his visit to Donegal 
in 193 7, Mühlhausen repeatedly told local people that they would be better 
off under German rule rather than British or even Irish native rule. While 
Mühlhausen founded the Irland-Redaktion in December 193 9, he left it two 
years later to work with the SS in France. He was also in charge of German 
propaganda to Brittany for a period before the fall of France in June 1940, 
and was well aware of the pro-Nazi Breton nationalist movement's desire for 
independence from France. As for Adolf Mahr, although he had lived in 
Ireland from 1927 to 1939, his primary loyalty appears to have been not to 
the state of which he was a senior civil servant but to Nazi Germany. The 
Irish people, their language and aspirations were of secondary importance 
to Mahr, a committed national socialist, who chose to spend the war years 
in the service of the German Foreign Office.
It is also noteworthy that while Hartmann's friends in Ireland rallied 
to help him after the war, neither Mahr nor Mühlhausen attracted the same 
support. In 1946 Mahr was effectively barred from resuming his post as 
director of the National Museum in Dublin, and Mühlhausen - a broken man by 
the time of his release from internment in 1948 - never resumed teaching. 
Hartmann went on to enjoy a distinguished academic career in post-war 
Germany. He continued to visit Ireland to record regional Irish dialects.
In 1990, when the author met Hartmann at his home in Cologne, he found that 
the German's study was filled with books about Ireland.
A F a i l u r e  o f  T im in g
If German Radio's Irish propaganda initiative failed both to win big 
audiences and to persuade Irish listeners of the righteousness of the Nazi 
cause, then the reasons were not hard to find. The initial propaganda 
programmes, starting in December 1939, consisted only of 15-minute talks in 
Irish given on Sunday nights by Ludwig Mühlhausen. In 194 0 Mühlhausen was 
joined by Hans Hartmann following which talks were broadcast twice weekly. 
But, as Adolf Mahr pointed out to Ribbentrop in May 1941, the English- 
speaking Irish were not being addressed at all by Berlin. This continued to 
be the case until the end of August 1941 when nightly test transmissions in 
English began. Having, in Mahr's estimation, failed to address most Irish 
listeners during the first two years of the war, the Irland-Redaktion was 
then given the almost impossible job of trying to catch up on lost time and
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to regain the propaganda initiative.
By the time Mahr had installed Hartmann as head of the Irland-Redaktion 
in December 1941, the raison d'etre of the Irish service had been overtaken 
by events. Firstly, the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 took the 
focus off Operation Sea Lion, the invasion plan for England. The Germans 
had also contemplated invading Ireland under the plan known as Operation 
Green. This was now similarly disregarded militarily as German panzer 
divisions headed east towards Moscow. Secondly, by the time Hartmann began 
assembling his propaganda team in Berlin shortly before Christmas 1941, 
America had already entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour. Thus, Mahr's idea of using propaganda to persuade the American 
Irish to oppose U.S. entry into the conflict was already a dead letter.
Germany's propaganda problems were compounded by the fact that it was, 
according to one study, faced 'with a military situation worsening 
gradually from late 1941 onwards to a point of despair [thus] the task of 
upholding morale in these circumstances was incomparably greater than that
nof British propaganda'. For one observer 'the greatest success of the 
Goebbels propaganda apparatus was reflected in the continuation of the
gstruggle by the German people into 1945'.
It is clear that comparing British and Nazi propaganda, or comparing 
Nazi propaganda to Britain with that to Ireland in World War II, is not 
comparing like with like. Thus, the researcher's difficulty is to determine 
the criteria by which to measure best the effectiveness of propaganda. A 
more valid comparison might be achieved by taking the Irland-Redaktion1s 
output vis-à-vis propaganda beamed to other neutral states like 
Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and - up to 7 December 1941 - 
the USA. But, as indicated in a study published in 1944, neutrality through 
German eyes varied depending on a country's value to the German war 
effort10, and the propaganda style used in broadcasts to Ireland defies 
strict comparison with propaganda to other states or regions. For example, 
while the use of Irish-language broadcasts was, in a sense, similar in 
intent to programmes for minority groups within states (eg. the Slovaks, 
Flemings and Slovenians) Ireland was, unlike these regions, never occupied 
by the Germans. Another important difference in Ireland's case was that the 
country shared a disputed land frontier with the United Kingdom which was 
at war with Germany. And Ireland's strategic position as an island nation
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with westerly ports that Churchill wanted to repossess - to patrol the 
North Atlantic shipping lanes more effectively - was yet one more 
difference between Ireland and other neutral states.
Perhaps the only common thread in Nazi propaganda to small regions or 
divided countries was that Germany appeared to be holding out the prospect 
of independence or unification for them at the war's end if they sided with 
the Nazis in the meantime. In reality, however, Germany's presence in such 
regions never progressed from the stage of occupation until the German Army 
was eventually dislodged by Allied forces.
Comparisons between Germany's domestic and foreign propaganda may also 
have little validity, since Goebbels 'knew that propaganda for home 
consumption and propaganda for overseas had to be thought out independently 
and that in neither case was the best propaganda necessarily that which set 
out to convince or convert' . 11
Domestic propaganda has been depicted as being successful in wartime 
Germany but only when coupled with other factors: 'The propaganda weapon
[had] a real effect in prolonging the war, but so, to at least an equal
12extent, did the regime's use of terror.' 'The limited propaganda success 
which Goebbels enjoyed in 1945 was due only in part to his ingenuity. 
Instead, it resulted from the fact that traditional Nazi propaganda 
overlapped and merged with traditional German patriotism and the people's 
intuitive response to defend the Fatherland in danger. ' 13 Goebbels once 
remarked that 'in propaganda, as in love, anything is permissible which is 
successful...propaganda has nothing to do with the truth - we serve the 
truth in that we serve a German victory' . 14 But Balfour and Briggs believe 
that propaganda had little effect on the outcome of the war in Europe. 15
As we know, Goebbels controlled the propaganda service to Ireland from 
December 1939 to November 1941. For most of that period, as we have already 
seen, the broadcasts were only made once a week for 15 minutes and in the 
Irish language, so it can be reasonably deduced that their effect was 
limited. All they can be said to have achieved with certainty is (a) to 
have attracted a small audience in the Gaeltacht, mostly in Donegal, (b) to 
have attracted also a small, yet not insignificant, group of listeners whom 
Adolf Mahr identified as 'language enthusiasts amongst the educated 
sections of [Irish] society' , (c) to have attracted the attention of
official monitors in Dublin, thus alerting senior government ministers to
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the official German propaganda line on Irish affairs, and (d) to have 
similarly attracted the attention of the BBC monitoring service and thus, 
indirectly, of the authorities in London and Belfast who were notified of 
the more important broadcasts.
As to whether any of the specific objectives of the Irland-Redaktion 
were achieved in part or in whole, it is necessary to examine them 
individually. These were identified in Chapter 1 as being:
1. To ensure t h a t  I r e l a n d  r e m a in e d  n e u t r a l :
Since de Valera upheld his policy of neutrality for the entire Emergency or
war period, the Irish service of German Radio was never, in practice, doing
anything more than preaching to the converted. Furthermore, de Valera's
formal adoption of a neutrality policy pre-dated by three and a half years
17the commencement of Germany's wartime broadcasts to Ireland. It is 
unlikely that anything, short of a German or British invasion, would have 
forced de Valera to abandon his neutral stance. Certainly, the radio pleas 
from Berlin for Ireland to maintain her neutrality could be considered as 
being superfluous in the circumstances.
2. To e n s u r e  t h a t  I r i s h  l i s t e n e r s  u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  N a z i  m e s s a g e :
The broadcasts, if widely heard, would have ensured that the Nazi message
was sufficiently comprehended, in as much as it was relevant to a nation
not directly involved in the conflict. Insofar as the Irland-Redaktion only 
managed to attract a small listenership, the Nazi message - both in the 
form of straightforward propaganda from Berlin and in the sense of 
providing a counter-thrust to Allied propaganda - was thus restricted to a 
narrow audience. This objective can be considered a failure in radio terms 
since the service appears to have reached only a small segment of the 
population.
3. To e n s u r e  t h a t  a s  f e w  p e o p l e  a s  p o s s i b l e  s i d e d  w i t h  t h e  A l l i e d  cause-.  
For the most part, Irish people had made up their minds whether or not to 
enlist in the British armed forces by the time German Radio's Irish service 
went on the air in December 1939. Some 165,000 people with next-of-kin 
Irish addresses volunteered for service with the British Army despite the 
lack of conscription, and the number of people from the 26 Counties who
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went to work in Britain's factories and farms during the war is put at 
1 Aaround 100,000. It should be noted also that German Radio's Irish 
programmes did not specifically or directly exhort Irish listeners not to 
side with the Allied cause. The tone was discernibly more indirect, citing, 
for example, British atrocities against the Irish civilian population in 
the 1919-1921 War of Independence. Francis Stuart's appeal, broadcast on 15 
May 1943, inciting Ulster-born soldiers in the British Army to mutiny and 
defect to either the German or Italian lines, was exceptional. Thus the 
goal of deterring Irish people from joining the Allied camp can be regarded 
as largely irrelevant since citizens of Eire who wished to side with the 
Allies would, for the most part, have made their decision before December 
193 9 when the Irland-Redaktion went on air.
4. To a p p e a l  t o  n a t i o n a l i s t  a s p i r a t i o n s  on u n i t y :
The earlier broadcasts to Ireland occasionally held out the possibility of 
a unified Irish state evolving from the destruction of the British Empire 
at the hands of Germany (e.g. Mühlhausen's talk on 15 December 1940) . 
Generally though, the talks fell short of giving any German guarantee on 
unity in the event of a Nazi victory and, in fact, the partition question 
was played down after plans to invade Britain were shelved. Whether or not 
a victorious Nazi Germany would have delivered a united Ireland - or, for 
that matter, greater autonomy for Brittany, Flanders, Wallonia and other 
regions - is a question that must remain in the realm of conjecture. It is, 
however, worth noting that on 13 November 1940 Ribbentrop's State 
Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, commented that 'after England was finally 
crushed by us, Ireland could then expect... to realize her national
-] Qgoals'. But, forty years later, Helmut Clissmann - who was involved in
the planning for Operation Sea Lion - maintained that 'Hitler would have
2 0sold the Irish down the river'.
In terms of extreme Irish nationalism the Nazi radio message, in so far 
as it promised the annihilation of England, must be said to have provided a 
certain amount of succour in such circles, particularly for the small 
number of IRA activists with whom the Nazis were in contact in Ireland, the 
USA and Germany itself. However, the goals of appealing to Irish 
nationalist aspirations on unity, ensuring that Ireland remained neutral 
and appealing to Irish Catholic fears of communism reflected attitudes
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which were widespread in Ireland at the time. The fact that German Radio's 
Irish output concurred with those attitudes does not prove any measure of 
success on the part of the propagandists in Berlin. What it does tend to 
indicate, however, is that those propagandists were following - rather than 
attempting to form - Irish attitudes to such issues.
5. To a p p e a l  t o  C a t h o l i c  f e a r s  o f  a t h e i s t i c  B o l s h e v i s m  a n d  J u d a is m :
The likelihood is that anti-Bolshevik messages would have been more 
relevant than anti-Jewish ones. Both types were broadcast, but anti-semitic 
talks to a far lesser degree, while wartime anti-semitism even found a 
sounding board in Dâil Eireann21, the Nazis' anti-Bolshevik propaganda was 
more apposite if only because it echoed what members of the Irish Catholic 
hierarchy were saying publicly. The determination of German Radio's Irish 
service to exploit Catholic fears of atheistic communism may have been 
reflected in the fact that, in January 1944, the service controllers sacked 
their top broadcaster Francis Stuart. According to Stuart this was because 
he would not give anti-communist talks on the radio. In the period from 
end-June 1941 to end-April 1945 the Irland-Redaktion's anti-Bolshevik 
broadcasts appealed to sentiments that were already well established among 
the target audience.
6 . To p r o v i d e  a f a m i l i a r  s e r v i c e  t h a t  w o u ld  h a v e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  p l a y  a 
m o re  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f ,  (a) a German i n v a s i o n  o f  E i r e ;  (b) a 
B r i t i s h  o r  U .S .  i n v a s i o n  o f  E i r e ;  (c) a s u c c e s s f u l  p r o -G e rm a n  co u p  d ' é t a t  
a g a i n s t  t h e  D u b l i n  g o v e r n m e n t ;  (d) a German i n v a s i o n  o f  B r i t a i n :
In the event of any or all of the above coming about, then the Irland- 
Redaktion - by virtue of its having been established relatively early in 
the war - could be said to have laid the groundwork for, and created the 
nucleus of, an important element of any German military or political 
initiative on Ireland. If British or American troops invaded Eire, German 
Radio had the potential to boost its output to Ireland - both in broadcast 
hours and signal strength - thus building on an established format, 
although it is by no means certain that the audience would have grown, 
particularly if the broadcasts had only been in the Irish language. A 
German invasion of Eire - with or without a concurrent, and successful, 
pro-German coup d'état against the Dublin government - would almost
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certainly have brought about an increase in Irish listeners to German 
Radio's Irish service. It is probable that in such circumstances the 
Irland-Redaktion would have been closed down and its output replaced by 
Radio Eireann programmes under German control. This would have been similar 
to what happened in the case of German Radio's service for Brittany which 
went off the air as soon as France fell to the Germans. Programmes for the 
whole of France were put out subsequently by Radio Paris under German 
control. In the event of a German invasion of Britain, the Irland-Redaktion 
could have been employed to target Irish audiences in British cities as 
well as republican elements in Northern Ireland. It can be assumed that in 
the event of the German invasion plan for England (Operation Sea Lion) 
going ahead in 1940 or 1941, Germany would have been grateful for any 
support from Irish nationalists in English cities, not to mention from 
Welsh and Scottish nationalists. Although the groundwork for establishing a 
familiar radio propaganda service for Irish listeners had been laid, its 
ultimate potential was contingent on various sets of circumstances 
occurring that never, in fact, came to pass.
From mid-1941 onwards the focus of the war in Europe moved to the east. 
Had the thrust of the European conflict remained in the west - and had the 
German Army's role in it been victorious - the effectiveness of the Irland- 
Redaktion could, arguably, have been quite different. However, as the war 
unfolded in Russia and elsewhere, the Irland-Redaktion became focused on a 
military backwater. Although Ireland was considered worthy of attention by 
the German propagandists for most of the war, it must be concluded that the 
Irish service did not succeed in achieving its aims in so far as they were, 
mostly if not exclusively, beyond both its scope and sphere of influence.
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A P P E N D I C E S
Note: the originals of some of the German wartime documents cited 
have deteriorated during more than 50 years in storage. A  number of 
them are barely legible as is evident from the copies in this 
section.
Appendix A: Key Players (a summary of the role of key personalities 
involved in the Irland-Redaktion).
Appendix B: Walshe memorandum to de Valera regarding Nazi activities
in Ireland, 22 February 1939.
Appendix C: Mahr report for German Foreign Office, 'Radio propaganda
to Ireland', 18 March 1941. (Sections of this report which were 
underlined by Mahr for emphasis in the original German language 
text, appear in capitals in the English translation. The original 
page breaks are included to guide the reader, e.g. - 2 - ,  - 3 - ,  
e t c .) .
Appendix D: Minutes of German Foreign Office meeting, Berlin, 22 May 
1941, attended by the Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Full 
original German text, followed by English summary including 
translation of section c) on Ireland.
Appendix E: Mahr memorandum for Foreign Office, 'English-language 
programmes to Ireland', 9 September 1941. Original German text and 
full English translation. ( N . B .  This document, which has never been 
published, was found in the German Federal Archives, Potsdam, in 
April 1991. It appears to be a draft rather than a final version.) .
Appendix F: Minutes of meeting of German Foreign Office's North 
America Committee, Berlin, 26 August 1943. Original German text plus 
English translation of section 5 including Dr Kiesinger's comments 
on Irish radio station plan (Source: Schnabel, pp. 468-71).
Appendix G: Technical data concerning broadcasts to Ireland by 
German Radio, 1939-45.
Appendix H: Profile of Franz Fromme.
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Appendix A
KEY PLAYERS
A d o l f  Mahr (1 8 8 7 -1 9 5 1 )
An Austrian archaeologist, Mahr left the Vienna Museum of Prehistory in 
1927 to join the National Museum in Dublin as Senior Keeper of Irish 
Antiquities. He joined the Nazi Party in April 1933 and was promoted to the 
post of museum director by de Valera's cabinet in July 1934. As head of the 
Nazis' Auslandorganisation (foreign organisation) in Ireland, Mahr was the 
most powerful member of the small pre-war Austro-German community. As Irish 
Military Intelligence stepped up their surveillance on him and intercepted 
his mail, Mahr left Ireland aboard a liner from Cobh to Hamburg on 19 July 
193 9 for what turned out to be the last time. He spent the war years in 
Berlin working on the Irish desk at the Foreign Office. He effectively 
controlled all Germany's radio propaganda to Ireland from November 1941 to 
May 1945.
L u d w ig  M ü h lh a u s e n  (1 8 8 8 -1 9 5 6 )
An accomplished language scholar whose post-war career foundered through 
his overt links to the Nazi Party and activities as an SS officer in 
occupied France, Mühlhausen joined the Nazis in 1932 and used his 
membership to advance his academic career. In 193 7 he moved from Hamburg to 
take over the Chair of Celtic Studies at Berlin University where other 
propagandists such as Hans Hartmann, Hilde Popping, Francis Stuart, 
Madeleine Meissner and Norman Baillie-Stewart also studied and taught. 
Mühlhausen began his Irish language broadcasts at the end of 1939. He 
continued them every Sunday night until 1941. From 1942 he worked with the 
SS in France where it is believed he forged links with pro-Nazi elements in 
the Breton nationalist movement.
Hans H artm ann  (1 9 0 9 -  )
A rising star in pre-war European language and folklore study circles, 
Hartmann started off by mastering Russian and in 1937 switched his 
attention to Celtic studies. In common with other German university 
students in the 193 0s, he was obliged to join the Nazi Party to get 
funding. In 193 7 he travelled to Ireland on a student exchange scholarship.
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Hartmann fell in love with Ireland and its people, mastering the Irish 
language in less than two years. What began for him as a one year visit, 
turned into a two and a half year stay, and only ended when the German 
legation in Dublin arranged for German nationals to leave Ireland for the 
Fatherland on 11 September 1939. Back in Germany, Hartmann continued 
studying at Berlin University where he was appointed a lecturer in 1942. In 
December 1941 Hartmann was put in charge of the Irish service of German 
Radio by his old Dublin museum acquaintance, Adolf Mahr.
H i l d e  S p i c k e r n a g e l , n é e  P o e p p in g  (1 9 1 6 -  )
Hilde Poepping was another German exchange student whose interest in
Ireland brought her to UCG for a year's studies in 1937-38. Poepping later
married a fellow student at Berlin University and, after completing her 
studies, as Mrs Spickernagel, joined Adolf Mahr on the Irish desk at the 
Foreign Office. Her main duties involved the preparation of propaganda 
material for broadcast to Ireland. In December 1941, after six months with 
Mahr, she was transferred to join Hartmann's newly formed, nightly Irish 
radio service where she occasionally read the news. She left Hartmann's 
team after a year to give birth to her son, and played no further role in 
the wartime Foreign Office or radio service.
F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  (1 9 0 2 -  )
Even in his nineties, Stuart still has the capacity to stir controversy 
over his wartime broadcasts for Nazi radio, a role he described as "a 
neutral writer addressing a neutral audience". Stuart made his first 
broadcast from Berlin to Ireland on St Patrick's Day 1942 at the request of 
Hans Hartmann. Both men were then lecturers at Berlin University. Stuart 
continued his radio talks until January 1944 when he fell out with Hartmann 
and Mahr over their demand that he broadcast anti-Russian propaganda. For a 
time his passport was withheld and he was threatened, via anonymous phone 
calls, with imprisonment in a concentration camp. However, he avoided 
trouble with the help of friends at the Foreign Office. Irish Army monitors 
decided that Stuart's radio talks amounted to pro-Nazi propaganda. Among 
other things, Stuart praised the bravery of German troops at Stalingrad, 
and called on British troops from Ulster to mutiny and defect to the German
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side. He also upset de Valera in the run up to the June 1943 general 
election by giving advice to Irish voters.
Jo h n  O ' R e i l l y  (1 9 1 6 -1 9 7 1 )
This flamboyant County Clare man was the only member of the Irland- 
Redaktion to have volunteered for a spying mission. He joined the radio 
propaganda unit in Berlin in September 1941 but left a year later to train 
as a spy with German naval intelligence in Bremen, and later in Hamburg. 
Equipped with a radio transmitter, O'Reilly was parachuted back to his 
native Kilkee by the Luftwaffe in December 1943 and was arrested almost 
immediately. The Irish authorities were convinced he had duped the Germans 
into flying him home but O'Reilly was, in turn, duped by G2 into revealing 
a secret radio code the Germans had taught him. He was interned for the 
remainder of the war.
S u s a n  H i l t o n ,  n é e  S w e n e y  (1 9 1 5 -1 9 8 3 )
Hilton broadcast to Ireland under her maiden name of Susan Sweney. Although 
born in India, her father had Donegal connections and had risen through the 
ranks of the British-controlled Indian civil service to become chief 
inspector of police in Madras. In England in the 193 0s, Sweney joined 
Mosley's fascists and edited the British Union of Fascists' paper V o i c e  o f  
t h e  P e o p le from January to May 1940. After a police raid on her London flat 
she left Britain on 2 8 May 194 0 aboard a ship bound for Burma where she was 
due to be reunited with her husband. Her ship was, however, sunk by a 
German raider in the Indian Ocean on 13 July 1940. Along with other 
survivors, Hilton was taken aboard a prison ship bound for occupied France 
where she was put ashore in September 1940. Working as a journalist in 
occupied Paris, Hilton was asked by the Nazis to undertake a spying mission 
to Ireland or the USA. She refused, but in 1942 moved to Berlin to work 
first on propaganda broadcasts to Britain and, from January 1942, with 
Hartmann's Irland-Redaktion. After leaving the Irish team in autumn 1942, 
she worked for Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. By mid-1943 she was being 
shadowed by the Gestapo who suspected her of being an Allied spy. Hilton 
had the unenviable distinction of being imprisoned by both the Nazis (from 
August 1944 to April 1945) and the British (from April 1945 to 1947) . In 
1944 she was arrested by the Gestapo in Vienna where she had joined an SS
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unit (after the war she claimed to have infiltrated the unit to tip off 
intended SS victims). The Gestapo were apparently alerted when Susan Hilton 
applied to the Turkish consulate for a visa to flee the Third Reich. She 
was transferred from prison in Vienna to Liebenau internment camp in 
Germany where she almost starved to death during nine months ' 
incarceration. Despite finding her in a Nazi camp, MI5 detained Hilton for 
a further seven months in the same camp before transferring her to London 
for trial on charges of assisting the enemy with propaganda broadcasts. She 
was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.
W o lfg a n g  D i g n o w i t y  (1 9 1 2 -  ?)
While Ludwig Mühlhausen began German Radio's weekly propaganda talks to 
Ireland in December 1939, Wolfgang Dignowity was appointed first head of 
the nightly propaganda service in June 1941. Both men worked at the behest 
of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. Dignowity knew nothing about Ireland and 
recruited his 'Irish' radio team in Paris. His reign was short lived. He 
was ousted as section head after only five months. At the instigation of 
Adolf Mahr in the Foreign Office, Hans Hartmann took over Dignowity's place 
as head of the Irland-Redaktion in December 1941 and held the post until 
the end of the war in May 1945.
E l i z a b e t h  C l i s s m a n n  (n é e  M u lca h y )  a n d  H e lm u t  C l i s s m a n n  (1 9 1 1 -  )
Elizabeth Mulcahy, from Sligo, met her German husband-to-be, Helmut 
Clissmann, when both were students in Dublin in the 193 0s - she at UCD and 
he at Trinity College. In his role as head of the German Academic Exchange 
Service, Helmut Clissmann arranged most of the study trips to Ireland by 
German university students in the 193 0s including those of Hans Hartmann 
and Hilde Poepping. All visiting exchange students were required to report 
to Adolf Mahr in his capacity as head of the Auslandsorganisation. In 
addition, the visiting Germans had to join the Nazi Party to qualify for 
travel funding. Helmut Clissmann himself joined the Nazis on 1 May 1934. 
Elizabeth Clissmann spent the war years in Copenhagen, while her husband 
was a member of the German Army's Brandenburg Regiment. He was reputedly 
involved in drawing up top secret plans for the invasion of England 
codenamed Operation Sea Lion. This invasion plan was dropped after the 
German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, as was the invasion plan for
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Ireland codenamed Operation Green. Elizabeth Clissmann's involvement in the 
radio propaganda war was peripheral yet important. At the beginning of 1944 
she was asked to investigate a plan to beam anti-Roosevelt programmes to 
Irish Americans in the United States. While originally mentioned by Mahr in 
March 1941, this idea had been revived by the Foreign Office's North 
America Broadcasting Committee in August 1943. The IRA man Frank Ryan, who 
was then resident in Berlin, was also sounded out about its feasibility.
The propaganda plan was aimed at turning Irish-American voters against the 
war effort thus preventing Roosevelt's November 1944 re-election to the 
White House. Mrs Clissmann claimed after the war that she had agreed to 
investigate the prospect of launching the plan, which she discussed with 
her husband, only because she wanted to make sure the idea never got off 
the ground. To this end she visited Hans hartmann's team in Luxembourg (the 
broadcasters had left Berlin in August 1943 due to Allied bombings) in 
March 1944 where she met Adolf Mahr. Mrs Clissmann eventually sent her 
report to Berlin advising against the propaganda project (Frank Ryan had 
given the same advice over six months earlier) which never materialised. In 
any case, the Irland-Redaktion was forced to flee Luxembourg ahead of 
advancing U.S. troops in September 1944, just two months before the U.S. 
presidential election which Roosevelt won. Hartmann continued to put out 
his Irish radio programmes from Apen in northern Germany for another seven 
months until 2 May 1945.
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22nd. F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 3 9 .
The T a o is e a c h ,  M i n i s t e r  f o r  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s .
P r o t e s t  b y  Germ an C h a rg é  d 1A f f a i r e s .
The G erm an C h a r g é  d * A f f a i r e s ,  H e r r  T hom sen, 
came t o  see me by appointment this morning (Vfednesday, 
2 2 n d  F e b r u a r y ) .  He b e g a n  b y  r e m a r k in g  t h a t ,  a lt h o u g h  
h e  l i k e d  th e  n i c e  S p r in g  w e a t h e r ,  h e  fo u n d  th e  p e o p le  
n o t  so c o n g e n ia l  a s  th e  N o rw e g ia n  p e o p le  am o ng st whom 
h e  h a d  J u s t  b e e n  l i v i n g .  T h e r e a s o n  f o r  t h a t  was t h a t  
t h e  N o rw e g ia n s  w e re  a  P r o t e s t a n t  p e o p le ,  and t h e  I r i s h  
w e re  a lm o s t  e x c l u s i v e l y  C a t h o l i c ,  a n d , f o r  t h a t  r e a s o n ,  
d o m in a te d  b y  t h e  C l e r g y .
A f t e r  t h i s  som ew hat s u r p r i s i n g  a n d  im p u d e n t  
b e g in n in g ,  he show ed me a  n e w s p a p e r  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  
P a s t o r a l  o f  D r .  B ro w n , B is h o p  o f  G a lw a y , w it h  a  
s e n t e n c e  m a rk e d  I n  w h ic h  t h a  l a t t e r  a c c u s e s  G erm any o f  
v i o l e n c e ,  l y i n g ,  m u rd e r  a n d  t h e  c o n t e m n in g  o f  o t h e r  
r a c e s  a n d  p e o p le .  He p r o c e e d e d  t o  s a y  t h a t  D r .  B row n  
h a d  no r i g h t  to  d i s c u s s  G e rm a n y 's  a f f a i r s .  M o r e o v e r ,  
i t  s h o u ld  be rem em bered t h a t  a n y  m e a s u r e s  't a k e n  a g a in s t  
t h e  C a t h o l i c  C l e r g y  i n  G erm any w e re  v e r y  l a r g e l y  due  
t o  th e  im m o r a l it y  o f  t h e  p r i e s t s .  G e r m a n y 's  a im  was t o  
c o n f i n e  th e  C h u r c h  t o  i t s  own s p h e r e ,  a n d  t o  p r e v e n t  
t h e  C l e r g y  i n t e r f e r i n g  i n  m a t t e r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  S t a t e  
e x c l u s i v e l y .
The C h a rg é  d ' A f f a i r e s  t h e n  p r o d u c e d  a  co p y  o f  th e  
" I r i s h  P r e s s *  o f  T u e s d a y ,  2 1 s t  F e b r u a r y ,  c o n t a i n i n g  a  
le a d e r  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  a n t i - C h r i s t i a n  e le m e n t i n  Germ an
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S t a t e  d o c t r i n e  and p r a c t i c e .  A s t h i s  p a p e r  w a s  
c o n t r o l l e d  b y t h e  G o v e rn m e n t P a r t y ,  t h e  G o v e rn m e n t  
w o u ld  h a v e  t o  a c c e p t  some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e s e  
a t t a c k s  o n  G e rm a n y . T he G o v e rn m e n t s h o u ld  rem em ber  
t h a t  t h e r e  w e re  a  g r e a t  many t h i n g s  i n  I r e l a n d  w h ic h  
c o u ld  b e c r i t i c i s e d  b y  G e rm a n y, e . g . ,  t h e  e x t r e m e  
p o v e r t y  o f  l a r g e  n u m b e rs  o f  t h e  p e o p le ,  a n d  th e  
a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  o r g a n i s e d  e f f o r t  t o  rem ed y i t .
I  g a v e  a l l  t h e  u s u a l  r e p l i e s ,  a n d  a  l i t t l e  m o r e , 
t o  t  h i s  o u t b u r s t , b u t  I  w as c a r e f u l  t o  l e t  h im  r u n  h i s  
f u l l  l e n g t h  b e f o r e  r e p l y i n g ,  a s  i t  seem ed t o  my m in d  
im p o r t a n t  t o  g e t  t o  know t h e  t y p e  we h a v e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
i n  H e r r  T h o m se n . He i s  a  c o m p le te  c o n t r a s t  t o  D r .  
H e m p e l, t h e  G erm an M i n i s t e r ,  who -  a lt h o u g h  so m e tim e s  
l a c k i n g  i ok  s e n s e  o f  hu m ou r -  n e v e r  a l l o w s  y o u  t o  f o r g e t  
t h a t  he i s  a  c u l t u r e d  g e n t le m a n . H e r r  Thom sen i s  
i n s o l e n t ,  b o m b a s t ic ,  a n d  a p p a r e n t ly  d e v o id  o f  a n y  s e n s e  
o f  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e s  o f  l i f e .  He i s  t h e  f i r s t  G erm an  I  
h a v e  m et who seem s t o  co m b in e  i n  h i m s e l f  a l l  t h e  w o r s t  
id e a s  b e h in d  t h e  N a z i  r e g im e .
A t  t h e  e n d  o f  o u r  c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  I  s u g g e s t e d  t o  h im ,
a s  I  h a v e  f r e q u e n t l y  d o n e t o  h i s  M i n i s t e r  a n d  h i s
Sky*M i n i s t e r ’ s  p r e d e c e s s o r ,  t h a t  t h e  o f  a  N a z i
o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  D u b l i n ,  no d o u b t r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  
v ie w s  h e h a d  e x p r e s s e d  t o  me i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  o u r  
i n t e r v i e w  a n d  h a v in g  a s  i t s  c h i e f  member and o r g a n i s e r  
a n  em p lo y e e  o f  o u r  S t a t e ,  was n o t  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  im p ro v e  
r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  o u r  tw o G o v e rn m e n t s . I  c o u ld  h a r d l y  
im a g in e  h i s  G o v e rn m e n t t o l e r a t i n g  a  s i m i l a r  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
i n  G e rm a n y . He a n s w e re d ,  n o t  q u i t e  i n  so m any w o rd s ,  
t h a t  t h e  N a z i  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  D u b l i n  w as r e a l l y  n o n e
O f  O U r  n a a c
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I n  my p r e v i o u s  t a l k s  w it h  t h e  G erm an r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  d u r i n g  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  I  e n d e a v o u re d  t o  
c o n v in c e  them  i n  t h e  m o st f r i e n d l y  f a s h i o n  t h a t ,  a s  
t h e  m e a s u r e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  C a t h o l i c  C l e r g y  i n  G erm an y  
i n c r e a s e d  i n  s e v e r i t y ,  a n t a g o n is m  w as h o un d  t o  
d e v e lo p  h e r e .  I n  t im e  o u r  C a t h o l i c  p e o p le  a n d  C l e r g y  
w o u ld  b e g in  t o  make p u b l i c  p r o t e s t s  a n d  t h e  G o v e rn m e n t  
w o u ld  be p l a c e d  i n  a  v e r y  a w kw ard  s i t u a t i o n  w hen t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  D r .  M a h r, D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  
M useum , a s  h e a d  o f  t h e  N a z i  C e l l  i n  D u b l i n ,  becam e a  
m a t t e r  o f  p u b l i c  c o n t r o v e r s y .  D r .  H e m p el t o l d  me, i n  
J u l y ,  1938, t h a t  D r .  M a h r w as r e s i g n i n g  fro m  h i s  
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  th e  C e l l ,  a n d  I  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  D r .  M a h r  
so  in f o r m e d  t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  E d u c a t io n  a b o u t  t h e  sam e  
t im e .  H o w e v e r, so r e c e n t l y  a s  D e ce m b e r l a s t ,  D r .  
H em pel t o l d  me t h a t  D r .  M a h r h a d  n o t  y e t  r e s ig n e d  h i s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o w in g  t o  u n f o r e s e e n  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  b u t  w as a b o u t  t o  do s o  im m e d ia t e ly ,  a n d  
t h a t  h e  w a s  t o  be r e p l a c e d  i n  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  b y  H e r r  
M e c k in g ,  who i s  a n  e m p lo y e e  o f  t h e  S t a t e  C a t l e a s t  
i n d i r e c t l y )  u n d e r  th e  T u r f  B o a r d .
A f t e r  D r .  B ro w n ’ s  P a s t o r a l ,  we may e x p e c t  a n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  a n t i - N a z i  f e e l i n g  a n d  p r o t e s t s ,  and  D r .  
M a h r* s  p o s i t i o n  c a n n o t  f a i l  t o  b e b r o u g h t  in t o  
q u e s t i o n  a t  a n  e a r l y  d a t e .  No o r d i n a r y  C i v i l  S e r v a n t  
i s  a l l o w e d  t o  be a  member o f  a  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
a n d  i t  c o u ld  n o t  be r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  i n j u s t i c e  i f  ■ D r .  
M a h r w e re  o r d e r e d  to  c e a s e  h i s  m e m b e rsh ip  o f  t h e  N a z i  
C e l l .
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grrpà f t m ir p ro pa grvn d a nach Irland
I. ESrerkreia
;i
A
< 1
!
A. Irland selbst»
1) £sr31Ir5rr^?rrrgrhältiils se .
Hier Ist stet3 sorgfältig syrischen den. (nsntralen) 
Eire rn»9 ¿las britischen Eordirland gay.'Gn'terscheld i r n *  3Jia
Gransea dar nflnsssngEHagi i cagieiten:% decken. S'Igea Jedoch
nicht nit der politischen Grenns. V '
\Eis BerSlkerung Irlands sahlt etaaa Sfeer- nil Ionen 
¿lenschgn - Esvan leben rund 3 tlilli r»n<»n in Sire, und Iciapp 
1 V4- Cllllon in Eordirlnnd. \
\Sie Eerrohner Eires sind grösstenteils ZatSolüen" \ ■ ♦•and haben ein lehhnftea TTn-fc-fcrr.^ l>M°FgnaH-fcRg>-f ti- Die dasrakra—v
tische Ideologie ist stark, ebenso dar: Eespeifc 22r Jassrüa. 
Schon kirchlichen Gründen herrscht wenig YeratSLsflsdB 
rcrA g-rr n* SjTpathie für t»7- < £ber\
unser Haggf gegen England erwirbt ocs trotsde® in dsa «trak\ 
national fühlenden Schichten <rlTt«Fn graeeen EespeSct* nach dea\ 
alten iert »Englands Terlegenheit is-fc Irlands Galaganheit* • \
Erinnerungen ans der 5eltkrlegBM.it und Ol» telntun— 
gen der dentschen gjasenschaft ks£  dem Gehievt dar kaltlwchea 
Pocraohacg tragen dasa. bei» ¿sss eis» reisdsciaLft XCr
d u  dcctscha Tclk. nicht bsatsht» esg tessh. eis. glossar Eail
der- I m .  gicrat geradeso, eine verniehtande glcdcrT.Tgg Ssa—
1 » w l«  t ?
In dar beatlgsa scirrieri^sa lag» ßrös* dio Eterea— 
litatsgclitik da Talerae die Snatiasmg «Her :&aisa» «a^i 
dar englanfifrecndl I nhan»
i #  ■ ■■■■■ ■ è  ? ^ 7 4 s e  U ' “ 1 -
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2linehgr gesinnt ala die Engländer selbst. -in Drittel, alao 
etsa 350.000 Zenschen, sind Katholiken, groasenteils nations— 
listiach und en^landfelrtdlich gesinnt»
fcad darüber hinaus) erhoffen Ton. Ausgang des gegsnaärtigsa 
Krieges die «iederyerelnlgung grins Irlands xmfl 3eine rcllt 
Souveränität und internationale Stallung. De TeLLera teilt 
diese Soffsungon und hat seine Neutralitätspolitik nicht 
zuletzt auf Bie auf^ebaut.
25C.CCO 'betragen (Irland rrar hinsichtlich. Rundfunk lange 
rückständig). Et«va die Elilfte durfte für den Bnrpfan^ knntinen—  
taler Sendungen geeignet sein. Der E2rerirels «rar bla Uriels—  
ausbruch in crosaeu und gannen auf die städtische und länd­
liche Intelligenz beschränkt. Cie Bauern des «estens, soweit 
sie überhaupt hörten, beschränkten sich auf den Landessender 
Athlons, der fast inner hörbar ist.
Gründen nur die Sendungen der E3C in Betracht, A l *  sehr- gut 
enpfangen werden. Da sie in der Progranngestaltung den. Sen­
dungen van Athlons natürlich weit überlegen sind., geben sia- 
desi irischen E3rer auch den erwünschten an
g r o sa *  S e i t *
fangen der- BBC. gehört, s.S. in Gestalt dar Sendungen das 
Senders Sorthara Ireland. Dieaer wurde naah Iriegsaasbraeh 
atillgelagt. Seither- hSren die ünloniatan nur dl* BBC-?rogr»s«a 
aus England. An den «-ngH ■cKan Sendungen *ua Daatschland äSzfts 
weniger Interesse beatehen ala in »ngUMrium TiATivpüi,. Dia 
Eationaliaten das Korden* waren rer das Erlag ebenfalls cd£
4 1 a  BBS a n g e w la a e n , h S r te n . a b e r  amch s e h r  AthleaB«» S s
a l a  a a l s t  d en  E naaren  S c h ic h te n  a agefeggea ,. a l s  s a
BradfunVaapfang ttbarhsupt ralativ wenige Anteil«
Die irischen Eationlisten in beiden Landes-teilen
Die Zahl der .^p fangs ¿je rate in Ri re dürfte ungefähr
Dariben kp.nen für das ganze T^nd schon an<
In Eordirland wurden von den Unionlaten. ™ *  a*« Sen—
■7
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Blas war dl« läge vor d e s  Erieg. Seither haben sieh, 
natürlich. Teriademngen voll T,og3n» Bsecsrdsrs nass sich, in den 
nationallatlechen Kreisen (weniger in dsn. ra5i0nisrfcinch.es.) 
aln Interesse an den engllachsprachl £ * rn Sgsdangen sss Deutsch­
land entwickelt haben. Pür die gTLiachen Sendungen. ena 
Deutschland aiehe den folgenden Abschnitt#
3)" Die Sprachenfrage.
2t^a 5 Prosent der 2ev£lkerans von Sire spricht «la 
Huttersprachö irisch (= gMLisch). Cie höran gerns die gilli— 
sehen Sendungen aas Deutschland (es schncicheit i h m  Sprach- 
bosrusstsein), aber als politisch wichtige Sprache £2111 
Gälisch so gut wie £ ¿Lee lieh aus. Die zeit Irisch redende 
Bevölkerung ("Uatire Speakers“) wchnen in -esten und sind seist 
Zlelnbauern. G.llische Sendungen von. Festland können Ton ihnen 
kann enpfangen werden. Sie hcren also isat nur ithlone 
(gällsch und englisch), canabea wohl euch B3C.
Die geil sehen Sendungen werden aber nicht ncr ven den 
■native apeakers* abgehört, sondern, auch von. den politisch 
viel wichtigeren Zlenent der Sprachenthusiaaten in den gebil­
deten Schichten des gansen Landes, die G-üisch erat erlernt 
haben. Sie- erblicken in der gälischen Sprachpolitik, für die 
eie nit allen Kräften eintreten, einen nationalpolitischen. 
Faktor ersten Banges und auf sie wirkten, die gälischen Sen­
dungen aus Deutachland natürlich «ehr vorteilhaf ~t. Dias« 
süaeen. also erhalten bleiben. Sa fragt sich nur, wie es nit 
dan Enpfang. atehrt.
Der weiter» irische HSrerkrela. ’ ~
Dar irische HCrerkreis ist Irtgaa n i c h t  ia vollem 
Umfang gasehen, wenn b&u dabei rar an Irland &albat dankt. 
5aben den 3 V3 Billionen national fehlender Iren. a x £  dar Insel 
s elbo tr gibt es die luagewandarten, beaw* die Isehto^Bcat Trat. 
Auswanderer»* -
So laben: in Croaabritr^rien. (LarAan, dasgsss-* M5ss>- 
poel und ln vlolaa «afisrm Saartrea^ ouaia nsrSSrlich. SScr &sa 
ganz« Land veratraut) lrtadaatcaa 1  Y 2  S i l U c a g a  l,
die aioh. ihrer lr lechen Besterft Vaeasei sind. Xa As&tsaldsa
' • - 2474SS_-4-
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Bin* es etea 250.OCQ» is. Eansda etsa 150.000» in den Yarsinlg— 
ton Staaten 5 — 6 F41H oaan {allen chna B arünhsichti^ans ¿er  
rollionsen la Angelsschsentaa aafgegangcnen EiechblELtigen} •
Eie ln {Srasstritannien lebenden TTachfroggen Ton Iren 
nögon su etwa croi Eritteln in der angelsächsischen politi— 
sehen Ideologie befangen Ealn, aber clndestena ein Drittel 
fühlt sicher natienslisitisch. In Earada und Australien 
dürft« es btü? anglLnstiger liegen. In den USA ist der Eua—
idertnats dar besagst irisch ?2hienden eher ncch höher• Eie 
v^ t»-‘ <zrf>e*'n Irsa oiad cs Tsleras naticnalpolitische 
?ra s tige—rrunpfhsrt e »
Alle nnf ge wählten Zlensnte, euch w e m  sie nasi- 
feindlich, sogar wenn sie g ~ p r^ifTsrir_d 1 i gh denken» sind 
doch cshr eirrfinil ich gegen ¿ede Eanachteiligung und SrÜninng 
irischer Interessen und der irischen Nation. Sie stellen, 
susamenge nennen r einen potentiellen, gegen England beein­
flussbaren ESrerfcrcis dnr, dar den dea Zlutterlandse aa 
Sahl und Baden tung nicht nachateht.
II» Bisherige Sendungen nach Irland
GSllsche Saaännjggn
Ten deutscher Seite mrrde nach Irland eeit Erieg3eu3— 
fcruoh gonSchat * 1 rrr^ l sochontlich estf Gälisch gesendet* Seit 
Beginn der SeatcffeusiTe ist der Urrfang der Sendungen T«r— 
doppelt Borden. 51» laufen jetst e s . Eittwoch nnd Sonntag roa 
22.30 bis 22*45 tlhr (Eursrellcn E23) » Ea such dies« ersreiter­
ten Sendungen mär in g31ischex~ Sprache lanfan, wenden sie sieh, 
praktisch also m r an die Saticnalisten Eires* Sie erfassen, 
nicht cinaal die altere Generation der Hatianüsten (welche 
w GSlicch »T-la-r7-,^  konnte) und eis erfassen überhaupt nicht
die latioaaliatea Ecrdirlacda*.
* ! •
Pan« rein technische Problea der KCglichha it 4«® 
Itapfan^ e* bedarf dringend'einer ^ Cwersaefaang ferch E^nÜfunh— 
tcchrerctEadig»* Sa fee©*s2ai ¿er V3r£.schtv finss dis ScsSsagsa;
: ■ V  . ■ / ; .  4  • • • ' . .
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oft gar nicht drreh^rrr^en. Bela Ast lief t o t einiger Zeit eia
Selegraaa des deutschen Gesandten ln Cablin ein, worin er 
fragte, ob Beutschlaad CTbcrhaapt noch, auf GiLLiaoh sende.
Sr sannta die richtig 7sllenl£nge, hat also offenbar auf 
dieser (tatsächlich, bcniltsrten) TTellenlänge keinen Enpfang 
gshabt.
Die der oendmi^en Irland -von. den Sendern
Honorars—2rannn auf nurs^ellensendcm. hat den Z^rpfan^ in 
Irland c77eifcllos ■varachlechtart.   — _
Bas rro£r=3 der gaiicchen Sendungen beatand tioher 
hauptsächlich. au3 Nachrichten und Zciraentarsn, sowie gele­
gentlichen talko.
Ba3 Pehlen von. Sen dar, re r. a~,if c^'-lisch.
Snglischsprachige Sendungen unsererseits nach Irland 
finden rJ.cht 3tattj die des Gällachen unbändigen üationaliatan 
der saassr. Insel and dar EÜ^ratioa werden ven uns also in
1  ^ .jC^ j. <* p-le Iren .-"^ ara^ ^^ Tt nieht an.%? e3T^ r cch.cn« denn
anssre Sendungen in englischer Sprache, ciad nicht an ihrexAdresse Gerichtet. In diesen engliochspral^igan 3endnngea 
sind irische Fragen bisher absichtlich re mieden worden»
Biese letzteren Sendungen laufen 1el Europa-Diana t 
ran. Beutschlandsender, Breslau, Erssen, Friesland, tt-1 lTnram, * 
Calais, Laxenburg and Rennes»
Ten F. cm wird -tätlich 2Gnal auf Bnglisch gesendet 
(gSlisahe Sendungen bringt an Kontinent setz Beatsohlaad 
*a»«g9). JLnch Raa hat e« bisher- ▼erraiaden, beaandBr«, auf 
Irische Eurer abgestiaate Sendungen auf englisch, ca schicken* 
E* Laufen, aber, dea Ternehraen nach, Torbereitungen n t  eines 
Ausbau in dieser Richtung.
Zuaaaaanfaaeend kann also gesagt werden,, dass Ala 
Köglichinlt einar anti-esglinchen, Eaadfankgropaganda T*r— 
nittsla dea Elt—Irenta=a bich.gr tiharhaupt nicht anageaStat 
werde« d a  Staaten dar Achee wenden sieh ln ihree «agllsc&— 
sprach 1 gen Saadaagsa bet an. das Angslasehscntan Nlbai und 
die darin vfilllg gafgeganganea ran Haas ana antowtawriffla.
Kl sperrte, nicht aber an rund 10 XUUosan Eeaachea irisch an
. . .. .  ;• 2 4 7 5 0 0
TolknbewusstBelna, von denen 99 Prozent das Englische als
üuttersprache reden tnd die ln sämtlichen angelsächsischen 
Ländern eine wichtige, oft eine höchst wichtige» Holle 
spielen,
C-rür-dg für dia blsheri/te Zurückhaltung.
i* , •
Sie sind einleuchtend. Eine sticke Propaganda hätte 
de Telera die Aufrechterhaitung der für uns vorteilhaften 
irischen Heutrslität noch ersch7?ert. Sie hätte auch rrohl die 
englische Haltung gegenüber Eixe ungünstig beeinflusst.
G-g ~sn diese Zurückhaltung sprach, dass eine stärkere Irland— 
propagsnaa des ILanpf der Anti—Interventionisten in USA dien­
lich ist. Die Iro—Aaerikancr sind innerpolitisch ein wichtiges 
Zlenent und die Interventionisten haben grosse Anstrengungen 
genacht, sie für den Ilrieg su goTrinnen. Bisher ohne nennens­
werten Erfolg. Le Yaleras grösster Aktivpposten ist der \liinbus seines Rückhaltes an den Anarika-Iren. Dieser soll 
unterminiert werden. Dann hofft man, auch «alt dar irischen 
Ueutrslität leichtes Spiel zu haben. £3 ist also ein Nach­
teil unserer Zurückhaltung in der Irischen Propaganda, dasa 
wir den Aserika—Iren in ihren Eanpf m. die Heutralität keine 
aktive Hilfe geben.
\¿ye.^ fall der Gründe für Zurückhaltung,
\Allmählich ist wohl die Zeit geknnmen, die Propaganda 
ln irischer Elchtung zu verstärken* Der Irak-Srieg ist ein 
Dünkirchen des engl lachen Prestige« in Sahen Osten. Seine 
Wirkung erfasst auch ändert Satellitenstaaten* Di* Anti—  
Interventionisten in USA verspüren. dieaon Auftrieb bereit* 
seit dam Balkan feldaus* So 1®^ «ln paycholerischer Groeaan— 
griff auch, im irischen Sektor wohl angebracht*
Die Iren, eelbat fühlen, daae Jetst wichtige Sat—  
acheidnngon in der Luft hangen, dl* ench ihr Schicksal 
beattemen* (fohl lat ee um die Stutzpunkte rsMgar gscrordsn, 
aber die Bombardierungen von Seifest haben den Erleg rShor 
gebracht» Sie *»ig»n einen neuen Aepefct dea tnaterproislsasa 
und. treffen einen. nervSeen Sei* punkt erator Ordcang. Itorch
2475017 ~
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Ulster Ist ein 2eil dar Insel aktiv und pssair in dèa .Erleg 
verwickelt. Hit den Schickaal Englands entscheidet sich; m m !» 
die L'lsterfrage. Dasu können die erti eilten BliDCtadeacinferig— 
kalten und der 2!errenkrieg. Znrs t die Iren iEkLen, dass 
die Trage der irischen * iedervereini^smg und dazdLt dar ertd— 
gültigen und voll ständigen Lösung gsna Irlands -atta dea 
■britischen Systen in eine letzte, entscheidende Firnse eia— 
tritt.
Ben sollten *iir grepagandistisch, sa. ZEchmsg tragen.
III. Auabaunöglichkeiten einer Propaganda, 
in irischer Richtung
Eine verstärkte Rundfuakpropaganda. dieser Irt gliedert 
sich. aa. bestes. wie folgt :
A. Offizielle deutsche Sendungen.
1. nach Irland
In gälischer Sprache
Die gälischen Sendungen Bären ia. bisherigen TTnfang unbedingt 
beinubehalten. Ihre Erweiterung ist aben Esreefclca.
b) in englischer Spraeäi*
Der ^eaante Ausbau hätte sieh in Englisch sn ToHniahen*
Etwa 15 1» des Quantons der ganzen bisherigen. Dienste so£
Englisch ist für die irischen Probleme nicht’nnrieL. Ton 
dieses Secdeprograsa wären wei Drittel toq des. M-sherigea 
englischen Sendungen absuxweigen j ein Drittel «Sre sos&ts— -■'-!
U fth  irnfm w uhnon T
(Diese Schätzungen berücksichtigen auch die usterurtsiaHsd. 
rob 2 und C Tongaschlagnan SnrsitarEagadiansta.)
■ o) Staticaai ~t ~ >• - ' ■
Hier alnd drei. Forderungen so. berückaicbtl g«a t :j
. ' / .  . : ,  m
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aa, Dl« Saugtasnga 4er Sendongsn sasa auf glttelirellan 
Isafen f 2nr=s«nd«r allein gcnflgen nicht•
bb. Der EHitelwllecseEder sasa ein. Srosa-Sender sein ) sa 
besten Bre=gn ( } 9 Friasland ( ' , ) «
cc. Daneben ist »in sg^der erstLnacht (an besten Rennaa
), nicht scrc.de aus "pan—kaltiachen" Errrägun—
geng die für cLiersen. hretcnischen Sender -sprechen n£gen,
*a7-a s ^ 3  rein technischen Gründen (¿jater Enpfans).
d. Gendasalten
Zwischen 17,30 «iä 13 dir r t^ ^A dann wieder swi3chen. 21 und 
22 Uhr (der r - - ? ? * " - rz  bessert aich an den langen irischen Scs- 
ssrabendsn d t  der 5ärr~3ggng.)
Die Sendsnran sollen rrLcüt Eit denen der eignentlichan Pro­
paganda nach England ä »ersehne Iden.
Inch w-Sre ea verfehlt , etara die lie^rs Bulletins der BBC 
blockieren so. sollen, Denn ziehen die irischen Ecrer
sehr gr.hrscha 1 nl Ich London vor.
2, rach irisrlia _
Sendungen en die aaeriksnischen Iren, nit Eicht strahlen 
wäxsn, drirTrend «rsSaaeht, ea besten ttbor den Sender Rennes«
ist nicht eu viel, DaaAusEass der- Sen— 
dangen fiela nntar die ob*n sab 1 b angegebene Gessateenge«
Ser Ausbau ¿er- SendnngaiL in. englischer Sprache ans 
*«»1 die «Ich, an dis Iren richten, wäre sehr zu 'begrüssen* 
T<rrCTTT,|M^ =^rw£ ist allerdings eine starke deutsche 
Ingsranz. auf Prr*^ ‘»rrF»£^ n'fcfll-fc?mg (aiehe Abschnitt TT} und. 
gats ■-"■ <* - Dsxn die üntarrichtung der italienischen.
Öffentlichkeit 2£er irische ?ragan ist stark: durch gsiatliahe 
Tw-f grmarM ga-fg-ySrfc^. DiSSSf IMnefaBl trSbsa ^ SSll*
gafisrfrber ist Yecsi«sht oa Plat*,. /
••• .•••-• . : • :..r |  ' _ - 9
• * ^ - *■ .. ! ^  . k. . ,y'., «. . .«.. ’ „ ^ "—V *!£ • V
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Andererseits findet der ITasa Eon (Stadt das Papstes) 
ln Irland stets eine gewisae aufnahnebereite seelisch* Grund 
sticmng. Dies ¿am. katholisch—religiös gefärbten. ialts 
sugate kennen, denen unsererseits wenig Überzeugungskraft 
innewohnt.
*S—3ender (Unreellen).
(Das Aumsss dieser Sendungen fiele unter die oben, suh 1 b 
angsbenen Gesani^engB.)
1) Ein S—Genfer soll dis Ansichten ancrikanischer Iren sun 
¿.usdm.ck brin^a. Zusannenaraeit mit den Anerikadienstea 
wäre TorausEetinng. Der Qprechor rmsa aneriksniDch reden« 
Solche Sendns£cn würden La Irland 2rneifello3 nit gro3ser 
>.ufnsrksan>eit verfolgt werden.
2) Sin rarvmischer G-öender könnte gegebenenfalls die 
Iren in Australien eir-geoetzt werden.
üenorkttn- : Für alle Sendungen unter A und C nüsste getrach
tet werden, unter den Irischen Insassen der Kriegs gefangenen 
lager gesigna? Sprecher, bcw. sogar Llltarbeiter su. finden» ■
IT, Ataban der Prograna*
Sa kamen folgende Eauptlienlen. ln Betracht i
A. Ifcegclcfissipgr gachrichtendianat t Unter ITT A.
n x  l  2 , m  s  m d  m  a t u ' : ;; . , y  ■
S» rnnmntierte Eachrichten t in. allen, 1a  Abschnitt TTT 
angeführten Diensten*. -
C • "nDra i Bl» Auswahl, der Zhezaea. zsaaa sich. ^ » « > 1 Eigen­
art der- Sender richten* • i :
Oie Serrdnrgsn »ollen an; da» eigenstSnllge Satlasal—  ' 
bernias t® ein <ter Itctl ln aller Val» empelleron, rti« as«rtra2a 
Haltung des langes d&äorah. eeollsch. atärfcoa und' als «¡»gi of, 
in ein* XaabalUgsrens unsublegen trachticv, Babel t w y  
dnrehaos die Linie sing*halten «erden, dass die tefestiit-
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erhaltung dieser Heutralitiit nicht nar- in eigenen irischen 
latexesae liegt, sondern auch in den des uiederoufbaus der 
¿eit nach den iCriege. Beseitigung des Ulster-Unrechtes iat 
eine grundlegende F orderurg aller Iren und dient der 
wirtscliaftlich.cn Zukunft des Tjndwa, der Befriedung T>n>r1 gmfl 
Gegenüber und dsj3.lt einer neuen, besseren ? eit Ordnung.
mThenen t
1. Geschichtlich» (einschliesslich Gräuelpropaganda histori­
schen Inhalts).
a) Z ± o  englischen Rechtsbrüche und Grausamkeiten
bei Eroberung ur.d Ziederhaltung des Landes. Bin fast unerschöpf 
liehes Ihena (Schandtaten Crcnv/ellu usvj.) Gielie auch IT 4 a.
b) Eie sozialen Zerstörungen an irischen Yolkskcir— 
per durch Landl-:enfishationen, Hunger, Austreibung unsähliger 
keuschen, 7erschleppung in die Sklaverei U35.
c) Ilatholikenverfclgungen. lin fast unerschöpfliches 
Thena. Besonders für Ron geeignet, Giehe auch 17 4- a und
17 Sr b.
d) der absolute Bankerott der englischen. Kolonial— 
politik in dieser seiner ältesten üolonie.
e) Das Epes des irischen Preiheitskanpfes seit der 
Eroberung. Beispiele heroischen Cpfersata der- Iren und 
bestialischer Behandlung der Besiegten durch Bngland» Siehe* 
auch 17 5 Bi
Z .  Irland als Blut— und ffnlturspendar»
a) Die Bedeutung Irlands als Auabeutungsob JeJct de* 
Inperiuns. Gein Aufbau ohne nilitürische und. kolonieatarisch* 
Leistungen der Zelten. «n^ twiVha-r ("Tampjri «am» Englarik an.
I r l  and**) .
b) Dl« Bedeutung der- Ixen, für Aaerika. flohen t o t 
■Rn£\nnA I m  Land der Freiheit. Sollen eie unter tausrikasiacker1 
Plagge für England bluten T (Deutschland keine ^drohssag 
Aaerikafl) • Baa wäre Terlrognzzss; A m  tmeri Vnr1 eohen Idaala Taaä.
- — X L  —
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und trenn es Aserlbiner gibt, die da^u bereit sied, die an«ri~ 
ksnischen Iran sind es nicht;. Siehe auch. IT 6 d.
c) die geistigo Leistung Irlands in der LLLsaionie—  
rung einst und Je tat*
' d) der Beitrag Irlands zur neueren englischen 
Literatur (die ohne Iren nicht bestünde) and auf vielen 
anderen Gebieten«
e) das irische Bevrusstaoin der Ausgewanderten und 
ihrer Kaehkcnr-cn in aller -eit, besonders in USA.
C-~ir.dnotg Toa 1 und 2 :
In der europäischen Geschichte gibt es kein Gegen­
stück zu ¿er Behandlung Irlands durch Sngland. Cie srar ein 
700 jahrires Verbrechen an einen ebenrürtigen, vielfach sogar 
höherstehenden ITachbarvolk.
3. Sociales.
Bas chris tlich-soaiale Staats ideal der Iren. Bia 
plntokratische ."¡eltanschaunng als Gegner des Bauerntums und 
al3 Ausbeuter der städtischen Axbeitarschaft (letzteres 
wichtig iJüjcc der irischen Arbeitersasse in Glasgow, Liver­
pool, London usv.)
4« 5e 11 rcions ¿ragen«
a). die tapfere Aufrecht er hal tung der katholischen 
Eeligion durch die Iren trotz aller Unterdrückungen. Uralte 
freundschaftliche Beziehungen nit Sen., Spanien, Belgien usw. 
Irland eines der kltestan chriatlichen Länder- Earopaa*.
Siehe auch IT In, IT' I o* -
b) Intoleranz der Dlsterproteetanten einet und jetat 
(sehr ergiebig). Siehe auch IT 1 c, .IT 5 bf IT 3 e«.
c) die » Aafreohterhaltang der irischen Neutralität 
als Akt bewussten Chris tentuaa gjsgrsnaber- des. kaltursexotaren- 
den Absichten der Plutckra tis, die christlich tut» dabei aber
d e a  ^  t j t r i a  11  mamm nrrvt B g d ß 3 B »  *4 narr b a n k e r o t t e n  S fc ltO T u B n ilg
vertritt. Bern wirklioh chriatlichen fitodacken einer- intear»- 
nationalen «ledarraraghxmng dient ea besten, wer neutral t&lbt
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5» Der irische Staat«
a) Seine efiedexeufxichtu=s gegen den. Jlderstand 
läiglanda. Siehe 17 1 a, IT 1 e.
b) Seine socialen, und religiösen Ideale. Siehe IT 3* 
17 4 a-c.
o) Eie Aufteilung des Lgrsdea in englischen InterBase 
* Siehe such 17 4 b, IT 8 e-e.
6. Die irische Eeutg^ ität.
a) TU r e  g eb rau ch t n u r  s e in  T -e rf^ scn g sn äsa ig ea  
(van J’estr.ir.stertrtatut garantiertes} Zecht, 3eE es neutral 
blieb. Dieser Urieg dient eng12schsn Geldaaehintei'essen.
■Lein irisches Interesse sieht auf den. Spiel. In Gegenteil t 
Irland könnte Ton einer englischen, aber nicht ron einer 
deutschen, Niederlage nur profitieren. 2rot3dsa bleibt 
Eire neutral«
b) Die Dominien sollten daraus lernen, auch ihre 
eigenen Rechte zu wahren. TT ollen aie England retten, so 
sollten sie ea durch Rücktritt yon Urieg arst recht zun. 
Frieden zjringen, ehe es su spät ist»
c) Die Iren sind die be-s'ten Innner englischer 
politischer llethoden. Ihre Neutralität lat also die denkbar 
schäxfste Terurteilung diese* j n t  1 Exieges«
Die Ixen in all ex ¿eit sollen dieser Seiateahaltung de« 
Euftexlandes folgen, ¿elbeiger&cirtigt^i t, Scheinheilig— 
ksit und GxausaEkeit der eng^ 1 neben Iclltik »erden Ton den 
Eriegahefeem in USA geteilt. 3o «ex es schon i» Weltkrieg» 
i t L S . haben diese Slenente ans den T?n>nr»g7iwtii*ifc»l genatoht T
»eitex t
d) Di« JLaerika—Ixen sind tos. der grasen Diaspora, 
die berufensten, fax die irtachs lectralitit sa. ikSbspfmu 
Dessit schätz *n aia «och ihre- «igaee SagtrulitSt» Dia 
■deutsch» Bedrohung* AagrUfcaa lgnhcrlich» Siebs euch IT 2 V 
m t  den Toraagagsagenaa gaaüct»- -________________ :..
; y j \  .... \ : 7 . ;  ’ ’" i - ü
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e) Eire wird seine Freiheit und Eeutralität -weder 2L r 
Eehl, Schiffe, Gold oder Stützpunkte verschachern, noch für
tage Versprechenden hinsichtlich. Fordirlands euf^aban. Eer 
EcKiernls—Schirinde! sur Zeit Eednonds und Car3ons vrird sich 
nicht tri.cäcraoIen lassen. Zire wird nie englische Soldaten 
oder dis einer anderen krie^führenden ilacht gntwiUig ins 
Land, lassen, anch. keine anerikanische, seien selbst. Iren 
darunter. Diea entspricht der nationalen 5ürde Eires. Sind . 
erat sinaal enrliseha Joldatan in Eire, dann beginnt 
•lallend eie ¿ex* c eia altes Ge^altspiel.
f) Die "eatralitiit dient also den begreiflichen 
Ziel, den ZcLrecken eines neaan englischen Eriegss, der die 
Iren nichts angoht, von Sire fernsuhalten.
Ihn ron der ¿annen Insel fcmnuhalten, ist Eire leider 
nicht n'i l^ich rsnesen. Eie englische Liecht in Ecrdirland hat 
dieses ame L-and zran Opfer ron ErlegsjLsndlur.gen cenacht.
C-in-'e os aach rialen seiner Eer/ohner, besonders der Ealrio— 
nalisten, so wäre dar Land ein Teil des neutralen ?;ire. Eie 
gräaste Schnld daran, dass es soweit können konnte, haben 
die Separatisten in Belfast. Eit ihnen leiden jetzt anch dis 
Eaticr.nlisten nnter den Bonb-artienents dieses englisch— 
jüdischen Erlegos, der trotz der wiederholten Prieöensange—  
bote Deutschlands weitergeht.
Erotaden fühlt Eire für seinen leidenden ii-eckbcro ist 
Corden, Katholiken und Protestanten, und wird nach Eräften 
helfen, ihr loa su lindem.
Dies ist auch n£tig, angesichts dea Tersagena der 
Belfsster eng] 1 schon Behörden nach TWWh«-rä 1 Brnngun bei. 4er 
dann herrschenden. TlEchtlingTnot« * .
g) Die Neutralität Eiras lat al.no nicht pro—deutsch» 
oder pro—italienisch» Sie ist auch nicht onti—britisch» Sie 
ist c i rrfreh pro-irisch. Sie ist eine echt» Seutralität osd 
wünscht,cur Tertürsang der. Leiden beisattogezu- Dssd-t hilft 
Sire auch, die Leiden, »einer nordirisehen Brüder ebhSrran»
h) Ein geeintes und freies Irland «Süsacirt,Taster Ssa - 
Staaten der «eit eine flaaexafls Tglt e P w M Ileh versaaksr^a 
Seutralität su halten* Tgl» IT 8 f.»
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7. Dct Slgcfede— grd gsrüfehkrieg fairen die irigeha Ueutr^" * tüt ..
Grgadterdsng :
Der Ir« erkennt, dass die englische, von TT3A gefcrdsrfca 
aSrgahlockade den 5« eck verfolgt, Sire gegen Beinen. Sillen 
"hriegsreif* su mc.ch.cn. Aller Eire Trtrd dieser Blockade wider­
stehen, sc rie die Iren bisher alle englischen Vergewaltigangs— 
versuchen siegreich überwunden hafcen. Der Ire denkt nicht 
“ natcrialistisch und das Hungern hat ihn Ungland s clbat bei­
ge bracht. Tgl. auch IT 6 e.
Schülcran." der hünr.-tlich Tcrachärften SlockadaachTriri^ksitsn 
Zir53 :
a) Leoena— und Genu3snittelknc.ppheit : Brot, "eepj£affee«
h) Znapphcit an Kchls, Treibstoffen, Holn, u o t .
c) inappheit an.Industriorohstaiien., Halbfabrikaten ust?.
d) Daraus resultierende Arbeitslosigkeit.
e) Torenthaltung von Schiffsraums-.
f) Der Kervenkrieg.
?Totr-dea ist all. das leichter su ertragen als Bcribcrtlensnts,
Land- und Luftkrieg, vielleicht sogar 3ürge~kzieg. Hie Iren, 
in aller «'eit kennen viel dann beitragen, den 7olh von Sir« . 
diesen Schrecken z u . ersparen r t - n i die ZTordiren cLavxm wieder 
eu befreien. .
8» Sie ncrdirische Fra -re. Sieha aizch IT 5 e. ^
s) Di« Iren werden nieraila enf die Vereinigung mit
den durch Gewalt -and List abgotrennten BrOdem. in Horden 
rexrichten. '• C>
b) Srat nach. d m  Anfhören der Teilung Ist ein. Ter— 
tranessTolles Verhältnis ggeischen ?ir.glaj7d und Irland eftgi 1 rih,
e) B«rufung auf <SaM'-g»K»riria Xusserungen da 
Tsleras ncs* ■ ¡' ■ . r_...
d) Schilderung de» nsmerliehea Terror» dLor «ngliscfcsa -ti 
BehÄrdsn vea» gogsn dl» Sotleoallstaa Igrtitlanasr »r. -
.. * . V -  TJf „>
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e) Schilderung der damit verbundenen religiösen 
Unterdrückung und Benachteiligung. Siehe auch IT 4- b und 
Xxmdgebungen der katholischen Bischöfe ana Jüngster Zelt.'
f) Ein geeintes Irland wird frei sein und dem. 
dauernd neutral— Tgl. IT 6 lu
SchlnaBfoIgerung i ;
Der Sturz des britischen Irrperialisrnia, dar so 
viel an Irian ¿verbrochen hat, ist unabwendbar. Zr wird die 
iiedenrereinigung Irlnndo, da=it seine Lösung aun den 
letzten Bindungen an das Britische Imperien alt sich "bringen. 
H Dann wird Irland sein unveräusserliches Recht auf volle
v- Souveränität erfüllt sehen.o
f. Erst dann wird die wiederhergeetellte sourrerSnö
iriBche Kation, in Freundschaft nit allen Tölkem und ohne iede 
Bindung an andere Mächte, ihren vollen Beitrag ‘srun vTiedereuf— 
bau der durch den plutotratischen und unchristlichen Irrpe— 
rialisnus Englands zerstörten wahren internationalen. Gemein— 
schaft der TSlker leisten können.
\
■
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TRANSLATION (Appendix C)
2 4 / 8 0  P o l i t i c a l  A r c h i v e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  
P o l i t i c a l  B r o a d c a s t i n g  D e p a r tm e n t
FILES 
r e g a r d i n g :
C o n t a c t  p e r s o n  f o r  R e i c h  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  (RAM)
N a t u r e  o f  r a d i o  a b r o a d
German f o r e i g n  r a d i o  p r o p a g a n d a
V olum e 2 :  F i n l a n d  -  T u rk ey
To :
P o l i t i c a l  A r c h i v e  
D e p a r tm e n t  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  
R 67483
fr o m : A p r i l  
O c t o b e r  1 9 4 1
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Dept, for Foreign Affairs - Cultural Section 18.3.41 
Professor Mahr
Report
re: Radio propaganda to Ireland
I. Listenership
A. Ireland as a country
1) Circumstances of the population
Here it is essential to distinguish carefully between 
(neutral) EIRE and British NORTHERN IRELAND. However, the 
border does not coincide with political differences.
The population of Ireland is slightly more than 4 
million people. Approximately 3 million live in Eire and slightly 
less than 1.25 million in Northern Ireland.
The majority of inhabitants of Eire are Catholics and 
have a vivid national identity. Democratic ideologies are strong, 
as well as respect for America. There is little understanding of 
and absolutely no sympathy for National Socialism, mainly for 
reasons related to the Church. However, our fight against England 
gains great respect for us in strongly nationalist sections of 
the population, as the old saying goes "England's difficulty 
is Ireland's opportunity".
Memories of the World War and Germany's 
achievements in the field of Celtic research are both 
contributing factors to the fact that enmity for the German 
people does not exist, even though the majority of Irish people 
would not wish a devastating defeat of England.
In today's difficult situation, most circles agree with 
de Valera's policy of neutrality, even those more sympathetic to 
England.
- 2 -
In NORTHERN IRELAND, two thirds of the population are 
more English minded than the English themselves. A third, i.e. 
approximately 350,000 people, are Catholics, mainly nationalists
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and ill disposed towards England.
In BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY (and beyond), Irish 
nationalists set their hopes on the reunification of Ireland as a 
whole along with full internationally recognised sovereignty as 
the outcome of the present war. De Valera shares these hopes and, 
last but not least, has founded his policy of neutrality on them.
2) Radio Reception
The number of wireless receivers in EIRE probably amounts 
to 250,000 (concerning radio, Ireland was backward for a long 
time). Approximately half might be suited for receiving 
continental broadcasts. Up until the outbreak of the war, the 
listenership was more or less restricted to the urban and rural 
intelligentsia. Farmers in the West, insofar as they were 
listening at all, only listened to the local Athlone station 
which is nearly always audible.
Apart from this, only BBC programmes were suitable for 
the whole country, not only for language reasons but also because 
of their very good reception. For Irish listeners, they also 
provide a desired connection to the outside world because the 
programmes are obviously far superior to the broadcasts from 
Athlone.
In NORTHERN IRELAND, unionists only listened to BBC 
programmes, partly broadcast from the Northern Ireland station. 
This station has been closed down since the outbreak of war.
Since then, unionists only listen to BBC programmes from England. 
The interest in English language broadcasts from Germany should 
be smaller than amongst the audience in England. Before the war, 
nationalists in the North also had to rely on the BBC, but 
nontheless quite liked listening to Athlone, too. Since most were 
not well off, they spent relatively little time listening to 
radio.
- 3 -
This was the situation before the war. Naturally, since 
then a lot of changes have taken place. Particularly in 
nationalist circles (less so the unionists), an interest seems to 
have developed for English language broadcasts from Germany. 
Regarding the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany see the following 
paragraph.
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3) The Language Question
Approximately 5% of the population of Eire speaks Irish 
(Gaelic) as their native tongue. They like to listen to the 
Gaelic language programmes from Germany (it flatters their 
linguistic identity), but as an important language in the 
political sense Gaelic is not relevant. The only Irish native 
speakers live in the West and are mostly small farmers. Gaelic 
broadcasts from the Continent can hardly be received by them. 
Therefore, they mainly listen to Athlone (Gaelic and English), 
and besides that perhaps the BBC.
However, not only native speakers listen to Gaelic 
broadcasts, but also a politically much more important element, 
namely language enthusiasts amongst the educated sections of 
society throughout the whole country, who initially had to learn 
the Gaelic language. In Gaelic language policy, which they defend 
with all their might, they see a nationalist political factor of 
the first order, and the Gaelic broadcasts from Germany naturally 
have a very positive effect on them. These must therefore be 
maintained. The only question remains the reception quality
B. Additional Irish Listeners
The full extent of Irish listenership cannot be 
recognized however, when considering Ireland by itself. Apart 
from the 3-1/3 million Irish with nationalist sentiments on the 
island itself, there are the emigrants or the descendants of 
emigrants.
Thus at least 1-1/2 million people living in Great 
Britain (London, Glasgow, Liverpool and in many other centres, as 
well as being spread throughout the whole country) would be 
conscious of their Irish extraction. In Australia,
- 4 -
there are approximately 250,000; in Canada approximately 150,000; 
in the United States 5 to 6 million (all this WITHOUT consideration of 
half-breeds totally absorbed in Anglo-Saxon culture).
Approximately two thirds of Irish descendants living in 
Great Britain might be caught up in Anglo-Saxon political 
ideology, but at least a third would have nationalist sympathies.
In Canada and Australia the situation could hardly be less 
favourable than this. In the United States, the percentage of 
consciously pro-Irish people is rather higher. The American-lrish 
are de Valera's prestige trump card, nationally and politically.
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Yet all these elements, even If they are anti-Nazi and 
friendly towards England, are highly sensitive to any insults or 
moves against Irish interests and the Irish nation. Together, 
they represent a potential listenership with the possiblity of 
indoctrination against England, which is of no less quantity 
and importance than the listenership in the motherland.
II. Present Broadcasting to Ireland
A. Gaelic programmes
After the outbreak of war, there was initially one 
programme in Gaelic per week broadcast to Ireland. Since the 
beginning of the offensive the amount of programmes has been 
doubled. They are on air now on Wednesdays and Sundays from 
22.30
to 22.45 hrs (short wave DZD). Since those extended programmes 
only run in Gaelic, they practically only address the 
nationalists in Eire. They do not reach the older generation of 
nationalists (who were unable to learn Gaelic) and they do not 
reach the nationalists in Northern Ireland at all.
An investigation into the purely technical problem of 
radio reception is urgently required by the experts. It is
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suspected that the programmes often do not get through to the 
target audience. A while ago, a telegram was received by the 
Foreign Office from the German ambassador in Dublin, in which he 
asked whether Germany was still broadcasting in Gaelic. He 
mentioned the correct wavelength, therefore he obviously had no 
reception on this wavelength (which was in fact being used).
The changeover of Irish programmes from the Hamburg- 
Bremen transmitter to short wave stations has undoubtedly 
impaired the reception in Ireland.
The Gaelic broadcasts have so far mainly consisted of 
news and commentaries, as well as the occasional talk.
B. The lack of programmes in English
English language programmes do NOT take place from our
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side to Ireland. The Gaelic nationalists on the entire island and 
the emigrants who are unable to speak Gaelic ARE NOT 
ADDRESSED AT ALL BY THEIR IRISH IDENTITY, because our 
programmes in the English language are not aimed in their direction. 
In those English language programmes, Irish questions have so far 
been avoided intentionally.
The latter programmes are broadcast within the European 
service from the following German radio transmitters: 
Deutschlandsender, Breslau, Bremen, Friesland, Hilversum, Calais, 
Luxembourg and Rennes.
ROME broadcasts 20 times a day in English (on the 
Continent, only Germany puts Gaelic programmes together). In 
addition, Rome has avoided to date, to broadcast programmes in 
English specifically aimed at Irish listeners. There are, 
however, according to the grapevine, preparations for an 
expansion in this direction.
In summary, one can therefore say that the possibility of 
anti-English radio propaganda by means of the old-lrish culture 
has not been made use of at all. The Axis states mainly address 
Anglo-Saxons themselves with their English language programmes, 
and have not yet addressed those elements originally of other 
extraction but now totally integrated i.e. approximately
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10 million people with an Irish ethnic identity, of which 99 
percent speak English as their mother tongue and who play an 
important, often highly important, part in all Anglo-Saxon 
countries.
C. Reasons For Caution To Date
They are clear. De Valera's adherence to Irish 
neutrality, which is of advantage to us, would have been impeded 
by strong propaganda. It would also have detrimentally influenced 
the English attitude towards Eire.
Reasons AGAINST this caution might have been, that a strong 
Ireland propaganda drive serves the cause of the 
anti-interventionists in the USA. The Irish-Americans are an 
important element from the point of view of U.S. domestic 
politics and the interventionists have made great efforts to win 
them over in favour of the war, so far without much success. De 
Valera's biggest asset is the glorification of his support among 
Irish-Americans. There are moves to undermine this. They could 
then hope to have an easy game with Irish neutrality, too.
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Therefore it is a disadvantage of our caution on Irish propaganda 
that we do not give the Irish-Americans active support in their 
fight for neutrality.
D. Cancellation of the Reasons for Caution
The time has come to increase propaganda in the direction 
of Ireland. The Iraq war represents a type of Dunkirk for 
English prestige. It also affects other satellite states. This 
upsurge can already be felt by the anti-interventionists in the 
USA since the Balkan campaign. Thus a large-scale psychological 
attack would also be called for in the Irish sector.
The Irish themselves feel, that important decisions are 
in the air at the moment which could determine their fate too.
Indeed, things have calmed down around the military bases but the 
bombings of Belfast have brought the war closer to home. They 
emphasise a new aspect of the Ulster problem and hit a sore spot
- 7-
of the first degree. Through Ulster, one part of the island is 
involved in the war either actively or passively. With England's 
destiny the Ulster question will be decided too. In addition to 
that there are increased difficulties in shipping blockades and 
the war of nerves. In short: the Irish feel the question of 
reunification, and with that the final and total breaking free of 
the whole of Ireland from the British system, is entering a last, 
decisive phase.
We should now take this into account in our propaganda.
III. Expansion Possibilities for Propaganda 
Directed to Ireland
For increased radio propaganda of this kind the 
following is the best structure:
1. To Ireland
a) In the Gaelic Language
The present extent of Gaelic programmes must absolutely be 
maintained. However, their extension would be pointless.
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b) In the English Language
The ENTIRE expansion would have to take place in English. 
Approximately 15% of the total quantity of English language 
services is not too much for Irish problems. Two thirds of this 
would have to be provided for by the current English programmes; 
one third would have to be newly created.
(These estimates also take into consideration the proposals for 
extended services listed below sub 2 and C.)
c) Stations
Here three demands are to be taken into consideration:
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aa. The major part of the programmes must be transmitted over 
medium wave; short wave stations alone are not sufficient.
bb. The medium wave station must be a MAJOR STATION; preferably 
BREMEN, FRIESLAND.
cc. Besides that a CHANNEL STATION would be desirable (best 
would
be Rennes, not just because of pan-celtic considerations 
which would be favourable for this Breton station, but also 
for simply technical reasons (good reception).
d) Transmission Times
Between 17.30 and 18.00 hours and then again between 21.00 and 
22.00 hours (the reception improves with dusk in the long Irish 
summer evenings.)
The programmes should not overlap with those of original 
propaganda to England.
It would also be inappropriate to attempt to block the news 
bulletins from the BBC. In that case, the Irish listeners most 
probably would prefer London.
2. To America
Broadcasting for the Irish-Americans by means of 
directional beams would URGENTLY be desirable, preferably via the 
Rennes station. Three times per week would not be too often. The
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amount of programmes would be included in the total amount under 
para. 1 b.
B. Foreign Station
An expansion of programmes in the English language from 
Rome, which would address the Irish, would be very welcome.
However, one condition for this would be strong German 
influence on the programme format (see para. IV) and good 
cooperation. The reason for this is the fact that reporting on 
Irish matters to the Italian public is intensely coloured by 
ecclesiastical information channels. We should do without this 
sometimes cloudy source.
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On the other hand, the name Rome (the Papal city) will 
always find a certain receptive spiritual atmosphere in Ireland. 
This can be beneficial for talks on Catholic-religious 
tendencies, which have little conviction from our point of view.
C. G-Stations (Shortwave)
(The extent of these programmes would be included in the total 
under para. 1 b above).
1) A G-STATION should express the views of the American Irish. 
One requirement would be cooperation with the America services. 
The newscaster must speak with an American accent. Such 
programmes would certainly be followed with great interest in 
Ireland.
2) A JAPANESE G-STATION could in certain circumstances be 
deployed for the Irish in Australia.
NOTE: For all programmes under A and C it should be endeavoured 
to recruit suitable speakers, i.e. even collaborators amongst the 
Irish inmates of prisoner of war camps.
IV. Structure of the Programmes
The following main streams are under consideration:
A. REGULAR NEWS SERVICE: Under III A 1 b, III A 2, III B and 
III C 1.
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B. NEWS COMMENTARIES: in all services listed in paragraph III
C. TALKS: The choice of topics has to be determined according to 
the type of station.
The programmes are supposed to appeal to the independent 
national identity of the Irish around the world, to strengthen 
the neutral position of the country spiritually and to encourage 
reform into a NON-BELLIGERENT STANCE, while the line can be
- 1 0 -
maintained, that upkeep of this neutrality is not only in their 
own interest but also in the interest of world reconstruction 
after the war. Elimination of the Ulster injustice is a basic 
demand of all Irishmen, it serves the economic future of the 
country, as well as the satisfaction against England and support 
for a new, better world order.
TOPICS:
1. HISTORICAL (including horror propaganda of historical 
content)
a) The infringements of law by the English and their 
cruelties when conquering and oppressing the country. A nearly 
inexhaustable topic (Cromwell's scandalous deeds etc.) Also see 
IV 4 a.
b) The social destruction of the Irish people by means
of confiscation of land, hunger, expulsion of countless people, 
abduction to slavery etc.
c) Persecution of Catholics. A nearly inexhaustable 
topic. Particularly suitable for Rome. Also see IV 4 a and 
IV 4 b.
d) Absolute bankruptcy of England's policy of 
colonialism in this, its oldest colony.
e) The epic Irish freedom struggle since the 
Conquest. Examples of heroic self-sacrifice of the Irish and the 
awful treatment of the conquered by England. Also see IV 5 a.
2. IRELAND AS A CONTRIBUTOR OF BLOOD AND CULTURE
a) The significance of Ireland as an object of
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exploitation by the Empire. Its formation without military and 
colonising achievements by the Celts unimaginable ("England's 
vampirism of Ireland").
b) The significance of the Irish for America. Emigrated
to the land of freedom from England. Should they bleed under the 
American flag for England? (Germany no threat to America). That 
would mean denial of the American ideal and
-11  -
even if there were Americans prepared to do this, the 
American-lrish are not. Also see IV 6 d.
c) Ireland's spiritual achievements in missionary work 
past and present.
d) Ireland's contribution to modern English literature 
(which would be non-existent without the Irish) and in many other 
areas.
e) Irish awareness of the exiles and their descendants 
around the world, particularly in the USA.
Note to 1 and 2:
In European history there is no equivalent to England's 
treatment of the Irish. It was a crime against an equal, often 
even superior, neighbouring people lasting 700 years.
3. SOCIAL MATTERS
The Irish ideal of the Christian-Social state. The 
plutocratic philosophy as opponent of farmers and exploiter of 
urban workers (the latter important because of the large numbers 
of Irish workers in Glasgow, Liverpool, London etc.)
4. RELIGIOUS ISSUES
a) The courageous adherence to the Catholic religion by 
the Irish despite all the suppression. Ancient friendly relations 
with Rome, Spain, Belgium etc. Ireland one of Europe's oldest 
Christian countries. Also see IV 1a, IV 1 c.
b) Intolerance by Ulster protestants in past and 
present. Also see IV 1 c, IV 5 b, IV 8 e.
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c) Maintenance of Irish neutrality as an act of 
convinced Christianity against the destructive forces of 
plutocracy, pretending to be Christian, yet representing the 
materialism and egotism of a bankrupt world order. He who stays 
neutral serves the truly Christian spirit of national 
reunification best.
- 1 2 -
5. THE IRISH STATE
a) Its resurgence against England's resistance. Also see 
IV 1 a, IV 1 e.
b) Its social and religious ideals. Also see IV 3, IV 4
a-c.
c) The segregation of the country according to English 
interests. Also see IV 4 b, IV 8 a-e.
6. IRISH NEUTRALITY
a) Eire merely makes use of its constitutional right 
(guaranteed by the Westminster statute) if it remains neutral.
This war serves the interests of English money bags. No Irish 
interest is at stake. On the contrary: Ireland could only profit 
from an English defeat, yet not from a German one. Nevertheless, 
Eire remains neutral.
b) The DOMINIONS should learn their lesson to guard 
their own rights, too. Should they want to save England, then 
they should force it to the cause of peace, before it is too 
late, by retreating from the war.
c) The Irish are most well acquainted with English 
political methods. Their neutrality can also be considered as the 
sharpest condemnation of the English-Jewish war. All the Irish in 
the whole world should follow this attitude of their motherland. 
English politics' self-righteousness, hypocrisy and cruelty are 
shared by the malicious agitators in the USA. This was already 
the situation in the World War. What did those elements do with 
the ideal of the People’s Federation? Further:
d) Of the entire diaspora, the American-lrish have the 
greatest vocation to fight for Irish neutrality. With that they 
also protect their own neutrality. America "threatened by 
Germany" ridiculous. Also see IV 2 b and the previous point.
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e) Eire will neither sell off its freedom and neutrality
for flour, ships, money or military bases, nor give them up for 
vague promises with regard to Northern Ireland. The Home Rule 
swindle during Redmond's and Carson's time can not be repeated. 
Eire will never allow English soldiers or those of another 
warfaring power willingly into the country, or Americans, even if 
there are Irish among them. This is in keeping with the national 
dignity of Eire. If English soldiers alone were stationed in 
Eire, then England would yet again begin its old game of 
violence.
f) Neutrality thus serves the understandable aim of 
keeping the terror of a new English war, which is of no concern 
to the Irish, away from Eire.
To keep it away from the entire island has unfortunately 
been impossible for Eire. This poor country has become victim to 
military actions by the English power in Northern Ireland. If 
many of the inhabitants had their say, particularly the 
nationalists, the country would be part of neutral Eire. The 
separatists in Belfast must take the greatest blame for things 
getting out of hand. The nationalists now have to suffer with 
them the bombardments in this English-Jewish war, which continues 
despite repeated peace offers on behalf of Germany.
Nevertheless, Eire is sympathetic with her suffering 
neighbours in the North, Catholics AND Protestants, and will help 
within her powers to ease their fate.
Indeed, this is highly necessary in view of the failure 
to deal with the refugee problem, resulting from bombings, by the 
English authorities in Belfast.
g) Eire's neutrality is therefore not pro-German or 
pro-Italian. Neither is it anti-British. It is simply pro-Irish.
It is genuine neutrality and strives to shorten all the 
suffering. With that Eire also helps to alleviate the suffering 
of her Northern Irish brothers.
h) A united and free country amongst the states of the 
world desires to maintain permanent neutrality established under 
international law. Compare IV 8 f.
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7. THE BLOCKADE AND WAR OF NERVES AGAINST IRISH 
NEUTRALITY
Basic tendency:
The Irish recognize that the suffocating English blockade 
supported by the USA, aims to make Eire "ready for war" against 
her will. But Eire will resist this blockade, just like the Irish 
have up to now victoriously overcome all other English attempts 
of rape. The Irish do not think materialistically and they were 
taught starvation by England herself. Compare also IV 6 e.
Description of Eire's artificially tightened blockade
difficulties:
a) food shortages: bread, tea, coffee.
b) fuel shortages: coal, wood etc.
c) scarcity of industrial raw materials, semi-finished 
products etc.
d) unemployment resulting from these.
e) withholding of cargo space,
f) war of nerves.
NEVERTHELESS all this is easier to endure than bombings, land and 
air raids, perhaps even civil war. The Irish around the world can 
contribute a lot to save the people of Eire from this terror and 
to rid the Northern Irish from it again.
8. THE NORTHERN IRISH QUESTION. Also see IV 5 c.
a) The Irish will NEVER relinquish their claim to 
unification with their brothers in the North, separated from them 
by violence and cunning.
b) Only after partition ceases, is a trusting 
relationship between England and Ireland possible.
c) With reference to related statements by de Valera
etc.
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d) Description of the most recent terror by the English 
authorities etc. against Northern Irish nationalists.
- 15-
e) Description of related religious suppression and 
discrimination. Also see IV 4 b and declarations by Catholic 
bishops from the recent past.
f) A unified Ireland will be free and then permanently 
neutral. Comp. IV 6 h.
Conclusion:
The overthrow of British imperialism is unavoidable since 
it has afflicted Ireland with so many crimes. It will bring with it 
Ireland's reunification so that it can sever all remaining 
connections to the British Empire. Then Ireland will see the 
fulfillment of its inalienable right to total sovereignty.
Only then will the reconstituted sovereign Irish nation 
be able to fully contribute, in friendship with all peoples and 
without link to other powers, to the rebuilding of the true 
international community of peoples which has been destroyed by 
England's plutocratic and un-Christian imperialism.
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durchgeführt csrden so ll.
Cer Herr RAM bntscheidet,. da3 die Propa­
ganda nach den einzelnen Lindern getrennt e rfo l­
gen soll. Der Zeitpunkt für den Beginn der Aktion 
wird van des Herrn RAH bekanntasseben serden.
Diese Aktion sali r»_r von Deutschland u n d  
Ita lien durchgeführt werden.
Japan wird unterrichtet werden, teilweise 
ist dies bereits geschehen..
Die zds Dreia chtepakt beigetretenen Staa­
ten-werden zu eines gegebenen Zeitpunkt in Kennt­
nis gesetzt werden. Es cird ihnen dann fre ige­
s t e l l t ,  s ich an d ieser  Aktion zu b e t e i l i g e n .
Betreffend die M i t t e l ,  a l t  denen die: .Pro- : 
paganda durchgeführt werden s o l l ,  i s t  san s ich  
darüber e i n i g ,  daß der Rundfunk a l s  v o rn eh ss t es  j 
InstruQent angesendet serdan s o l l .  - , 4
. _ Die Presse &1rd durch dia Zeitungen,  die  
s ie  1n dän betreffenden Ländern beeinf lußt;  und 
durch Lancieren von Nachrichten e i n g e s e t z t  - e r -  >
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t e i l t  od i r  s b g s s c r f c a  se rd e n .
C'cr Herr  RAM b e t o n t  noch e i n z e l ,  de3 d e r  De—' 
ginn der Aktion ncch e i n i g e  Z e i t  ( 2 - 4  vochen)  
h inausss cchcb sn  ^srosn  cu*3. "sc t i c h u o r t  riird
ygr i 1:2 -'snc-ben.
1 s 1 chze 1 tl-g g 1Vt er ^sioung, eie 
rsitunj=n beschleunigt und sc gründlich zu t re f ­
fen, daO nicht nur technisch keine Schuieriihet- 
te-n entstehen kannen, sondern Deutschland such 
stofflich  in der lege is t ,  I g-jch GegenstcS sufzu- 
fanaen und sich jeder Situation ¿esishsen zu 
zeigen. . .
Is e inze lnen  gab der »isrr zisr-Durcn-  
füiirung der Prepe-jan-e-Aktien nscli ¿sa v e r s c h i e -  
denen.Undsra .fc-lgesda. l e i s u n g e a i
a) I n d i e n * -  " • • ?';■-•
mm.m • ■ ■■ wm ■■ ■ ■■ m . • - •>
Oie Aktion s i r d  a l t  e i n e r  g e s e i n s e s e n  Er— , 
Uärung Deutschlands und I t a l i e n s  begonnen,, ^
Bose s o l l  e l a  "Frer lndi sa  Centre” b i l d e n .  5 
Zur Durchführung s e i n e r  Arbeiten sind iha s i n #  - 
H i l l i o g  8srk und s o - s c h n e l l  s ie-  g l i c h ,  g s s l g - -  
neta Saune zu? Verfügung za s t e l l c s u ¿.-■'¿".-¿■z -¿j
_ •• —• - \  ;  i , » • • • * • ' * ,  • • I *• ^
;.v ,033 / ' Fr es - Indis a  G se tr s f  Jtei-'-frS&.pis®
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Mit der Arb e i t  e i n e s  indi sch en  F r e i h e i t s -  
senders s o l l  in Anbetracht c=r T s tsc ch e ,  daS e i s a  
14 Tage b e n ö t i g t  werden, b i s  e r  fceksrmt s i r d *  
begonnen werden.
Zun Zwecke e i n e r  stärkeren B e e in f lus su ng  _ 
Indiens auf  des sc e  ces  .rundf unks s o l l ,  s i o  
7ca YU Kühle v ü r g s s c h l a g c n , e i n  Kü rz¿u l l en -S ea-  
der nach A f g a n i s t a n  gsferscht s i r d e n .  Er = i rd  
dort entsprechend des Vorschlag von Bcss e i n a s -
s e t z t  werden.\\
Dvc Anzshl der o r d e n t l i c h e n  Sendungen des  % w
dfctftscheikRandfünks nach Indien s o l l ,  s o w e i t  
technisch o ö g l i c h ,  v e r s t ä r k t  s srdsn*
V
Hit den Kl s s i o n e a  biT.  Sonderbeauf tragten  
i s t  ZTtcks Beschaf fung a k tu e l l e n  f i a l e r i e l s  eng­
s t e  Fühlung zu halden« Es s l r d  nachdrückl ich  bs—» *
tont r daS niemand engeres  o l s  d ie  K ic s i c ne a  b z s .  ? 
31 e Sonderfceauftrsgtea des Astes  für die  Surcb~ ' 
führung d i e s e r  Akt ionen v e r e n t s o r t l i c h  und za— ... j  
ständig s ind»  % k .  ...
Dir g e s e i a s a s e  Erklärung d e r  Achse 
Indien,  zu d e r  e l a  Entwurf Böses  e c r g s i o g t  *1rdf 
s o l l  ab s o f o r t  haup tsäch l ich  a u f  sa- ösü-r . j
Rundfunks- and durah Landerung  vosr jTsssplchisn -g
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as i den ,  da3 d ie se  Aktion durch ‘ihr p l ö t z l i c h e s  
Lii isctzen v e r d ä c h t i g t  und in  ihrer  Schlagkraft  
von vornherein g e h a s s t  n ird.
b) F-er a r a b i s c h e  H’ un
Zz « ir c  c'jf die Gefahr h tn g er ie se n ,  e ie  
s ich  dcrs-'J-s e r g i b t ,  c cB je da fropaccnes  nach ds« 
arabischen Houn s ich such gergen ä i e  Ver häl tn i s se  . 
in Syrien senden und d a s i t  den Franzosen Scfrsie-  
ri ::ks\ tco bere i ter ,  bürde, die 1s « ^ e n b l  ick po—— * -«i i
l i t i s c h  w;:er-dnscr.t s i n d .  ;!_ fühle  s t e l l t  f e s t ,  
csC san Syrien in den dend^noan n i cht  ausns-hsan 
kdnne: Es suC ¿eher bei der ges sa te n  fropagsada  
die besondere Eehanclunq der Araber in Syrien*4
b e r ü c k s i c h t i g t  serden*
In d i e s e s  3ahsen g i b t  der Herr Zt& S s i — 
sang,  die Propaganda nach des arabischen Paua -- 
e i n s t w e i l e n  nur so zu ve r s tärk en ,  daS nur von |  
F r e i h e i t  $ anz a l l g e s e i n  gesprochen s i r ö *  : ->?
Ferner s o l l e n  Ober den Kürzte! l e n s s s d s r - ^
* * .
Athen Sendungen i n  a r a b i s c h e r >Sprache aafjssfrs—- -4
een werden, • ;■- •: .v.*. j
Dia A r b e i t  e i n e s  ägypti schen  Schssrzsa® -;' \ 
ders kann begonnen »erdtai.'."*“ > " ' " ** ..i ' -■ *«¿3 \ ; -f -^j|'
•. Eins o f f i z i e l l e  R a g i e f y s g ^ ^ l ^ s s g ^ a i A j ^
nach. des- arab isc hen  Raus ff a ta * h te ih a  v""
•
L^iOrx <hj;A- 1  ^~ y  ¡¿¿Sw- «L*iS-*c<-¡¡¡¿,
" S t e f f i  ■ ; ' i S  ‘ "• " ' '
■ ' ■ 1 ‘ » ¥ v ' W  ■'■ V :‘ ■?■ :,¥-:
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c) I r l a n d
' Rscn Irland 3lrd keine Erk13rütg;a&gege- 
ben «erden. 3ie is t  fUr später vorgesehsa*
Es* sollen von je tz t 2b jedoch -d.i-5 irss  
in den 2ngliscr.cn Sendungen .-escijders c s : s t r i ­
chen werden, vrov:-ei die ‘Jlster-Frjrge nicht za 
berühren is t .
in Anbetracht der -geringen Yerbrsiviza  der 
Sprache sollen die gäliscK-en Senden*-en s icM  
verstärkt serdsn, dagegen soll ein besssdsr-.r - 
Ge ader (sahrscbsinli&h ':ennee) e lls in  f . r  die 
Frop3g:-nc3 nach Irland (englische Sprache} eis- 
gesetzt werden.
d) S ü d a f r i k a
Oie fiundfunkpropagsn-da.soll a s s t s lg a r i  . v- 
werden.
' ' i"
L e its c tiv  dieser Prepaga-nda is t  als is s — 
sptelung der Bur8tt. gegea die EaglBnt&r*. . a ^
■«" -■ * ltrf
Es s?ird za gegebener Z e i t  e i s e  E r k l i f s s f  
der Ach^e abgegebea werden, die *sa US ¿5 
soernann a u sg ea r b s i t t t  turdea i st« ' -.
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translation (Appendix D)
Dr Timmler; Meeting of 22 May 1941.
M in u te s
Re: Foreign Office meeting concerning propaganda for countries standing under 
the yoke of Great Britain.
Meeting was convened at 17.00 by the Foreign Minister.
Also present: Under Secretary of State, Dr Woermann; Envoy, von Rintelen;
Envoy, Dr Schmidt (Press); Envoy, Luther; VLR Ruehle; Consul General, Muester; 
Legation Counsellor, Dr Hesse; SS Brigade Leader, Dr Stahlecker; LS Raykowski; 
Dr Timmler.
As an introduction, Dr Woermann gave a short report about the preparation work 
done in Berlin. He emphasised the points under which the propaganda would have 
to be carried out. His report ended with the questions whether an explanation 
to the Axis powers should be given and whether an action plan should be 
instigated against all countries at the same time or conducted one by one.
The Foreign Minister decided that the propaganda should proceed separately in 
individual countries.
The time for the start of the action plan will be announced by the Foreign 
Minister.
Action plan to be carried out only in Germany and Italy. Japan will be 
informed, this has partly already happened. The states who joined the tri­
partite pact will be informed. They will then have the choice to take on the 
action plan. Regarding the medium with which the propaganda plan is to be
carried out, the meeting unanimously agreed that radio will be used as the most
refined instrument.
The press will be involved through newspapers to influence the relevant
countries by launching the news.
Finally, the propaganda plan will include leaflets dropped by air, as well as 
whispering propaganda and medals with messages to be spread by chosen agents.
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The Foreign Minister emphasised once more that the start of the action plan 
would have to be put back by some time (two to four weeks). The go-ahead will 
be given by the Foreign Minister. At the same time, he gave instructions that 
the preparations have to be speeded up and efficiency improved so that not only 
will there be no technical difficulties but also Germany will be fully prepared 
to deal with any counter measures, and able to deal with any given situation.
In particular, the Foreign Minister gave the following instructions for the 
instigation of the propaganda action plan in the following countries: a) India,
b) the Arab regions, c) Ireland, d) South Africa, e) Canada, and f) Australia.
c) Ireland:
No declaration will be made in Ireland. That will be reserved for later. 
However, from now on, the Irish should be addressed particularly in English 
language broadcasts, whereby the Ulster question should not be touched upon.
In consideration of the restricted spread of the language, Gaelic broadcasts 
are not to be increased. On the other hand, a special station (probably Rennes) 
should be solely employed for (English language) propaganda to Ireland.
The meeting ended at 18.35
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f Abt. Ra 
Sonderreferst Irland
Aufzeichnung.
U v i f C
Eachdem loh Uber die Besprechung em 27. Kal 1941 unterrichtet 
werden, war, in welcher die Vertreter von Eult H, des DES? und 
des Propagandaminieterium® die baldige Einrichtung solcher 
Sendungen beschlossen hatten, trachtete ich, so bald ela möglicl 
mit den zuständigen Sachbearbeiter des Europasenders, Herrn 
Zama, die Fühlung aufaunehmen, um die Ingerenz der.Abtellung Ru 
bei der ■Einrichtung der Irland-Redaktion sicherzustellen.
(Herrn Kamm kannte ich durch seine täglichen dienstlichen 
Besuche bei „Concordia*'.)
Mein Besuch bei Herrn Kaum fand am 5- <?uni statt. Damals 
erfuhr ich, dass vom Propagandsministerium ein Herr I>r. Digno- 
ffily als Redakteur bestellt werde. Ich drückte den Wunsch aus, 
so schnell als möglich mit diesem Eerrn in Kontakt zu gelangen. 
Irgendein praktisches Ergebnis hatte dieser Besuch nicht.
Über Betreiben von Herrn Ziesinger sollte endlich am 16. Jul: 
eine Zusammenkunft mit Dr. Dignowity stattfinden. Dieser sagte 
aber am yoij^itag wegen einer loiohten Erkrankung ab und 
führ zwei Jage später nach Peris, um dort seine Redaktion 
zua r. rrtnansue teilen.
Srst am 22. August fand die Begegnung der Beteiligten statt, 
worüber eine Aufzeichnung von Dr. Kiesinger vorliegt.
Dia Sendungen liefen Um etwa den 26. oder 28. August an. Das 
genaue Datum ist mir nochn'nicht bekannt, da die mir von Dr.
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Dignowlty zu^esagton Aijoobriften der Sendungen^riooh nioht hier 
ein^etroffen sind.
Seither batte ich zwei Arbeitab©oprechungen mit i>r. Dignofcity» 
ge 5. und cm 8.9. ( des zvreitemal in Anwesenheit von Kr. Hlair, 
einem Mitglied von Dr. Dignowitya Stab, und Frl. Dr. Pöpping, von 
Abteilung Ru).
Sie Sendungen.
D ie  Sendungen. l o u f  e n  tä>3l i c h  v o n  2 1 .  ° °  -  2 1 . ^  O h r und v o n  
22.^" b i s  2 3 . 0 0  !^ h r .  U r n p r ü n g l i c h  g in g - d i e  a r s t e  S e n d u n g  t lb e r  d e n  
S e n d e r  fte n n e s 4 3 1 . 7  ( M i t t e l w e l l e ) ,  d i e  z w e it e  ü b e r  R e n n e s und zu ­
g l e i c h  ü b e r  K u r z w e l le  Diii) 2 8 . 4 3 .  ¿ e i t  e i n i g e n  T a g e n  g e h e n  a b e r  
b e id e  S e n d u n g e n  n u r  ü b e r  d i e  K u r z w e l l e .  S i n  f ü r  d i e  M i t t e l w e l l e  
g e e i g n e t e r  n o r w e g is c h e r  '¿ e n d e r  w i r d  z u r  . - e i t  g e s u c h t .
2s gelang mir zweimal» die erste Üendun& abzuhüren. Weder mir, 
noch neinen Mitarbeitern wollte e3 aber gelingen, die zweite 
zu erfassen.
Aufbau der Sendungen« Die erste Sendung bringt A) zunächst 
einen Nachrichtendienst, der, wie es heisst;euf eine irische
^uhörez'schsft suseschnitten ist. Dann folgt si) ein kurzer Talk, 
der an das wichtigste Ereignis des Tages ankniipft. Die zweite 
Sendung enthält, dem Vernehmen nachj O )  eine Übersicht Internationa' 
ler Pressestifflaen und überhaupt der nesktion der öffentlichen 
Meinung auf die Ereignisse.
Die Bedaktiont Sr. öignowity hat in Deutschland und Senf 
Sprachen und Volkswirtschaft studiert. Dr war mehrereraale auf 
einen Gut in südlichen Irland eingeladen, wo er sich einasl auch 
ziemlich lange sufhielt. Zs hat aber anscheinend nicht zu einen 
Jesuch in Dublin gelangt. iE Ce sprach verhehlt er nicht, dass sei­
ne Kenntnis irischer Proc-lece beschränkt ist. Seine stärke ist
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auf dem Gebiet f ranzösischei’ Probleme, sein ßn^liach ist aber 
recht gut.
Ale Sprecher für die Sendungen A) und C) fungiert ein Franzose 
nsnens Piche, der längere Jahre ela Journalist in Amerika gelobt 
hat und angeblich £nsrliseh Eit aineriknüschein AnKLen#; spricht, 
ris lässt aich nicht behaupten, dsss er eine suts Stinme hat.
Die Sendung wird korap liiert und gesprochen von einen Kr. 
Blair, dar von väterlicher Seite Schotte und von Bitterlicher 
Seite Ire zu sein angibt. Er lebte asit den -ï tu ff en still st and 
191G in Paris als • ror r enp or.dent sneriknniacher Blätter. Kr 
gibt zv,  dass nein letzter Aufenthalt in Irland *viele Jahre 
zurJokl ie^tn. Y,t hat sich in Paris einen irischen Pa sa ausfolßen 
lassen (wenn?). Deutsch kann er kau», kann also des Original- 
r-iichrichtennsteriel nicht lesen.
Dieser t-r. iilsir soll unter den ITacen "Pat C'/irien" su einer 
?.adioperffönlichkeit ger.aeht und als solche hersusgestellt werden; 
er soll den irischen "can in the Street" vortäuschen, sc ds3s 
ein irisches Auditoriun glaubt, so reegiert ein typischer Ire 
auf die Zeitereignisse.
Die Sendung C) wird von Dr. .Digncwity und einem 24 jährigen 
Bretonan, Graf Keroer, redigiert (Sprecher ¿‘iche), der gute 
ieprachkenntnisse haben soll, aber Irland nicht kennt.
Als Sekretärin, fundiert eine Ukrainerin namens Kowsnko.
Dieser internstional susarasengssetzte ctab enthält aleo nur 
eine Person, die Irland einigeraassen aus eigener .Anschauung 
kennt, naclich Dr. Dignowity selbst.
Ds wurde nit den letzteren vereinbart, dass sein Mr. ...lsir 
tätlich un 12 lihr ins Koltkebsus können wird« um von uns 
Informationen und Ideen für ,'alks zu erhalten. Den Grafen
-  3 -
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K eroer  h a b e  i c h  n o ch  n i c h t  zu  ' . .s c ia h t  bekom men.
Auf m eine A n fr a g e , ob und w ie  o f t  - c l k s  u n s e r e r s e i t o  ¿rewünscht 
w e r d e n , s c h lu g  H err Dt . DlL-rnowL'iy v o r ,  " jed en  z w e i t e n  S o n n ta g  
e in e n  -.Cali:"; e r  w erde a b e r  noch  m it  lierrr . ft&im R ü ck sp ra ch e  p f l e -  
g e n .
H ie r m it  Uber
H errn  L?. ö r .  ¿ c h i m e r
H errn  G e sa n d te n  l .ü h le
z u r  g e f ä l l i g e n  Iv e n n t n is n a h c e  v o r g e l e g t .
.  Kehr)
D u rc h sc h r i f t  t 
P ro  f .  K e f e r k o m  
D r. T ls m le r  
Dr. r i ia s in ^ e r
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TRANSLATION
Broadcasting Section Berlin, 9 September 1941
Note concerning 
English language programmes to Ireland.
I was told about the meeting on 27 May 1941, where representatives of Kult R, 
the DKW and the Propaganda Ministry decided to establish those programmes soon. 
I wanted to get in touch with Mr Kamm, the official in charge of European 
programmes, to ensure the participation of section Ru in setting up the Irland- 
Redaktion. (I know Mr Kamm from my daily, official visits to Concordia).
My visit to Mr Kamm took place on 5 June. I was told then that the Propaganda 
Ministry will name a Dr Dignowity as editor. I wish to contact this gentleman 
as quickly as possible. With the assistance of Mr Kiesinger, there should at 
last have been a meting with Dr Dignowity on 16 July. But he cancelled it the 
day before due to a slight illness, and two days later he went to Paris to 
assemble his editorial staff.
The first meeting of all the members took place on 22 August, and Dr Kiesinger 
was there. The programmes commenced around 26 or 28 August. I do not know the 
exact date as I did not yet receive copies of the programme scripts from Dr 
Dignowity. Since then I have had two working sessions with Dr Dignowity, on 5 
and 8 September (the second meeting was also attended by Mr Blair, a member of 
Dr Dignowity's staff, and Dr Poepping from the Foreign Office's broadcasting 
section.
The.
The programmes run daily from 21.00 to 21.15, and from 22.45 to 23.00. 
Originally, the first programme was broadcast by the Rennes transmitter on 
431.7 (medium wave), the second by Rennes and, at the same time, on the 
shortwave transmitter DZD 28.43. A few days ago, both programmes were only 
being broadcast on shortwave. A Norwegian station, suitable for medium wave 
transmissions, is being sought at the moment. I twice managed to listen to the 
first of the two programmes, but neither my colleagues nor myself succeeded in 
getting the second one.
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Programme structure: The first programme provides A) Firstly, a news bulletin 
which, they say, has been tailored for an Irish audience. Then follows B) a 
short talk linked to the most important event of the day. The second programme 
contains, so I have heard, C) an international press review and public reaction 
to the main events of the day.
The editorial staff: Dr Dignowity has studied languages and economics in 
Germany and Geneva. He has been invited to a farm in Southern Ireland several 
times, and once stayed there for quite a long time. But, apparently, he could 
not manage to visit Dublin. When talking to him, he does not deny that his 
knowledge of Irish problems is limited. His strength is in the field of French 
problems, but his English is quite good.
The announcer for programmes A) and C) is a French man called Piche who lived 
as a journalist in America for several years and allegedly speaks English with 
an American accent. One cannot say if he has a good voice.
Programme B) is compiled and presented by a Mr Blair who claims to be Scottish 
on his father's side and Irish on his mother's side. Since the 1918 armistice 
he has been living in Paris as a correspondent for American newspapers. He 
admits that his last visit to Ireland was 'many years ago1. In Paris he 
obtained an Irish passport (when?). He can hardly speak German, which means he 
cannot read original news material.
This Mr Blair is to be made into a radio personality under the name of 'Pat 
O'Brien', imitating the Irish 'man in the street', so an Irish audience will 
believe that a typical Irish man would react to world events in this way.
Programme C) is edited by Dr Dignowity and a 24 year old Breton, Count Keroer, 
(speaker Piche) who is supposed to have a good knowledge of the language but 
knows nothing about Ireland.
The secretary is a Ukrainian woman named Kowanko.
This international team contains only one person who knows Ireland a bit from 
his own experience, namely Dr Dignowity himself.
It has been agreed with the latter that his Mr Blair will come every day at 12 
noon to the Moltkehaus to get information and ideas for talks from us. I have 
not met Count Keroer yet.
When I asked if, and how often, they would like talks from our side, Dr 
Dignowity suggested 'a talk every second Sunday1; but he has to confirm it with 
Mr Kamm.
For the attention of :
Dr Schirmer, and 
Envoy Ruehle.
(A . Mahr)
Copies to:
Professor Haferkorn 
Dr Tiinmler 
Dr Kiesinger
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Dokum ent 227
©eljehtte SJeitfjSfrtdfje
N ordam erika-K om itee
Niederschrif t  über die 
Sitzung am 26. August 1943. 
(A nw esenheitsliste lieg t bei)
N.A.K.Nr.25 gRs 
G efertigt in 15 Expl. 
D ies ist Expl. Nr. 7.
1. Dr. Colin Ross berichtet über seinen Aufenthalt in der 
Schweiz. Die Stimmung in der Schweiz ist nicht durch­
weg feindselig. Man ist sich weitgehend darüber klar, 
daß auch ein Zusammenbruch Deutschlands keine Lö­
sung der Nachkriegsprobleme bringen würde. Man 
fängt an, die Amerikaner in einem anderen Licht zu 
sehen: brutal und handfest. Amerikaner bereiten 
offenbar eine große Propagandaoffensive vor, um die 
Bedenken und Besorgnisse gegen sie in neutralen Län­
dern zu zerstreuen. Sie arbeiten vor allem erfolgreich 
mit Filmen und gehen dabei äußerst skrupellos vor.
Mit Jazz und Swing w ollen sie ihre “frohe, freie 
W elt” zeigen. Dieser Propaganda müssen wir entge­
gensetzen: 1. daß weder Sieg oder Niederlage einer 
Partei Nachkriegsprobleme löst, 2. daß Amerika weder 
w illens noch in der Lage ist, europäische Fragen zu 
lösen. D ie Schweiz ist mit feindlicher Literatur über­
schwemmt. Buchhändler behaupten, sie bekämen 
keine deutschen Bücher. Dr. Ross schlägt vor, Über­
setzungen geeigneter ausländischer Bücher und in 
Ermangelung eigener Propagandafilme entsprechend 
überarbeitete feindliche Filme zu vertreiben, die als 
Gegenpropaganda wirken würden, (wie z. B, “Yankee 
Doodle Dandy” und “Marinka").
Das Komitee beschließt, die Frage zu prüfen, ob 
von den 150 in Genua unter Zollverschluß lagernden  
USA-Film en einige entnommen, entsprechend ge­
schnitten und wieder an Ort und Stelle geschafft w er­
den können, ohne daß dies der Schweizer Film ver­
leihgesellschaft bekannt wird. Gesandter Reinebeck 
wird mit dem zuständigen Sachbearbeiter, Herrn 
Schatter diesbezüglich in Verbindung treten.
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Dr. Megerle weist darauf hin, daß bisher Propa­
ganda gegen  USA erörtert wurde, jedoch die eigent­
liche Aufgabe des Ausschusses Propaganda nach und 
in USA sei, und fragte Dr. Colin Ross, ob nach seinen 
Beobachtungen in der Schweiz auch heute noch die 
Bekanntgabe eines Europaprogramms mit etwa sechs ^
bis acht allgemeinen Grundsätzen propagandistisch er­
folgreich abzusetzen sei. Colin Ross bejaht. Man müsse 
den Schweizern auch klar machen, was ein alliierter 
Sieg bedeuten würde. Viele Leute fürchteten einen 
solchen. Er weist auf eine günstige Predigt hin, die 
Kardinal Faulhaber gehalten habe. Dr. Megerle bittet 
um Beschaffung des Textes.
2. Der Ausschuß bespricht dann die mögliche Auswer­
tung des Phosphorkrieges. Colin Ross meint, daß der 
Unterschied zwischen deutscher und englischer Luft­
kriegführung nicht genügend herausgearbeitet wird.
Dr. Werth berichtet, der Angriff auf Hamburg 
konnte nicht ausgewertet werden, weil militärische 
Stellen dagegen. Dr. Megerle hält subtile Behandlung 
für möglich und erwähnt erfolgreiche Auswertung in 
Schweden. Dr. Kiesinger betont, daß die grundsätz­
liche Barbarei des Auslöschens einer Zivilbevölkerung 
herausgestellt werden müsse. Dr. Sallet schlägt vor,
durch Nennen vieler Namen von Bombenopfern in ;
USA-Funksendungen den Hörerkreis in USA zu er­
weitern. Dr. Kiesinger glaubt, daß gewünschte Wir­
kung allein durch Schilderung der ungewöhnlich grau­
samen Angriffsweise erzielt wird. Dr. Megerle bittet 
um Ausarbeitung von ein oder zwei entsprechenden 
Talks zur Vorlage bei RAM. Dr. Kiesinger wird Pro­
fessor Koischwitz hierzu veranlassen.
Die Frage Dr. Megerles, ob man mit dem Problem  
der kleinen europäischen Nationen in Amerika Ein­
druck machen könne, wird von Colin Ross verneint.
3. Dr. Werth berichtet über die Auswertung kritischer 
Stimmen aus Amerika und England gegen das bol­
schewistische Rußland. Eastman-Artikel ist zur
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Verbreitung den Missionen übersandt, desgl. der Artikel 
von Voigt in “19th Century". Zusammenfassung ver­
wertbarer Seiten von "Life” vom 5. Juli in Sonder­
nummer wird versucht. Colin Ross schlägt Herausgabe 
einer ähnlichen Zusammenfassung propagandistisch 
verwertbarer Aufsätze aus “Reader’s D igest” in spa­
nischer Sprache vor. Dr. Werth berichtet, daß etwas 
Ähnliches durch die von uns herausgegebene Zeit­
schrift “Common Sense” geschieht. Colin Ross tritt 
jedoch für seinen Vorschlag ein, da dabei der allbe­
kannte “Reader’s D igest” ausgenutzt werden könnte. 
Zusammenstellung und Druck sollte in Madrid er­
folgen.
4. Dr. Grünbeck erwähnt das Interesse für eine Abhand­
lung von Röpcke über Währungspläne und schlägt 
vor, daß eine führende Persönlichkit, etwa Reichs- 
minister Funk, in einem Vortrag vor einer Akademie 
dieses Thema anschneidet, wobei zum Ausdruck kom­
men müßte: 1. wie w eit die Gegner auf diesem Gebiet 
Gedankengut von uns übernommen haben; 2. was wir 
eigentlich wollen. Eine Diskussion hierüber würde 
auf die neutralen Länder wirken, die sich zurzeit 
überfahren fühlen. Dr. Megerle erklärt, daß beab­
sichtigt ist, mehr als bisher dem Gegner nachzuweisen, 
daß er unser Gedankengut übernimmt.
Anschließend bittet Dr. Megerle, in jeder Sitzung 
programmäßig ein bis zw ei Punkte des Amerikapro­
gramms zu erledigen. RAM möchte auch genau über 
die innere Lage in USA unterrichtet sein. Gesandter 
Reinebeck erwähnt die neuerdings angeordnete täg­
liche Meldung hierüber an RAM.
5. Dr. Kiesinger teilt mit, daß ein polnischer Geheim­
sender bereits im Anlaufen sei. Dr. Kiesinger, Dr.
Sallet und Her Kramarz sollen alle diesen Sender be­
treffenden Fragen (Dr. Podetzki etc.) besprechen.
Dr. Kiesinger erwähnt die Sendungen nach Nahost 
über den Metropolsender, durch den hauptsächlich 
polnische Offiziere angesprochen werden sollen. Dr.
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Megerle w eist darauf hin, daß Nachrichten aus dem  
Generalgouvernement über Herrn Kramarz beschafft 
werden können.
Dr. Kiesinger berichtet ferner, daß jetzt eine ge­
eignete Persönlichkeit für den irischen Sender zur 
Verfügung steht, durch den Iren in USA zweim al 
wöchentlich angesprochen werden könnten. Der kroa­
tische Sender sei zurzeit durch Sabotage gestört.
Finnen und Ungarn seien zurzeit für Sendungen 
unzugänglich.
Es wird beschlossen, daß auf der folgenden Sitzung  
die innerpolitische Lage in USA erörtert werden soll.
B erlin, den 26. August 1943. 
gez. Reinebeck
A nw esenheitsliste für die  
Sitzung des N ordam erika- 
K om itees am 26. August 1943.
G esandter Reinebeck  
Dr. Colin Ross 
GK Dr. G yssling  
LS Dr. Sallet 
Dr. M egerle 
Dr. K iesinger  
Dr. Ahrens 
Dr. Werth 
WHA Richter 
K Reichel 
RR Dr. Grünbeck 
LR Kramarz 
GK Reinhardt
Stellvertr . G eneralsekretär
P ol IX  
Pol IX
Stab RAM 
Ru
Ru IX  
Kult Pol 
K ult Pol
P IX a 
Ha Pol
England-Ausschuß
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Translation: (Appendix F)
DOCUMENT 227, Paragraph 5
P age  4 7 0
5. Dr. Kiesinger informed the meeting that a Polish secret radio station
was already in its early stages of existence. Dr. Kiesinger, Dr. Sallet
and Mr. Kramarz should discuss all relevant questions (Dr. Podetzki etc.)
related to this station. Dr. Kiesinger mentioned the programms 
transmitted through the Metropol Station to the Near East, which are 
supposed to address mainly Polish Officers. Dr. Megerle pointed out 
that news from the Generals' Government could be obtained via Dr.
K ram arz.
Dr. Kiesinger reported further that now a suitable person for the 
Irish Station was available. Irish people in the USA could be 
addressed twice weekly through this station. At this point in time, 
the Croatian Station was disrupted by sabotage. Finns and Hungarians 
were not reachable by any programms at the moment.
The meeting decided that the following meeting should consider the 
situation of internal affairs in the United States.
Berlin, 26th August 1943,
(signed) Reinebeck
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Appendix G
Technical data concerning broadcasts to Ireland 
by German Radio from 1939 to 1945.
Period
month/year
Wavelength 
metres (kc)
Irish Time 
all p.m.
Station 
name/no.
Studio Source 
location
end-1939 332 
395 . 9 
31.22
8.25 to 8.40 
Sundays only-
Hamburg 
Bremen 
DXB Zeesen
Berlin
Berlin
Berlin
AA
AA
AA
early 1940 332 
395 . 9 
31. 38
same as above Hamburg Berlin 
Bremen Berlin 
DJA Langenberg Berlin
BBC
BBC
BBC
mid-1940 19 . 74 
1875
9 . 3 0  to 9 . 4 5  
Sun.& Wed.
DJB Zeesen 
Kootwyk
Berlin
Berlin
DNA
DNA
9-11/1941 28 .45
3 0/31-m band
8 . 00 
7 . 00
Zeesen
Zeesen
Berlin
Berlin
BBC
BBC
12/1941 1154 8- 1 0 various Oslo Berlin BBC
1942
to
7/1943
1154 
431.7 
28 .43
7-11 various Oslo 
Rennes 
DZD Zeesen
Berlin
Berlin
Berlin
BBC
BBC
IAMS
9/1943 1293 same as above Luxembourg Luxembourg BBC
10/1943 514 . 6 7.15 Calais Luxembourg BBC
2-3/1944 1293
301.5/415.5
various Luxembourg
Hilversum
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
BBC
BBC
8-9/1944 41.44 
514 (582) 
301 (995) 
296 (758) 
1875 (160) 
41.4 
48 .23
5.15/6.15/7.45 
same as above
6.15
7.45
DXJ
Calais I
Calais II
Bremen
Friesland
DXJ
DXR-7
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
IAMS
DNA
DNA
DNA
DNA
DNA
DNA
10/1944 396 
301. 6
6.45/8.00
same
Bremen
Hilversum
Apen
Apen
IAMS
IAMS
3/1945 301. 6 8 . 45 Hilversum Apen IAMS
early 4/45 n.a. 5.45/8.45/10.45 Hilversum Apen IAMS
mid 4/1945 n . a . 8.45/9.45 Hilversum Apen IAMS
end 4/1945 n.a. same as above Bremen Apen IAMS
1 May 1945 n.a. 8.45/9.45 n.a. Apen IAMS
2 May 1945 n.a. 8.45 to 8.55 n.a. Apen IAMS
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Transmitter details
Short wave transmitters: DXJ, DXR-7, DXB, DJA, DJB and DZD (all located at 
Zeesen except DJA at Langenberg).
Medium wave transmitters: Calais I, Calais II (both lost to Allied troops 
in October 1944), Bremen, Hamburg, Rennes, Hilversum.
Long wave transmitters: Friesland, Luxembourg, Kootwyk, Oslo.
Abbreviations used in main table :
m = metres
kc = kilocycles
n.a. = data not available
IAMS = Irish Army Monitoring Service
BBC = BBC Monitoring Service
AA = Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) Political Archive, Bonn 
DNA = German News Agency (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, Berlin)
Note: German programmes beamed to Ireland from April to May 1945 were 
mostly announced as coming from Bremen. When the Bremen transmitter was off 
the air its substitute was not identified. Although the last programmes of 
the war were broadcast to Ireland from makeshift studios in Bremers Hotel 
in Apen, emergency transmitters at Oebisfelde and Helmstedt were used to 
relay the signals. These transmitters were located near the city of 
Braunschweig, east of Hanover.
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Appendix H
Profile of
Franz Fromme
Professor Franz Fromme visited Ireland in 1932, doing research for a 
book which was published in Berlin the following year. Entitled I r l a n d ' s  
Kampf um d i e  F r e i h e i t , Fromme's book featured maps and photographs of 
Ireland. It drew heavily for source material on Roger Casement's diaries, 
Dan Breen's book My F i g h t  f o r  I r i s h  F reedom , Irish newspaper cuttings, and 
articles from the republican weekly paper An P h o b l a c h t . 1
Fromme1s book established him during the 1930s as the Abwehr1s expert on
Irish affairs. When researching the work he spoke to the widows of War of
Independence leaders Cathal Brugha, Tom Clarke, and Arthur Griffith. He
also sought the advice of government officials including Sean O Cuiv of the
2Government Information Bureau.
Fromme never broadcast to Ireland or anywhere else. His Irish expertise 
was instead put to work for the shadowy world of the Abwehr, Germany's 
counter intelligence network. The Abwehr directed Fromme to provide a 
detailed briefing on Irish affairs to Oscar Pfaus, the man chosen to be 
Germany's first spy sent to Ireland to establish contacts with the IRA. 
Pfaus arrived in Dun Laoghaire on 2 February 193 9 aboard the mailboat 
C a m b ria . Six months later, Fromme was best man at Pfaus' wedding in 
Hamburg.^
Fromme paid a second visit to Ireland in 193 9, spending two months being 
closely followed by the special branch. Arriving at Cobh, from Hamburg, on 
2 2 April, he gave his address as the home of M. W. O'Reilly at Roebuck in 
Dublin. O'Reilly was managing director of the New Ireland Assurance 
Company, and Fromme had met the Irishman's daughter Irene while she was on 
a singing tour of Germany. In fact, Fromme never stayed with the O'Reilly 
family, although he visited them, choosing to take up residence for his two 
month stay in the Mayfair Hotel in Lower Baggot Street, Dublin. There, the 
only visitor noted by his police shadow was the German professor of 
sculpture at the National College of Art, Friedrich Herkner. 4
Fromme, like other Germans visiting Dublin in those years, availed 
himself of the hospitality at the German Club evenings in the Red Bank 
restaurant. Acutely aware of pre-war propaganda from London, Fromme wrote 
from the Mayfair Hotel to his family in Göttingen, complaining about the 
influence of the BBC in Ireland. Just ten days before he sailed home from
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Cobh to Hamburg on 20 June 1939, Fromrae's wife wrote to him in Dublin 
saying she 'was sorry that the English press and also the radio have such a 
strong influence there [in Ireland] , because in the abstract, there was 
always a friendly feeling to Germany there. ' 5
A revealing pen-picture of Fromme appears in Roisin Ni Mheara's memoirs 
where she recalls that the German professor
made contact with me, in some way which I've now forgotten, during those 
beautiful, bitter, quiet periods of the autumn at the beginning of the 
war. I remember the phone call from him when he asked me to have an 
evening meal with him in the city. That old professor was a particularly 
wonderful person. He was a small, lithe, athletic man, his eyes flashing 
with humour behind his frameless glasses. And his presence, as he strode 
down the street, freely and primly... Fromme's only interest and 
satisfaction lay in linguistics but his deep study of ethnology had 
aroused in him a profound sympathetic interest in downtrodden peoples. 
That German scholar was a resolute defender who never tired of 
discussing the distressing cases of the unjustly treated small nations. 
Later on, Fromme's life was dedicated to the fight for the rights of 
minorities, particularly in Europe. Fromme had been an important 
executive in the counter intelligence department of the Ministry of War 
during the First World War. When war was again predicted and the same 
problems were pressing on the government, the old professor was asked to 
function as an advisor on minority affairs in the department of the War 
Ministry in the Third Reich. Fromme set about his duties. But he was 
strongly critical of those in Abwehr II as the counter intelligence 
department was now called. He cast a doubtful eye on the way this new 
generation was handling its affairs, and he vented his anger 
disparagingly on them. "What a mistake! And no one bothers listening to 
me. What the hell are they doing? They're always making a mess of 
things." With that, you'd see Fromme fingering his hair with his two 
hands until it was like a cock's comb. "Didn't I tell them", he'd go on 
shouting, "not to give authorisation to people like that. I'll raise 
hell with them. The minority have nothing left but their pride. What a 
mistake. It's we who'll pay for it." But despite everything and every 
tonguelashing that was given, Fromme stayed and he continued with his
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efforts. He couldn't but keep his hand in the business to stand up for 
the small nations. Needless to say, he took special care to help the 
Irish. He was with us as he had been before when he had charge of Roger 
Casement in the first [world] war. He showed kindness to us as he did to 
the Bretons, the Flemish, the Montenegrans and others. He spoke 
different languages, such as Basque and Irish fluently. "By the way", 
Fromme said nonchalantly as he paid the bill, "I've a good friend who'll 
be going to Ireland shortly and he'd like to meet you." We set a day. Dr 
Hermann Goertz, a lieutenant-gGeneral in the German army at the time, 
saw eye to eye with Professor Fromme in his idealistic and enthusiastic 
outlook. He set his two eyes on me, the moment of testing, then held my 
hands firmly and said, "This is a true person I can trust." Quite 
clearly, that warmed the cockles of Fromme's heart. He ordered one of 
the bottles of wine of his choice for us, sat down to table with it and, 
in keeping with the practice of middle class old stagers still in vogue, 
fixed his napkin under his chin. There was still a little wine to be 
hand in some of the special taverns like this one on the fashionable 
city boulevard called Kurfürstendamm. On this kind of occasion Professor 
Franz Fromme used to be seen, after a few glasses of wine, jumping up on 
a table to dance a stave of an Irish jig, or a mazurka perhaps, with his 
napkin still under his chin.
Fromme1s services were employed by the Abwehr in early 1940 when he 
resurfaced as a secret courier to Genoa to deliver propaganda leaflets 
(probably produced by Ludwig Mühlhausen) en route for Breton nationalists, 
as well as contacting an IRA courier to arrange the voyage of IRA leader
Seän Russell from New York to Berlin via Genoa aboard a trans Atlantic
nliner. Ni Mheara notes that
Russell had already come ashore. On that unfortunate May day in 1940 he 
reached Genoa. He had travelled from the USA on his way to Germany, at
his own request it should be said. Professor Fromme was on the quayside
to welcome him on behalf of the Abwehr II section, and after providing 
him with a German passport in the Genoa Consulate, he directed him to 
the German capital. Russell reached Berlin together with Fromme in due 
time.®
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In January 1940 Fromme had also been called in by Che Abwehr to identify 
the writer Francis Stuart who had arrived in Berlin to begin work as a 
lecturer at Berlin University. Stuart was later asked to follow Russell to
gIreland with a shipment of arms.
Edmund Veesenmayer, the Nazi's coup d'état specialist who had 
masterminded the abortive plan to send Sean Russell back to Ireland, did 
not think highly of Franz Fromme. In a post war interview10 Veesenmayer 
recalled 'the comic ineptitude' of Professor Fromme whom he described as 'a 
romanticist allotted to the imbroglio of getting Russell to Genoa', adding 
that Fromme 'was neither a politician, a proper professor, a soldier nor an 
Abwehr man.'
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Agency.
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National Library, Dublin
The I r i s h  B u l l e t i n  (file ref. Ir 94109 il5) , an underground pamphlet 
circulated by the provisional government during the Irish War of 
Independence, 1919-21. Its contents formed the basis of the U.S. Senate 
document, The S t u g g l e  o f  t h e  I r i s h  P e o p l e , which was quoted by German 
Radio's Irish service in the 1941-44 period.
N a t i o n a l  Museum, D u b l i n
Director's file no. 490 (containing correspondence concerning Adolf Mahr, 
1946-51)
Dr Adolf Mahr's work diaries in three volumes covering the period 1927-35 
(the diaries for August 1935 to July 1939 are missing):
Volume 1: 16 September 1927 to 14 February 1931.
Volume 2: 15 February 1931 to 31 December 1933.
Volume 3: 1 January 1934 to 31 July 1935.
J o u r n a l  O f f i c e ,  H o u s e s  o f  t h e  O i r e a c h t a s ,  D u b l i n  
Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, as follows:
Broadcast from Hamburg Radio Station, 27 September 1939, Vol. 77, Col. 195. 
Alleged Radio References, 30 April 1940, Vol. 79, Col. 1945.
Parachute Landing, 17 February 1944, Vol. 92, Cols. 1237-1240.
Parachute Landing, 23 February 1944, Vol. 92, Cols. 1509-1510.
National Museum Director, 6 December 1945, Vol. 98, Cols. 1549-1551. 
Committee on Finance - Supplementary Estimate, 13 November 1946, Vol. 103, 
Cols. 792-797.
U n i v e r s i t y  C o l l e g e  D u b l i n ,  M ain L i b r a r y
U.S. Senate document The S t r u g g l e  o f  t h e  I r i s h  P e o p l e is held in the 
library's United States collection (No. 8 SD 67-1 vol. 9-4).
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P u b l i c  R e c o r d  O f f i c e  o f  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d ,  B e l f a s t
CAB 9CD/207 BBC MR, contains summary of German and other broadcasts 
referring to Ireland in the 1941-44 period. The files were originally 
passed from London to the Northern Ireland Cabinet.
Germany
B e r l i n  D ocum en t C e n t e r ,  U. S .  E m b a ssy ,  B e r l i n
T 240 Rudolf Thurneysen 
1153327 M 32 Ludwig Mühlhausen 
1433301 M 812 Adolf Mahr 
1784939 Wolfgang Dignowity 
111-2232/43 Susan Hilton 
3452960 Helmut Clissmann 
4830138 Hilde Spickernagel 
ST 377 Francis Stuart 
7112352 Otto Reinhard 
546679 Heinz Mecking 
7161 John Freeman 
5622 98 6 Henry Freeman 
I 28044 Nora O'Mara
A u s w ä r t i g e s  A m t, P o l i t i s c h e s  A r c h i v ,  Bonn ( P o l i t i c a l  a r c h i v e  o f  German 
F o r e i g n  O f f i c e )
R 2 718 8 Fremdsprachiger Nachrichtendienst des Deutschen Rundfunks (Foreign 
language news service of German Radio), 1 December 1939.
R 67477 Adolf Mahr, containing details of Mahr's career at wartime Foreign 
Office from 1940 to 1944.
R 67483 Rundfunkpropaganda nach Irland (Radio propaganda to Ireland) report
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by Adolf Mahr for Foreign Office dated 18 March 1941.
R 57482 Sitzung beim Herrn RAM über die Propaganda nach den unter dem Joche 
Grossbritanniens stehenden Ländern (Meeting convened by Foreign Minister 
concerning propaganda to countries standing under the yoke of Great 
Britain), 22 May 1941, Berlin.
B u n d e s a r c h i v ,  P o tsd a m  ( f o r m e r  E a s t  Geiman/DDR n a t i o n a l  a r c h i v e )
VA 62407, document no. 168, Englischsprachise Sendungen nach Irland 
(English-speaking programmes to Ireland), memo by Adolf Mahr for German 
Foreign Office, dated 9 September 1941.
Belgium
I n s t i t u t  G é o g r a p h iq u e  N a t i o n a l , B r u s s e l s
91 (417)-3 document 25 P9/3 Militârgeographische Angaben über Irland 
(Military Geographical Data on Ireland). 5-volume document prepared and 
printed in occupied Brussels 1940-41, published Berlin 15 October 1941 by 
German Army's department of war maps and surveys.
Britain
L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r ' s  D e p a r tm e n t ,  London
CRIM 1/1745 Rex V Hilton. This file, which has not yet been released to the 
Public Record Office, contains details of the case brought against Dorothea 
Susan Hilton (née Sweney) for 'assisting the enemy' by making propaganda 
broadcasts. It also contains details of statements taken from Hilton by MI5
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at Liebenau Camp in Germany on 30 May, 30 June, 1 July and 3 July 1945.
CRIM 1/1783 Rex v James Gilbert. This file contains an unsigned and undated 
statement by Gilbert to British military authorities c.1945, detailing his 
Gestapo interrogation and subsequent imprisonment in Grossbeeren workcamp 
for refusing to work for the radio propaganda service. It also details a 
meeting in Berlin with Adolf Mahr after Gilbert's release.
I m p e r i a l  War Museum, D u x fo r d ,  O x f o r d s h i r e
E88 BBC original monitoring reports 'Germany in Irish Gaelic', 22 September 
1940 to 6 July 1943.
C88, C89 and C90 Eire in English 1939-1959.
P u b l i c  R e c o r d  O f f i c e ,  Kew
HO 45/25839 William Joseph Murphy in 'Renegade' files.
FO 371 46702 Political Intelligence Department [British Military 
Intelligence/MI5] report on 'Control of propaganda in Germany', 19 December 
1945 .
BT 27/1553, passenger list of SS Kemmendine, 27/28 May 1940 (including Mrs
S. Hilton).
P u b l i c  R e c o r d  O f f i c e ,  C h a n c e r y  L a n e ,  L ondon  ( C r im in a l  R e c o r d s  D i v i s i o n )
CRIM 4/173 0 indictment papers concerning trial of Dorothea Hilton at Old 
Bailey, 18 February 1946.
N a t i o n a l  S o u n d  A r c h i v e ,  London
4151 2152/1-15 DS 396 Catalogue of German Radio recordings, 1929-1936 
(including details of programme changes following Nazi takeover on 3 0
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January 1933) .
BBC Sound Archive Catalogue, January 1943 to December 1945.
BBC W r i t t e n  A r c h i v e s  C e n t r e , R e a d in g-, B e r k s h i r e
Left staff records for Angus Matheson 1940-42, and
Maurice Irvine 1943-44
D e p a r tm e n t  o f  T r a n s p o r t ' s  G e n e r a l  R e g i s t e r  a n d  R e c o r d  O f f i c e  o f  S h i p p i n g  
and  Seam en , C a r d i f f
File 147892, lists of crew and passengers of vessels Kemmendine and 
Tirranna (including Mrs Susan Hilton).
United States
N a t i o n a l  A r c h i v e s  a nd  R e c o r d s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  W a s h in g to n  D. C.
Register no. CL-1566-BG: secret dispatches from U.S. Embassy, Dublin, to 
Office of War Information, Washington, 1943-1945.
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service logs (contain 35,000 international 
shortwave broadcasts to North America which were monitored from 1941-45). 
The FBIS also holds a collection of captured German sound recordings.
P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  A r c h i v e s , New J e r s e y
The university's Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library contains details on the 
Princeton Listening Center which pioneered American monitoring of foreign 
broadcasts from 1939 to 1941. The monitoring work was taken over by the 
Federal Communications Commission in October 1941.
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Mr Charles Acton, Dublin, 2 July 1992.*
Miss Mona Brase, Dublin, 8 October 1991, 4 March 1995.*
Mr Ned Butler, Dublin, 23 August 1990.
Professor F.J. Byrne, University College, Dublin, 3 0 December 1991.*
Mr Hugh Byrne, Teelin, Co Donegal, 15 January 1992 
Miss Mary Charleton, Belfast, 1 February 1993.*
Mr Helmut Clissmann, Dublin, 11 September 1990.
Mrs Elizabeth Clissmann, Dublin, 11 September 1990 and 19 October 1990. 
Professor Tomás de Bháldraithe, Dublin, 15 November 1990 and 1 April 1993. 
Mr M. Dewinter, Brussels, 22 November 1991.
Mr Noel Dorr, Secretary, Dept, of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 13 June 1991.
Lt. Col. John P. Duggan (retd.), Dublin, 8 June 1991.
Miss Ina Foley, Dublin, 19 June 1992.*
Mrs Margaret Greiner, Dublin, 25 May 1993 and 26 June 1993.
Miss Agnes Hannigan, Dublin, 29 April 1993.
Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 9 July 1990*, 21 October 1990*, 28 December
1990, and 12 May 1991.*
Mr Michael Healy, Dublin, 15 October 1991.*
Mr Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 31 January 1992.
Seán Mac Reamoinn, Dublin, 8 August 1991.*
Joan Medcalf (née Budina), Dublin, 15 December 1992.*
Eimear 0 Broin, Dublin, 10 June 1992 and 15 June 1992.
Bláth 0 Brolcháin, Dublin, 10 October 1991.
Tomás 0 Cathásaigh, Dept, of Early Irish, UCD, 11 December 1991.
Seán 0 Heochaidh, Gortahork, Co Donegal, 14 January 1992.
Liam 0 Muirthile, Dublin, 9 October 1991.
Seán 0 Súilleabháin, Dublin, 24 April 1991.
Dr Joseph Raftery, Dublin, 20 May 1991.
Ingrid Reusswig (née Mahr), Dublin, 28 July 1994.
William Ryan, Dublin, 26 February 1991.*
Miss Margaret Schaffhauser, Liphook, Hampshire, 9 November 1992.*
Günther Schütz, Shankill, Co Dublin, 6 September 1990.
Mrs Jean Sheridan-Healy, Cork, 4 January 1992*, and 2 March 1992.*
Mrs Edward Slowey, Dublin, 15 November 1990.
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Enno Stephan, Cologne, 28 December 1990.
Francis Stuart, Dublin, 17 November 1989, 24 February 1990, 10 February 
1992 and 19 June 1992.
Edward Sweney, Oldcastle, Co Meath, 9 June 1991*, 14 September 1992, 18 
November 1992 and 28 August 1993.
Dr Pat Wallace, Director, National Museum, Dublin, 5 December 1990. 
Eileen Walsh, Dublin, 10 July 1992.
Bob Wylie, Strasbourg, 10 September 1991.
Commandant Peter Young, Dublin, 29 January 1991 and 9 December 1991.
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Letters elicited by the author from
Charles Acton, Dublin, 27 August 1992.
Professor Bo Almqvist, UCD, Dublin, 24 May 1991.
Professor James J. Barnes, Wabash College, Indiana, 5 August 1991.
Dr Rolf Baumgarten, Dept, of Celtic Studies, Dublin Institute for Advanced 
Studies, 8 July 1991.
Dr Wolf Bierbach, Studienkreis Rundfunk und Geschichte, Cologne, 22 October
1990 .
Mrs Carolle J. Carter, Menlo College, California, 13 January 1991.
John Cassidy, Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London, 13 January 1994. 
Mrs Iris Cawley (née Marsden), Hindhead, Surrey, 12 November 1994 and 22 
November 19 94.
Mary Charleton, Belfast, 27 July 1991.
Terence C. Charman, Imperial War Museum, London, 13 September 1990, 19 
October 1990, 3 December 1990, 8 August 1991, 4 October 1991 and 5 May 
1992 .
Miss J. Coburn, Greater London Record Office and History Library, 2 7 June
1991 and 24 July 1991.
Tom Collins, Athlone, 30 July 1990.
Sean Cronin, Washington D.C., 26 November 1990.
Mrs Siobhân de hOir, Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, Dublin, 10 
September 1991.
Dr Ansgar Diller, Frankfurt, 23 August 1990 and 16 May 1993.
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton M.P., House of Commons, London, 30 December 
1994 .
Colonel J.M. Doyle (retd.), Dublin, 14 July 1994.
Lt. Col. John P. Duggan (retd.), Dublin, 17 August 1992.
Friedrich Engel, BASF, Mannheim, 8 February 1991.
Martin Esslin, London, 15 December 1993.
Tony Fahy, RTE, 12 March 1992.
George Fleischmann, Ontario, Canada, 6 May 1991.
M. Flynn, City Librarian, Limerick, 12 June 1991.
Dr Ann Gallagher, TCD, Dublin, 26 April 1994.
Ms Tracy Gallagher, British Embassy, Dublin, 12 August 1991.
The Duke of Hamilton, East Lothian, Scotland, 24 December 1994 and 28
435
January 1995.
Miss Agnes Hannigan, Paris, 8 March 1993.
J. Harrison, Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London, 14 August 1991.
Dr Hans Hartmann, Cologne, 28 June 1992, 12 July 1993 and 16 August 1993. 
Billy Hawkes, Dept, of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 18 June 1991 and 18 October 
1993 .
Dr Louis D. Healy, Mandurah, Australia, 14 January 1992.
Dorn Placid Hooper OSB, Buckfast Abbey, England, 16 March 1993.
Fr Ignatius C.P., Broadway, Worcestershire, 28 January 1993 and 18 April 
1993 .
Maurice Irvine, Brighton, 29 April 1991, 31 July 1991, 10 January 1992, 3 
November 1992 and 28 December 1993.
Kate Johnson, Imperial War Museum, London, 18 November 1992.
Frau Jung, Deutsche Dienstelle, Berlin, 29 April 1993.
Jacqueline Kavanagh, BBC, Reading, 20 June 1990, 13 July 1990, 24 August
1990, 26 July 1991, 4 September 1991 and 24 December 1991.
Dr Maria Keipert, Foreign Office, Bonn, 9 July 1990 and 2 May 1991.
Douglas King, Berlin, 1 March 1991.
Heike Klauss, Foreign Office, Bonn, 7 August 1991 and 17 June 1993.
Pierre Kowanko, Paris, 8 May 1994.
Dr David Lammey, Public Record Office, Belfast, 14 February 1990.
Anke Leenings, DRA, Frankfurt am Main, 4 March 1991.
Professor Gearoid MacEoin, Dept, of Old and Middle Irish, UCG, 5 March
1991.
Tony McKenna, Bord na Mona, Newbridge, Co Kildare, 5 June 1991.
Dr Alf Mac Lochlainn, Galway, 11 June 1991.
Dr Seamus MacMathuna, UCG, Galway, 23 September 1991.
John Magennis, N.I. Dept, of Education, Bangor, 22 October 1991.
Gustav Mahr, Berlin, 28 November 1990.
Gerard Mansell, London, 13 November 198 9.
Dr David G. Marwell, Berlin Document Center, 17 September 1991, 24 May 1993 
and 3 0 July 1993.
Dr Ian Maxwell, Public Record Office, Belfast, 24 June 1994.
Hans Heinz Mecking, Friesoythe, Germany, 22 July 1991.
Joan Newman, Fort William, Scotland, 2 July 1992.
Miss Isold Ni Dheirg, Dublin, 10 February 1994.
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Eimear 0 Broin, Dublin, 2 July 1992.
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Dr Oldenhage, Bunesarchiv, Potsdam, 26 April 1991.
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Michael Ryan, Director, Chester Beatty Library and Gallery of Oriental Art, 
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Miss Margaret Schaffhauser, Liphook, Hampshire, 26 November 1992 and 29 
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Mrs E. Smith, Lord Chancellor's Department, London, 27 August 1991.
Dr Hilde Spickernagel, Hanover, 11 November 1991, 9 February 1992, 10 
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Mrs V.A. Swyers, Lord Chancellor's Department, London, 24 September 1991, 
25 October 1991 and 1 December 1991.
Professor Derick Thomson, University of Glasgow, 27 November 1990 and 16 
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Ms Rionach ui Ogain, Dept, of Irish Folklore, UCD, 26 November 1992.
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Dr Pat Wallace, Dublin, 30 May 1990.
John Walsh, Dublin, 25 January 1992.
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